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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the applicability of aspects of Schön’s (1983) 
theories of reflection-in-action in relation to visual art practice. Schön’s (1983) 
theories demonstrate that whilst they are written with design disciplines in mind, 
they do not extend to consider the appropriateness of its use in visual art practice. 
Scrivener (2000: 10) draws the distinction that whilst Schön’s (1983) use of scientific 
language in reflection-in-action is considered applicable for problem-solving projects 
in design, aspects of it are problematic for creative production research projects and 
recommends focusing reflection on the underlying experience of creative 
production. This thesis proposes that this and other issues, such as the emphasis on 
problem solving, and particularly, a reliance on a conversational metaphor, is 
likewise problematic for visual art practice. This thesis therefore moves to examine 
what is distinct about the application of reflective methods in visual art practice, in 
relation to design and research in the arts, through a series of text-based and 
documentary case studies. Analysis of the case studies suggest that there is an 
emphasis on embodiment essential to visual art processes, which is experiential in 
nature rather than problem-solving. A thorough examination of recent theories of 
embodied mind, which provide empirical evidence from a broad range of knowledge 
fields for the pervasive role of embodiment in shaping human experience, is 
presented. The primary research method is a review of two existing sets of theories 
and a synthesis of aspects of them in an original context, a process offered as an 
original contribution to knowledge. The context in question is the assessment of the 
applicability of the resulting synthesis to visual art practice, a domain for which 
neither theory was written. Knowing-in-action (Schön, 1983) describes the tacit 
knowing implicit in skillful performance when practice is going well, reflection-in-
action (Schön, 1983) takes over, and describes the processes cycled through, only 
when problems are encountered in practice. Through an analysis of theories of 
embodied mind, and the documentary cases studies, the conclusion is drawn that in 
addition to these descriptions there is a rich layer of non-verbal embodied 
experience shaping action, conceptual meaning and verbal articulations of practice. 
This thesis therefore suggests modifications to theories of reflective practice in the 
visual arts, by incorporating theories of embodied mind in the development of 
additional reflective methods to supplement Schön’s theories (1983). Two methods 
are proposed as worthy of further study. The first researches Mark Johnson’s (1987) 
theory of metaphorical projection, which is presented as a means of mapping 
aspects of visual arts practitioners' verbal articulations of practice, back onto source 
domains in their embodied experiences of practice. The second explores a 
recommendation from within theories of embodied mind (Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch, 1993: 27) that mindfulness training could help develop a mindful, open-ended 
reflection. Taken together, this thesis proposes that an Embodied Reflective Practice 
could be developed to the benefit of visual art practitioners.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM ,  THE CONTEXT ,  THE 
METHOD ,  AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
1.1  The Problem 
 
Donald Schön’s theory of reflection-in-action, detailed in ‘The Reflective 
Practitioner’ (1983), is presented as a means both for describing how professionals 
think in action, and as a reflective method that brings beneficial structure and 
understanding to the development of professional practice. The influence of the 
American Pragmatist John Dewey, who in 1933 emphasized the need for structured 
reflection as the foundation for deep learning, is clearly evident in Schön’s 
epistemological interests. Schön’s (1987) ‘Educating the Reflective Practitioner’ 
further extended the implementation of reflection-in-action as an influential 
method of reflective practice in the domain of education. 
 
Since the early nineteen nineties in the UK, when art and design institutions became 
transformed by the Higher Education Funding Council into Universities, the 
competition for academic grants required applicants from art and design to give 
greater attention to the conventions of academic research (Scrivener, 2002: 2). As 
an established reflective method in education Schön’s (1983) theories of reflective 
practice are widely cited in art and design. Over the last twenty years Schön’s (1983) 
theories of reflective practice have been applied to a wider range of practices than 
originally designed, including visual art practice.  
 
Whilst Schön’s (1983) theories of reflective practice were written with design 
disciplines in mind, they do not explicitly consider the appropriateness of its use in 
visual art practice. Professor Stephen Scrivener, whose contribution to 
investigations into the applicability of Schön’s (1983) theories, in relation to 
technology, design and creative production research projects, has been significant, 
has outlined a number of distinctions that have helped to isolate the problem 
investigated in this thesis.  
 
The first distinction relates to creative production research projects and visual art 
practice, which must be clarified in relation to this thesis. Due to the additional 
requirements for academic rigour and the need to evidence reflective and critical 
inquiry, Scrivener (2000: 19) considers creative production research projects are 
distinct from everyday art making, referred to in this thesis as visual art practice. 
These distinctions are acknowledged, however, I propose that critical investigation 
into the applicability of aspects of Schön’s (1983) theory of reflective practice has 
implications for both creative production research and visual art practice.  
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Scrivener (2000: 10) writes that the use of scientific language, such as, theory of 
action, logic, experimentation, hypothesis and experimental rigour, in Schön’s (1983) 
theory of practice, whilst considered applicable for technology and problem solving 
research projects in design, is at odds with his sense of creative production. Whilst 
not having adequate alternatives to put in their place, Scrivener (2000: 10) 
considers the processes and characteristics of this language still possess the potential 
to capture much of what he observed, as an experienced supervisor and examiner, in 
his creative production research students. However, the suggestion that this central 
aspect of Schön’s (1983) theory of reflection-in-action involves a compromise when 
applied to creative production requires further investigation, both in the context of 
creative production research projects and visual art practice.  
 
Whilst Scrivener (2000: 18) considers that Schön’s (1983) theory of reflective 
practice provides ways of thinking about the nature of the creative-production 
process, he concludes that this in itself is insufficient. For Scrivener (2000: 18), the 
relationship between the issues, concerns and interests explored by his creative 
production research students, and the artefacts they produce, is inextricable tied to 
the act of making. Consequently Scrivener (2000: 18) considers that the only way to 
reveal the complex relationship between theory and practice in creative production 
is through description and reflection on the underlying creative-production process.  
 
This thesis takes the position that Scrivener’s (2000: 19) recommendation is well 
founded, and proposes that further examination of the underlying experience of 
practice can supplement aspects of Schön’s (1983) theory of reflective practice with 
methods more applicable to visual art practice.  
 
The ‘problem’ taken as the point of departure for this investigation therefore, is the 
perceived inapplicability of certain aspects of Schön’s (1983) model of reflective 
practice in relation to visual art practice. Whilst the use of scientific language has 
been raised as problematic, other issues concern the emphasis on problem solving in 
Schön’s (1983) work, in contrast to experiential processes in visual art practice. It is 
Schön’s (1983: 76, Bamberger & Schön, 1983: 68) reliance on a conversational 
metaphor however, which requires particular attention. 
 
In this thesis I propose that the key to addressing the three issues outlined above 
and investigating the underlying experience of visual art practice, is by taking 
account of recent theories explicating the role of the embodied mind. 
 
1.2  The Context: 
 
The investigations into reflective methods and practices in this thesis are firmly 
grounded in an epistemology of reflection. This establishes a context of reflection as 
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an inherent and distinctive cognitive function, which has been integral to the 
evolution of human consciousness (Donald, 2011). The second chapter therefore 
reviews the ways in which reflection has developed as a concept throughout history, 
how it has been employed in philosophy and how it came to be established as a 
reflective method aimed at improving professional practices. 
 
Specifically the context of this thesis surrounds Donald Schön’s (1983) theory of 
reflective practice and the influence it has had in art and design research and 
practice. The context expands to encompass the implications recent developments in 
theories of embodied mind could have for further understanding, and development 
of, reflective practices.  
 
In the third chapter the development of Schön’s epistemological interests are 
explored. This commences with Schön’s PhD thesis, which dealt with John Dewey’s 
theory of inquiry and educational philosophy. Attention is given to Schön’s 
innovative work on ‘Generative Metaphor’ (Schön, 1963), through to the 
development twenty years later of his theories of reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983). 
In the professions that embraced Schön’s theories, such as education, architecture, 
psychology and town planning, problem setting and –solving, the use of scientific 
experimentation and hypothesis testing, and the central role of the conversational 
metaphor was widely accepted and successfully implemented. The conversational 
metaphor is a useful simplification of a complex cognitive process. In professions 
where an emphasis on the underlying experience of practice is of little practical 
benefit it makes sense to frame the practice situation as a ‘reflective conversation’  
with the situation ‘talking back’ to the practitioner. Whilst Schön’s interest in the 
underlying cognitive functions of reflection are evident in his work on generative 
metaphor (Schön, 1978), it might be said that the method of reflection-in-action, for 
practical reasons, is not interested in how reflection occurs cognitively, but rather in 
what it says linguistically. Schön’s (1983) theories of reflective practice marginally 
predate developments in cognitive science that were so influential on theories of 
embodied mind. Two years after Schön published his work on generative metaphor 
(Schön, 1978) Mark Johnson and George Lakoff published their first collaborative 
work ‘Metaphors We Live By’ (Johnson & Lakoff, 1980). In a conversation with 
Mark Johnson he referred to Schön’s work on generative metaphor but confessed he 
was unfamiliar with Schön’s later theories on reflective practice (Gray, 2007). 
Despite following different lines of inquiry both Schön (1983) and Johnson et. al., 
(1980) share common interests set in the philosophical background of Dewey and 
American Pragmatism.  
 
‘The embodied nature of reflection-in-action’ therefore, alludes to the two dominant 
sets of theories I am reviewing and synthesizing in this thesis, namely theories of 
reflective practice, largely through the work of Schön (1983) and theories of 
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embodied mind including Johnson (1987). The following schematic, set out early in 
the development of this research in collaboration with my supervisory team, 
illustrates the selection bias on the range of knowledge fields considered relevant to 
this thesis. 
 
Figure 1: Early thesis schematic showing the interrelation of the knowledge fields 
forming the proposed selection bias for this research. 
 
The contextual development of reflective practice and the potential to supplement 
aspects of existing theories with methods of more applicability to visual art practice 
has required significant background reading. 
 
Following on from an examination of Schön’s theories (1983), Chapter 4 examines 
how they were applied, analysed and modified by Scrivener (2000) in relation to art 
and design research projects. As detailed in the ‘problem’ section, this has helped 
outline how issues with the applicability of Schön’s (1983) theories might be 
modified in relation to visual art practice. Scrivener’s (2000: 2-4) focus on the norms 
of production in art and design has also helped isolate distinctions between the way 
reflective methods are applied in technology and problem solving research projects 
in design on one hand, and creative production research projects on the other. This 
distinction forms the basis of the first two cases studies. As will be addressed more 
thoroughly in the methodology section, these case studies are text-based and 
reference peer reviewed academic research projects. Despite examining what is 
distinct about the reflective methods employed in examples from design and visual 
art, given the way in which the reflective methods in each have been constructed to 
embody academic rigour the term Constructed Reflective Methods (CRM) has been 
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applied to these case studies. This helps to help distinguish the first two case studies 
from case studies 3&4, which are framed under the term Naturalistic Reflective 
Methods (NRM). The context of NRM focuses upon the second distinction Scrivener 
(2000) draws between creative production research projects and everyday art and 
design making, as stated in the ‘problem’ section, this is referred to as visual art 
practice. In visual art practice when the need to construct and apply reflective 
methods is not a necessity, reflection still occurs, however it appear unremarkable 
to, and unmarked by the practitioner (Scrivener, 2000: 12). As Scrivener (2000: 12) 
suggests, however, practitioners may benefit if reflection was recorded and then 
reported more systematically. Placing the emphasis on the underlying experience of 
practice (Scrivener, 2000: 18-19) would be a significant development in making that 
possible. The issue of how to report on and document visual art practice has been 
hotly debated in recent years (Fortnum, & Smith, 2007). An important contextual 
issue concerns how the qualitative, tacit, embodied experience of making can be 
attended to, and what meaning can be extracted from it. 
 
All thought in every subject begins with just such an unanalysed whole. When 
the subject matter is reasonably familiar, relevant distinctions speedily offer 
themselves, and sheer qualitativeness may not remain long enough to be 
readily recalled (Dewey 1934/1987: 249). 
 
Johnson (2007: 75) considers that experiences come whole, pervaded by unifying 
qualities that demarcate them within the flux of our lives.  
 
If we want to find meaning, or the basis of meaning, we must therefore start 
with the qualitative unity that Dewey describes. The demarcating pervasive 
quality is, at first, unanalysed, but it is the basis for subsequent analysis, 
thought, and development. Thought starts from this experienced whole, and 
only then does it introduce distinctions that carry it forward as inquiry. 
(Johnson, 2007: 75) 
 
Dewey’s notion that qualitative unity may not remain long enough to be recalled 
essentially describes the problem of reflective practice in visual art. The issue is the 
need to recall rather than be mindful and aware of qualitative experience as it is 
being experienced.  
 
In summary, the aim of the reviewing of the selected literature is as follows: 
 
• To review and establish an epistemology of reflection that contextualises 
how both the term and the practice is understood and employed by the 
range of theories selected for this thesis, the selection bias for which will be 
discussed in the methodology. Particular emphasis is placed on how 
reflection will be understood in relation to the model of reflective practice 
presented in the conclusion [Chapter 2] 
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• To review Schön’s (1983) theory of reflection-in-action and examine the 
limits of it in relation to creative practice. [Chapter 3] 
• To review Scrivener’s (2000) examination of the applicability of Schön’s 
(1983) model of reflective practice in relation to design and creative 
production. This chapter introduces the first two case studies and introduces 
the concept of ‘Constructed Reflection’, which refers to reflective methods 
that have been designed to be academically rigorous. [Chapter 4] This also 
applies to the case studies examining Naturalistic Reflection [Chapter 5] 
• To review recent theories attending to the embodied mind. This section of 
the literature review is necessarily dense as theories of the embodied mind 
are being developed across the following knowledge fields: neuroscience, 
artificial intelligence, linguistics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy. The 
selection bias here has purposely prioritised certain knowledge fields over 
others for their relevance to the domain of art and design. Varela (1992) in 
‘The Embodied Mind’, examines the role of reflection in the analysis of 
experience and considers that in the interaction between cognitive science, 
phenomenological reflection, and mindfulness/awareness meditation, 
embodiment refers to a view of reflection which is not on experience but is 
experience. [Chapter 6] 
• To review the theories and methods emerging out of Mindful-Based 
Approaches (MBA). Psychological studies examining the psychometric 
properties of the dispositional Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS), 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) are reviewed. The techniques involved in 
developing mindfulness are explored, which introduces qualitative data from 
interviews with instructor/practitioners. [Chapter 7] 
• To examine the implications theories of embodied mind, Mindfulness-Based 
Approaches and phenomenological reflection have for building upon and 
extending Schön’s model of reflective practice. [Chapter 7] 
 
1.3  The Method: 
 
The methodology and the methods in this thesis have employed two interdependent 
strategies. The choice to use two methods was taken due to the investigative nature 
of reviewing and synthesizing existing theories and the phenomenological nature of 
the documentary case studies.  
 
The first method, which takes the form reviewing and synthesizes existing 
knowledge, is extensive due of the range of knowledge fields involved in both 
theories of Reflective Practice and theories of Embodied Mind. A form of Narrative 
review has been chosen over a Systematic review, on the grounds that the texts 
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have been chosen by author selection. The selection bias for the texts used in this 
thesis stems directly from the hypothesis that specific theories of Embodied Mind 
can help advance a specific method of reflection in relation to the domain of visual 
art practice. The selection bias has been chosen to represent peer-reviewed studies 
of high methodological quality. Where possible the author has collected primary 
sources in the form of direct interviews with the theorists whose work is being 
reviewed and synthesized. The choice to carry out these interviews developed from 
the investigative nature of reviewing theories where the theme of reflection in 
visual art practice was not explored directly in the theorist’s published work.  
 
The research philosophy in this thesis follows a Phenomenological rather than a 
Positivistic approach. The Phenomenological perspective allows for the collection of 
holistic, qualitative, units of analysis under naturalistic conditions (Frey, Botan, 
Friedman, & Kreps, 1991). Subjectivity in the participants frames of reference, which 
is clearly evidenced through the case studies and interviews needed to be 
accommodated.  
 
The research method developed and employed in this thesis uses an ethnographic 
approach toward the collection of holistic, qualitative data for analysis. The 
naturalistic conditions characteristic of a Phenomenological perspective, (Frey, 
Botan, Friedman, & Kreps, 1991) corresponds in this context, to the participants of 
the case studies working in their studio environments.  
 
The following schematic illustrates the early development of the research method. 
Figure 2: Development of the research method  
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The second method involved the collection and analysis of qualitative data from 
interviews and documentary sources. The following schematics illustrate the early 
development of this research method. Figure 3, shows the triangulation between 
Self Reflective Methods (SRM), Naturalistic Reflective Methods (NRM) and 
Constructed Reflective Methods (CRM). 
 
Figure 3: Triangulation of proposed stage 1 case study/studio documentary structure  
  
Figure 4: Development of second round of interviews to review stage 1 
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Based on SRM and the schematics outlined above the interviews and case studies are 
divided into the following three categories: 
 
1. Constructed Reflective Methods (CRM): Case studies exploring the reflective 
methods employed by creative practitioners operating within an academic 
context.  
 
The concept of ‘Constructed Reflection’ is introduced in this section. The purpose 
of conducting and including these case studies was to explore the distinctions 
first implied by Scrivener (2000) between the ‘problem solving’ nature of 
reflective methods in design, and the need to develop reflective methods in 
relation to creative production that focus on the underlying experience of 
practice. These case studies have been drawn from existing textual sources and 
are included in Chapter 3. These include: 
 
1.1. Owain Pedgley: ‘Capturing and analysing own design activity’, was the title 
of Pedgley’s doctoral thesis in 1999, in which he explores the use of diary 
entries to document and reflect upon his design processes.  
 
1.2. Beth Harland: Zone 15, 2006, was Harland’s contribution to the VIRP (Visual 
Intelligences Research Project), which features the development of a range 
of reflective methods. Particular emphasis is placed on the participant Beth 
Harland. This case study makes use of interview transcriptions conducted as 
a part of the VIRP, not by the author, in which Harland answers questions 
specifically relating to her reflective methods. 
 
2. Naturalistic Reflective Methods (NRM): The documentary research method was 
initially developed through SRM. The results of these early stages of filming, 
reviewing, and reviewing the reviewing process can be referenced in ‘file 6 
Studio Documentary 1 - development of research method.mov’ on the external 
hard drive accompanying this thesis. Interviews with visual arts practitioners 
operating independently from academic institutions. The purpose for conducting 
these case studies and interviews was to analyse the qualitative data to look for 
examples of embodied experience, phenomenological reflection, and mindfulness 
in practitioners who operated independently from an academic context. This 
introduces the concept of ‘Naturalistic Reflection’. The development and 
introduction of the concepts of Naturalistic and Constructed reflection, which 
examines what is distinct about reflective practices developed for the purpose of 
academic research or those which develop naturally and largely unconsciously by 
independent practitioners, and differentiates between them, may be considered 
a secondary claim to an original contribution to knowledge in this thesis. 
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2.1. Case study and Interviews with Andreas Reichlin. This case study involves 
three separate documentary sections.  
 
2.1.1 An interview recorded outside of his studio/gallery in 
2009 using video documentary techniques. It addresses 
his reflections-on-practice.  
 
2.1.2 The artist was filmed working in his studio in 2009 using 
non-invasive video documentary techniques, multiple 
cameras over several hours were used.  
 
2.1.3 An interview recorded at the artist’s studio using video 
documentary techniques recording the artist from two 
angles as he watched himself at work. This interview 
focuses on the artist’s reflections –in and –on –action 
and -practice 
  
2.2 Case study and Interview with Laurence Karasek. This case study involves 
filming the artist in his studio in Switzerland during the initial development 
of a new painting. The documentary footage was then edited and the artist 
was interviewed using video documentary techniques whilst he watched 
himself at work. The interview has been transcribed and analysed. The 
analysis of the interview involves Narrative Research and focused on his 
references to embodied experience and phenomenological reflection. It 
deals with both the artist’s reflections-in and –on –action. 
 
2.3 Interview with Patrick Sims: This interview was recorded in the artist’s 
studio in Barcelona in 2007 immediately prior to the opening of his show 
the ‘Armature of the Absolute’ at the L’Antic theatre. Consequently when 
the interview took place all of the studio practice had been completed. As a 
result the interview took the form of a reflection on the making of the 
show. It is a semi-guided interview involving non-structured questions that 
respond to the interviewee and deal with development of his conceptual 
ideas. As an interview rather than an exemplar of the research employed in 
the previous two case studies, the transcript is presented in the Appendix. 
 
3. Interviews with academic theorists and professional practitioners operating 
outside of the field of art and design (with the exception of Professor Rodrigeuz, 
who is a visual artist), whose work is significant in relation to this thesis.  
 
The purpose of conducting and including these interviews was to address their 
theories/practice in relation to reflective methods in visual art practice, a thenot 
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explored directly in their publications. Some aspects of the interviews feature 
directly in the main body of the thesis, the full transcriptions of the interviews 
can be located in the Appendix. These include: 
 
3.1. Interview with Prof Mark Johnson addressing his theories of metaphorical 
projection in relation to visual art practice, conducted with Professor Mark 
Johnson, at the Experiential Knowledge Conference, University of 
Hertfordshire, England – 29th June 2007. It is included in this chapter on the 
methodological grounds that 1, it is presented as a primary source of 
qualitative research and 2, Johnson’s theories of CMT had not dealt overtly 
with the consequences of the theory within visual art practice, a theme this 
interview attempts to address. This is included in Chapter 6. 
 
3.2. Interview with Prof Anthony Grayling addressing the contextual role of 
theories of embodied mind in relation to humanism. Extracts from this 
interview feature in Chapter 6 
 
3.3. Interview with Dr Linda Lehrhaupt, Managing Director of the IMA (Institute 
for Mindfulness-Based Approaches) addressing the distinctions between 
concentration and mindfulness in visual art practice. Extracts from this 
interview are included in Chapter 7 
 
3.4. Interview with Prof Michael Rodriguez currently Chair of the Humanities 
Department addressing mindfulness in visual art practice. This interview can 
be read in the Appendix. 
 
The Conclusions: 
 
Chapter 8 offers a thorough reflection on the development of the research, my 
development as a researcher and the main conclusions drawn from this research. 
The following is a brief overview of the main conclusions, which will be of most 
contextual value at the end of this thesis.  
 
In this thesis I argue for the potential to advance aspects of Schön’s theory of 
reflection-in-action (1983), in relation to visual art practice, by incorporating recent 
theories of embodied mind. The process of bringing these peer reviewed theories of 
high methodological value, together in an original context is offered as an original 
contribution to knowledge. 
 
I make explicit in this thesis, that the potential to advance aspects of Schön’s (1983) 
notions of reflection-in-action and knowing-in-action is presented as supplementary 
to the main work in ‘The Reflective Practitioner’. The specific ways in which aspects 
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of Schön’s (1983) theories can be supplemented are detailed in the main conclusions 
in section 8.8. It involves however the development of an Embodied Reflective 
Practice that can be used in practice in addition to the rigorous application of 
reflection-in- and -on -action and -practice. This thesis therefore supports Scrivener’s 
(2000: 18) recommendation that Schön’s (1983) theory of reflection-in-action can 
provide structure and rigour to reflective methods employed by doctoral students, 
who are engaged in creative production research projects, with the recommendation 
that the further development an Embodied Reflective Practice could be beneficial in 
the domain of visual art practice. 
 
This thesis concludes that for reflections-on-action and –practice, Schön’s (1983) 
model is presented as beneficial for framing and reframing practice situations, 
reflecting on habits of practice, past experience, conceptual agendas, and the 
background theories shaping practice. Reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983) is 
presented as being capable of describing the cyclic process of framing and reframing 
situations when obstacles to practice are encountered. However, this process has 
been written specifically for projects of a problem solving nature. Schön’s (1983) use 
of scientific language to describe the process of reflection-in-action in terms of 
problems and solutions is shown to be problematic when applied to experiential 
processes in visual art practice. Knowing-in-action (Schön, 1983) is likewise 
presented as capable of describing the tacit knowledge a practitioner employs and 
displays when practice is going well in some circumstances. In this thesis however, I 
argue that Schön’s (1983) notion of ‘knowing-in-action’ and consequently the 
capacity to report on ‘surfaced tacit knowledge’ (Scrivener, 2000: 13), can be 
enriched by theories of embodied mind.  
 
Schön’s (1983) conversational metaphor, which frames reflection-in-action, is 
presented as a useful simplification of a complex cognitive process, which can be a 
relevant metaphor for the visual arts practitioner at certain points of the creative 
process, however, I argue that it cannot be considered relevant in every visual art 
practice situation. The conversational metaphor (Schön, 1983) presented under the 
headings ‘design as a reflective conversation with a situation’ (Schön, 1983: 76-104) 
and ‘learning as a reflective conversation with materials’ (Bamberger and Schön, 
1983: 68-73), is aimed at practices where the embodied aspects of practice are not of 
central importance. Based on the qualitative data collected through the case studies, 
the conclusion is drawn that by taking into account embodied aspects of practice the 
need to reduce aspects of the process of creative making to a conversational 
metaphor is removed, and richer accounts of embodied practice can be generated. In 
conclusion, in visual art practice where embodied aspects of practice such as the 
qualitative engagement with the materials and the generation of non-verbal, pre-
linguistic meaning, are of critical importance the simplification to a conversational 
metaphor is unnecessary and inappropriate.  
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I propose that the development of an adequate alternative to Schön’s (1983) 
conversational metaphor can be achieved through the process Scrivener (2000: 18-
19) recommends, of focusing attention on the underlying experience of practice. I 
offer examples of how this can be aided by taking into account recent theories of 
embodied mind. Particularly I argue that connections between the physical act of 
visual art practice, and the conceptual ideas that grow out of reflections-in and –on 
–action and –practice can be examined using metaphorical projection (Johnson, 
1987). In the main conclusion section 8.8, schematics are presented that explore this 
process. This is the key point at which the theories reviewed in this thesis, Schön’s 
(1983) theories of reflective practice and theories of embodied mind (Johnson, 1987) 
become synthesized.  
 
In the conclusion I reflect upon how as a researcher I saw potential in the theories of 
embodied mind to focus on pre-linguistic meaning in relation to visual art practice. I 
consider whether visual arts practitioners, engaged in the midst of action with visual 
and mental images, qualities of tools, materials and relations, patterns of action and 
the felt experience of making, could be considered to be developing meaning on a 
pre-linguistic level. I take this forward to consider how the experience of making 
might shape and structure the way in which the practice situation is understood and 
reflected upon.  
 
In considering ways in which embodied aspects of practice can be attended to in 
practice, this thesis moves to speculate on whether mindfulness/awareness training 
can be considered beneficial in modifying reflective methods. This thesis has 
consequently presented clinically proven cases (Chapter 7) where mindfulness 
training has been beneficial across a wide range of professions in developing the 
inherent human capacity to be attendant to moment-by-moment perceptions and 
perform reflectively.  
 
The following schematic therefore illustrates the main synthesis of Schön’s reflective 
methods and theories of Embodied Mind vertically. It also illustrates horizontally 
the practices of mindfulness and phenomenological reflection, proposed as being a 
methodologically compatible means of bringing theories of embodied mind to bear 
upon theories of reflective practice:  
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Figure 5: Proposed synthesis between the main contextual domains explored in this 
research 
 
 
Figure 6: Schematic illustrating the core role of Embodied Reflective Practice  
 
This figure presents a working schematic as an initial attempt to illustrate the core 
role of Embodied Reflective Practice in relation to reflection-in-action and –practice, 
reflections-on-action and –
practice. This thesis presents 
research, which leads toward 
the development of an 
Embodied Reflective 
Practice, through an 
investigation of the 
embodied nature of 
reflection-in-action. 
 
 
  
Metaphorical  
Projection: 
Mapping concrete 
qualities of matter 
metaphorically onto 
abstract conceptual ideas 
Mindfulness/ 
Awareness:  
Being mindful of 
moment-by-moment 
perception/ Awareness of 
unconstructive habitual 
action 
 Theories of 
Embodied Mind: 
Cognitive Science/ 
Linguistics/ /Cognitive  
Psychology/Philosophy 
Reflective 
Methods: 
 
Reflections-in and –
on –action and –
practice  
 
Embodied Reflective 
Practice: 
Embodied 
Reflective 
Practice 
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CHAPTER 2.  THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF REFLECTION 
 
Detractors of Schön’s notion of “reflection in action” often point out that 
there is seldom time for reflection when a person is engaged in work. Such 
comments indicate an overly narrow conception of what reflection is. […] 
Though there is a diversity of forms of reflection in practice, it is argued that 
Schön’s notion of “conversation” or “dialogue” can be developed so as to 
exhibit a structural similarity to various reflective practices. Reflection in 
action emerges, then, as a form of knowledge in action, as fallible as any 
other form of empirical knowledge. (Molander, 2008: 4) 
 
Given the extent to which the word ‘reflection’ will be referenced in the following 
chapters, it is clearly essential to eliminate any ambiguity with regard to how it is to 
be employed in this thesis, and, in relation to reflection-in-action, understood. As 
Brengt Molander (2008: 4) points out, it is important to avoid using an overly 
narrow view of reflection. However, it is likewise important to avoid employing the 
term too liberally. Throughout history many specific accounts can be viewed and for 
the purpose of this thesis it is necessary to be clear to which is referred in what 
context. As Jennifer Moon (1999: 20) points out, most recent writers on reflection 
have begun their articles by referring to one or two of the following four writers; 
John Dewey, Jürgen Habermas, Donald Schön and David Kolb. I agree with Moon 
(1999: 20) when she writes that the choice as to which of these theorists will be 
focused on is dependant largely on the angle the writer is taking. I shall outline 
which of these writers I shall be focusing on and why in section 2.3. The first task in 
this chapter however, is to identify a need for an epistemology of reflection by 
considering the range of reflective theories and methods, on a continuum of human 
developments. I therefore chose during the early stage of this research, to explore 
the etymology and epistemology of reflection, into order to arrive at a concise and 
appropriate use of both the term and the practice of reflection in relation to this 
thesis.  
 
2.1  Identifying a Need for an Epistemology of Reflection 
 
Developments in reflective practice over the last 50 years ought not be viewed in 
isolation. The work of Dewey (1933), Habermas (1971), Schön (1983), Kolb (1984) 
and Moon (1999) must be seen on a continuum of developments in human 
cognition and human culture that preceded them. The institutional drive to nurture 
the development of reflective practitioners across a range of disciplines in recent 
years, including visual art practice, is likewise one advance in reflective methods 
amongst many advances throughout human history. In this respect the theories of 
reflection which emerged in the Twentieth Century, can be seen as a critical 
investigation into making explicit, something human beings have been engaged in, 
even unconsciously, for millennia.  
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The result of generations of human development is evidenced in the sophistication 
of present day practices, technologies, tool design and use, which are generally 
superior to those existing in the past. Practices have been evolving gradually 
generation through generation, through practitioners carefully considering their 
actions, and improving them. Can one assume that the cognitive functions 
responsible for what we now call reflection were as integral to their development as 
it is to ours? 
 
What is the relationship of reflection to the continual development of human 
practices? Reflection is considered a cognitive process that brings about a deeper 
understanding of experience. Twentieth century writers on reflection, (Dewey, 1933, 
Habermas 1971, Schön 1983, Kolb, 1984 and Moon, 1999) are united in their 
consideration that the purpose of reflection is to aid learning. Dewey (1933: 78) is 
quoted as saying ‘we do not learn from experience, we learn from reflecting on 
experience’, however more recently it has been suggested by Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch (1993: 27), that reflection is not on experience, but is experience. There has 
been a large emphasis on Kolb’s (1984) development of ‘The Learning Cycle’, which 
he based on the work of Dewey (1933), Lewin (1947) and Piaget (1970), to 
demonstrate how experience is subjected to reflection. James Zull (2002: 19) has 
examined evidence that the learning cycle arises naturally from the structure of the 
brain, which suggests it is an inherent human capacity. The human brain has not 
significantly changed in an evolutionary sense for at least the last 25,000 years, but 
whilst the cognitive capacity to engage in a learning cycle is inherent, the 
development of practice is progressive. Establishing what evidence exists for the 
progressive nature of reflective learning cycles through human development is of 
course beyond the scope of this research, however it is considered useful in the 
context of this chapter to briefly review evidence of the development of practices in 
pre-history, as it is exclusively found in art. 
 
The palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould reminds us, ‘the Cro-Magnon people are us—
by both bodily anatomy and parietal art’, (Gould, 1999: 9). Of course, one can only 
speculate as to whether the Cro-Magnon cave painter was ever ‘reflective’ about his 
or her ‘practice’. However, that it seems reasonable, in itself, to suggest that the last 
deer he or she ever drew possessed more ‘artistry’ than his or her first ever attempt, 
is quite telling. Abbé Breuil in his book ‘Four Hundred Centuries of Cave Art’ (1952) 
examines how the art of painting developed through the Magdalenian era. This 
progression was extremely gradual, to the point that one could attribute this 
progression to each individual cave painter’s development. Between their first cave 
painting and their last, we can imagine that the drawings gradually became more 
competently composed, more efficient in the use of tools and media, and more 
stylised in the form of representing animal states. By contrast it seems 
counterintuitive to suggest the cave painters drawings, and tool use gradually 
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worsened over time, indeed such a notion would be ‘un-human-like’. The 
development of such a successful species as ours requires that we improve our 
ability to perform across all the tasks in which we engage.  
 
Art is universal to all societies and unique to humans. Inevitably, when a 
phenomenon is both universal and species-unique, the question of its 
evolutionary origins arises. Within the reach of evolutionary theory, human 
evolution is special, and unusually complex, because it entails the co-evolution 
of biological and cultural forces. Art is central to that process, and one of the 
most interesting phenomena of human culture. The cognitive domains of 
human cultural and cognitive evolution have emerged in three cascading 
stages, which I have labelled, successively, as Mimetic (~2 million years ago), 
Mythic (~150 thousand years ago), and Theoretic (last 2 thousand years, 
approximately) (Donald, 1991, 1993, 1998, 2001). These dates are only rough 
approximations; it is the sequence, rather than the specific dates, that is 
important. The progression is cumulative and conservative, with each 
preceding stage remaining in place, and continuing to serve its specialized 
cognitive function. Humanity has an investment in all these cognitive 
domains, and its many forms reflect the very rich cognitive accumulations of 
human culture. Indeed, in many instances art has been a major factor in 
evolving these domains, and constitutes our primary evidence in determining 
the nature of prehistoric culture. (Donald, 2001: 8) 
 
Viewing the development of art in an evolutionary context Merlin Donald (2001) 
describes how the ‘new’ is always built upon the ‘old’ and therefore art ought to be 
considered a reflection of the ancient form of human expression, mimesis. Further 
more the diversity of art reflects the evolution of modern cognition and culture, 
which he illustrates in the following table by mapping artistic forms onto the 
emergence of culture and cognition.  
 
Figure 7: Mapping artistic forms onto the emergence of culture and cognition 
(Donald, 2001: 9) 
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The recent evidence to suggest that human beings learn through doing is compelling 
(Dewey, 1933, Habermas 1971, Schön 1983, Kolb, 1984 and Moon, 1999), is it such a 
grand claim therefore, to suggest that we always have, and likely always will? If 
true, then the human tendency to be reflective must be regarded as an embodied 
human capacity as intricately linked to the self-aware consciousness as the mind is 
to the body. This thesis shall later turn to the recent developments in cognitive 
science, which may help unpick the cognitive functions of reflection-in and –on –
action and –practice and understand the nature of embodiment. 
 
What is it to be ‘reflective’, and at what point in history did it enter into language as 
the notion of ‘bending back’. How did the physical qualities of reflective surfaces 
become associated with the self-aware contemplative act of re-‘cognising’, and 
trying to understand that which has been ‘cognised’? Certainly there is a wealth of 
written evidence that some human beings thought about what they had done after 
doing it, and there are museums full of physical evidence that practitioners 
advanced the technical proficiency of their practices over time. Humanity seems to 
have done, and continues to do, a lot of ‘reflecting’. Let us first look at the 
etymology of reflection and the history of its usage. 
 
2.2  The Historical Development of the Term Reflection 
 
The etymology of reflection  
 
Entry found in the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
• re.flec.tion n [ME, alter. of reflexion, fr. LL reflexion-, reflexio act of bending 
back, fr. L reflectere] (14c) 1: an instance of reflecting; esp: the return of light 
or sound waves from a surface 2: the production of an image by or as if by a 
mirror 3 a: the action of bending or folding back b: a reflected part: fold 4: 
something produced by reflecting: as a: an image given back by a reflecting 
surface b: an effect produced by an influence <the high crime rate is a ~ of 
our violent society> 5: an often obscure or indirect criticism: reproach <a ~ on 
his character> 6: a thought, idea, or opinion formed or a remark made as a 
result of meditation 7: consideration of some subject matter, idea, or purpose 
8 obs: turning back: return 9 a: a transformation of a figure in which each 
point is replaced by a point symmetric with respect to a line or plane b: a 
transformation that involves reflection in more than one axis of a rectangular 
coordinate system -- re.flec.tion.al adj  
At what point did the physical action of ‘bending back’ become associated both 
with physical mirrored surfaces and human thought? Whilst the Latin root is 
clearly evident in the use of ‘re’ meaning back and ‘flectere’ meaning to bend, there 
are numerous earlier references, which allude to the physical presence of mirrors 
bending light back to the viewer, and furthermore of being associated with self-
aware contemplation, even if this was bound up in a sense of divinity. 
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  In ancient Egyptian the long name for mirror is ankh-en-maa-her, which is 
considered to translate as “life-force for seeing the face,” this was later shortened 
to “see-face.” The goddess Hathor, holding ankhs resembling mirrors have been 
discovered on coffin lids. These Egyptian mirrors were given religious titles like 
“the divine”, “that which is in eternity,” and “the truth”, (Pendergrast, 2003: 18). 
The Egyptians had no word for, ‘art’, nor ‘artist’, rather, the name for the Egyptian 
sculptor translated as ‘he who keeps alive’. The power of an image to embody some 
aspect of a living presence, be it as fleeting and transient as a reflection in a 
polished surface, or endowed with such longevity as a sculpture, was deeply rooted 
in Egyptian culture. The power of image to embody some aspect of a living 
presence, be it as fleeting and transient as a reflection in a polished surface, or 
endowed with such longevity as a sculpture, was deeply rooted in Egyptian 
culture. I will happily endure the dense crowds of people in the Louvre for a brief 
audience with ‘The Seated Scribe’ Egypt, 2620-2500 BC. His eyes are made of red-
veined white magnesite into which is placed circular polished rock crystal with 
beaten copper behind to reflect the light in the room back out to the viewer. The 
effect is mesmerizing. Reflective surfaces clearly held more than mere functional 
meaning in the wider context of Egyptian culture. 
Pendergrast (2003) through his journalistic research, in which he popularised a brief 
history of the mirror, provides a number of historical references in which the 
physical qualities of polished surfaces were associated with aspects of self-awareness 
and contemplation. The Etruscan word for the soul, ‘hinthial’, is purported to mean 
“image reflected in a mirror.” The Jewish mystic Solomon Ibn Gabirol spoke of “the 
souls, close packed, / Peering in mirrors, [who] hope these may reflect / God’s image 
glimpsed”. Muhyi ’d-Din ibn ’Arabi, a Mohammedan, wrote of man’s resemblance to 
God, and vice-versa: “God is the mirror in which thou seest thyself, and thou art His 
mirror in which He contemplates His names” (Pendergrast, 2003: 23-46). These 
associations were echoed when the Christian mystic Meister Eckhart, who was burnt 
for heresy in 1329, wrote: “The soul contemplates itself in the mirror of Divinity. God 
Himself is the mirror, soul is able to transcend all words, the more it approaches the 
mirror.” The following passage, taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, expands 
upon this significant usage of the term reflection through the work of the 13th 
Century Beguine Marguerite Porete.  
Without denying the importance of the basic structures of the Christian 
religion, and while insisting that his radical preaching to the laity was 
capable of an orthodox interpretation, Eckhart and the new mystics of the 
13th century were a real challenge to traditional Western ideas of 
mysticism. Their teaching seemed to imply an auto-theism in which the 
soul became identical with God, and many feared that this might lead to a 
disregard of the structures and sacraments of the church as the means to 
salvation and even to an antinomianism that would view the mystic as 
exempt from the moral law. The Council of Vienne condemned such errors 
in 1311, shortly after one of the most remarkable Beguines Marguerite 
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Porete, was burned as a heretic in Paris in 1310 for continuing to 
disseminate her mystical book Miroir des simples âmes (c. 1300; The Mirror 
of Simple Souls) which is thought to be the greatest religious tract written 
in Old French. The council associated these views with the Beguines, so-
called "holy women" (Latin: mulieres sanctae, or mulieres religiosae) who 
first appeared in Liège toward the end of the 12th century. Use of the word 
"Beguine" (Latin: beguina) was established by the 1230s. Its etymology is 
uncertain; it seems to have originated as a pejorative term. By the mid-13th 
century the movement had spread throughout the Low Countries, 
Germany, and northern France. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2001) 
It is clear that the ‘mirror of simple souls’ was far from the first reference to the 
physical qualities of a mirror being mapped onto the cognitive capacity to be self 
aware in contemplation. It is an interesting question to consider however, whether 
this association was arrived at independently in the 13th Century or whether it was 
developed from a long line of references and uses in oral language passing from one 
human culture to another. Whilst it is not my purpose to provide evidence as to 
whether this was or was not the case, what does seem common is the human 
capacity for both mapping concrete qualities onto abstract domains, and 
understanding the mappings which one comes into contact with in language. Here 
the concrete physical qualities of the mirror have been clearly mapped onto the 
abstract domain of contemplation of the self and/or the self through a ‘sense of 
otherness’. It is amongst the most profound examples of the human capacity to 
generate abstract concepts from concrete experience. As will be seen in later 
chapters this will be shown to be a common occurrence in visual art practice. It is 
significant however, that these early references to reflection precede by some 600 
years the use of reflection as a term in philosophy, denoting contemplation. 
 
2.3  Philosophical Interest in Reflection -  from Decartes to Dewey 
 
In the 17th century the Jesuit philosopher Emmannuele Tesauro compared the 
human intellect to a perfect mirror, claiming that it was an appropriate metaphor 
because ‘it is a more curious and agreeable thing to look at several objects in 
perspective than to see the originals pass before the eye’ (Pendergrast, 2003: 23-46). 
Descartes’ systematic doubt, however, where everything other than the ‘reflective 
knowledge’ that Descartes’ directly ‘thinks’ can be doubted, might be considered the 
first real instance where philosophy embraced the term (Molander, 2008: 5). 
Reflection became a common expression in the English language to refer to ‘the 
mode, operation, or faculty by which the mind has knowledge of itself and its 
operations, or by which it deals with ideas received from sensation and perception’ 
(Oxford English Dictionary – OED online), after being employed as a term by the 
philosopher John Locke. Locke was the first to use the term “reflection” as a key 
term in his philosophical discussions. For Locke, sensation and reflection are the two 
sources of all our ideas (Pendergrast, 2003, Molander 2008). 
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By Reflection then…I would be understood to mean, that notice which the 
Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them. (Locke, 1690) 
 
In terms of sensation, which for Locke is the other source of our ideas in addition to 
reflection, there is a broad spectrum of theory regarding its interpretation and 
significance. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962: 3) states in his chapter titled ‘The 
sensation as a unit of experience’:  
 
I might be said to have sense-experience (sentir) precisely to the extent that I 
coincide with the sensed, […] Pure sensation will be the experience of an 
undifferentiated, instantaneous, dot-like impact. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 3) 
 
The view of sensation Merleau-Ponty presents suggests a holistic view of human 
beings, as immersed in their environment, in a way that is distinct from the 
approach of objective science. 
 
The traditional notion of sensation was not a concept born of reflection, but a 
late product of thought directed towards objects, the last element in the 
representation of the world, the furthest removed from its original source, and 
therefore the most unclear. Inevitably science, in its general efforts towards 
objectification, evolved a picture of the human organism as a physical system 
undergoing stimuli which were themselves identified by their physicochemical 
properties, and tried to reconstitute actual perception on this basis, and to 
close the circle of scientific knowledge itself, by establishing an objective 
science of subjectivity. (Merleau-Ponty,  1962: 10).   
 
Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of an objective science of subjectivity are extensive and 
are concisely expressed as follows: 
 
The core of philosophy is no longer an autonomous transcendental 
subjectivity, to be found everywhere and nowhere: it lies in the perpetual 
beginning of reflection, at the point where an individual life begins to reflect 
on itself. Reflection is truly reflection only if it is not carried outside itself, only 
if it knows itself as reflection-on-an-unreflective-experience, and consequently 
as a change in structure of our existence. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 62) 
 
The significance of Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) view of phenomenological reflection can 
now be reviewed in light of recent theories of Embodied Mind. Antonio Damasio 
(1999) in his book ‘The Feeling of what Happens’ explains how he began seeing 
consciousness in terms of the organism and the object, and their relationships.  
 
All of a sudden, consciousness consisted of constructing knowledge about two 
facts: that the organism is involved in relating to some object, and that the 
object in the relation is causing a change in the organism. (Damasio, 1999: 133) 
 
Mark Johnson (1990), describes these changes to the structure of experience as a 
continuous, analogue pattern of experience with sufficient internal structure to 
permit inferences in the following two ways.  
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[…] our conceptual system ‘plugged into’ our most relevant experiences very 
accurately at two levels. (a) The basic level, at which we distinguish elephants 
from giraffes and tigers and at which we distinguish walking from running, 
and standing from sitting […]. (b) The image-schematic level, which gives 
general form to our understanding in terms of structures such as CONTAINER, 
PATH, CYCLE, LINK, BALANCE, etc. This is the level that defines from itself, 
and allows us to make sense of the relations among diverse experiences. 
(Johnson 1990: 208). 
 
In the ‘The Phenomenology of Perception’ (1962) Merleau-Ponty, who was 
committed to exploring the relationship between science and experience, experience 
and the world, describes a fundamental circularity between them and also alludes to 
the continuity between them. 
 
When I begin to reflect, my reflection bears upon an unreflective experience, 
moreover my reflection cannot be unaware of itself as an event and so it 
appears to itself in the light of a truly creative act, of a changed structure of 
consciousness, and yet it has to recognize, as having priority over its own 
operations, the world which is given to the subject because the subject is 
given to himself.... Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an 
act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the background from which all 
acts stand out, and is presupposed by them: The world is not an object such 
that I have in my possession the law of its making; it is the natural setting of, 
and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions. (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962: x) 
 
However, recent theorists suggest that phenomenological reflection is not an 
effective means of analysing experience in isolation. It needs cognitive science.  
 
Phenomenological reflection, though valuable in revealing the structure of 
experience, must be supplemented by empirical research into the cognitive 
unconsciousness. (Johnson, Lakoff, 1999: 4) 
 
Conversely, cognitive science is beginning to recognise the need for 
phenomenological reflection. The metaphor of strands of a rope bound together for 
strength seems applicable here. 
 
A phenomenologically inclined cognitive scientist reflecting on the origins of 
cognition might reason thus: Minds awaken in a world. We did not design 
our world. We simply found ourselves with it; we awoke both to ourselves 
and to the world we inhabit. We come to reflect on that world as we grow 
and live. We reflect on a world that is not made, but found, and yet it is also 
our structure that enables us to reflect upon this world. Thus in reflection we 
find ourselves in a circle: we are in a world that seems to be there before 
reflection begins, but that world is not separate from us. For the French 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the recognition of this circle opened up 
a space between self and world, between the inner and the outer. This space 
was not a gulf or divide; it embraced the distinction between self and world, 
and yet provided the continuity between them. Its openness revealed a 
middle way, an entre-deux. (Varela, et. al., 1993: 3) 
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Husserl (1931) considered Phenomenology to be the study of essences, in which the 
analysis of the ‘life-world’ was not anthropological or historical but philosophical. 
The failure of the Husserlian phenomenology is considered to have stemmed from 
taking an entirely theoretical approach to the analysis of experience, which lacked 
any pragmatic dimension (Varela, et. al., 1993: 19). Furthermore this criticism is 
considered to hold for both Heidegger’s existential phenomenology and Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of lived experience. Despite the criticism, the 
phenomenological tradition is supported by contemporary philosophers, such as 
Johnson and Lakoff (1999), who also acknowledge American Pragmatism. 
  
John Dewey, no less than Merleau-Ponty, saw that our bodily experience is the 
primal basis for everything we can mean, think, know, and communicate. He 
understood the full richness, complexity, and philosophical importance of 
bodily experience. For their day, Dewey and Merleau-Ponty were models of 
what we will refer to as "empirically responsible philosophers." They drew 
upon the best available empirical psychology, physiology, and neuroscience to 
shape their philosophical thinking. (Johnson, Lakoff, 1999: ix) 
 
The American Pragmatist John Dewey has had significant bearing on both the 
theories of the reflective practice and theories of the embodied mind to which this 
thesis attends. As stated earlier, the work of Dewey (1933), Habermas (1971), Schön 
(1983), Kolb (1984) and Moon (1999) have all advanced theories of reflective 
practice, and within any research a particular selection bias will be chosen. This 
thesis focuses specifically on the writings of Dewey (1933), rather than Habermas, 
and Schön (1983) rather than Kolb (1984) for the following reasons. Dewey (1933) 
and Habermas (1971) approach reflection in very different ways and for different 
purposes, although there are crossovers such as the notion that reflection serves to 
generate knowledge (Moon, 1999: 20). Dewey's (1933) specific purpose was to 
elucidate educational processes and arrive at a more general understanding of 
human function. Habermas (1971) on the other hand employed reflection to develop 
epistemological issues in the sociology of knowledge and draws attention to the 
nature of the different processes underlying the generation of forms of knowledge, 
in which reflection is just one of these processes (Habermas, 1971, Moon, 1999: 20). 
Dewey’s (1933) writings seem more appropriate for use in this thesis based on his 
focus on the nature of reflection and how it occurs through the manipulation and 
reprocessing of knowledge. Dewey (1933) also has been central to the development 
of both Schön’s (1983) theories and the work of Mark Johnson (1987, 1999, 2007). 
Kolb’s (1984) learning cycle has been criticized for not paying sufficient attention to 
reflection, and indeed the stages of his learning cycle that deal with reflective 
practice are very similar to Schön’s reflection-in and –on-action. Schön’s (1983) 
theories are taken therefore as primary sources in this thesis. Schön’s ‘design as a 
reflective conversation with a situation’ (1983) and ‘learning as a reflective 
conversation with a material’ (Bamberger & Schön, 1983), also broached examples in 
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the domain of art and design, which are central to this thesis. The following sections 
therefore move to examine firstly Dewey and then continues through to a thorough 
examination of Schön’s (1983) theories of reflective practice. 
 
Here Dewey suggests that the general features of reflective experiences are: 
 
(i) perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that one is implicated in an 
incomplete situation whose full character is not yet determined; (ii) a 
conjectural anticipation—a tentative interpretation of the given elements, 
attributing to them a tendency to effect certain consequences; (iii) a careful 
study (examination, inspection, exploration, analysis) of all attainable 
considerations which will define and clarify the problem in hand; (iv) a 
consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to make it more precise 
and more consistent, because squaring with a wider range of facts; (v) taking 
one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan of action which is applied 
to the existing state of affairs: doing something overtly to bring about the 
anticipated result, and thereby testing the hypothesis. It is the extent and 
accuracy of steps three and four, which mark off a distinctive reflective 
experience from one on the trial and error plane. (Dewey, 1981: 504-505) 
 
Dewey’s five-point analysis of reflective experience may be considered a much 
broader account of reflection than generally prevails over its usage in language, 
where reflection is often referred to solely as a form of post-event contemplation. 
Given the influence this expanded view of reflection had on Donald Schön’s theories 
of reflective practice, a closer look at what Dewey proposed in each of these 
definitions will be useful.  
 
1. “perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that one is implicated in an 
incomplete situation whose full character is not yet determined”:  
Immediately Dewey shifts the focus of reflection from the past to also 
encompass the present and the future. Reflection becomes a sense of 
anticipation and uncertainty about an incomplete situation, which implies 
action in a continuum. The notion of an incomplete situation is something I 
propose visual arts practitioners can relate to. As a painter I find Dewey’s 
account very apt for describing many of the experiences I encounter whilst 
practicing. Very rarely is a creative process realised from concept to product 
without being at some point unresolved. The exceptions might be found in 
growing number of practitioners who work closely together with crafts 
practitioners who create the physical presence of the work on the artist’s 
behalf. However, here the part of the creative process Dewey describes is 
only shifted from one practitioner to another. This felt perplexity, is the 
means through which a sense of rightness, or lack thereof, is recognised. It is 
a testament to the nonverbal character of these moments in practice where 
the meaning traffics as images, qualities, patterns, and feelings (Johnson, 
2007: 9). 
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2. “a conjectural anticipation—a tentative interpretation of the given elements, 
attributing to them a tendency to effect certain consequences”: 
Each ‘given element’ in a practice situation has a character. This character, 
when analysed can be found to possess an internal structure of many parts. 
Material, temporal, and spatial qualities, amongst many others, may 
compose the ‘given element’. These factors provide the parameters 
governing the situation. Johnson and Lakoff (1980, 1999) have worked 
extensively in this area and their work shall be expanded upon later in this 
thesis. However, in order to address what Dewey meant by ‘a conjectural 
anticipation’, this notion of an internal structure must be clarified. Let us 
begin with a truism, which is evidenced in human language, ‘concrete 
physical qualities are mapped onto abstract domains’. The concept of 
balance, for example, has many abstract meanings and applications. One 
might present a ‘balanced argument’, or attempt to ‘find a balance between 
work and leisure time’, or ‘be a well balanced person’. These are all extremely 
abstract concepts existing only within a human context (in many languages). 
What is of interest here is where these notions originate. Abstract concepts 
of balance, are thought to have been metaphorically projected (Johnson, 
1980, 1987, 2007) from the concrete physical nature of balance as a sense 
experience or ‘sentir’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2008: 3). A human being experiences 
balance in the following three meaningful ways 1, the result of the symmetry 
of the body and its interaction with gravity and movement, 2, internal 
pressures caused by having too much or too little gas or liquid in the body, 3, 
chemical homeostasis, the result of having too much or too little of a 
chemical in the body. In each of these cases the sentir is embodied, and can 
be experienced consciously on a daily basis. One only needs to think of being 
hungry, being parched, regaining a vertical position after tripping on the 
curb. The human capacity to abstract from concrete embodied experience is 
among the richest examples of human creativity. In ‘metaphors we live by’ 
(Johnson & Lakoff, 1980, 2003) we are treated to a wealth of examples of 
how the embodied experience of concrete phenomenon is metaphorically 
projected to formulate and enable conceptual understanding. Let us take an 
example, which Johnson elaborated upon when I interviewed him in 2007. 
Mark Johnson: “By the way there’s a metaphor of standing, which is going to 
be operative here. The metaphor is ‘EXISTING IS STANDING’, or continuing 
to stand. And so when something is knocked over, it falls, so we talk about 
regime change, it was toppled, it fell. And so the notion of standing up right 
is metaphorically a kind of, continuing in existence. Anyway that’s one of the 
metaphors that would be relevant to our experience of those works” (Gray, 
2007). The extensive examples Johnson and Lakoff present are key to 
unlocking what Dewey alluded to in the above statement. The ‘tentative 
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interpretation’ of the range of ‘given elements’ experienced in practice are 
likely emerging into conscious language from the physical qualities and 
parameters governing the situation. Attributing to them a ‘tendency to 
effect certain consequences’, could then be considered a natural consequence 
of the human capacity to abstract from the concrete. Whilst materiality is 
essentially consistent, the way in which it is interpreted, albeit tentatively, 
by the practitioner is indexical and reflexive (Deleuze, 1992). 
 
3. A careful study (examination, inspection, exploration, analysis) of all 
attainable considerations which will define and clarify the problem in hand: 
The tradition of examining, inspecting, exploring, and analysing is clearly 
established through the scientific method. The main issue here however, is 
whether the practitioner is aware of ‘all’ the attainable considerations. This is 
an important point, which is taken up in my analysis of the case studies. Due 
in part to a philosophical tradition born of mind/body dualism, and to the 
nature of ‘focal disappearance’ Leder (1990: 14), vital aspects of ‘all the 
considerations’ are missing. Where the operations of the body are privy to 
‘focal disappearance’, reflection is an attempt to bring experience into focus. 
The notion that we do not hear our ears or see our eyes serves to reduce 
awareness of the body we experience through. We do not perceive the 
organs we perceive through, yet practice requires a cyclic perceptual 
engagement. As meaning-making is increasingly being understood as 
emerging first pre-linguistically, before propositions and concepts are 
achieved, (Johnson, 2007) the meaning-making processes in visual art 
practice require an account of the very operations that are governed by focal 
disappearance. How is this issue to be addressed? One key proposition, made 
by this thesis, is to develop reflective methods in which experience can be 
mapped and analysed through the language that describes it. 
 
4. A consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to make it more precise 
and more consistent, because squaring with a wider range of facts:  
In a nutshell, this is how human beings develop their way of doing things on 
a moment by moment basis. I propose Dewey is not describing a rigorously 
articulated hypothesis in the scientific tradition, but moreover the many 
ways in which we frame our understanding of a range of minor operations. 
Prediction is the primary means through which future events are played out 
and analysed for risk and gain. Prediction requires a tentative hypothesis to 
frame the characteristics of any given agents in a situation. How many 
tentative hypotheses govern a practitioners understanding of materiality? 
On a micro level, it is a practitioner’s ability to continually develop their 
tentative hypotheses through the flux of experience, which allows for 
creative momentum, it is the skeletal structure of practice. The can be little 
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doubt that this process, the largely operates subconsciously, and from the 
data later explored in the form of case studies, it is an aspect of practice 
seldom considered, however its importance in practice is vital. 
 
5. Taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan of action, which is 
applied to the existing state of affairs. Doing something overtly to bring 
about the anticipated result, and thereby testing the hypothesis:  
As a practitioner often the best starting point is merely to start, to begin 
with a hypothesis and stand by it until it fails or develops. As Quince, the 
architectural tutor in Schön’s ‘Reflective Practitioner’ (1983) exemplar, tells 
his student, “You must start with a discipline”… 
 
Shifting focus from reflection as post event contemplation, to an on going 
interaction with the world, presents opportunities for a fuller understanding of 
reflective practice in visual art practice. Pursuing reflection in the Deweyian sense 
also requires that Schön’s (1983) reflective practitioner be analysed accordingly. As 
will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Schön was very familiar with Dewey’s 
work. 
 
It seems clear that Dewey considered the reflective experience to be synonymous 
with learning from experience.   
 
[…] to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to 
things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such 
conditions, doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out 
what it is like” (Dewey, 1981: 495-496).  
 
Molander (2008: 3) considers that Dewey’s broad application of reflection enables 
us ‘to keep inquiry moving’, a notion, which is central to Schön’s (1983) account of 
reflection-in-action. Dewey (1981: 500) also appears to frame reflection as 
synonymous with thinking.  
 
[Thinking] … is the intentional endeavour to discover specific connections 
between something we do and the consequences, which result so that the 
two become continuous. (Dewey, 1981: 500)  
 
The continuousness of the relationship between thinking and doing is pivotal to 
both Dewey’s and Schön’s notions of reflective practice. According to Dewey 
reflective experience requires: 
 
…a certain sympathetic identification of our own destiny, if only dramatic, 
with the outcome of the course of events. (Dewey, 1981: 501)  
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Molander (2008: 6) considers that Dewey ‘wants to pack too much into a “reflective 
experience”. Whilst admitting that “reflection” makes sense ‘only in the context of 
experience’.  
 
It is also important, I think, that in Dewey’s understanding “thinking” is not 
specifically “mental”. Thinking is one aspect of how we place ourselves in the 
world as agents and social human beings. (Molander, 2008: 6) 
 
The expanded view of both reflection and thinking, predates theories of the 
embodied mind, cognitive science and the growing body of empirical knowledge, 
which supports it. Dewey’s influence can be seen in both the work of Schön (1983) 
whose theories of reflective practice we will turn to in the next section, this is 
acutely seen in Dewey’s summary to ‘Experience and Thinking’, chapter 11 of his 1916 
book Democracy and Education. 
 
Summary. In determining the place of thinking in experience we first noted 
that experience involves a connection of doing or trying with something, 
which is undergone in consequence. A separation of the active doing phase 
from the passive undergoing phase destroys the vital meaning of an 
experience. Thinking is the accurate and deliberate instituting of connections 
between what is done and its consequences. It notes not only that they are 
connected, but the details of the connection. It makes connecting links explicit 
in the form of relationships. The stimulus to thinking is found when we wish 
to determine the significance of some act, performed or to be performed.  
Then we anticipate consequences. This implies that the situation as it stands is, 
either in fact or to us, incomplete and hence indeterminate. The projection of 
consequences means a proposed or tentative solution. To perfect this 
hypothesis, existing conditions have to be carefully scrutinized and the 
implications of the hypothesis developed -- an operation called reasoning. 
Then the suggested solution -- the idea or theory -- has to be tested by acting 
upon it.  If it brings about certain consequences, certain determinate changes, 
in the world, it is accepted as valid. Otherwise it is modified, and another trial 
made. Thinking includes all of these steps, -- the sense of a problem, the 
observation of conditions, the formation and rational elaboration of a 
suggested conclusion, and the active experimental testing. While all thinking 
results in knowledge, ultimately the value of knowledge is subordinate to its 
use in thinking. For we live not in a settled and finished world, but in one 
which is going on, and where our main task is prospective, and where 
retrospect -- and all knowledge as distinct from thought is retrospect -- is of 
value in the solidity, security, and fertility it affords our dealings with the 
future. (Dewey, 1916) 
 
In relation to visual art practice, it is this strong recognition that the world is not 
settled or finished but one with which we are in a constant exchange, which makes 
our actions and interactions prospective rather than retrospective. In the following 
section a view of reflection is put forward that suggests humans possess the capacity 
to be mindful of this prospective nature of experience, to experience what one’s 
mind is doing as it does it (Varela, et. al., 1993: 23). This is a somewhat radical view 
of reflection that in large part has been viewed as retrospective function. Making 
 
 
44 
brief reference to the following method will help to contrast against Schön’s (1983) 
methods of reflective practice, which have been influenced by Dewey (1916). 
 
2.4  The Role of Reflection in the Analysis of Experience – A 
Contemporary View of Reflection in Theories of the Embodied 
Mind 
 
The following extracts from Varela’s et. al., (1993) ‘The Embodied Mind’, will be 
expanded upon in chapter 7.  
 
We are still in need of a method, however. Where can we turn for a tradition 
that can provide an examination of human experience in both its reflective 
and its immediate, lived aspects? (Varela et. al., 1993: 21) 
 
Its purpose is to become mindful, to experience what one's mind is doing as it 
does it, to be present with one's mind. What relevance does this have for 
cognitive science? We believe that if cognitive science is to include human 
experience, it must have some method for exploring and knowing what 
human experience is. (Varela et. al., 1993: 23) 
 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1993: 27) have been instrumental in the development 
of theories of the embodied mind. Of particular interest to this thesis is their focus 
on development the embodied mind not merely as a theory but as a practice.  
 
If the results of mindfulness/awareness practice are to bring one closer to 
one's ordinary experience rather than further from it, what can be the role of 
reflection? […] This question brings us to the methodological heart of the 
interaction between mindfulness/awareness meditation, phenomenology, 
and cognitive science. What we are suggesting is a change in the nature of 
reflection from an abstract, disembodied activity to an embodied (mindful), 
open-ended reflection. By embodied, we mean reflection in which body and 
mind have been brought together. What this formulation intends to convey 
is that reflection is not just on experience, but reflection is a form of 
experience itself-and that reflective form of experience can be performed 
with mindfulness/ awareness. When reflection is done in that way, it can cut 
the chain of habitual thought patterns and preconceptions such that it can 
be an open-ended reflection, open to possibilities other than those contained 
in one's current representations of the life space. We call this form of 
reflection mindful, open-ended reflection. (Varela et. al.,1993: 27) 
 
2.5  Taking Reflection Forward 
 
In this chapter the need for an epistemology of reflection has been identified based 
on the benefits of clarifying which of the numerous accounts of reflection will be 
referred to in the context of this thesis. The exploration of the historical emergence 
of the term reflection in relation to mirrored surfaces illustrated an underlying 
structure of human meaning making, the capacity to develop abstract concepts from 
concrete experience, which will be taken up in chapter 6. The overview of how 
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reflection became associated with contemplation and entered into philosophical 
discourse has helped to define how reflection can be employed as an analysis of 
experience. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of phenomenological reflection. 
 
As stated, Dewey’s (1981) 5 point analysis detailed in section 2.3, has been selected as 
providing a broad yet specific and structured definition of reflection. These views of 
reflection are referred to in respect to the reviewing of Schön’s (1983) method of 
reflection-in-action.  
 
As the thesis moves forward to examine theories of embodied mind our view of 
reflection must move with it. For Varela, et. al., (1993: 27) the question as to what 
role reflection can have in bringing us closer to experience is seen as the 
methodological heart of the interaction between mindfulness, phenomenology and 
cognitive science. I propose that the implications of this view be investigated for 
their potential to be translated into a useful method, which could engender 
modifications to andragogy on a number of levels. 
  
 
 
46 
CHAPTER 3  -  THE INFLUENCE OF D .  A .  SCHÖN ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF REFLECTIVE PRACTICE 
 
3.1  The Development of Schön’s Epistemological Interests – The 
Cognitive Tools for Learning and the Role of Reflection 
 
D. A. Schön’s PhD thesis, delivered at Harvard in 1955, dealt with John Dewey’s 
‘theory of inquiry’’. Dewey, a prominent American Pragmatism along side Charles 
Sanders-Pearce and William James, was among the first to write about reflective 
practice. It is important to note that American Pragmatism influenced Schön’s 
(1983) later work and enabled him to move a theory of how professionals think in 
action beyond Simon’s (1969) theory of technical rationality. Schön (1983) felt that 
Simon’s (1969) theory of technical rationality ignored the importance of problem 
setting in the activity of problem solving, which consequently lead to a crisis of 
confidence in professional knowledge.  
 
His first book, ‘Displacement of Concepts’ (Schön, 1963) deals with categories. In this 
book he explores how categories are used to examine things, but are not examined 
as a way of thinking per se.  
 
The interest in metaphor expressed in that book, would grow years later 
toward his elaborations on “generative metaphor,” and its role in allowing us 
to see things anew. Thus, he was already showing some of what would be 
epistemological enduring interests for his inquiry, namely: learning and its 
cognitive tools, and the role of reflection (or lack of it) in learning processes in 
general, and conceptual and perceptual change in particular.  
(Pakman, 2000: 3) 
 
Srivastva and Barrett (1988), describe how a generative metaphor in Schön's terms, 
is characterized by the carrying over of frames or perspectives from one domain to 
another. It allows for frame re-structuring when frame conflict exists. The notion of 
a generative metaphor may be extended to include a proposed metaphor that 
frames socially constructed reality in a new, more complex way. Furthermore not all 
metaphors are generative, some merely capitalize upon existing ways of seeing 
things. What is specific about generative metaphor, however, is that new 
perceptions, explanations and inventions are generated. Importantly the sense of 
what is wrong in a problematic situation, and what needs fixing, is the hallmark of a 
generative metaphor. The key idea of ‘generative metaphor’ that was taken forward 
was the way that figurative descriptions of social situations, however implicitly, 
shape the way the problems themselves are approached and tackled.  
 
A generative metaphor "derives its normative force from certain purposes and 
values, certain normative images, which have long been powerful in our 
culture." For Schön, the notion of generative metaphor "then becomes an 
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interpretive tool for the critical analysis of social policy". He argues that, "it is 
not that we ought to think metaphorically about social problems, but that we 
do already think about them, in terms of certain pervasive, tacit generative 
metaphors; and that we ought to become critically aware of these generative 
metaphors, to increase the rigour and precision of our analysis of social policy 
problems by examining the analogies and "disanalogies" between the familiar 
descriptions... and the actual problematic situations that confront us."  
(Srivastva, Barrett, 1988) 
 
Schön’s theories on learning systems dealt with the idea that learning occurs at a 
supra-individual level. The notion that learning takes place on a level that transcends 
the individual speaks specifically of cultural/social influences.  
 
Schön’s next two books ‘Technology and Change, The new Heraclitus’ (1967) and 
‘Beyond the Stable State’ show the influence of the work of Raymond Hainer, 
(1968).  
 
Donald Schön had been able to work through his ideas with Hainer, and to 
draw upon, for example, his exploration of pragmatism, rationalism and 
existentialism. (Hainer, 1968)  
 
Appointed Ford Professor of Urban Studies and Education at MIT in 1972, Schön 
began collaborating with Chris Argyris. This collaboration resulted in three key 
publications:  
 
• Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness (1974) 
• Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (1978) 
• Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method, and Practice (1996)  
 
Throughout these works, his writing concerns professional learning, learning 
processes in organizations, and critical self-reflecting practice. Through this brief 
chronological portrait of Schön’s professional academic career, we can see how his 
thoughts developed and accumulated in the following highly influential books. 
 
• The Reflective Practitioner: How professionals think in action (1983) 
• Educating the Reflective Practitioner (1987)  
• The Reflective Turn: Case studies in and on educational practice (1991)  
 
In ‘The Reflective Practitioner’, the work of primary interest to this study, Schön 
(1983) sought to offer an epistemology of practice based on a close examination of 
what a small and selective range of what practitioners actually do. Schön, (1983) 
through his proposal of the reflective-practice concept, opposed design as rational 
problem solving defended by Simon in his Sciences of the Artificial (Simon, 1969). 
The disciplines he chose are significant and included: 
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• Architecture,  
• Psychoanalysis  
• Science-based professions - medicine, agronomy and engineering  
• Town planning 
• Management 
 
Interestingly for this study, visual art practice is not included as a discipline and aside 
from a very few brief references to be found in his introduction to the subject of 
reflection-in-action, which will be mentioned in the next section, the domain is 
absent from his academic writings. ‘The Reflective Practitioner’ became a highly 
influential book across a number of professional domains outside of the 
aforementioned list. Nursing, and particularly education, are perhaps the most 
notable examples. Indeed, the popularity of ‘The Reflective Practitioner’ (Schön, 
1983) in education prompted Schön to write, Educating the Reflective Practitioner 
(1987), and The Reflective Turn: Case studies in and on educational practice (1991).  
 
3.2   Generative Metaphor ,  Knowing- in-Action ,  Reflection- in-Action 
and the Schön’s Reliance on the ‘Conversational’  Metaphor 
 
Within the following extracts from The Reflective Practitioner, D. A. Schön 
introduces his theory of reflection-in-action. As I will be examining what is 
distinctive about reflection-in-action in the visual arts from this theory, it is 
necessary to list this introduction down in some detail, so as to facilitate access to 
what Schön (1983) considered reflection-in-action. 
 
 Reflection-in-action  
 
It is this entire process of reflection-in-action which is central to the “art” by 
which practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, 
instability, uniqueness, and value conflict. […] 
 
[…] When we go about the spontaneous, intuitive performance of the 
actions of everyday life, we show ourselves to be knowledgeable in a special 
way. Often we cannot say what it is that we know. When we try to describe 
it we find ourselves at a loss, or we produce descriptions, that are obviously 
inappropriate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of 
action and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right 
to say that our knowing is in our action. […] (Schön, 1983: 49) 
 
Here, in his introduction to ‘The Reflective Practitioner’, Schön (1983) alludes to a 
layer of non-linguistic meaning, which is notably absent from the remainder of his 
academic writing. Polyani’s (1967) ‘tacit knowing’ is also referenced here, and the 
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notion of ‘patterns of action’ and ‘feel for the stuff’, is later echoed in Johnson’s 
(1987) theories of the embodied mind. 
 
[…] Knowing-in-action. Once we put aside the model of Technical 
Rationality, which leads us to think of intelligent practice as an application of 
knowledge to instrumental decisions, there is nothing strange about the idea 
that a kind of knowing is inherent in intelligent action. 
Over the years, several writers on the epistemology of practice have been 
struck by the fact that skilful action often reveals a “knowing more than we 
can say.” […] 
 
[…] As early as 1938, in an essay called “Mind in Everyday Affairs,” Chester 
Barnard distinguished “thinking processes” from “non-logical processes” 
which are not capable of being expressed in words or as reasoning, and which 
are only made known by a judgement, decision, or action. Barnard’s 
examples include judgements of distance in golf or ball throwing, […] 
[…]Michael Polanyi, who invented the phrase “tacit knowing,” draws 
examples from the recognition of faces and the use of tools. […] 
[…] Chris Alexander, in his Notes Toward a Synthesis of Form, considers the 
knowing involved in design. He believes that we can often recognise and 
correct the “bad fit” of a form to its context, but that we usually cannot 
describe the rules by which we find the fit bad or recognise the corrected 
form to be good. […] 
[…] Ruminating on Alexander’s example, Geoffrey Vickers points out that it 
is not only artistic judgements which are based on a sense of form which 
cannot be articulated: 
 
artists, so far from being alone in this, exhibit most clearly an oddity 
which is present in all such judgements. We cannot recognise and 
describe deviations from the norm very much more clearly than we 
can recognise the norm itself. (Geoffrey Vickers, unpublished 
memorandum, MIT, 1978)  
 
 (Schön, 1983: 49-50) 
 
Interestingly, this brief reference to ‘artists’, which assumes artistic judgements are 
based on a ‘sense of form that cannot be articulated’, is the only reference to the 
discipline in ‘The Reflective Practitioner’ (Schön, 1983). Schön’s work focused rather 
on professions of industrial and educational significance. This however, did not 
prevent his work from being influential in the relatively new field of art-practice-
based research. 
  
The closest Schön (1983) gets to art and design is architecture and music (Bamberger 
& Schön, 1983). In a later section, ‘The Structure of Reflection-in-action’, Schön 
(1983) references a mentor relationship between an Architectural professor and a 
student, which he earlier elaborated upon under the title ‘Design as a reflective 
conversation with a situation’.  
  
Their hypothesis testing experiment is a game with the situation. They seek 
to make the situation conform to their hypothesis but remain open to the 
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possibility that it will not. Thus their hypothesis testing activity is neither 
self-fulfilling prophecy, which insures against the apprehension of 
disconfirming data, nor is it the neutral hypothesis testing method of 
controlled experiment, which calls for the experimenter to avoid influencing 
the object of study and to embrace disconfirming data. The practice situation 
is neither clay to be moulded at will nor an independent, self-sufficient object 
of study from which the inquirer keeps his distance. The inquirer’s relation to 
this situation is transactional. (Schön, 1983: 150) 
 
Schön adds in his notes, as clear evidence of his epistemological affiliations that: 
 
The idea of the relation of the knower to known as a “transaction” derives 
from the work of John Dewey. See A. F. Bentley and John Dewey, Knowing 
the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949). (Schön, 1983: 361) 
 
This notion of knowing-in-action requires an acknowledgement of embodied 
experience in a way that was removed from Technical Rationality (Simon, 1969). Its 
Philosophical roots where Pragmatist rather than Positivist, and talks about 
‘knowing’ over ‘knowledge’. This is significant in terms of this investigation for 
reasons I will expand upon in chapter 6, which introduces the work of Mark 
Johnson, whose work is also influenced by John Dewey.  
 
To put it briefly, for Dewey knowing is a matter of cultivating appropriate 
habits of intelligent inquiry that allow us to more or less satisfactorily 
reconfigure our experience in the face of problematic situations. The goal is 
not some illusory fixed and eternal knowledge. Instead, to call something 
knowledge is simply a way to valorize certain ways of knowing – ways of 
transforming experience – that tend to actually enrich our sense of the 
possibilities for action, that deepen and broaden our grasp of the meaning of a 
situation, and that help us lead more humane, constructive, and creative lives. 
So Dewey urges us to turn our focus away from the substantive term 
knowledge (as a noun) and to focus, instead, on knowing (as a verb). In this 
way we emphasize the character of the process of inquiry instead of some final 
product construed as a body of knowledge. (Johnson, 2010: 157) 
 
Schön’s (1983) criticisms of Technical Rationality frame an epistemology of 
reflection-in-action against the Positivist epistemology of practice.  
 
…we have also begun to describe an epistemology of reflection-in-action 
which accounts for the artistry in situations of uniqueness and uncertainty. 
On this view of professional knowing, technical problem solving occupies a 
limited place within the inquirer’s reflective conversation with his situation; 
the model of Technical Rationality appears as radically incomplete. (Schön, 
1983: 165) 
 
The Positivist epistemology of practice is propped up on three dichotomies that are 
challenged by Schön’s (1983) theory of reflection-in-action. In a Positivist sense 
practice: 
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• Separates ‘means’ from ‘ends’. Instrumental problem solving can be seen as a 
technical procedure to be measured by its effectiveness in achieving a pre-
established objective. 
• Separates ‘research’ from ‘practice’. Rigorous practice can be seen as an 
application to instrumental problems of research-based theories and 
techniques. The objectivity and generality of which derive from the method 
of the controlled experiment. 
• Separates ‘knowing’ from ‘doing’. Action is only an implementation and a test 
of technical decision. 
 
In Schön’s (1983) case studies he shows that: 
• ‘Means’ and ‘ends’ are framed interdependently through the practitioner’s 
‘problem setting’. 
• ‘Practice’ is a kind of ‘research’ in the reflective conversations of the 
practitioners. 
• ‘Knowing’ and ‘doing’ are inseparable as the practitioner’s inquiry is 
transactional with the situation. 
 
The values of control, distance and objectivity, central to the model of 
Technical Rationality, take on new meanings in the reflective conversation. 
Here the inquirer tries, within the limits of his virtual world, to control 
variables for the sake of hypothesis-testing experiment. But his hypothesis is 
about the potential for transformation, and in the testing he steps into the 
situation. (Schön, 1983: 166) 
 
Despite the widespread application across the disciplines mentioned here, I find it 
interesting that the following description is framed around aspects of performance. 
 
‘Reflecting-in-action: If common sense recognises knowing-in-action, it also 
recognises that we sometimes think about what we are doing. Phrases like 
'thinking on your feet', 'keeping your wits about you', and 'learning by doing' 
suggest not only that we can think about doing but that we can think about 
something while doing it. Some of the most interesting examples of this 
process occur in the midst of a performance. […] They (performing Jazz 
musicians) are reflecting-in-action on the music they are collectively making 
and on their individual contributions to it, thinking what they are doing and, 
in the process, evolving their way of doing it. Of course we need not suppose 
that they reflect-in-action in the medium of words. More likely, they reflect 
through a feel for the music […]  
[…] when intuitive performance leads to surprises, pleasing and promising or 
unwanted, we may respond by reflecting-in-action. Like the baseball pitcher, 
we may reflect on our “winning habits”; or like the jazz musician, on our 
sense of the music we have been making; or like the designer, on the misfit 
we have unintentionally created. In such processes, reflection tends to focus 
interactively on the outcomes of action, the action itself, and the intuitive 
knowing implicit in the action. (Schön, 1983: 49-56) 
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Before studying Philosophy at Harvard, Schön attended the Conservatoire Nationale 
de Music in Paris. It is worth noting that he was awarded the Premier Prix as a 
clarinettist. He later also became an accomplished pianist and played in both jazz 
and chamber groups.  
 
This interest in improvisation and structure was mirrored in his academic 
writing, most notably in his exploration of [sic] professional’s ability to ‘think 
on their feet’. (Smith, 2011) 
 
I find the notion that Schön’s experience of improvisational jazz was mirrored in his 
academic writing quite alluring, and will return to it later. For now however, it is 
interesting to note that in Schön’s premiere definition of reflection-in-action, in the 
creative discipline as an exemplary example. When he writes, ‘of course we need not 
suppose that they reflect-in-action in the medium of words. More likely, they reflect 
through a feel for the music’, we can assume that he his writing from direct 
experience. Reflecting through a feel for the music is a fascinating notion, and not 
unlike to my own experiences of reflecting through my feel for the material of paint, 
glass or stone. In his sequel ‘Educating the Reflective Practitioner’, Schön makes 
further brief reference to creative practice in the context of the curricular models in 
higher education.  
 
Beyond the confines of professional schools, there are other deviant 
traditions of education for practice. There are apprenticeships in industry and 
crafts. There is athletics coaching. And perhaps most important, there are the 
conservatories of music and dance and the studios of the visual and plastic 
arts. The artistry of painters, sculptors, musicians, dancers, and designers 
bears a strong family resemblance to the artistry of extraordinary lawyers, 
physicians, managers, and teachers. It is no accident that professionals often 
refer to “art” of teaching or management and use the term artist to refer to 
practitioners unusually adept at handling situations of uncertainty, 
uniqueness, and conflict.  
 
In education for the fine arts, we find people learning to design, perform, and 
produce by engaging in design, performance, and production. Everything is 
practicum. Professional knowledge, in the sense of the propositional 
contents of applied science and scholarship, occupies a marginal place – if it is 
present at all – at the edges of the curriculum. Emphasis is placed on learning 
by doing, which John Dewey described long ago as the “primary or initial 
subject matter”: “Recognition of the natural course of development … 
always sets out with situations which involve learning by doing. Arts and 
occupations form the initial stage of the curriculum, corresponding as they 
do to knowing how to go about the accomplishment of ends” (Dewey, 1974: 
364). (Schön, 1987: 17) 
 
Schön’s comments here need to be contextualised. As stated earlier we see the fine 
arts being used again as an exemplary example of unusual adeptness in the handling 
of uncertainty, uniqueness, and conflict. Yet whilst this model of practice is in 
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someway revered, the closest to visual art practice or the plastic arts presented in 
the case studies referred to in his writing is architectural design and music.   
 
This notion however, is of closest relevance to the operation of Reflection-in-action 
in the visual arts. Reflection-in-action in the visual arts, in this context, could be 
considered ‘the non-verbal feel for the materials employed in the performative 
operation of creative practice’. However, Schön’s (1983) exploration of the learning 
systems in the arts maintains a strong emphasis on the conversational metaphor. In 
‘Learning as Reflective Conversation with Materials: Notes from Work in Progress’ 
(Bamberger & Schön, 1983: 68) the authors make use of Schön’s earlier work on 
generative metaphor and theory of reflection-in-action (1983) to emphasize that 
changes in the use of the materials can change modes of description. This notion is 
explored through an experiment in which novice musicians are assigned the task of 
creating a tune. Bamberger & Schön, (1983: 68) highlight the significance of 
conversation as a way of analyzing the evolving course of the study's participants 
and as a way of managing an ambiance for research.  
 
We have chosen this protocol because it seems a paradigmatic example of 
what we have come to call “conversational learning”. By this we mean the 
gradual evolution of making something through reflective “conversation” 
between makers and their materials in the course of shaping meaning and 
coherence. “Reflective” has at least two intentions here, and often they are 
so intertwined as to be indistinguishable: the maker’s spontaneous (and 
active) reflective response to their actions on the materials, and the 
“reflection” of the materials (as they take various shapes and forms) back to 
the makers. The two kinds of reflection can be thought of as two kinds of 
“talking back”. In the first, the makers talk back to the materials (reshaping 
them); in the second, the materials talk back to the makers, reshaping what 
the makers know about them. The distinction is, in a sense, moot since 
materials don’t “talk” and the “talk” of the makers is most often (but not 
always) action rather than words. Further, the back-talk of the materials is 
only to the extent that the makers “hear” it- i.e., the current state of the 
makers’ knowledge-in-action strongly conditions what they recognise and 
apprehend as the “message” implicit in the current state of the materials. In 
turn, the makers’ talk back to the materials is not “heard” by the materials 
except to the extent that these are re-shaped in some way. (Bamberger & 
Schön, 1983: 68) 
 
This paper (Bamberger & Schön, 1983) published in the Volume 36, issue 2 of the Art 
Education journal, in the same year as Schön published the ‘Reflective Practitioner’ 
(1983), needs to be stressed as it is one of the few references Schön makes to the 
arts disciplines as distinct from design. It is important to note however, that the 
‘conversational’ metaphor is considered as applicable to visual art practice and music 
as design and problem solving projects. 
 
We have tried to make an ambiance for research, give some examples, and 
pose some speculative questions. Nelson Goodman is willing to answer one 
of them: “Even if the ultimate product of science, unlike that of art, is a 
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literal, verbal or mathematical, denotational theory, science and art proceed 
in much the same way with their searching and building.” (Goodman, 1978: 
107) And Ben Shahn puts that “same way” like this; “So one must say that 
painting is both creative and responsive. It is an intimately communicative 
affair between the painter and his painting, a conversation back and forth, 
the painting telling the painter even as it receives its shape and form.” 
(Shahn, 1957: 49). (Bamberger & Schön, 1983: 68) 
 
I find Schön’s et. al., (1983) reliance on the conversational metaphor, as a fits all sizes 
construct, problematic. Schön et. al., (1983) describes design phenomena as a 
computational strategy that relies upon a conversational metaphor.  
 
The metaphor of “conversation” can serve a two-fold purpose: it can, as 
suggested above, serve as a way of viewing the evolving course of our 
participants’ work; at the same time, it can serve as a way of setting a mood, 
an ambiance for research. In this latter sense, the motion of “conversation” 
becomes important and productive as it encourages us, as researchers, to 
make our own action experiments in search of the emergence of new 
meaning, new features, new structures. (Bamberger & Schön, 1983: 68) 
 
What is it to have a conversation? What characteristics does a conversational 
metaphor bring to a practitioner’s experience of the practice situation? When Schön 
suggests that reflection can be thought of as “talking back”, he introduces a 
metaphorical means for conceptualizing a complex cognitive process. It is a 
significant simplification of these cognitive processes, made with the best intentions 
of developing a practical method of dealing with the flux of experience. However, 
whilst it may have use value in many situations, the conversational metaphor needs 
to be examined with caution as to whether it is applicable in all situations.  
 
There is an issue here, which is seemingly contradictory. On one hand Schön (1987: 
25) considers that: 
 
Whatever language we may employ, however, our descriptions of knowing-
in-action are always constructions. They are always attempts to put into 
explicit, symbolic form a kind of intelligence that begins by being tacit and 
spontaneous. (Schön, 1987: 25) 
 
In this case the language employed, which I would also suggest extends out to the 
use of the conversational metaphor, is arbitrary. On the other hand Schön’s paper on 
generative metaphor (1970) exploring the case of slum housing where the 
underlying metaphor of the slum is as a ‘blight’ or ‘disease’, is a warning that an 
inappropriate use of metaphor can have profoundly negative consequences. Schön 
(1970) claims the ‘blight’ metaphor encourages corresponding medical remedies, 
including surgery to remove the blight. Schön (1970) continues by suggesting that if 
the underlying metaphor of the slum is that of a "natural community", then this 
orients any response in terms of enhancing the life of that community. For Schön 
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(1983) then the way in which a problem is framed depends upon the underlying 
metaphors and conversely the metaphor in use sets the direction of problem solving.  
 
The construct of the conversation requires translating the qualities of tacit 
engagement into something it is distinctly not. The question is just how vital the 
tacit dimension of the practice experience is. As an educator I can benefit from the 
simplicity of a reflective conversation with a situation, it is practical, but as a visual 
arts practitioner being attentive to the qualitative dimension of the creative process 
makes the conversation metaphor an over simplification or a rich cognitive process. 
 
3.3   The Structure of Reflection- in-Action 
 
For Schön the initiation of reflection-in-action, in the midst of practice, occurs when 
a practitioner has been unable to solve a problem in the way it has been set. From 
this situation, the framing of the problem is subjected to criticism and new 
directions for shaping the situation are developed, which changes and reframes the 
problem. The practitioner begins then to experiment with the reframed problem, in 
order to assess what consequences and implications can be drawn from it. Having 
reframed the problem, Schön suggests that the practitioner also tries to adapt the 
situation to the frame. Here a cyclic process occurs as not only the problem is 
reframed but the situation is also. Changing the situation, changes the problem, 
reframing the problem requires the situation to be made to fit the revised frame. 
This process is played out through discovered consequences, implications, 
appreciations, and further moves. These moves create further problems to be solved 
but surround the situation in new meanings. These new meanings are generated 
through the unintended changes caused through the experiment of reframing and 
adapting the situation. This is what Schön refers to as the situation ‘talking back’. He 
describes the practitioner as listening to the situation as it talks back, appreciating 
what he/she hears, and reframing the situation in response to this reflective 
conversation.  
 
In this reflective conversation, the practitioner’s efforts to solve the reframed 
problem yields new discoveries which call for new reflection-in-action. The 
process spirals through stages of appreciation, action, and re-appreciation. The 
unique and uncertain situation comes to be understood through the attempt 
to change it, and changed through the attempt to understand it. (Schön, 1983: 
132) 
 
This process relies heavily on the reframing of the situation. The operations of 
reframing link back to Schön’s theories of generative metaphor.  
 
A generative metaphor in Schön's terms is characterized by the carrying over 
of frames or perspectives from one domain to another. It allows for frame re-
structuring when frame conflict exists. The notion of a generative metaphor 
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may be extended to include a proposed metaphor that frames socially 
constructed reality in a new, more complex way. […] For Schön, the notion of 
generative metaphor "then becomes an interpretive tool for the critical 
analysis of social policy". He argues that "it is not that we ought to think 
metaphorically about social problems, but that we do already think about 
them in terms of certain pervasive, tacit generative metaphors; and that we 
ought to become critically aware of these generative metaphors, to increase 
the rigour and precision  of our analysis of social policy problems by examining 
the analogies and "disanalogies" between the familiar descriptions...and the 
actual problematic  situations that confront us. (Srivastva and Barrett, 1988) 
 
There is therefore reason to be wary of generative metaphors, especially when they 
carry their own solutions to problems. More often than not they will fail to present 
an objective characterization of the problem situation. 
 
The following text is an example of using metaphor to frame a situation. The author 
of the text first describes a situation that arose whilst he helped some friends finish 
rewiring their house. He elaborates on the problem solving process that enabled 
them to turn a frustrating situation into an eloquent solution of how to pass a wire 
through an empty tube embedded in the wall. In the many examples and 
explanations of generative metaphor I have read, I have found myself coming back 
to this story repeatedly as a means of explaining the concept to others. I consider it 
useful then to present this short text in full. 
 
 The development of generative metaphors 
 
A few years ago I gave two friends of mine a hand finishing the electric wiring 
in their house. For this purpose long and narrow plastic pipes had been laid 
through the brick walls while constructing years earlier. Every single one of 
these pipes contained a string that would allow us now to pull the wiring 
through. Unfortunately, one of these strings had been pulled by accident and 
left us with a 8m long curved pipe without a means to pull the electric wire. 
We first tried to just push it through, but the wire wasn’t rigid enough to make 
that work. So we reinforced it with wire and tried again. It lasted a while 
before we got frustrated with this strategy, realizing it wouldn’t work despite 
efforts to reinforce the wire with all sorts of things. Amidst the frustration 
came the idea – first as a joke – to flush rather than push the wire. Water! 
From ‘water’ our thinking shifted to ‘air’, and only a few minutes later we had 
tied a tiny piece of fabric to a sewing thread and sucked it all the way through 
the pipe with the vacuum cleaner. The wire followed. Sometimes it pays off to 
take jokes seriously. The original set-up being a string to pull, our initial image 
had been one of pulling and pushing: our minds were set on 'mechanics'. As it 
became increasingly clear that our mechanical thinking didn't allow us to solve 
our problem, we accommodated 'hydraulic' and 'pneumatic' metaphors. All of 
a sudden it became easy: the point was in our problem-setting rather than in 
problem-solving as Donald Schön (1993) puts it. 
 
Schön has described the process of metaphor development in different stages 
that are easily recognizable in this story. A first important phase consists of 
people's immersion in the experience. We were pushing and pulling wires with 
different methods. Despite our getting better at pulling and pushing, the 
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feeling grew that this would not work. In the midst of this, the generative 
image was triggered: sucking. We stopped looking at our problem as if it were 
a mechanical one, and re-imagined it as a pneumatic problem. 
 
It seems important to notice that, at first, we didn't have a precise idea of 
where to go with this idea, but we somehow felt it could apply to our 
situation. Schön called this `an unarticulated sense of similarity'. 
 
An immediate consequence of this new perspective was a change of 
vocabulary: we ‘reframed and renamed’. We didn't talk about strength, length 
and rigidity anymore, but about weight and volume . . . What followed, Schön 
points out, was `an explicit account of similarities': we 'mapped' how the 
image of sucking would apply to a situation that until then we had looked at 
as one that needed pulling or pushing. The result was a new approach, and a 
solution. In my summary Schön's stages are as follows: 
 
• immersion in the experience 
 
• triggering the generative metaphor 
 
• unarticulated sense of similarity 
 
• naming and framing 
 
• explicit account of similarities: 'mapping' 
 
• new solutions 
 
 (Hovelynck, 1998) 
 
The situation that Hovelynck (1998) describes is not merely about problem-setting, 
it requires the generation of new meaning in the solving of the problem. The process 
is clearly focused on the end product, but still relies upon the metaphorical 
projection of physical qualities. When the process is experiential rather than 
problem-solving I propose the relationship between the metaphorical projection of 
physical qualities and the generation of meaning becomes of central importance. 
Here Schön et. al., (1983) raise the point that the generation of meaning is in itself a 
process of making.  
 
 Making meaning 
 
If we take seriously the notion that meaning, itself, is a process of making, 
describing the work of the participants presents certain difficulties at the 
outset.  (Bamberger & Schön, 1983: 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4  Design as a Reflective Conversation with a Situation 
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It is important to note that the concept of a ‘reflective conversation with the 
situation’ and indeed the whole development of an epistemology of practice based 
on an examination of what practitioners actually do, was first put forward by John 
Dewey in 1933 in his book ‘How We Think: A restatement of the relation of 
reflective thinking to the educative process’. In this respect it might be argued that 
Schön was not really saying anything new at the time he published ‘The Reflective 
Practitioner’ in 1983. However, given the degree to which Dewey, and American 
Pragmatism in general, had been largely ignored throughout the mid part of the 
twentieth century, and that theories of professional practice, namely Simon’s 
Technical Rationality, had caused what Schön described as a crisis in professional 
thinking. 
 
Technical-rationality is a positivist epistemology of practice. It is ‘the dominant 
paradigm’ which has failed to resolve the dilemma of rigour versus relevance 
confronting professionals. (Usher et. al. 1997: 143) 
 
Schön’s intervention was a timely reminder of the developments Dewey had made, 
and certainly helped to contextualize them in the later part of the twentieth century 
across a wide range of professions. 
 
Schön, who uses the phrase ‘design as a reflective conversation with a situation’ as 
the title of his third chapter, makes use of a protocol study to investigate a case in 
the architectural profession. He chose architecture over other design professions, as 
he considered it to be an already well-established field of design, which he had the 
opportunity to observe and study. 
 
At the beginning of the chapter, he briefly overviews design as a general field and 
states that it is expanding across a range of disciplines and that through this process 
it might be possible to discern an underlying generic design process. As an example 
for this he notes that various perspectives and notions exist in Architecture, for 
which underlying actions can be found.  
 
Schön (1983) introduces his case study as an example that he believes represents a 
generic design process shared by other design professions. ‘Design as a reflective 
conversation with the situation’, is essentially metaphorical. It is interesting in the 
context of this thesis that he chose a conversational metaphor in which processes 
like ‘talk back’ are used to describe how the practitioner perceives what the situation 
is trying to ‘tell’ them. As will be seen later this conversational metaphor is useful in 
design but problematic in creative production. 
 
Schön dissects the design process into variables, which include: 
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• possible moves 
• norms 
• interrelations  
 
Through the complexity of these variables the outcomes of the design process, as 
the experienced by the designer, can be received ‘happily or unhappily’, than those 
intended.  
 
[…] the designer may take account of unintended changes he has made in 
the situation by forming new appreciations and understandings and by 
making new moves. He shapes the situation in accordance with his initial 
appreciation of it, the situation “talks back” and he responds to the 
situation’s back talk. (Schön, 1983: 79) 
 
Schön considers that in a good design process this conversation with the situation is 
reflective. In his example, he observed the 20 min critiquing session between an 
architectural student, Petra and her tutor Quist.  Schön (1983) begins by introducing 
the studio environment, and how students work and design there. In the session, 
Petra firstly describes her design process and the problems she is encountering. Quist 
proceeds by reflecting on Petra’s sketches, and by making use of his repertoire of 
design experiences reframes the problems Petra is facing. This process leads to a re-
appreciation of the situation.  
 
Drawing and talking are parallel ways of designing and together that make 
up what I call a language of designing. (Schön, 1983: 80)  
 
The dialogue between Petra and Quist is concise but difficult to understand by 
outsiders because of what Schön calls “dietic utterances” for example the words 
‘here’, ‘that’ and ‘this’ can only be interpreted through Petra’s drawings and the 
transparent overlays Quist sketches onto. Quist criticizes Petra for taking the land 
contours and the architectural norm that building shapes and land contours must fit 
one another, too seriously. Consequently he considers Petra’s sketches lack an 
individual discipline. Schön quotes Quist as saying “You should begin with a 
discipline, even if it is arbitrary”. In this respect discipline means a self-imposed 
method, a set of self-determined rules in the geometry. Quist suggests that this 
discipline can be uncompromising to start with but can yield over time. In design 
this form of meta-theory can be seen to inform actions and decisions. 
 
In the analysis section, Schön elaborates on the elements of his design language, 
which takes the form of a spatial action language. Schön summarizes this in a table 
of terms, which are used in the protocol analysis. Whilst the language is seemly 
informal, the terms embody a great deal of professional knowledge. Schön also 
highlights the key aspects of the reflective conversation, of which ‘framing’ the 
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problem is prominent. For Schön a failure to find a solution is a failure to frame the 
problem. It is considered imperative therefore that designers learn to frame and re-
frame the problems they encounter. In contrast to Technical Ractionality, Schön 
considers that every design decision is a local experiment that contributes to the 
reframing of the problem, not the application of theory to a problem.  
 
[…] the designer must consider not only the present choice but the tree of 
further choices to which it leads, each of which has different meanings in 
relation to the systems of implications set up by earlier moves. (Schön, 1983: 
80) 
 
If design is a reflective conversation with the materials of the situation what is 
visual art practice? As the materials of design ‘talking back’ to the practitioner 
unanticipated problems and potentials are realized, the appreciation of which leads 
to new and unexpected phenomena. 
 
Designers might differ, for example with respect to the priorities they assign 
to design domains at various stages of the process. They might focus less on 
the global geometry of buildings as Quist does, than on the site or on the 
properties and potentials of materials.  But whatever the differences 
designers have, such as backgrounds, experiences and priorities, they are 
likely to find themselves in a complex situation and a conversation with the 
situation. (Schön, 1983: 100) 
 
Despite these differences Schön perceives an underlying structure to the design 
process.  
 
3.5   Criticisms of Schön  
 
Whilst Schön’s (1983) theories are considered to have been influential, his work has 
been subject to criticism.  
 
It is noted later, for example, that constructs such as ‘reflection-in-action’ 
(Schön 1983) appear to have been accepted into established theory without 
substantial testing. Once ideas have been put into print, they easily became 
utilized as if they are fact. (Moon, 1999: 23) 
 
Moon (1999: 23) makes an important point here that Schön’s (1983) theories of 
reflective practice were not substantially tested, however they have been 
extensively cited across a wide range of papers over the last 30 years. 
 
There have been three important areas of criticism with regard to this model 
(beyond those wanting to hang onto ‘technical rationality’). First, the 
distinction between reflection in and on action has been the subject of some 
debate (see Eraut 1994 and Usher et al 1997). Indeed Donald Schön may well 
have failed to clarify what is involved in the reflective process – and there is a 
problem, according to Eraut, around time – ‘when time is extremely short, 
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decisions have to be rapid and the scope for reflection is extremely limited’ 
(1994: 145). There have also been no psychological elaborations of the 
psychological realities of reflection in action (Russell and Munby 1989). 
(Smith, 2011) 
 
Molander (2008: 4), states that detractors of Schön’s notion of “reflection in 
action”, such Eraut (1994), in suggesting that there is seldom time for reflection 
when a person is engaged in work indicate an overly narrow conception of what 
reflection is. Time in relation to reflection has been considered to possess distinct 
qualities. Here Burnard & Hennessy (2006), draw specific reference to visual art 
practice in addition to illustrating how Schön (1983) applied this theories to a range 
of time frames. 
 
Reflective time engages us intrinsically in a sharply focused attentive mode of 
functioning. Artists in particular give themselves over to virtually continuous 
reflective time, placing reflection at the heart of the creative process. Some 
authors consider that reflection is a recollective form constituted in a thought 
or action that is already passed or lived through (van Manen, 1990). Other 
theorists consider reflection to be constituted in action in different time 
frames. Such dimensions include reflection-on-action (Schön, 1987), reflection-
in-action (Schön, 1983; Killian and Todnem, 1991), reflection-in and on-action 
(Zeichner and Liston, 1996) and reflection-for-action (Norlander-Case et al., 
1999) with each drawing upon and utilising different time frames. These can 
be rapid and immediate, as automatic reflection or thoughtful reflection in the 
moment (called repair). Reflection can occur at a particular point in time 
(called review) or be more systematic over a period of time (called research). 
A long-term reflection can be informed by established theories (called 
retheorising) (Schön, 1983, 1987). (Burnard,  et. al., 2006) 
 
Within education where Schön’s theories have received wide attention (Usher et. al., 
1997: 143), the criticisms are yet to have been fully addressed (Smith, 2011). 
 
The widespread use of ‘reflection’ as a concept of importance for the 
development of teacher professionalism coincides with the publications of 
Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner (1983) and the sequel Educating the 
Reflective Practitioner (1987). The texts are extensively referred to and have 
had enormous impact on education and related fields. Schön’s theories, 
however, have not gone unchallenged. Gary Fenstermacher criticises the 
inconsistent use of the term ‘reflection’ in Schön’s theories (Fenstermacher, 
1988); Max van Manen argues that reflection does not describe the differences 
between novice teachers and experienced teachers (van Manen, 1995); 
Newman claims that the whole epistemological account in Schön’s theories 
has to be rewritten (Newman, 1999); I [Erlandson] have argued that Schön 
generates a dualistic Cartesian worldview and a control-matrix in the theories 
presented in The Reflective Practitioner (1983) and Educating the Reflective 
Practitioner (1987). (Erlandson, 2004: 39) 
 
Usher et. al. (1997: 143) considers however, that Schön’s (1983) theories of reflective 
practice, have been frequently adapted by trainers in a variety of professional fields 
in ways that do not represent Schön’s emphasis on enacting.  
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3.6   The Introduction of Schön’s Theory of Reflection- in-Action in 
Education 
 
In order to understand how Schön’s (1983) theory of reflection-in-action came to be 
used in art and design and when it was introduced it is necessary to first ask how it 
became so widely used in education. Whilst there is no specific defining moment 
when Schön’s theories made the transition from the disciplines he initially explored 
in the ‘Reflective Practitioner’ (Schön, 1983), it is widely acknowledged that it was 
his sequels to this work, ‘Educating the Reflective Practitioner’ (1987), and ‘The 
Reflective Turn: Case studies in and on educational practice’ (1991), which brought 
his theories into the domain of education, which emerged to be clearly the field 
most in demand of Schön’s theories of reflective practice. It is contextually note 
worthy also that John Dewey, with whose work Schön was very familiar, was 
regarded as a prominent philosopher of education. 
 
In 1987, Donald Schön introduced the concept of reflective practice as a 
critical process in refining one's artistry or craft in a specific discipline. Schön 
recommended reflective practice as a way for beginners in a discipline to 
recognize consonance between their own individual practices and those of 
successful practitioners. As defined by Schön, reflective practice involves 
thoughtfully considering one's own experiences in applying knowledge to 
practice while being coached by professionals in the discipline (Schön, 1996). 
After the concept of reflective practice was introduced by Schön, many 
schools, colleges, and departments of education began designing teacher 
education and professional development programs based on this concept. As 
the concept grew in popularity, some researchers cautioned that SCDEs that 
incorporated reflective practice in their teacher education programs were 
focusing on the process of reflective practice while sacrificing important 
content in teacher education (Clift et al, 1990). These researchers 
recommended that reflective teaching combine John Dewey's philosophy on 
the moral, situational aspects of teaching with Schön 's process for a more 
contextual approach to the concept of reflective practice. (http://www.cyc-
net.org/cyc-online/cycol-0404-reflective.html, accessed on 27.7.14) 
 
No one of course is suggesting that reflective practices did not exist in visual art 
practice prior to this introduction. My first introduction to the notion of the 
reflective practitioner came whilst studying for my masters degree at the Sir John 
Cass department of Art & Design at the London Metropolitan University (formally 
the London Guildhall University) in 2001. A lecture series led by the former course 
organiser Christopher Smith entitled ‘the reflective practitioner’ developed the idea 
that the role of the student within the context of a ‘by project’ masters degree was 
that of a reflective practitioner. The subject of reflection-in-action fascinated me 
sufficiently to write my masters thesis about it.  
 
Whilst Schön’s (1983) theory of reflection-in-action has certainly been applied, at 
various levels, in the field of art education as an educational tool, it is as a research 
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method within doctoral projects in art and design that it has received most 
attention. As stated, in my research I have found a notably lack of evidence for 
creative practitioners having any knowledge of Schön’s (1983) theory of reflection-
in-action, therefore focus on its use in creative-production doctoral projects initially. 
The reason for this is to help isolate what is distinct about reflection-in-action in 
visual art practice that may require refinement to Schön’s (1983) theories when 
applied to this field. In the context of this study the notion of reflective practice in 
creative-production doctoral projects has been more richly debated in recent years 
than in professional art practice outside of academic research. 
 
The following citation frames the process of learning to become a reflective 
practitioner as an objective of doctoral research in art & design. 
In the USA the PhD quickly became a passport into teaching (as it is today in 
many disciplines in the UK) prompting some commentators to note that in 
practice it is now a qualification for teaching rather than research. Similarly, 
a doctorate in creative-production might be seen as appropriate training to 
teach others to become reflective artists and designers. (Scrivener, 2000: 18) 
The ruling by the AHRC that a creative practitioner’s artefacts are considered not 
evidence enough that research has been conducted, provides a significant context 
for why creative production research projects require reflection-in-action to be 
employed as a research tool for reporting on creative practice. The following ruling 
requires that practitioners report on their activities through academic writing. 
 
We do not believe a creative, performance, or practice-led output should be 
allowed to stand on its own as a record of research activity... we have come 
to the conclusion that this documentation — at least for the purposes of RAE 
— should be required to be presented in verbal written form’ AHRB’s (now 
altered to the AHRC) recommendation to the Funding Councils. 
(Brown, Gough, and Roddis, 2004).  
 
In response to this, attempts to define specific practice-led research disciplines in the 
arts, such as ‘Developmental Research’ and ‘Applied Research’ (Design, B. Brown, P. 
Gough, J. Roddis: March 2004), are beginning to categorise the research methods 
through which practitioners are using their practices as a research tool. However, 
there are concerns about addressing the relationship of ‘practice-led research’ to 
‘scholarly research’.  
 
Given that the characteristic research stance is that of objectivity, control, 
and distance, how might the stance of the practitioner be described? (Schön, 
1983) 
 
Here Schön (1983) poses an interesting question, which poses another in the context 
of creative practice. How might the creative practitioner's position be described 
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when the research stance is that of objectivity, control, and distance? Indeed, this 
‘research stance’ has been taken up in response to the AHRC’s statement concerning 
practice-based submissions mentioned above. 
 
In consequence, the AHRB (now the AHRC) is in danger of increasingly 
reducing the academic community's opportunities to test current 
epistemological and pedagogic models against other, more responsive, 
'conversational' or 'dialogical' alternatives. This is particularly unfortunate 
because an acknowledged major difficulty in evaluating any new or 
unconventional form of knowledge is that those who undertake such 
evaluation usually have a vested interest in maintaining the epistemological 
status quo, from which they derive their academic authority, economic 
advantages and evaluative criteria. The result is that, in the most extreme 
case, no form of knowledge is officially acceptable that does not already 
conform to the dominant epistemological model. (Biggs, 2004) 
Reflection-in-action as a mode of professional development, a research tool, and an 
objective of doctoral research, has become integrated into the field of the visual arts 
. 
Schön sees reflection as the primary cognitive mechanism for dealing with the 
unexpected and, through the resolution of the unexpected, for learning. There 
is, then, an argument for suggesting that the practitioner could benefit if 
reflection was recorded and then reported more systematically. (Scrivener, 
2000: 12) 
As stated earlier, however, Schön did not write specifically with the visual art 
practice in mind. Whilst his theories have been assimilated into the field of design 
through Schön’s examples from architecture, questions have been raised about the 
applicability of his problem-solving model of reflection-in-action for creative 
production research projects. The following chapter therefore moves to address how 
Schön’s (1983) reflective methods have been applied to design and visual art 
practice. 
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CHAPTER 4  –  APPROACHES TO REFLECTION IN DESIGN AND VISUAL 
ART PRACTICE 
 
This chapter follows on from Schön’s (1983) theory of reflective practice to examine 
the contexts for their use in art and design research and through in to the visual 
arts. Whilst design disciplines have been explicitly referenced in Schön’s (1983: 76) 
‘design as a reflective conversation with a situation’, visual art practice has been 
referred to only sparingly in Schön’s writing (Schön, et. al., 1983: 70). The question 
addressed in this chapter asks whether the applicability of Schön’s (1983) problem-
solving model of reflective practice, and the ‘conversational metaphor’ central to 
how Schön’s (1983) reflective methods are approached across a range of disciplines, 
including design, can be adequately applied to visual art practice. The investigation 
of this question requires examining distinctions between approaches to reflective 
methods in design and visual art practice. 
 
4.1  Distinctions of Creative-Production and Problem-Solving 
Research Projects 
 
Professor Stephen Scrivener is an experienced supervisor and examiner on doctoral 
research projects in technology, design, and creative-production. Across a wide 
number of papers Scrivener has offered valuable contributions to the nature of 
research in art and design and the relationship between theory and practice. In this 
chapter I draw particularly upon Scrivener’s (2000) paper, ‘Reflection in and on 
Action and Practice in Creative-Production Doctoral Projects in Art and Design’, as 
providing a strong academic framing for the distinctions of reflective methods 
between design and visual art. Scrivener (2000) draws two important distinctions 
that have helped frame the focus of the case studies that follow this chapter. The 
first distinction posed by Scrivener (2000: 1-7) considers that whilst the distinctions 
between creative-production and problem-solving projects in design and technology 
are by no means black-and-white, there remain fundamental differences between 
them, reflected in their process, form and presentation. The second looks at the 
distinction between the reflective methods developed and employed in doctoral 
research in problem-solving design projects and creative production on the one 
hand, and everyday visual art and design making on the other. This distinction also is 
considered distinguishable from Bachelor and Master education in art and design 
due to the emphasis on the additional requirements imposed on the student 
conducting doctoral research, which Scrivener (2000: 19) maintains take the activity 
of reflection beyond the ordinary practice situation. In the following section 
Scrivener (2000: 2-4) establishes norms that help outline the distinctions between 
creative production and problem-solving projects in design and technology.  
Figure 8: (Scrivener, 2000: 2) Norms of Technology Research Projects  
 
 
66 
artefact is produced  
artefact is new or improved  
artefact is the solution to a known problem  
artefact demonstrates a solution to problem  
the problem recognised as such by to others  
artefact (solution) is useful  
knowledge reified in artefact can be described  
this knowledge is widely applicable and widely transferable  
knowledge reified in the artefact is more important than the artefact  
In my experience, most students’ and supervisors’ interests can be 
accommodated in design research projects, which like technological projects, 
exhibit the features identified in Table 1. What characterises this type of 
project, whether technological or design, is that it is focussed on problem 
solving. Nevertheless, I have encountered, supervised and examined students 
whose projects, while being concerned with the production of artefacts, 
exhibit few of the other features identified in Table 1. What characterises this 
latter kind of project is that it is focussed on creative production. In the 
remainder of this paper, I will explore these differences and how they are 
reflected in problems of process, form and presentation. […][…] While in a 
typical problem-solving project the "know-how" exemplified in the artefacts 
is of central interest because it can be reused, in creative-production projects 
there is no general interest or utility in this "know-how". For example, even if 
one knew how to, why should one want to reproduce the photographs 
produced by a particular artist or the ceramics of a particular ceramist. For 
the same reason, there is no obvious merit to this knowledge being widely 
applicable and transferable (however, later I shall argue that it does provide 
examples, images, understandings that others may adopt for, or adapt to, 
their own purposes). Furthermore, as noted above, the artefacts are not 
exemplars of the project outcomes, they are the project outcomes. Table 2 
illustrates how creative production projects relate to the norms of problem-
solving projects. (Scrivener, 2000: 2-4) 
Figure 9: (Scrivener, 2000: 4) Relating Creative-production to the Norms of 
Problem-solving Research 
 
 artefact is produced  
artefact may not be a new or improved version of an earlier artefact  
artefact is not a solution to a known problem  
artefact doesn’t demonstrate a solution to a problem  
the topic of interest and creative objectives may not be of obvious relevance to others  
artefact may have no obvious use  
there may be no value abstracting knowledge for reuse  
"knowledge" reified in the artefact is unlikely to be widely applicable or transferable  
the artefact is more important than any "knowledge" reified in it  
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Isolating the norms listed in the two tables above is an important step toward 
clarifying what is distinct between visual art practice, creative production and 
design, and consequently how they might differ in approaches to applying Schön’s 
(1983) reflective methods. Whilst Scrivener (2000: 5) stresses what appear to be 
fundamental differences between creative-production and problem-solving projects 
he also indicates how aspects of creative production may include problem solving 
processes.  
A creative-production project may comprise some problem solving and, 
indeed, it may involve cultural theory, cultural history, and scientific research, 
inter alia. Where this is the case, it is important that the outcomes of this 
activity are reported. Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to view the contribution 
to knowledge made through these activities as the primary goal of the 
activity, or for the fact of this knowledge or these activities to be used to 
obfuscate, i.e., to claim that one is the same as the other. In a creative-
production project, this knowledge is a by-product of the process rather than 
its primary objective. One reason for seeking to distinguish this form of project 
from the problem-solving form is to establish a framework of ideas and 
concepts that will prevent the former from becoming subsumed under the 
latter, which has a longer doctoral tradition and well-established norms. 
(Scrivener, 2000: 5) 
The notion that it is inappropriate to view the contribution to knowledge made as 
the primary goal of the activity is a key distinction between design and visual art 
practice that could impact on the way in which reflective methods might be 
approached. Scrivener’s (2000: 5) drive to establish a framework of ideas and 
concepts that prevent inquiry through visual art practice being subsumed by more 
traditional forms of research, is I feel, supported by Mark Johnson’s (2010) paper 
‘Embodied Knowing Through Art’. 
 
Artistic inquiry is less abstractive and generalizing than science, focusing more 
on grasping the qualitative unity of a situation. Art, in Dewey’s view, does not 
so much describe or explain; rather, it presents or enacts the qualities, 
meanings, and values of a situation. Dewey saw that his account of inquiry 
and knowing reveals a deep parallel between acts of knowing and the 
processes of experiencing, making, and judging art. The parallel rests on 
Dewey’s idea that the starting point of any experience is the sense of a 
unifying quality that pervades the entire situation and gives it its distinctive 
character and direction. […] This pervasive unifying quality is what binds the 
various components of any given situation together into a unified complex 
whole that has meaning for us. Not surprisingly, Dewey often used artworks 
to illustrate his claims about the role of pervasive unifying qualities. (Johnson, 
2010: 158-159) 
 
I propose Dewey’s (Johnson, 2010: 158-159) view that visual art focuses on the 
unifying qualities of an experience is central to what is distinct about visual art 
practices. The rationale to isolate this distinction is to ensure visual art practice can 
be adequately investigated. The need to clarify this distinction has a significant 
bearing on the applicability of Schön’s (1983) reflective methods in relation visual 
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art practice. In setting out norms specific to creative production Scrivener identifies 
specific functions for the artefacts of creative making and draws attention to the 
role they play in contributing to human experience.  
While a creative-production project may not exhibit the norms of a problem-
solving project, this does not mean that norms cannot be identified, quite the 
contrary. (Scrivener, 2000: 6)  
Figure 10: (Scrivener, 2000: 6) Table 3 Norms of Creative-production Research 
Projects  
artefacts are produced  
artefacts are original in a cultural context  
artefacts are a response to issues, concerns and interests  
artefacts manifests these issues, concerns and interests  
the issues, concerns and interests reflect cultural preoccupations  
artefacts contribute to human experience  
artefacts are more important than any knowledge embodied in them  
 
  
The way in which visual art making can contribute to human experience may be 
understood in relation to Dewey’s ‘Art as Experience’ (1939: 35-57). Johnson (2010) 
presents the following passage as one of Dewey’s greatest insights, in which ‘art 
involves an imaginative, expressive transformation of the materials of existence in 
ways that enhance and deepen the meaning of our experience’ (Johnson, 2010). 
  
In short, art, in its form, unites the very same relation of doing and 
undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an 
experience. Because of elimination of all that does not contribute to mutual 
organization of the factors of both action and reception into one another, and 
because of selection of just the aspects and traits that contribute to their 
interpenetration of each other, the product is a work of esthetic art … The 
doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of such a nature that its 
qualities as perceived have controlled the question of production. (Dewey 1987 
[1934]: 48) 
In the Routledge Companion to Research in the Arts (2010), both Scrivener and 
Johnson, through separate papers, explore the relationship of ‘art and research’ from 
different perspectives. It is clear that this thesis is concerned with the nature of 
reflective practice in the arts, and not with the nature of research and art. However 
in reference to Scrivener’s (2000: 6) ‘artefacts contribute to human experience’, in 
the above table, both the approaches of Scrivener in ‘Transformational practice: on 
the place of material novelty in artistic change’ (2010: 259) and Johnson’s (2010: 
141) ‘Art and the transformation of experience’, have made valuable contributions to 
how art can contribute to human experience. Indeed Scrivener’s three conceptions 
of research into art, research through art, and research for art (Scrivener, 2010: 
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264), in addition to Johnson’s particular stance on research through art and design 
(2010: 152) suggest an emphasis on reflection.  
I assume, with Scrivener, that one important sense of arts research is the idea 
that good artists are engaged in an on going inquiry into the nature of their 
medium, into how to produce certain effects through it, and into how to 
expand the capacities of that medium. There can be no doubt, for anyone 
who has ever tried it, that this is an intensely rigorous mode of artistic 
inquiry into how to do certain things through art. It requires an arduous on 
going dialogue with your medium (or media), extending over the lifetime of 
an artist who remains open to discovering new things about the possibilities 
of her art. (Johnson, 2010: 150) 
Here Johnson echoes Schön’s et. al., (1983) ‘Learning as a reflective conversation 
with materials’, in reference to the notion of an on going dialogue with media. 
Whilst I propose that it is just this on going inquiry into the nature of media that is a 
key distinction between visual art practice and design, I suggest that the 
metaphorical reference to a ‘dialogue’, which is embedded in ‘conversational 
metaphor’ through which Schön et. al., (1983) frames reflective practice in design, is 
not applicable in the same way to visual art practice. It is my intention to examine 
the role of the ‘conversational metaphor’ and alternatives to it through the case 
studies. The conversational metaphor is not alone in terms of language usage that 
are problematic when applied to visual art practice. 
4.2  Recording and Reporting on Practice the Development of a 
Research Method 
 
There have been strong recommendations that practitioners could benefit if 
reflection was recorded and then reported on more systematically (Schön et, al. 
1983, Scrivener, 2000, Fortnum, & Smith, 2007). However, the issues connected 
with this require careful consideration. 
 
Artists … have learned to tread cautiously when it comes to reporting the 
internal events that produce their works. They watch with suspicion all 
attempts to invade the inner workshop and to systematise its secrets. 
(Arnheim, 1962: 1) 
 
Rebecca Fortnum and Chris Smith quote Arnheim in their joint paper ‘The problem 
of documenting fine art processes’ (Fortnum, & Smith, 2007). The question of who 
documents the process of art, and why, drives their debate. A key aspect of the 
paper also is the range of opposing and supporting views. The spectrum ranges from 
Hans Namuth’s infamous documentation of Jackson Pollock painting ‘in action’, 
from which one can derive the notion that too much introspection can sometimes 
have negative consequences for creativity, to the growing number of ‘work in 
progress’ exhibitions since the 1990’s, which suggest that more attention to the 
process of art making, both by visual arts practitioners and audiences, is being given.  
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Mark Jarvis in his 2007 article published in the Journal of Visual Art Practice, 
‘Articulating the Tacit Dimension in Art making’, states:  
 
A more effective articulation of practice can enable the subsequent 
relationship between artist, artwork and viewer to become closer. The analysis 
of tacit and often hidden art making processes and meaning, should help to 
develop a more informed viewer. (Jarvis, 2007) 
 
Furthermore Jarvis, (2007) quotes Schön (1988: 22) to suggest that ‘with regard to 
the interaction of hand, body, tools and materials,’ artists are, quintessential 
reflective practitioners. The passage to which Jarvis refers, in which Schön, (1988: 
22) explores Michael Polyani’s (1967) ‘The Tacit Dimension’, is worthy of note. 
 
[to become] skilful in the use of a tool is to learn and appreciate directly, 
without processes of intermediate reasoning the qualities of the materials we 
apprehend through the tacit sensation of the tool in our hand. (Schön 1988: 
22) 
 
However, regarding artists as ‘quintessential reflective practitioners’ is problematic 
if reflection, as Scrivener suggests, is unremarkable to and unmarked by the 
practitioner (Scrivener, 2000: 12).  
According to Schön (1983), reflection is central both to the practitioner’s 
ability to successfully complete projects and to their professional 
development. However, such reflection is unremarkable to and unmarked by 
the practitioner. Hence, the importance of such events or how they have 
changed the practitioner may not be consciously registered. As noted earlier, 
Schön sees reflection as the primary cognitive mechanism for dealing with the 
unexpected and, through the resolution of the unexpected, for learning. There 
is, then, an argument for suggesting that the practitioner could benefit if 
reflection was recorded and then reported more systematically. (Scrivener, 
2000: 12)  
Whilst I did not consider my visual art practice a creative production research 
project, my personal and professional interest to continue the critical investigation 
of practice initiated through the MA (by Project), prompted me to develop a more 
systematic means of recording and reporting on my practice.  
The record of creative-production is the starting point for its documentation. 
At the very least, this should record reflection (i.e., reflection-in-action and -
practice). This will provide the material for reflection on action and practice. 
As noted above, this latter process is more a matter of discipline than 
necessity. (Scrivener, 2000: 13) 
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It was as Scrivener (2000: 13) points out a discipline, rather than a necessity. As 
Smith & Fortnum, (2007) make clear the documentation of practice has certainly 
been made easier, cheaper through the development of more sophisticated 
technologies over the last 50 years. Indeed, it was Chris Smith who suggested 
making use of video documentation and the process of recording the reviewing of 
the footage in 2001, during my Masters education. This process went through a 
number of stages before I considered it useful for the case studies. (A series of short 
edited clips are provided on an accompanying hard drive as examples of the 
development of the research method applied to the case studies)  
Figure 11: Film still Andrew Gray studio documentary – 
initial reviewing session 
When initially reviewing the tapes in which I was 
commenting on myself working, I was struck at how 
lacking in insight the initial comments seemed. I 
appeared acutely bored by the passivity of watching myself working, and frustrated 
by the slow pace of the process of making captured on video. The context this 
related in part to the large scale mixed media paintings I was working on, which 
required around 100 hours to complete, therefore an hour long video tape might 
capture only a 100th of the progress. I can be seen frequently fidgeting, looking 
away, or standing up to go to the actual canvass. I was left with the feeling that I 
could learn far more from actually painting than reviewing myself painting.  
Figure 12: Film still Andrew Gray studio documentary -  
Preference  of practice over reviewing practice 
 
The passivity of reviewing the footage was clearly 
problematic for me as it was in stark contrast to the 
intense engagement of actually working on the painting. 
Indeed this problematic was exacerbated by the set up of the studio. The canvass I 
was working on lay directly in front of the desk on which I was viewing the video. 
Given the choice between the passivity of viewing myself working or the activity of 
actual studio practice, Scrivener’s (2000: 13) distinction between the discipline 
required to reflect and report –on-action and -practice when operating outside of 
academic necessity, became very apparent.  
 
I was dissatisfied with the limits of my reflections-on-action and the linguistic 
analysis, which seemed in contrast to my sense knowing through the making process 
or what Schön (1983) described as ‘knowing-in-action’.  
 
I shall use knowing-in-action to refer to the sorts of knowhow we reveal in 
our intelligent action-publicly observable physical performances like riding a 
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bicycle and private operations like instant analysis of a balance sheet. In both 
cases knowing is in the action. We reveal it by our spontaneous, skillful 
execution of the performance; and we are characteristically unable to make 
it verbally explicit. (Schön, 1987: 25) 
 
In relation to the skillful performance in visual art practice this notion of ‘knowing-
in-action’ concerned me. There are stages in practice in which skillful execution 
could be considered a knowing, but it belied the experiential process of making that 
seemed to me more as a ‘discovering-in-action’, suggesting moving through 
something unknown towards realizations that become known, which are not yet at 
the level of reflection-in-action. There seemed to be a stage between these states 
that was not made explicit in Schön’s (1983) theories that is significant in visual art 
practice. 
 
By contrast to the initial trials of using video documentary to capture and reflect on 
action, I felt I was becoming more attentive to my natural inherent ability to reflect 
in the midst of action. In some cases the potential meaning of a gesture, or visual 
quality, would emerge as a state of realization that something had been 
internalized, and only later would that sense be articulated without having to search 
for it, rather it was a case of developing sensitivity towards it. I came to the 
conclusion that there was a rich layer of meaning making occurring on a non-verbal 
level and that my conceptual ideas had been shaped in part by my embodied 
experience of the physical qualities of the materials. I considered that this was a case 
where, as Johnson (2007) asserts, the nature of meaning traffics firstly in images, 
patterns, feelings and qualities before becoming conceptual and prepositional. It also 
reminded me of the writing of the Phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard in ‘Earth and 
Reveries of Will - An Essay on the Imagination of Matter’ (1943) in which he 
considers how human will is pitched against the resistance of matter.  
 
Sometimes this form of natural phenomenological reflection would force me to pull 
out of the activity and write the idea down, wherever possible, sometimes on the 
studio wall. This process was certainly not as rigorous as systematic diary entries, 
but it curiously seemed more useful to me than the form of constructed reflection I 
had attempted to employ through recording and reporting on practice using the 
video as a tool. 
 
As a consequence of my dissatisfaction with the documentary footage I found that 
when studio time was limited I would fail to review the tapes from the previous 
sessions. My studio practice was entirely unaffected by this lack of discipline. Whilst 
I continued to document my studio sessions I ceased the reviewing process, and over 
time the tapes built up. The process of setting up the camera and filming became 
redundant, and yet as habitualistic as having music playing in the studio. By contrast 
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my interest in the insights garnered through phenomenological reflection 
intensified. 
 
Figure 13: Film still Andrew Gray studio 
documentary - Reviewing the reviewing process 
 
However, this dissatisfaction transformed when I 
began the process of reviewing the reviewing stage. 
I began commenting on myself commenting on my 
self, and found the process very interesting. In one 
instance I returned to the studio after a month 
absence and found watching the tapes very encouraging. There was, for example, an 
experiential assertiveness to the painting approach when the work was at a less 
advanced stage, which forced me to reflect on the way I regarded the present state 
of the painting with a sense of preciousness, and concluded that this may inhibit the 
progress on the remaining areas.  
 
This experience was certainly beneficial in developing the research method I have 
applied to the case studies. It also helped to establish what aspects of practice are to 
be documented, how they are documented, what it reveals about practice and how 
it is reported on. It also provided a context to understand the distinctions Scrivener 
(2000: 19) makes between creative production doctoral research projects and 
everyday art and design making. 
 
4.3  The Role of Reflection in Creative Production Doctoral Research 
Projects  
 
Scrivener (2000: 19) considers that the additional requirements imposed on the 
student in the context of a doctoral programme take the activity beyond ordinary 
art and design making. In the following passage Scrivener (2000: 10) examines the 
distinction between problem solving research projects and creative production in 
detail. 
 
Clearly, although Schön (1983) presents a theory of practice that is very 
different to Simon (1969), practice is nevertheless conceived in terms of 
problems and solutions. Furthermore, Schön’s scientific language of theory of 
action, logic, experimentation, hypothesis and experimental rigour is at odds 
with my sense of creative-production. While I do not have adequate 
alternatives to put in their place, I would emphasise that I do not see creative 
production in these terms. Nevertheless, in my experience, the things onto 
which these words are attached, the process and its characteristics, seem to 
capture much of that which I have also observed in the actions of my creative-
production project students. (Scrivener, 2000: 10) 
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Whilst specifically aimed at creative production research projects I consider that this 
is a significant passage also in relation to visual art practice. In this research I find 
that my sense of visual art practice is at odds with Schön’s (1983) choice of scientific 
language. I agree with Scrivener's (2000) ascertain that the ‘processes and 
characteristics’ of this language has the potential to capture much of what I have 
also observed in both the actions of my own visual art practice, and that of others. 
However, the mere suggestion of the absence of adequate alternatives suggests that 
the appropriation of inadequate language is something of a compromise, however, 
useful it may be. If the potential exists to improve it even in a minor way I propose it 
is investigated. Scrivener (2000: 10) sets out the processes and characteristics 
evidenced in Schön’s (1983) and how they can be applied to creative production in 
eleven succinct points, which I separate numerically so as to make referencing them 
more accessible: 
1. Schön’s (1983) theory stresses the role of tacit knowledge in competent 
practice, i.e., knowing-in-action and -in-practice.  
2. Second, he puts store on problem setting as something that recurs 
throughout the process in response to difficulty or uncertainty 
encountered during a task. Dialectic occurs between the situation and 
the practitioner’s conception of the task in hand which stimulates a 
parallel dialectic between problem setting and problem solving.  
3. Third, reflection is the primary conceptual tool for handling the 
unexpected.  
4. Fourth, creative action is a way of keeping things moving.  
5. Then there is the notion that past experience provides examples, 
images, understandings and actions, rather than generalised theories, 
methods, techniques or tools.  
6. Sixth, there is the recognition that the creator’s interest is in 
transforming the situation (i.e., psychological, emotional and created) 
to something better (e.g., equilibrium between intention and 
realisation).  
7. Seventh, there is idea that action seeks to shape the situation to 
intentions, rather than to test understanding.  
8. Eighth, there is the recognition that the process is subjective.  
9. Ninth, there is the insight that the creator seeks affirmation, not 
confirmation, of the appropriateness of a course of action.  
10. Then there is the idea that only those things that lend themselves to 
embodiment in creative action are worth exploring.  
11. Finally, Schön shows that the practitioner’s response to the situation 
demands a certain kind of rigour; there are appropriate and 
inappropriate ways of responding (see Section 8 for further discussion 
of this point).  
 
(Scrivener, 2000: 10, numeration added) 
 
However, because a creative-production project is not concerned with and 
does not reduce to a problem and its solution it is not possible to separate 
formative processes from outcomes and to specify a "calculus of decisions" 
(i.e., that relates means to ends). The relationship between issues, concerns 
and interests and outcomes in a creative-production project is one that 
changes throughout the entire process. Thus, unlike a problem-solving project, 
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where we can largely ignore the actual problem setting and solution processes, 
I am of the view that description of the creative-production process should be 
the principle means by which students demonstrate that they are self-
conscious, systematic and reflective creators. In the following sections, I will 
argue that Schön’s (1983) theory of design as reflective practice provides us 
with concepts which help to characterise creative production, e.g., to identify 
what should be attended to in the process, its form and documentation. 
(Scrivener, 2000: 10) 
 
I consider that many of the points listed above have the potential to correspond also 
to visual art practice in both an academic and non-academic context. Understanding 
the structure of visual art practice situations in these terms can be beneficial to the 
practitioner in a variety of contexts. Points 5 and 6 represent complex cognitive 
processes that require further consideration. I would suggest that point 7 is a two 
way process where action not only shapes the situation to intentions but also shapes 
the intentions in some situations. With regard to point 10 I must speculate as to 
whether Scrivener (2000: 10) refers to embodiment in the context of things that 
can be physically explored through practice or in a wider relation to embodied 
cognition. In reference to the latter, I consider the role of embodiment to be 
extremely worthy of exploration, particularly in relation to points 5 and 6 on the list. 
I consider this key to enriching Schön’s (1983) theory of reflective practice and for 
deepening understanding of visual art practice. Due to the way in which issues, 
concerns, interests and outcomes changes throughout the entire process of creative 
making I support Scrivener’s (2000: 11), and Jarvis’ (2007), views that the 
articulation of the creative processes are a principle means of developing both a 
more informed practitioner and a more informed viewer.  
I am suggesting that if we are to give greater attention to the process of 
creative production, then this should focus on the recording and reporting of 
these moments of reflection, including intended and unintended consequences 
and responses to them. The systematic recording of making and reflection-in-
action and -practice would play a crucial role in supporting the practitioner’s 
reflections on action and practice and in making the whole creative-production 
project more accessible, both to the researcher and those to whom the project 
is communicated. (Scrivener, 2000: 13) 
Following Scrivener’s (2000) investigation further, through the context of the 
creative production research project may offer further insights into how Schön’s 
(1983) theory in relation to visual art practice might be better understood. 
  
4.4  Moments of Reflection- in-Action  
 
Scrivener's (2000: 13) proposal that the description of creative production should be 
focused on these ‘moments of reflection-in-action and –practice’, leads to further 
questions as to the nature of each of those ‘moments’ in relation to visual art 
practice.  
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Schön (1983) describes how practice is an exploration in which the practitioner 
seeks to come to terms with a given creative task. This exploration involves 
the formulation and testing of ways of proceeding. Generally, all thinking in 
this activity is directed toward action. Occasionally, when ways of proceeding 
don’t work or when they produce unintended consequences, the practitioner is 
forced to reflect on implicit knowledge and strategies. At such points, the 
practitioner steps out of action momentarily and past action and outcomes 
become objects of conscious attention. When a practitioner reflects on 
knowing-in-practice they reflect on knowledge and ways of working 
automated over an extended period (cf., Figure 1, reflection-in-action and -
practice, RIAP). Practice is made up of projects lasting days, weeks, or months. 
Whenever work is suspended, at the end of the day, at weekends, during 
project suspensions and upon project completion, the opportunity exists to 
reflect on the current project, the approach taken to it, and on its relation to 
past projects. (cf., Figure 1, reflection on action and practice, ROAP). In 
contrast to reflection-in-action and -practice, reflection on action and practice 
is not driven by the unexpected per se but by the desire to learn from 
experience: it is a discipline rather than a necessity for further action. 
(Scrivener, 2000: 11) 
Figure 14 (Scrivener, 2000: 12) Reflection in and on design episodes and projects 
 
Reflection here is applied over various time scales, in this sense the discipline 
required needs to have endurance and applied in a number of contexts. Under the 
conditions of a doctoral program or similar conditions the capacity to reflect-in and 
–on-action and –practice, through rigourous documentation, is a necessity. Despite 
this obligation however, a practitioner still has to negotiate a range of reflective 
situations, and know what to reflect upon. Scrivener (2000: 12) outlines 5 aspects of 
these moments of reflection-in-action that he as a supervisor would like to see 
doctoral students record. This required reporting on the following operations, all of 
which were then to be reflected on, both with regard to their contribution to 
practice and their implications for future action and practice (Scrivener, 2000: 13). 
 
1. each surprise during working and its associated frame  
2. refuted theory of action 
3. surfaced tacit knowledge  
4. revised theory of action  
5. revised frame and subsequent action (Scrivener, 2000: 13)  
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Regardless of the disciplined application of Schön’s (1983) theory of reflective 
practice in the way proposed by Scrivener (2000), the quality of the reviewing 
process is only as good as the data collected. Of the 5 aspects list above the 
third is of particular interest in the context of this thesis. The notion of 
surfaced tacit knowledge, is something I consider to be extremely important in 
particular reference to visual art practice and I will return to it in subsequent 
chapters. As outlined in the previous chapter Knowing-in-action, (Schön, 1983) 
describes the tacit knowing implicit in skillful performance when practice is 
going well, reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983) takes over, and describes the 
processes cycled through, only when problems are encountered in practice. 
Scrivener (2000) illustrates how the transition between knowing-in-action 
and reflection-in-action is related to encounters with surprise. 
Table 4 shows the full range of outcomes arising from on-the-spot 
experimentation, i.e., those meeting the practitioner's expectations or not, 
together with the desirability of intended and unintended consequences.  
Figure 15: (Scrivener, 2000: 12) The outcomes of on-the-spot-experimentation (from 
Schön, 1983: 153)  
   Consequences in relation to intention  Desirability of all perceived consequences 
intended or unintended  
1  Surprise  Undesirable  
2  Surprise  Desirable or neutral  
3  No surprise  Desirable or neutral  
4  No surprise  Undesirable  
In the first case, the move is disaffirmed and the practitioner’s theory of 
action is refuted; here the practitioner is obliged to reconsider its relevance 
and appropriateness. In the second case, although the theory of action is 
refuted, since the result is desirable there is no obligation, in the logic of 
reflective practice, for the practitioner to surface and reflect on the 
underlying theory of action. In the third case, the move is simply affirmed 
and design can continue without any need for reflection. Finally, in the 
fourth case, although the theory of action has produced the expected result 
the outcome is undesirable. This will necessitate reflection, not some much 
about the truth of the theory but its scope of relevance, thus promoting a 
search aimed at extending the theory of action to cover the observed case. 
Consequently, only outcomes 1 and 4 demand reflection-in-action and -
practice, but demand it they do and to ignore such demand is a failure of 
rigour in on-the-spot experimentation. (Scrivener, 2000: 12) 
Writing some ten years later Scrivener (2010) continues to explore surprise in 
relation to cognition. This progression from the practical application of Schön’s 
(1983) theory of reflective practice to an examination of cognitive transformation,  
in which surprise is central, is an important development. It draws upon recent 
research across a range of knowledge fields, such as cognitive psychology. This 
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progression is echoed in the following chapters where the potential of embodied 
cognition to enrich understanding of reflective methods in the visual arts is 
explored.  
Kagan writes in the introduction to his book Surprise, Uncertainty and 
Mental Structures (2002: 4) that, events that are transformations of an 
agents psychological forms are significant incentives for brain activity and its 
psychological consequences […] Events that are discrepant from schemata 
create a state one might call surprise. Surprise occurs when ones 
expectations do not fit the situation. Meyer, et al. (1997) have proposed a 
staged model of cognitive surprise in which a cognized event is appraised 
utilizing a mechanism that computes the degree of discrepancy between the 
cognized event and existing beliefs, and then tests this value against an 
unexpectedness threshold. Crossing the unexpectedness threshold is 
accompanied by the experience (emotion) of surprise, followed by the 
interruption of on going information processing and the reallocation of 
processing resources to the analysis and evaluation of the unexpected event 
and its resolution, namely the updating and revision of existing schemas or 
beliefs (Meyer et al. 1997; Reisenzein 2001). The surprise mechanism 
functions to enable, by interrupting and refocusing attention and cognitive 
resources, and to provide an initial motivational impetus for immediate 
adaptation to the surprising event and cognitive change enabling future 
occurrences of similar events to be handled. (Scrivener, 2010: 273) 
Scrivener’s (2000: 18) approach has been to consider why the norms and tests of 
problem-solving research are not appropriate to creative-production. Scrivener 
(2000: 18) concludes that framing appropriate norms and tests is insufficient.  
 
The relationship between the issues, concerns and interests explored and the 
artefacts produced is so tied up with act of making that this can only be 
revealed through description and reflection on the underlying creative-
production process. I am persuaded that Schön’s (1983) theory of reflective 
practice provides us with ways of thinking about the nature of the creative-
production process, the way past experience (both personal and collective) is 
brought to bear on it, the assessment of action, rigour in creative-production, 
and the stance of the practitioner.  
 
I have proposed that reflection should be central to the discipline of creative-
production. This will involve recording creative production in a way that 
captures moments of reflection-in-action and -practice (i.e., material for 
reflection on action and practice). This emphasis on the underlying experience 
of creative production has implications both for the shape of the research 
programme and the form of its reporting, and I have sketched out patterns for 
each that I hope to work from in future projects. (Scrivener, 2000: 18) 
 
Schön’s (1983) model of reflective practice as indicated by Scrivener (2000), has 
been shown to be beneficial in bringing structure and rigour to reflective methods 
across design and creative production research projects. Despite the framing of 
knowing-in-action and reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983) having greater correlation 
to design in its use of scientific language, Scrivener (2000: 18-19) has found it 
workable in the context of creative production research. I have suggested that the 
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appropriation of inadequate language, which leads to issues of structuring what is 
attended to in reflection, constitutes a compromise, and proposed to investigate the 
potential to improve the applicability of Schön’s (1983) theories, even in a minor 
way, in relation to visual art practice. In this respect the recommendation for 
addressing the issues of applicability of Schön’s (1983) reflective method in relation 
to visual art practice is presented as additional to, rather than a radical overhaul of, 
the theories proposed in the reflective practitioner (Schön, 1983).  
 
Scrivener (2000: 18-19) suggests a focus for this investigation by placing the 
emphasis firmly on the underlying experience of creative production. This provides a 
focus for reflection, which Scrivener (2000: 18-19) proposes ought to be central for 
his creative production doctoral research students, in a way distinct from students 
conducting technology or problem-solving design projects. Focusing a practitioner’s 
attention on the underlying experience of practice is a powerful recommendation 
that I consider equally valuable in relation to visual art practice and one that is taken 
up through the following case studies and indeed in the remainder of this thesis. 
 
The following section therefore presents two case studies that were chosen to 
investigate samples of reflective methods in academic research in art and design. In 
both of the case studies reflective methods have been constructed to accommodate 
academic rigour. The term Constructed Reflection, has therefore been assigned to 
them.   
 
In the following chapter reference is made to Scrivener’s (2000: 19) distinction 
between the reflective methods employed in academic research in art and those 
occurring naturally in the practitioners’ practice situations. The term Naturalistic 
Reflection has therefore been assigned to the two case studies presented. The focus 
in the analysis of these case studies, places the emphasis on the underlying 
experience of practice and how that might be better recorded and reported on. 
 
Constructed Reflective Methods (CRM)– Case Studies 1 & 2 
 
The term Constructed Reflective Methods (CRM) has been developed to describe 
methods of reflection designed to be academically rigorous. Two cases studies where 
chosen from a number of candidates through which to explore Scrivener’s (2000: 2-
7) distinction between the way in which Schön’s theories can be applied. Initially this 
search extended only to completed PhD thesis in both art and design, however upon 
the recommendation of my main supervisor, I looked also at post-doctoral research 
and independent research projects that were academic in nature.  
 
For the example of CRM in design, Owain Pedgley’s doctoral thesis was chosen as his 
primary focus was the development of a systematic means of recording and 
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reporting on design activity through the use of a diary. Pedgey’s (2007) use of the 
diary as a reflective tool and his use of Schön’s (1983) theories of reflection-in-
action, served to illustrate the benefits of Schön’s (1983) problem-solving model of 
reflective practice in the field of design. Pedgley, (2007) describes how end-of-the-
day diary entries (framed as reflections-on-action and –practice), helped to ‘raise the 
level of alertness to own design activity (reflections-in-action and –practice), easing 
the grasping of some design issues and aiding decision-making’ (Pedgley, 2007). 
 
For the example of CRM in visual art practice, the decision was taken to look Beth 
Harland’s involvement with the VIRP (Visual Intelligences Research Project). Whilst 
not a doctoral research project it seemed to epitomise the academic rigour that 
could be applied to reflective methods in visual art practice, whilst presenting the 
opportunity to explore what is distinct between visual art practice and design. 
   
4.5  Case Study 1:  Owain Pedgley – Capturing and Analysing Own 
Design Activity  
 
A strength of practice-led research is the familiarisation that the researcher 
can draw upon in creating these connections, both for the designing being 
analysed and the specialist subject being probed. (Pedgley, 2007) 
 
The following citation comes from the field of research in design, Owain Pedgley, 
like Scrivener (2000), isolates a number of important issues relating to the 
methodological considerations in developing rigorous research methods in ones own 
practice.  
 
The purpose of this paper (Capturing and analysing own design activity, 
(Pedgley, 2007) is to identify and discuss the principal methodological 
considerations for creating a convincing research evidence base from own 
design practice. It centers on the need for systematic and objective tools for 
capturing and analysing design activity, with the intention of achieving the 
rigour associated with studies of other people’s designing (Cross et al., 1996; 
Bayazit, 2004). One of the chief characteristics of practice-led research is that 
it is highly personal, being centred on the creative practices of the self. 
Practice-led researchers must subscribe to the goal of making public one’s 
private design discourses. There can be no place for seeking to uphold an 
inexplicable ‘black box’ account of art and design practice (Fallman, 2003) or a 
reluctance to be candid about own creative processes (Hockey and Allen-
Collinson, 2000). Nor can the artefacts arising from design projects be relied 
upon to communicate aspects of their conception, development or research 
relevance (Rust et al., 2000). The consensus amongst researchers is that 
practice-led research must include substantial reflection, analysis and 
theorising on one’s design activity and design outcomes if the work is to be 
differentiated from routine design practice (Frayling, 1997; Friedman, 1997; 
Cross, 1998; in press). (Pedgley, 2007) 
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Pedgley’s (2007) research is significant also in respect to the case studies presented 
in this chapter, as it provides clarity between the reflective methods employed in the 
problem-solving and creative production research projects described by Scrivener in 
the previous chapter.  
 
The position Pedgley (2007) describes has become a familiar rationale for practice-
based research in art and design. Schön’s (1983) claim that, ‘Professional knowledge, 
in the sense of the propositional contents of applied science and scholarship, 
occupies a marginal place – if it is present at all – at the edges of the curriculum’, 
may have been true in 1983, but the advent of practice-led and practice-based 
research has brought academic rigor into art and design research. Professional 
knowledge and scholarship rather are integral aspects of critical art practice for 
many creative practitioners, and the drive through practice-based and practice-led 
research to have practitioners theorising their own practice is testament to the 
significant academic progress made over the last two decades. 
 
Owain Pedgley has contributed to the development of this trend through the 
practice-based research methods applied to his 1999 doctoral thesis in industrial 
design at Loughborough University. Now Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Industrial Design at Middle East Technical University, Ankara; and Visiting Fellow in 
the Department of Design and Technology, Loughborough University, he is also a 
founding member of the musical instrument innovation project Cool Acoustics.  
It was through the field of New Product Design that Pedgley reinvented the concept 
of an all polymer acoustic guitar first developed in the 1950s by Mario Maccaferri, 
but which at that time failed in the market place. In his 2007 paper 'Capturing and 
analysing own design activity', (Pedgley: 2004, 463-483), Pedgley outlines work 
from his 1999 doctoral thesis, which centred on the ‘guitar project’. This paper 
carries the retrospective refinements of 8 years of academic work and may be 
considered superior to the original thesis. It deals with his thesis as a critical study on 
the reflective methods employed in the research process. Indeed this was Pedgley’s 
recommendation both in a personal email to the author and in an earlier JISCMail 
thread entitled ‘Please Help: Practice as a method of data collection’. 
 
Much time has passed since gaining my doctorate (over ten years now). 
Consequently, I am heavily critical of the way I presented my doctoral study in 
the thesis and also have reservations about some of the research structure.  
The fact that it is still cited as a good example gives a sense of fulfilment for 
me of course.  I guess it should really be viewed as an historic document now, 
conceived and prepared at a time when far, far less advice was available on 
conducting academic research through designing an artefact. Even PhD-design 
list did not exist :) If you would like to access the thinking and achievements 
for the various PhD thesis chapters, then it would be better for you to look at 
the journal articles that were published subsequently. 
(https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgibin/webadmin?A2=phddesign;e27e7640.1005) 
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 The journal articles Pedgley refers to are as follows: 
Pedgley O. (2009), 'Influence of stakeholders on industrial design materials 
and manufacturing selection', International Journal of Design, Vol.3 No.1, 
pp1-15. 
Pedgley O., Norman E. and Armstrong R. (2009), 'Materials-inspired 
innovation for acoustic guitar design', METU Journal of The Faculty of 
Architecture, Vol.26 No.1, pp157-175. 
Pedgley O. (2007), 'Capturing and analysing own design activity', Design 
Studies, Vol.28 No.5, pp463-483. 
Pedgley O. and Wormald P. (2007), 'Integration of design projects within a 
PhD', Design Issues, Vol.23 No.3, pp70-85. 
From these papers a critical analysis of the reflective methods employed in Pedgley’s 
design practice can be garnered. The method of particular relevance concerns the 
use of a diary in order to record daily activities. The rationale for including Pedgley’s 
reflective practice in this thesis is threefold. Firstly as a practice-led research project 
in the field of design it provides a concrete case study through which to explore the 
distinctions between a problem-solving model research project and the creative 
production research projects which will follow (Scrivener, 2000: 2-7). Secondly, 
Pedgley’s application of a rigorous reflective method through the use of a diary is 
clearly developed from the need to satisfy academic criteria and is embedded in a 
tradition of academic research, this provides a counter point for the analysis of the 
case studies from practitioners operating outside of academia. Thirdly, the diary 
method he developed possesses a number of novel refinements from those 
employed in the social sciences in order to collect ethnographic data, which are 
distinct to creative practice. 
Pedgley’s rationale for using the diary method, was derived from the premise that a 
successful data collection method had to satisfy four criteria: 
1. Solo effort .  Opportunities to employ a second researcher to fulfil a 
data collector or analyzer role may not exist. Data collection must 
therefore be executable as a solo effort. 
2. Endurance .  Data collection must be compatible with a longitudinal 
design project, spanning months if not years. 
3. Subject delimitation .  Without subject delimitation, literally all 
aspects of design activity are candidates for capture. This would result 
either in data overload and researcher fatigue or data dilution, caused 
by too much breadth and too little depth. Data collection must 
therefore be carefully directed towards the specialist subject of the 
research. 
4. Mobility .  Data collection must allow designing to be carried out in 
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multiple locations, such as a studio, workshop and home, as is normal 
for a longitudinal project. 
 
Pedgley (2007) follows this up with the following list, presented in Design Studies 
28, (2007: 470) that details which of the data collection methods available to him 
satisfied all four criteria. The methods he considered include: 
 
• Project archiving – in which the designer systematically collects and archives 
outputs for modelling, minutes of meetings and suchlike 
• Project report – the designer creates a varied and detailed factual account of 
the project upon its completion 
• Interview – suggested as oral exchanges between a designer and a 
researcher 
• Questionnaire – a range of ‘tick box’ and ‘write about’ requests are prepared 
by a researcher and completed in printed form by the designer 
• Survey – Suggested as being administered on a large enough scale to gain 
statistically strong generalised results. Exactly how extensive ought a survey 
to be in order to provide usable data in this context?  
• Observation – A researcher carefully monitors and takes notes on a 
practitioners externally perceptible activities  
• Participant observation – The designer is involved in observing and note 
taking on the dynamics of social situations occurring during the design 
process 
• Action research – here the designer initiates and evaluates perhaps with the 
aid of an observer/researcher, the effects of a planned intervention on the 
design process.  
• Diary – The design process is reported on at regular intervals. In this context 
Pedgley suggests that there be a particularly strong emphasis on the 
designers personal experiences and perceptions. This suggestion has a 
rationale and theoretical context with requires further analysis in this 
chapter 
• Protocol analysis – Real-time audio is recorded with the intention of 
capturing concurrent vocalisation, which can later be transcribed. Video 
footage is recorded from which Pedgley suggests cognitive activity can be 
revealed 
• Replication protocol analysis – a researcher independently attempts to 
deduce the designers apparent line of thinking by examining both the brief 
and the final design proposal 
• Reflective conversation – A reference to Schön’s reflective practitioner 
whereby the designer uses reflection-in and –on action and –practice to 
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verbalise thinking. Pedgley describes this as occurring both during and after 
design episodes. It is questionable the degree to which a practitioner can 
conduct a verbal reflective conversation whilst in the midst of designing.  
 
The ‘reflective conversation’ was included as a candidate data collection tool, but it 
was rejected because it required a conversational interview with a ‘facilitator’. 
However, reflective conversation has its origins not as an empirical data collection 
tool but rather as an explanation of the silent cognitive processes that drive 
professional expertise, known as ‘reflective practice’ (Schön, 1983). Reflective 
practice is said to comprise reflection-in-action (the mechanism for ‘thinking-on-
one’s-feet’) and reflection-on-action (the mechanism for retrospective ‘stock-
taking’) (Moon, 1999). In the context 
of design practice, reflection-on-
action involves a deliberate pause in 
designing to make critical comment 
on the period of activities that has 
passed, in order to orient subsequent 
designing in a desired direction. The 
reflection is made using the outputs 
of design modelling as stimulus 
material, revealing for example a 
‘conversation with materials 
conducted in the medium of drawings’ 
(Schön and Wiggins, 1992). (Pedgley, 
2007: 470) 
 
Figure 16: (Pedgley, 1999: 260) 
Artwork associated with cognitive 
modeling initiated by the act of drawing  
 
Pedgley questions the degree to which a practitioner can conduct a verbal 
conversation whilst in the midst of action. When I first came across Schön’s (1983) 
work, 10 years ago this was also my first question however, this appears to have 
been a common misconception that Schön (1983: 276) attempts to counter when 
addressing the limits of reflection-in-action. 
 
According to conventional wisdom, thinking interferes with doing in two 
ways. First, artistry being indescribable, reflection on action is doomed to 
failure, and second, reflection-in-action paralyzes action. Both arguments are 
largely, though not entirely mistaken. They owe their plausibility to the 
persistence of misleading views about the relation of thought to action.  
As to the first argument, I have already noted that “artistry” has two 
meanings. It may designate intuitive knowing, like the intuitive judgements 
of a skilled craftsman or the intuitive theories-in-action of an expert block-
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balancer. It may also designate reflection-in-action on intuitive knowing, as 
in Quist’s designing or the Supervisor’s interpreting. In both these senses, 
artistry is describable. When practitioners reflect-in-action, they describe 
their own intuitive understandings. And it is possible to describe reflection-
in-action itself, as I have done in previous chapters. (Schön, 1983: 276) 
 
From the list presented in Design Studies 28, Pedgley (2007: 470) deduced that of 
the suggested data collection methods that satisfied all four criteria, both ‘action 
research’ and ‘participant observation’ required a social interaction, which for solo 
practitioners may be untenable. Furthermore, the use of a ‘project report’ was 
considered by Pedgley as too distant, in terms of post-event analysis, leaving the 
diary as the only credible method.  
 
Diaries are used widely in social sciences to gather ethnographic data. One of 
the attractions of a diary as a data collection tool is that it requires no oral-
to-text transcription, so a great deal of time and effort can be avoided during 
data preparation. Nonetheless, the use of diaries as a design research tool is 
rare, most probably because diaries are associated with longitudinal design 
activity and macroscopic analyses, which have tended not to be the focus of 
researchers. Almost without exception, where diaries have been used they 
have been for studying other people’s longitudinal designing rather than to 
account for own design practices. For example, Jagodzinski et al. (2000) used 
a written log as a repository for the results of interviews held weekly with 
design engineers across a 40-week project. Ball et al. (1994) managed diary 
studies of seven electrical and electronic engineering student projects. 
Mackinder and Marvin (1982) compiled diary studies of architects’ intended 
and actual activities over a weeklong project. The only known previous work 
combining longitudinal own design practice with a diary is Hales (1987), who 
used a daily journal to log details of meetings and work done across a three-
year engineering design project, recording a total of 1373 ‘project 
interchanges’. […] It was apparent that the full potential of design diaries as 
a data collection tool had yet to be realised. A major objective of this present 
work was therefore to trial and evaluate a new form of design diary, devised 
especially to capture own design activity in the context of practice-led 
research. In response to weaknesses identified by Hales (1987), emphasis was 
placed on increasing the level of personal conscience and accountability 
communicated in the diary, augmenting plain logs of ‘time spent and work 
done’. The new diary was required to extend beyond the specification-
oriented investigation and inspiration typically found in a fieldwork diary, to 
contain more insightful accounts of decision-making. As well as facts, diaries 
traditionally reveal emotional responses towards circumstances, along with 
moments of serendipity and comments on perceived roles within social 
situations (Duncan, 1993; Moon, 1999). These were the kinds of entries that 
were sought, characterised especially well by Brett (1987). (Pedgley, 2007) 
 
During the third year of Pedgley’s doctoral research project in 1999, he created over 
a period of 203 days, 408 separate diary entries. The duration of these entries 
ranged from 45 minutes to 10 seconds, and averaged at 15 minutes (Pedgley, 1999, 
2007). Prior to commencing this section of his research and beginning the diary 
entries, Pedgley outlined a theoretical basis for the use of the diary, which grounded 
party in Schön’s theories of reflection-in-action. 
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Hatton and Smith (1995) identify three types of written report arising from 
reflection-on-action: descriptive reflection (a factual account of an event), 
dialogic reflection (‘stepping back’ to give account of personal involvement 
and influence on an event) and critical reflection (exploring reasons for an 
event in a broader social, ethical, moral or historical context). Reflection-on-
action has obvious parallels to the retrospective accounting required for 
diary writing. It was thus adopted as the main mechanism for creating diary 
content, performed as a self-conversation with one’s inner voice. (Pedgley, 
2007) 
 
This emphasis on reflection-on-action, which Pedgley describes also as marcoscopic 
analysis, rather than reflection-in-action, microscopic, grounds the reflective 
practice employed in Pedgley’s research firmly in post event analysis.  
 
End-of-the-day diary writing was experienced as a secretarial layer on top of 
the guitar project. It required meticulous organisation, whilst a quiet location 
without interruptions was found to be beneficial. Perseverance towards the 
task was solid because the award of an academic degree was at stake. Even 
so, as would be expected over such a longitudinal project, motivation for 
diary writing occasionally waned. An awareness to write diary entries was 
omnipresent and was felt to raise the level of alertness to own design 
activity, easing the grasping of some design issues and aiding decision-
making. Regrettably, the degree of deviation away from ‘normal practice’ 
caused by such interference effects is impossible to ascertain, but the lasting 
impression having completed the diary is that the effects had a positive 
influence. On a few occasions, the prospect of design activity rich in 
attention to materials and manufacturing fuelled an excitement that strong 
diary entries would result. With regard to data validity, the diary entries 
showed extensive correlation to modelling outputs throughout the guitar 
project: evidence that can allay concerns over honesty and post-event 
rationalisation. (Pedgley 2007) 
 
This thesis concludes that Owain Pedgey’s use of the diary as a reflective tool and his 
use of Schön’s (1983) theories of reflection-in-action, serves to illustrate the benefits 
of Schön’s (1983) problem solving model of reflective practice in the field of design. 
Pedgley, (2007) describes how end-of-the-day diary entries (framed as reflections-
on-action and –practice), helped to ‘raise the level of alertness to own design activity 
(reflections-in-action and –practice), easing the grasping of some design issues and 
aiding decision-making’ (Pedgley, 2007). 
 
4.6  Case Study 2:  Beth Harland -  Structuring a ‘Conversation’ 
Between the Painting’s Surface and the Digital Screen  
 
For the example of constructed reflective methods in visual art practice the decision 
was taken to look Beth Harland’s involvement with the VIRP (Visual Intelligences 
Research Project). Whilst not a doctoral research project it seemed to epitomise the 
academic rigour that could be applied to reflective methods in visual art practice, 
whilst presenting the opportunity to explore what is distinct between visual art 
 
 
87 
practice and design. This case study will therefore look initially at the VIRP as a 
whole, before then focusing on Harland’s involvement. 
 
In 2004, Harland participated in a seminar organised by Rebecca Fortnum, then 
Research Fellow for the VIRP, which was an initiative of the art section of the 
Lancaster Institute for the Contemporary Arts within Lancaster University. This 
seminar brought a group of prominent artists together to respond to a list of 
questions relating to issues of decision-making and process within their individual 
practice (Senior, 2007).  
 
In 2006, the work the seminar inspired, culminated in an exhibition ‘Inspiration to 
Order’, staged at the University Art Gallery of California State University in 2006, so 
titled from an essay by Max Ernst (Fortnum, 2006).  
 
In the catalogue for the ‘Inspiration to Order’ Exhibition, staged at the University 
Art Gallery of California State University in 2006, the curator Rebecca Fortnum, 
presented a paper entitled, ‘What is visual intelligence, and how do artists use it?’ 
The pertinence of the question provide scope for an extensive exploration of various 
answers, which are worth exploring here in order to contextual Beth Harland’s 
contribution to the Visual Intelligence Research Project (hitherto referred to as 
VIRP) in respect to this thesis. Rebecca Fortnum begins by quoting Martin Kemp, a 
quote, which both Fortnum and Smith suggest is a statement which ‘rings true for 
most artists and, if demonstrated, does much to challenge populist views of the 
‘conceptual’ nature of contemporary art’ (Fortnum & Smith, 2007).  
 
…works of art are physical products made by executants who face real 
challenges, and do not come ready-made from the heads of their makers. 
(Kemp 2003: 37). (Fortnum, 2007) 
 
This extract from Kemp’s ‘The Art Book’, is refreshingly resolute, and I shall draw 
upon it again later in the thesis in context to the embodied nature of reflection-in-
action. However, Nigel Whiteley (JVAP, 2007) who presents more of this quotation,  
 
Whether he [David Hockney] is right or wrong, in part or whole, it also 
reminds me that art historians have no monopoly of interpretation, and that 
many of our concerns may be driven more by the internal dynamics of our 
industry than by acts of hard looking and intellectual adventure. (Whiteley, 
2007) 
 
Whiteley (2007) employs it in order to remind us, that in reviewing Hockney’s book 
‘Secret Knowledge’, Kemp is making the point that the statements of artists must be 
treated with as much caution as those of historians in terms of discerning truth 
conditions about art practice. Whiteley furthermore makes the valid assessment, 
which Fortnum and the VIRP attempt to address, that the written accounts of 
historians, whilst all valuable and contribute to cultural knowledge and 
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understanding (Whiteley, 2007) are insufficient on the own to offer insight into the 
intimate functions of visual art practice.  
  
What these other approaches almost invariably lack are specifics about the 
artist’s working process and thinking, and the documentation of the creative 
process with an embedded commentary that helps to explain why as well as 
what and how. (Whiteley, 2007) 
 
Rebecca Fortnum’s introduction to the concept of Visual Intelligences from the 
catalogue of the ‘Inspiration to Order’ exhibition continues from Kemp’s description 
of art practice as being made by ‘executants who face real challenges’ (Kemp 2003: 
37): 
The Visual Intelligences Research Project at The Lancaster Institute for the 
Contemporary Arts seeks to investigate these ‘real challenges’, that is the 
way visual artists think and make and, most importantly, the relationship 
between their thinking and making. The term I am proposing for the 
interconnection of thinking and making is ‘visual intelligence’ and, whilst the 
phrase has its difficulties, for many it proves an interesting proposition. The 
term seeks to address the fact that Kemp highlights; most visual artists make 
a number of decisions whilst making their work that aren’t purely conceptual 
or only to do with material and technique but lie in the relationships 
between these aspects of making. At this moment in time the articulation of 
visual intelligence could be helpful for both intellectual and pragmatic 
reasons, providing new ways to map artists’ processes and methodologies. It 
is hoped that the phrase may present a genuine life raft, enabling the 
decision-making processes of contemporary visual practices to be recognised 
and enter certain academic debates where they have been largely absent. 
(Fortnum, 2006) 
 
The agendas of the VIRP are here expanded considerably, the ambition of which is 
admirable. From that of a research project involving a number of artists/researchers, 
which culminated in an exhibition, Fortnum presents the concept of ‘Visual 
Intelligences’ rather as an overarching phrase, which having been applied during the 
VIRP, is suggested may present a genuine opportunity to examine the decision-
making processes of contemporary creative practice to gain a level of recognition in 
academic debate, which Fortnum considers is presently lacking (Fortnum, 2007). 
This term is presented both as sign and signifier for the tacit/embodied decision-
making processes involved in the act of making, that which Katz (1997) is quoted as 
calling unconscious or nonverbal intelligence. 
 
Well… I’m pretty sure… you have an idea about what a painting should be, 
or an idea of a painting. And then it correlates with something I see and then 
I start out empirically and optically. And when I do that I get involved… 
there’s an unconscious procedure and it gets into something I wouldn’t have 
thought of to start with. It moves around a bit and that’s the part that’s 
interesting. Because when you go in there you find things; weird things 
happen and some are all right and some aren’t all right. But they wouldn’t 
have happened if you just took the idea and did it, and that’s part of it. I 
think with painting you have the opportunity to go inside yourself and find 
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your unconscious intelligence or your non-verbal intelligence and your non-
verbal sensibility and your non-verbal being in a sense. And you alternate 
between consciousness and unconsciousness and it can engage much more of 
you than if you just merely took an idea and executed it. (Katz 1997: 238) 
 
Nigel Whiteley who also quotes Katz in his contribution to the JVAP (2007) draws 
parallels between Katz’s use of the phrase non-verbal intelligence and visual 
intelligence.  
 
Katz uses the terms ‘non-verbal intelligence’ and ‘non-verbal sensibility’ to 
describe the decision-making process. Equally, he may have referred to 
‘visual’ or ‘creative intelligence’ to describe this tacit knowledge and 
process. Whatever the term employed, what he is alluding to is a decision-
making process that ensures the right sort of outcome as opposed to a 
mere illustration of an idea that someone without experience, skill, expertise 
etc., would be more likely to produce. (Whiteley, 2007) 
 
Whether it is the ‘moments of reflection-in-action’ that Scrivener (2000: 13) 
contests ought to be primary for explicating practice, ‘Visual Intelligence’ or any 
other name, it is important that clarification is brought to what these terms and 
phrases signify. Schön can also be seen to question the importance of the name we 
choose to signify what occurs in the midst of action.  
 
Whatever language we may employ, however, our descriptions of knowing-
in-action are always constructions. They are always attempts to put into 
explicit, symbolic form a kind of intelligence that begins by being tacit and 
spontaneous. (Schön, 1987: 25) 
 
Schön’s assertion that his own description of the ‘kind of intelligence that begins by 
being tacit and spontaneous’, namely what he calls knowing-in-action, is just a 
construction is contextually significant. What has in this thesis been described as 
embodied experience, Fortnum (2007) calls visual intelligence, and these terms, 
together with knowing-in-action, must be recognised as constructions. In some 
respects one might argue that they are all trying to say the same thing, however the 
form of the construction is in itself significant. The question is whether the form is 
appropriate for a particular discipline, not whether it is right or wrong. I consider the 
development of the term ‘visual intelligence’ (Fortnum, 2007) is in and of itself a 
significant attempt to examine what is distinct between visual art practice and 
design. 
 
Fortnum acknowledges that there are issues with the name ‘Visual Intelligences’, but 
her consequent investigation of both ‘visual’ and ‘intelligence’, expose important 
distinctions concerning what is meant by the phrase. Briefly focusing on these 
distinctions will help further contextualise the work of the VIRP.  
 
The primary issue Fortnum raises in respect to the term ‘visual’, questions the 
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implications of the many diverse art practices to have emerged since the 1960’s, 
which deny total reliance on visual qualities, particularly the influence of these 
practices on the traditional analysis of art history and its more contemporary 
version, visual studies (Fortnum, 2007). 
 
It appears that the visual has an established critical domain but one that 
finds itself increasingly estranged from contemporary developments. 
Contemporary visual art invigorates itself via other academic fields such as 
psychoanalysis, philosophy and political theory, which enable it to join 
current debates. This challenge for new ways of understanding and relating 
to art is re-iterated by art itself as it has evolved during the twentieth 
century. Cherry quotes Charles Harrison characterizing conceptual art as a 
“withdrawal of visuality” and notes the emergence of art practices that are 
“antagonistic or averse to the visual” and calls for a different type of critical 
response. 
 
[…] Compelling writing by art historians such as Michael Baxandall, Svetlana 
Alpers and Michael Podro have in common a sense that their analyses are 
founded in a primary experience of looking; the intuitions or reactions 
experienced whilst contemplating a work of art are acknowledged and then 
related to a scholarly exploration of the artist’s works and processes. 
 
Critical description never properly or adequately corresponds to the 
interest and force of a painting, both because our interest is 
irreducibly bound to our perceiving, and because what we describe 
takes on its force for us only in the context of innumerable other 
recognitions in which it is embedded and which lie beyond the scope 
of describing. (Michael Podro, 1998: 147)  
 
Fortnum presents strong cases against an ‘over-prioritization of sight’ in art history 
(Fortnum, 2007) or the ‘occularcentrism of visual studies’ (Cherry, 2004), such as 
the writing of Mieke Bal. 
 
Perception, however, is a psychosomatic process, strongly dependent, for 
example, on the position of the perceiving body in relation depends on so 
many factors that it is pointless to strive for objectivity”. (Mieke Bal, 2001: 42) 
 
[…] Rather than avoid the idea of the visual then, it would make sense to 
acknowledge its importance in our perception of art and its basis in the 
material, sensory world. In the term ‘visual intelligence’ then, the visual refers 
to the perceived physical nature of medium and process. Accepting our 
inability to verbally define the visual is important and perhaps releases us to 
engage with the more ephemeral kinds of statements about art that often 
issue from a studio practice. (Fortnum, 2006: 8) 
 
The VIRP is, as Fortnum (2007) states, an attempt to examine what happens when 
visual artists make decisions whilst making their work, that aren’t purely conceptual, 
or only to do with material and technique, but rather lie in the relationships 
between these aspects of making. I consider that the ‘surfaced tacit knowledge’ that 
Scrivener (2000: 13) states ought to be reported on when rigorously applying 
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Schön’s model of reflection-in-action, also alludes to this relationship. The VIRP 
might then be seen as only a slight modification in the use of terms, but I suggest it 
is much more than that. The description of the relationship Fortnum presents 
(2007) is not a ‘knowing-in-action’ but rather an unknown that becomes known. 
Neither is it ‘knowledge’ that surfaces, tacitly or otherwise, neither would I suggest 
that the term ‘visual’ intelligence, is the most explicit means of describing the 
‘perceived physical nature of medium and process’, rather I propose that the term 
‘embodied practice’ encompasses this relationship more fully. 
 
Beth Harland: Zone 15,  2006  
 
 I think moving towards something that is unknown is important. Foucault 
calls it ‘working at the edge of an un-thought, slowly building a language in 
which to think it’.’’ (Harland, cited in Fortnum, 2006: 12) 
 
Beth Harland’s appreciation of Foucault’s phrase, coupled with her own, was a 
deciding factor in her inclusion here. I found it suggested that for her, the process of 
art-making is not a means to an end, nor subservient to the conceptual ideas that 
drive her practice. This helped validate and contextualise the rich data that could be 
garnered from an analysis of some of the reflective methods she has explored and 
employed.  
 
In addition, I found the phrase thoroughly alluring in its own right, and felt 
compelled to explore my own interpretation of it. What is really meant by building a 
language in which to think the un-thought one is working at the edge of? Whilst 
this reframing sounds cryptic and clumsy the notion rings all sorts of bells, which 
seems to represent a state of being I recognise as a practitioner. The description of 
this felt state however, strikes me as an incomplete telling of the story. Nonetheless 
I consider that there is something highly significant for the-greater-understanding-
of-artistic-processes, hidden in Foucault’s phrase. Throughout the process of making 
new thoughts certainly emerge that appear for all the world as if that’s what we’d 
been thinking all along, but are perhaps rather less rigorous and intentional than 
we’d believe them to be. I rather think Foucault alludes to the complex processes of 
embodiment through which the rich phenomenological influence of materiality, 
temporality, spatiality, and sensory experience continually informs our conscious 
awareness and, only later, our conceptual frameworks. However, I shall resist the 
temptation to examine this poignant phrase further until the concluding chapter 
where its contextualisation will be greatest. 
 
Beth Harland is a prime candidate for this case study series. As a creative 
practitioner her reflective practice has developed partly through the rigor of her 
academic affiliations, she completed her PhD entitled ‘A Fragment of Time in the 
Pure State; a mapping of Painting’s Time through Proust, Deleuze and the Digital 
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Image’, in 2007. Having studied at The Ruskin School of Art, Oxford University, and 
Royal College of Art, London, she has developed into an internationally exhibiting 
artist whose work explores the relationship between painting and photography. 
Presently she is a Reader in Fine Art and Head of Research Degrees at the 
Winchester School of Art, University of Southampton.  
 
The aim to set up a way to document and publish the aspects of the process and 
outcome, Beth Harland’s painting ‘Zone 15’, was ingeniously accomplished. Beth 
Harland’s collaboration with Gary Pearson of Lomi-Lomi design and Martyn Evans 
of Sumac UK produced an interactive painting, which played through Adobe Flash. 
Clicking to view the image, the viewer witnesses the painting emerge over 
fractionally less than a minute. Once complete sections of the painting then become 
interactive to a degree, with the viewer able to scroll over the surface and select 
areas of the painting, which open into a range of investigations into the making 
process. Beth Harland generously offers up the textual and pictorial references that 
inspired the painting, together with a range of preliminary sketches, digital drawings 
and studio photographs.  
 
Figure 17: (Harland, 2006) Zone 15, oil on canvass – (Last accessed 18.9.14) 
http://www.visualintelligences.com/beth-harland-i2o_921.html) 
 
 
Figure 18: (Harland, 2006) Compositional sketch 
for Zone 15.  
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The played time lapse image begins as a sketched composition, which whilst very 
similar to the sketched draft design seems to have altered very slightly in response 
to the washed or projected colour background. The darker area emerging at the 
bottom of the screen clearly indicates the illusion created by this form of 
documentation. The painting 
itself never existed in this state. 
The shades would have been 
applied stroke by stroke onto the 
surface in full vibrancy. The use 
of superimposition creates layers 
of false saturation as one image 
slowly dissolves through 
another. Could it be said that 
this serves the function of 
documenting practice or ought we rather to consider it the creation of something 
new? Harland’s work lends itself to these qualities as she seeks to alter photographic 
images through digital manipulation. 
Figure 19: (Harland, 2006) Detail 4 seconds into the 
Flash media presentation 
 
The original photographs she took for this series, ‘prosaic objects, ordered on a table 
top’, are repeatedly manipulated until spatial order becomes disjointed and 
traditional genres of still life and landscape seem to merge’. (Harland, 2007)  
 
Figure 20: (Harland, 2006) - Figure 21: (Harland, 2006) - Figure 22: (Harland, 2006) 
Zone 15 process image 1,  Zone 15 process image 2        Zone 15 process image 3 
 
In this respect I can imagine Beth Harland being delighted with the many 
incalculable and unique intermediate steps created by the process of cross fading the 
stills of the paintings development through one another. However, in terms of 
making the process of art making more transparent to the viewer this cinematic 
aspect must be questioned.  
 
The phenomena is certainly novel, however as a painter I find it somewhat surreal to 
see the paint appearing on the canvass without reference to how it was put there. 
At no point do we see the painter applying pigment to the surface. The illusion of 
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paint dissolving into being at all places at once belies both the qualities of paint and 
the temporal aspects of painting, including all the messy stages when an area could 
be said to be half done or half finished. What does this documentation technique tell 
us about the patterns of action implicit in her practice? Did Harland start from the 
left or the right, did she produce the outlines first before painting the centers, were 
the outlines faithfully filled in or modified during the process of painting, was the 
colour premixed or mixed on the canvass? These details are obscured through the 
slickness of the presentation.  
 
Procedures and systems emerge from the medium and, rather than constrict, they 
often give the artist structure and a sense of freedom. There are times however 
when the limits of the medium will be temporarily exhausted. Beth Harland 
examines this when talking about her interest in digital imagery. She suggests 
changing media can propel the work’s trajectory. She says, “Jon Thompson talks 
about ‘learning how to make a space for yourself in which to act’ and says 
‘sometimes painters have to do something else to find this’ and this rang true with 
me –I think new mediums bring with them different ways of looking and thinking 
and they disturb your habits” (Harland, 2007). These parameters and procedures for 
the making of a visual artwork develop through a relation between the material 
process, and concept or idea. Harland adopts an approach to making that has a 
conscious ideological framework. She describes its thus, “One of the things that is 
very important to me is the notion of Faktura, which is from the Soviet avant-garde. 
It’s an emphasis on the mechanical quality and the materiality of the procedure…. 
For me the linking of form and content is crucial so that painting as a practice 
signifies subject just as much as the found or constructed image that I choose to 
work from….. I want to resist making a representation of something in the world, so 
that the matter of painting itself is a mode of address and a site of critical thinking 
which goes beyond the image.” So, artists continually write their own internal rule 
books prior to making work. Any study of visual intelligence thus needs to begin by 
a thorough mapping of an individual’s acknowledged boundaries. Before work 
commences many possibilities are hypothesised and decisions are taken. 
 
In the recent series of paintings entitled Zone, the making process is structured 
as a ‘conversation’ between the painting’s surface and the digital screen, the 
image developing through alternate modes of painting and digital reworking. 
Photographs of prosaic objects, ordered on a table-top, are repeatedly 
manipulated until spatial order becomes disjointed and traditional genres of 
still life and landscape seem to merge.  
 
Central issues in the working process include the impact of visual technologies 
on aspects of space and duration in painting (the digital offering painting an 
expanded topography) and concepts of rhizomatic space, fragmentation, re-
inscription and appropriation. Fragmentary quotations from other paintings 
and various image sources are woven into a complex surface. Chance and 
mechanical projection procedures combine to produce a double space in which 
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oppositions of figure/ground begin to disperse, enabling multiple positions, 
fluid structure, slippage. This spatial, and temporal investigation is also linked 
with filmic encounters such as Tarkovsky’s Stalker, and references various 
writings including Deleuze and Proust. 
The process of copying/translation from digital print-out to painting, is a form 
of mapping, bridging the retinal and the tactile. Due to the fragmentation of 
the original image I’m perpetually losing my place and finding it again, and this 
experience transfers to the viewer, caught in the movement between clarity 
and indistinction – in flux. The work tends to operate in the domain of haptic 
visuality or close range vision; the boundaries are blurred and flawed, images 
partially absorbed and fleetingly described. The haptic is a form of looking that 
tends to move rather than focus, and one that alludes to senses other than the 
visual; an embodied form of seeing. The physicality of the surfaces in the 
paintings is important, all are made in oil paint but numerous different 
approaches to marking the surface and different consistencies/mediums are 
adopted to evoke sensory experience. The play of difference and fragment, yet 
coherence, becomes a delicate balance.  
 
The fragility of boundaries, definition of inside and outside, is referenced 
through camouflage and formal decisions such as the use of the coloured 
border. Like the framer’s device ‘passepartout’, it interfaces the interior and 
exterior of the work and is linked to Derrida’s notion of parergon - without it 
the depiction is exposed, too present. I approach making strategically, 
sometimes mechanistically but always with an interest in the meaning 
engendered by the material and its behaviour, viewing the matter of painting 
as itself a mode of address; a site for critical thinking. (Harland, 2007) 
 
The following extracts have been selected from a complete transcription that can be 
viewed on Beth Harland’s page on the Visual Intelligencies website 
(http://www.visualintelligences.com/beth-harland.html). It takes the form of 
Harland’s responses, answering a series of questions put to her at a VIRP seminar by 
Rebecca Fortnum, Paula Kane, and Micheal Ginsborg. It is included here as it focuses 
intently on her reflective methods and is presented as data to be analysed. 
 
In the case of the Beth Harland, the attempts to systematize the process of 
documentation and reflection introduces a relationship between clear critical aims 
and the notion of ‘moving towards an unknown’. Harland (2004) reflects on her 
process of making as a strategic and mechanical approach, whilst maintaining her 
interest in the meaning engendered by the materials and its behaviour, which 
suggests an emphasis on the underlying experience of practice. The distinctions 
between the research through visual art practice typified in Harland’s involvement 
in the VIRP and problem-solving research, is illustrated in something Harland (2004) 
calls ‘moments of spill that occur in the process’. The relationship between the new 
meanings engendered through the materiality of the painting process and the 
strategic and mechanical approaches that guide the painting alludes to the 
relationship between thinking and making Fortnum (2007) states the VIRP was set 
up to explore.  
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The similarities between the approaches to CRM in design and visual art practice are 
many, however, a distinction between them is evident. Where the approaches to 
aspects of reflection are distinct, it follows that aspects of the reflective methods 
ought also to be distinct. The aspect I deduced was particularly distinct concerns the 
personal meanings that emerge out of practice and the practitioners’ ways of 
dealing with them. In design personal meaning is placed in the context of solving the 
problem of the design and producing an object that will perform a function. In visual 
art practice however, new meaning is dealt with very differently, and is framed in 
the context of personal agendas. It is, as Scrivener (2000) suggests, the emphasis on 
the underlying experience of practice that is distinct between these two case studies. 
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CHAPTER 5  –  METHODOLOGY  
 
5.1  Defining a Research Philosophy 
 
The research philosophy in this thesis follows a Phenomenological rather than a 
Positivistic approach. Positivistic perspectives would have required that the 
reflective methods employed in visual art practice be analysed in a detached and 
systematic manner. This was considered inappropriate on the grounds that analysis 
of reflective practices, require subjective, ethnographic and qualitative approaches. 
The Phenomenological perspective by contrast, allows for the collection of holistic, 
qualitative, units of analysis under naturalistic conditions (Frey, Botan, Friedman, & 
Kreps, 1991). The Phenomenological perspective also accommodates the subjectivity 
in the participants’ frames of reference that is clearly evident in the case studies and 
depth interviews.  
 
The research method developed and employed in this thesis uses an ethnographic 
approach toward the collection of holistic, qualitative data for analysis. The 
naturalistic conditions characteristic of a Phenomenological perspective, (Frey, 
Botan, Friedman, & Kreps, 1991) corresponds in this context, to the participants of 
the case studies working in their studio environments.  
 
The purpose of conducting the following case studies through field research, studio 
observations and depth interviews, is to explore the distinctions between 
Constructed and Naturalistic reflection in order to gain a richer account of what is 
distinct about reflective methods in visual art practice per se. The question 
addressed in this section specifically concerns reflective methods used in ordinary 
every-day visual art practice as being distinct from the cases studies detailing 
academic research in the visual arts. This refers to the second of Scrivener's (2000: 
18-19) distinctions referred to in the previous chapter. The research method is 
applied to three case studies, which are introduced in the second part of this 
chapter. 
 
The primary research method for the following case studies involves a documentary 
technique, initially proposed by Christopher Smith during the MA (by Project) in 
2001. It involves documenting studio practice with video cameras and then filming 
the practitioner reviewing and commenting on the footage. Following Scrivener’s 
(2000: 12) recommendation that practitioners could benefit by recording and 
reporting on reflection systematically, I made use of this process in my own visual 
art practice between 2004 -2006 after setting up a studio in Switzerland. Upon 
further research I discovered that Schön et. al. (1983) made use of this research 
method and also developed novel forms of analysis. 
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5.2  Developing a Research Method for Collecting Qualitative Data in 
the Visual Art Practice Studio Environment  
 
 Towards a Methodology of Research 
 
What contributed to this turn-around? At some point, while still engaged with 
the initial question, we set ourselves the task of trying to capture moments in 
which individuals actually came to see in new ways. To do this we designed 
simple but rich task situations and video-taped the work of the individuals 
doing them. Some of the tasks we borrowed from more traditional ones (like 
the Vygotsky block task), but some were more open-minded (like making a 
tune). Our real work began when we faced the problem of making sense of 
what our task-participants were doing. 
 
The modes of analysis evolved over a number of tasks and also over several 
years, eventually raising questions that went far beyond the immediate 
objective of capturing moments of insight. The most powerful strategy we 
found as a starting point for our analysis was something we called “chunking 
the protocol.” This involved looking for what seemed important boundaries 
that articulated observable phases or organic “chunks” within the continuing 
course of a participant’s work. These we thought might signal shifts in 
behaviour and/or focus in the evolution of the participant’s understanding. 
(Bamberger & Schön, 1983: 68) 
 
Prior to commencing this research degree my experience of documenting my studio 
practice, was far from successful. Having set up and filmed myself working, and then 
filmed myself watching myself working, I found the passivity of reviewing the 
footage was problematic and in stark contrast to the intense engagement of actually 
working. However, I persisted with intention that the potential to revisit past 
experience would be useful. 
 
We have to take certain things as read. We have to fall back on routines in 
which previous thought and sentiment has been sedimented. It is here that the 
full importance of reflection-on-action becomes revealed. As we think and act, 
questions arise that cannot be answered in the present. The space afforded by 
recording, supervision and conversation with our peers allows us to approach 
these. Reflection requires space in the present and the promise of space in the 
future. (Smith, 1994: 150) 
 
Despite that in relation to my own studio practice I felt that I could learn far more 
from actually working, than reviewing myself working, this documentary technique 
presented itself as the primary means of dealing with other practitioners’ practices. 
The experience of using this technique in my own practice, and what I learnt from it, 
has aided the development of an effective means of using this technique in the case 
studies. Indeed, the evidence of the participants’ responses to the phenomena of 
viewing themselves working was resoundingly positive. This can also be evidenced in 
the case studies detailed in Paul Harper’s doctoral thesis ‘Talking and Doing: 
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Communicating Crafting’ (2013: 180), who recently published research developing, 
using, and advocating this method. 
 
Given the nature of the research and the degree of background reading required, I 
elected in consultation with my supervisors, not to use a practice-based method. I 
ceased gathering data on my own practice and concentrated on the collection and 
analysis of qualitative data from the reflective methods employed by other 
practitioners.  
 
The documentary technique, which I first employed in 2007, involves a three stage 
process:  
 
1. Field Research: Initially the visual arts practitioner participates in an informal 
interview centered on the practitioner’s background, training and motivations.  
 
2. Protocol analysis: The second stage involves filming the subject in the 
naturalistic environment of their studio. Two cameras are set up in non-invasive 
positions and run for the length of the studio session. This ranged between 2 and 
5 hours. Video footage is recorded for the purpose of capturing cognitive 
activity. Real-time audio is recorded through the internal microphone on the 
camera with the intention of capturing concurrent vocalisation, which can later 
be transcribed.  
 
3. In the third and final stage the subject is filmed watching the second stage 
documentary.  
 
During the first interview phase, participants generally used this as an opportunity 
to offer a conceptual account of their practice, which was later useful as a contrast 
against the material account of the processes they engaged in during the studio 
documentary, and reviewed during the third stage of the research method. During 
this initial interview no explicit inquiry is made concerning the practitioner’s 
reflective methods, unless the practitioner initiates discussion on the matter. The 
purpose of not pursuing what the focus of the analysis will be was to prevent 
influencing the practitioner’s responses.  
 
During the second studio documentary phase the subject is neither spoken to, nor 
communicated with. No notes are taken, nor any activities other than reloading the 
tapes every hour, performed, that could distract the practitioner from their studio 
practice. After the filming in the studio the raw footage was cut down into an edited 
documentary making use of the two angles of the cameras. My previous education 
in filmmaking and editing was useful in this regard. Intentionally however, the 
footage was not dealt with stylistically. The decision to edit the raw footage was 
 
 
100 
partly based on my early experiences of using this method prior to commencing this 
research degree. I considered that a contributory factor to the disengagement I felt 
with watching raw footage was the monotony of a single camera angle, and the 
periods of inaction when I was out of frame. I did not consider the single camera 
perspective representative of the practitioner’s dynamic movement in studio.  
 
I considered the edited documentary generally made the viewing experience more 
engaging for the interviewee, which I considered made the process of conducting 
the third phase of the research method more productive. This was not always the 
case however; in the second of the case studies presented here the subject vocalized 
his disappointment that so much had been edited out. The decision to edit the 
documentary of course introduces a selection bias, which needs to be taken into 
account. In this respect, I found myself selecting sections of the raw footage that 
seemed to reveal the moments of reflection-in-action Scrivener (2000: 13) proposed 
the description of creative production should be focused on. The questions regarding 
the nature of each of those ‘moments’ in relation to visual art practice were very 
much integral to what I as a researcher hoped to observe and explore. Given the 
focus of the selection bias, the guided questions and the analysis methods, this 
particular research cannot be considered based on Grounded Theory. However, this 
research method can be successfully used in line with a Grounded Theory method 
(Harper, 2013: 209).  
 
During the third phase of this research method the participant was invited to 
comment on themselves working. The analysis of these responses must take into 
account both the interviewer and response bias. As mentioned above the 
participant’s responses to the phenomena of watching themselves was positive. 
There is an issue here that I consider important to raise. The experience of having 
someone (interviewer bias) take an interest in your work, film you and then present 
an edited documentary for you to watch and comment on seems to have had a 
positive psychological effect (response bias). Whilst this was beneficial for this 
research, the fact that my own experience of using this method was not positive 
makes me wary. I may question whether I would find the experience pleasurable if 
someone filmed me and showed and interest in my work, I can speculate that I 
would. The researcher effect here is not quantifiable and it is not in the scope of this 
research to conduct the necessary psychological quantitative data collection, or 
statistical analysis to investigate whether that is a general phenomenon or 
something specific to the research conducted in this thesis. However, if this research 
method is to be considered generally recommended and beneficial to all 
practitioners in all circumstances, further research ought to be conducted. The 
selection of the interviewee’s also introduces an inclusion bias, in the sense that 
proximity and availability were factors.   
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The interviews were semi-structured and discursive. The questions where not 
preordained and responded largely to the participants comments, but the general 
focus guided the interview particularly toward the end of the interview session. The 
specifics of each participants responses will be reviewed toward the end of this 
chapter. 
 
There were a number of methods of qualitative data collection that were not 
selected in this research on grounds that are explained here. 
 
• Diary/Audio Journal – This method was not selected due to its longitudinal 
nature. Requesting the visual arts practitioner to engage in a process of 
reporting on at regular intervals was considered too invasive.  
 
• Replication protocol analysis – attempts to deduce the visual arts 
practitioner’s line of thinking merely by examining the conceptual ideas 
drawn from the first stage interview and the final art works may well be an 
appropriate method in design, but it entirely neglects the embodied aspects 
of practice evidenced in the practitioner’s processes.  
 
• Reflective conversation – Inviting the practitioners to use reflection-in and –
on action and –practice to verbalise thinking would have required instruction 
to introduce both the terms and the methods, which would have turned 
these cases studies into constructed rather than naturalistic reflection 
practices.  
 
• Establish a panel & group discussions (composed of the interviewees) - the 
decision was taken to focus on individual practitioners in the naturalistic 
environments of their studios. The study is not concerned with individual life 
stories, although it pays close attention to this aspect of each case for what it 
might reveal about the whole phenomena of visual art practice.  
 
5.3  Oral History ,  Multi-Lingual Interview Techniques and Location 
Set Up 
 
Oral history, first credited to Nevins (1940), has been widely applied to a range of 
disciplines including anthropology, sociology, law, psychology, history and political 
science (Russel, 1999: 1). I do not consider my role as an interviewer presented here 
fits with the standard Russel (1999: 1) here describes. 
 
[…] the skilled practitioner must remain impartial, listen, and stay in the 
background. (Russel, 1999: 1) 
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From my experience of conducting interviews with visual arts practitioners I have 
found that my own experience of practice has been beneficial. My stance as an 
interviewer therefore, is framed as an ‘informed and sympathetic collaborator’ 
(Harper, 2013: 180). In this respect I acknowledge my background as a visual arts 
practitioner with an interest in reflective methods and the role of embodiment in 
shaping experience of the practice situation (Rossman and Rallis, 2003, p.10). The 
notion of being an informed collaborator is established naturally through discussion 
between practitioners who share an intimate knowledge of visual art practice is 
presented as an exemplary example of the collaborative nature of the interview 
process described by Lomax and Casey (1998:1.4).  
 
Indeed having a fellow visual artist conduct the interview, as opposed to an 
interviewer from a psychological or sociological discipline, is presented as being of 
particular advantage in respect to the interview structure. An intimate knowledge of 
practice enables one to ask pertinent questions, contextualize and encourage 
practitioners’ responses. Mark Feldstein, in “Kissing Cousins: Journalism and Oral 
History (Oral History Review, 31. 1: 2004: 1-22), writes that oral historians and 
journalists are related, but separate, and considers that each discipline can improve 
by employing techniques from the other.  
 
The most liberty awarded to oral history practitioners comes from Mark 
Feldstein’s review of the methods where he compares oral history to 
journalism where both disciplines attempt to compile narratives and 
landscapes to uncover truths (otherwise not available). Feldstein argues that 
each would benefit from adopting some methodologies of the other. 
Journalism, he says, would benefit from applying the exhaustive research 
common to oral history, most importantly verification and finding 
corroborating evidence. On the other hand, Feldstein argues that oral history 
can be enhanced by utilizing the more sophisticated interviewing techniques 
common to journalists. One idea is to establish context where the narrative 
be supplemented or challenged by framing it in the historical context of the 
time with the intention of getting more information. In addition, Feldstein is 
a strong advocate for applying some strong interviewing techniques, like the 
use of adversarial encounters, as a tactic for getting more information from 
the narrators. (El Sayed, 2013) 
 
In this sense the decision was taken that the role of being an interviewer in the 
context of this research, was as an informed investigative collaborator employing 
strong interviewing techniques, rather than an impartial oral historian, for the 
purpose of deriving more information from the interviewees. The other reason to 
take this approach was that the interview was not concerned with the interviewee’s 
life history but their specific relationship to the practice situation, and if possible 
evidence of their reflective practice. 
 
In each of the three documentary phases the interview questions were unstructured 
and guided by responses to the practitioners comments. Whilst the scope is provided 
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for the subjects to construct the data about their own practice, in collaboration with 
the interviewer, the interviewer’s questions are influenced by the background 
investigation into reflective practice. Harper (2013:182) suggests the following 
points in structuring of adequate questions in relation to interviews with art & 
design practitioners, which can be contrasted with my interview methods. 
 
• not asking leading or overly complex questions; 
• avoiding talking too much, or offering too much in the way of 
interpretation, so that the interviewer contributes too much to the 
narrative; 
• allowing for silence, so that the subject has time to reflect, or because silence 
can have its own eloquence; 
• using gestures and body language to encourage or prompt the subject, again 
so that the interviewer isn’t too prominent in the recording, and so that the 
recording isn’t overly punctuated by audible prompts. 
(Harper, 2013:182) 
 
The interview is therefore an opportunity to hear a visual artist’s ideas and 
observations in relation to their practice in their own words and in their own 
language. 
 
In the case of Swiss sculptor Andreas Reichlin the initial interview and case study 
documentary was filmed in his studio in 2008. The follow-up interview was also 
recorded at his studio in 2009, in a non-studio-practice situation. Both interviews 
were conducted in his native language of Swiss German and transcribed by a 
professional German Teacher in collaboration with the interviewer. The language of 
the interview was driven by necessity as Reichlin’s English was limited, however it 
was also considered to be an ideal research situation, in relation to oral history, to 
conduct the interview in the interviewee’s mother tongue, without the use of a 
translator (Field, 2009:174).  
 
Working and conducting research in Switzerland required that I learn to speak, write 
and translate German, but also learn to orally speak and understand the dialect of 
Swiss German, which whilst notably distinct as an oral language, does not exist in 
written form.  
 
Evans-Pritchard (1951:79, cited in Bradby, 2002) writes: “(...) in learning the 
language one learns the culture and the social system which are 
conceptualized in the language”. (Filep, 2009: 60) 
 
Undertaking the interview with Andreas Riechlin in his native language was 
advantageous also for establishing a rapport with him. However necessity of 
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translation in order to make this case study accessible to non-German speaking 
readers, introduced a research method that required careful consideration.  
 
Translation, defined as transcribing the text of a source language into the 
target language (Gau et al., 2008), is more than just “changing the words”, or 
as Temple (2002:4–5) points out: “communication across languages involves 
more than just a literal transfer of information”. Therefore, as Simon 
(1996:137–138, cited in Temple, 2002: 5) writes: “The solutions to many of the 
translator’s dilemmas are not to be found in dictionaries, but rather in an 
understanding of the way language is tied to local realities, to literary forms 
and to changing identities. Translators must constantly make decisions about 
the cultural meanings which language carries, and evaluate the degree to 
which the two different worlds they inhibit are ‘the same’.” We have to 
understand language as “an important part of conceptualization, 
incorporating values and beliefs, (…). [Language] carries accumulated and 
particular cultural, social, and political meanings that cannot simply be read 
off through the process of translation” (Temple, 2002:5). (Filep, 2009: 60) 
 
Considering the implications of research into translation, I employed a bilingual 
Swiss/English translator to aid my own translation ability. I then reviewed the 
transcription together with the interviewee and the translator, to discuss specific 
meanings. The transcription detailed in full in the appendix is used together with the 
audio-visual documentary presented as a Quicktime movie, which is not subtitled. 
 
In the case of the American painter Laurence Karasek, the initial informal 
conversation was not recorded, as it took place at a busy public exhibition and was a 
spontaneous meeting. During this initial meeting Karasek agreed to accommodate 
the second stage documentary process. The second stage documentary was filmed in 
his studio and documented the development of a new painting ‘Bloom’ from his 
garden series from commencement to completion. During the filming two cameras 
were running; a static camera documenting a wide shot which encompassed the 
painting and the table on which Karasek mixed the paints, and handheld close ups 
from multiple angles. The raw footage was edited down to 20 minutes. The follow 
up third stage interview in which Karasek was filmed watching himself work was 
filmed in my studio. The length of the edit proved problematic for Karasek as he 
wanted to see more than twenty minutes, during the third stage interview therefore 
we watched the edited version twice and then a selection of the raw footage tapes. 
 
In the case of the interview with American performance artist Patrick Sims his studio 
in Barcelona was the chosen location. Upon arrival however, the work in progress I 
had hoped to film had already been completed, prior to a major new performance in 
the L’ Antic theatre, Barcelona. The interview therefore has a different character 
then the first two in this series in that it is presented as a standalone interview. The 
selection of this subject was taken as his work ranged across the creative spectrum 
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and provided a case study that was distinct from the traditional visual art disciplines 
of painting and sculpture. 
 
In both Karasek’s and Sims’ case studies the interviews are conducted in English. 
 
5.4    Attending to the Details  of Documentary Filmmaking as a 
Research Tool 
 
Equipment: 
 
The following case studies where made with minimal filmmaking equipment. Two 
Canon MD205 digital video cameras with Hama tripods were used. Whilst this 
camera would not be described as a professional model and could not produce 
broadcast quality material, it is a good quality camera with a good internal 
microphone, from which the transcriptions detailed in this thesis were easily made. 
The smaller size of the camera was also considered advantageous for being less 
intrusive.  
 
The raw footage was recorded on Mini DV tape and edited using standard iMovie 
software. The resulting documentaries have been saved as QuickTime movies and 
saved onto an external memory sticks that accompany this thesis. 
 
Duration: 
 
The duration of each interview was chosen in response to each case study. In the 
case of Andreas Riechlin, I responded to something he said in the first initial stage in 
order to adapt the length of the second phase of the documentary process. He 
stated that he can work for several hours at a time and that short hour-long sessions 
are useless for him. If he had only an hour he would just clean the studio and not 
commence work. In response to this I filmed the second stage over a full day studio 
session. In Laurence Karasek’s case the second stage documentary captured the 
development of a new art work from start to finish in an intense four hour session.  
 
Incorporating flexibility into the duration of the data collection process I felt was 
necessary in order to respond to the individual circumstances surrounding each case 
study. 
 
Ethics  
 
During the first stage meetings with each of the participants, both the purpose of 
the films and the use to which they would be put, was made explicit. Participants 
were requested to sign a consent form giving the researcher the right to use the 
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films for non-commercial, educational and research purposes. The form explains that 
any use of the material not covered by the agreement will require the consent of 
interviewee. The form is aligned with Chapter IV of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988, in regard to the interviewee’s moral rights. A copy of the form is 
included as an Appendix. 
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5.5  Case Study 3:  Andreas Reichlin ,  Sculptor 
 
Refer to file ‘1. Andrew Gray - Case Study Andreas Reichlin.mov', on the 
accompanying external hard-drive.  
 
Andreas Reichlin (born 1968) lives and works in 
Immensee, Switzerland. Having began his sculpture 
career using wood and trained at Académie de la 
Grande Chaumiere carpentier in Paris, he 
progressively transferred his media of choice to 
metal. This progression from the rectangular blocks 
of wood to the cylindrical steel tubes can still be seen 
outside of his studio. For over a decade Reichlin has been abstracting the forms of 
the cylinder, drawing his inspiration from nature. He describes the qualities of taut 
surfaces, sweeping edges and perfect finishes as the basic elements with which he 
seeks the reduction to the essential forms of nature. 
 
Having begun working with solid steel tubing, 
cutting, inverting, and reattaching the sections of 
tubing to achieve the wave-like forms characteristic 
of his work, the restrictions on the size of his 
sculptures was imposed by weight. Andreas 
developed and employed an alternative technique in 
which he could replicate the character of the solid 
tubing by making hollow structures out of refabricated sheet metal. This case study 
follows the development of one such structure. 
 
Figure 26: (Reichlin, 2010) Untitled 
(last accessed 18.9.14) 
http://www.andreasreichlin.com 
 
 
Figure 23: Film still #1 
Figure 24: Film still #2 
Figure 25: Film still #3 
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Andreas Reichlin: I know now, but at the time I had 
completely forgotten, just forgotten, that you where 
there, I was so into the work. (Gray, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
This is a commonality I have found in my case studies, 
casual conversations with other practitioners, and my 
own practice. There appears to be a form of ‘focal 
disappearance’, in which all sensory information 
superfluous to the immediate act of making can be 
screened out. This is an issue that will be taken up 
later in this thesis as it relates to questions of 
mindfulness, concentration, habitualization and awareness. 
 
AR: […] When I have a new idea I put what I’m doing aside and I make a small 
model from the new work, very spontaneously. I have to realize the ideas 
immediately. 
 
[…]You mean whether the form changes? I think not, no, I think…. I have a 
very clear vision how I’d like to do it. Then comes only the craftwork to realize it. 
And the problem is that when you have a small model you can make it very 
spontaneously, very quickly, it is complete, it is correct, it is right.  
 
AG: Its not so much work? 
 
AR: Exactly, and if you are working one month or two months on the same 
sculpture then it means that you have to bring during the whole time the same 
quality as you brought in, in 5 or 6 hours (making the small model). And this is 
very difficult, that the large sculptures have the same power, spontaneity, and 
clarity. You see I’m working already a long time on this, I work, and work, and 
that it has this lightness, this calmness, that it is self-evident 
(Selbstverständlichkeit). You don’t need to ask what for and why, its logical, it is 
just normal, it is just here. (Gray, 2009) 
 
Sculpting the larger forms appeared therefore, to be something of a means to an end 
where the form does not alter from the maquette to the final piece. Might Reichlin 
therefore, be described as engaged in the ‘sport’ of welding to some degree, working 
as an artisan to manufacture his design? The question could be posed as to whether 
he could commission an artisan to manufacture his design for him? Having watched 
Reichlin working the struggle to translate the spontaneously conceived form from 
the maquette through a process of months into the final sculpture is not something 
that can be simply scaled up. The nature of the form changes with the scale. He is 
not therefore operating as an welder might do building a ship, faithfully following 
the design. He is responding to the qualities of the media and adjusting his design as 
he moves through the process of making. This process might be simply described 
Figure 27: Film still #4 
Figure 28: Film still #5 
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through the mountaineering metaphor from Schön’s et. al., (1983) case studies 
exploring ‘learning as a reflective conversation with materials’.  
 
This unplanned move serves as the piton whereby her reflective conversation 
carries her beyond what she knows already. (Bamberger & Schön, 1983: 72) 
 
Schön’s idea here is that as the practitioner ‘ascends’ the practice situation, the 
practitioner places pitons to secure them. Despite this mountaineering metaphor the 
conversational metaphor is still central to his description of practice. I must stress 
that I do not see Reichlin’s practice in these terms.  
 
The difference for me is that in the studio of Andreas Reichlin, these explorations of 
metal and form, also explore in parallel, integrally and as a prerequisite for action, 
inferences, metaphorical projections, and conceptual blends. Andreas may have 
other names for these capacities, but whether or not he is aware of them only on a 
subconscious level he is exercising these human capacities in ways that a commercial 
welder may not. These inferences both emerging from practice and feeding through 
the practical work are projected metaphorically onto abstract domains. One such 
example is starkly literal. The philosophy of the sculptures, as Andreas has stated, is 
that the inside is turned outside.  
 
AR: The inner part of the heart 
(demonstrates sweeping gesture 
curving his hands from his chest 
out in front of him) is made like 
this – (Spoken in English) this is the 
inside – this is the inside (referring 
to concave areas of the sculpture 
that are facing outwards) 
The inside comes outside – (spoken 
in German) that is the idea and the 
philosophy – I know it only that is 
the dosha, that is the name (of the 
sculpture) ‘dosha’ and that’s why 
there’s also the contact (touches 
the sculpture). (Gray, 2009) 
 
For Andreas, the ‘dosha’, refers to Ayurvedic medicine and specifically the three 
energies believed to be in the body, which govern physiological activity. The dosha is 
projected outwardly and revealed to the world. Whilst it is not my intention at this 
point, to begin discussing the validity of this reference, Andreas’s belief in this 
expression of these energies provides an interesting contrast to the physicality of 
the structures he creates. In Andreas’s sculptures the physical frame of reference is a 
cylinder. The cylinder is sliced top to bottom, and the slice is flipped vertically, 
leaving the inside of the cylinder facing outward. The literal metaphorical 
projection, from the qualities of the cylinder, to the human being, is not difficult to 
Figure 29: film still #6 
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map. What for me differentiates this sculptural activity from metal work as a 
commercial profession, in this case, is not the claim that it is an expression of the 
soul, but rather that the form, the source domain of which is a manipulated cylinder, 
has been projected onto an abstract domain, whose source is the human being, or at 
least a concept of transcendental otherness, invented by a human being. 
 
Andreas had never heard of the concept of ‘image schemata’, or any of Johnson’s 
(1987) theories pertaining to a bodily-basis of meaning, nor does his practice require 
him to. If he had however, he may have been aware that his principle forms, ‘the 
inside/outside metaphor’, graphically illustrates the in/out schema as presented by 
Johnson in ‘The Body in the Mind’ (1987). The image schemata for a container, is 
that it has an inside, an outside, and a boundary. The ‘containment’ schemata can be 
mapped onto external objects such as a glass, a room, a metal cylinder, a country 
etc., but its source domain is the human body, our insides, the outside, and our skin 
that divides ‘us’ from that which is ‘not us’. Andreas Reichlin’s explorations of form 
in this respect are, to quote Johnson (2007), ‘an exemplary example of human 
meaning making’. Intuitively Andreas Reichlin’s inversion of the container not only 
makes use of an integral meaning structure that is forcibly rooted in the human 
body, but manipulates it to create novelty. It is exemplary because it provides a 
platform for further projection. The sculpture he was working on in August 2008, 
when I first filmed him in his studio, was his first exploration of working with pieces 
whose circumference totalled more than 360 degrees. As with his earlier work the 
cylindrical form was mapped metaphorically onto the human body, or rather vice 
versa. The complete circle represented a human life, more than one circle therefore 
must represent more than one human life. With this simple formula as an 
underlying structure, the sculpture was provided a platform to be an 
exploration/expression of ‘love’, union and human relationships.  
 
AR: Except this one I’m working on now, that is 
more. This is 360 (gestures the initial shape) and 
another piece, more comes in. This is for me… I 
mean this work symbolizes love.  
 
AG: That totals more than a whole circle? 
 
AR: Yes, something more comes into it. When you 
are in love there is always someone else involved, a 
second person comes in from outside and that’s 
why it is more than a circle. (Gray, 2009) 
 
Again there is a clear metaphorical structure between the notion of the cylinder 
representing a human being. In this case the 360 degrees have been added to we 
therefore have two human beings. I enquired whether the idea in this respect grew 
out of the experience of practice, the qualities of the materials, tools, workspace 
Figure 30: film still #7 
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etc., but Andreas stated that the form originally conceived spontaneously in a 
maquette, did not change on route to being a finished large scale sculpture.  
 
AG: Once you have made the model and then you move to the larger piece, you 
encounter this problem, this machine, this new process, this quality in the 
polishing, does a new concept emerge through the process, through the 
material, the time you have, the space you have, your experience of the work? 
The metal is hot, sharp, heavy, you expend so mush energy, do all these 
processes change the idea from the original model? 
 
AR: You mean whether the form changes? I think not, no, I think…. I have a 
very clear vision how I’d like to do it. Then comes only the craftwork to realize it. 
And the problem is that when you have a small model you can make it very 
spontaneously, very quickly, it is complete, it is correct, it is right. (Gray, 2009) 
 
In practical terms I believe there is evidence that what Andreas says here is true of 
his practice. In retrospect however, I believe I could have been more thorough with 
my elicitation. I ought to have asked in that moment, whether the spontaneously 
conceived maquette, was influenced by qualities of the material. Further more I 
believe an inquiry into Andreas’s early work is necessary in order to find the origins 
of some of his principle forms, which are irrevocable bound to the form of the 
cylinder. 
 
AG: For me it is a very interesting question – what comes first – ok this is the 
quality, and for me, I can work with this quality and bring it to a metaphor for 
life, or do I have an idea, a concept of life and I must find something that 
displays that quality? Does the material and the process lead to the idea, or does 
the idea find the material and the process? 
 
AR: I think it is both. It is really both.  (Gray, 2009) 
 
For an investigation into what is distinct about NRM, and consequently visual art 
processes, the question as to whether the modifications subconsciously led Andreas 
to this idea and not the other way round. Later whilst discussing whether the idea 
preceded the practice or vice versa, he stated that he believed it to be both. 
However, I must recognise that it was very much a led question. The relationship 
between the practice situation and the quality of the completed sculptures was very 
apparent to me as an observer. 
 
AG: It is a huge contrast, this piece here is very quiet, its very stable, and the 
experience of the piece is a calm experience, but 
the practice to make it is the total opposite.  
 
AR: Exactly! 
 
AG: It is loud and heavy… 
 
AR: …and hot 
 
Figure 31: film still #8 
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AG: ..and hot, and I have seen when you work that you make small pauses as if 
it’s a reward, of as if the stillness in your pause is the quality you wish the 
sculpture eventually to have. 
 
AR: I find that really beautiful what you have just said. I have never been aware 
of that.  The work is loud, extremely, with the machines and other things, and 
the sculpture is quiet. You don’t feel the work anymore. It is quiet, still. This is a 
totally new aspect. (Gray, 2009) 
 
I must pose the question as to how can such a fundamental aspect of the practice 
situation be obscured from his conscious awareness? There is no question that 
Andreas Reichlin was attendant to the physical sensations of the practice situation. 
How many times has he cut himself on a sharp piece of metal, burnt himself, had his 
fingers crushed under the weight of the metal? How many times have his eye’s felt 
dry from the dust, been blinded by the welding arc, how many times have his ears 
been left ringing by hours of noise. One need only watch the documentary to realise 
these questions are descriptive of his practice. There is the sense of ‘focal 
disappearance’ (Leder, 1990) and its role in obscuring embodied experience from 
conscious awareness, and consequently from central theories of the mind for much 
of philosophical history, put forward by Drew Leder in his book, ‘The absent body’ 
(1990), but Reichlin’s experience of practice is certainly internalised. Neither is there 
any question that Reichlin is aware of the physical quality of the silent and 
immovable sculpture. What is interesting is that he had not considered the 
relationship between these two qualities. In some ways it is indicative of a view of 
practice as a means to an end, and Reichlin has expressed that once realised in 
miniature the larger sculptures follow a very clear design. However, the silence 
achieved by the work is only achieved through the noise of practice. The bringing 
together of these two experiences of the object under construction and the object at 
rest on its plinth is an example of a conceptual blend that clearly held significance 
for Reichlin.  
 
AR: You know it would be great to, for example, for an exhibition, if you see 
the work, just this sculpture, you just see only that… but when you close your 
eyes, you know you hear just the audio. That fascinates me now! 
 
 
 
AG: You’d play just the soundtrack from the process, no images. 
 
AG: (turns the light down on the computer screen – both AG & AR listen to the 
audio) [See Figure 32.1 & 32.2] 
Figure 32.1: film still#9 Figure 32.2: film still#10 Figure 33: film still#11
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AR: It’s really exciting (listening to the audio with no images) It’s the essence. 
 
AR: You told me something which I 
have never forgotten, you told me, I 
work in such noise, emissions, with 
such a lot of noise, always (points to 
ears), When the work is finished the 
sculpture is silent. That’s what you 
told me. I’ll never forget this. That was 
amazing. It was when we spoke here a 
year ago. I could imagine to place a 
sculpture in a room where you hear 
only the sound of its making, its 
development. Do you understand? 
The sound of the process, just the sound, not visual. The sound of the chains, the 
power tools… For once no music, just this sound. With really good speakers, 
good quality recording. That is really cool. I will do that at the next exhibition! 
(Gray, 2009) 
 
Reflexively I must acknowledge my role in influencing the outcomes of this part of 
the interview session. However, as stated in the methodology, my role as a 
researcher is also the stance of a sympathetic and informed collaborator (Harper, 
2013). Practitioners share ideas, influence and inspire one another because they can. 
A similar language is spoken, visually and contextually for the purpose of edification 
and mutual benefit. I do not consider with negative connotations the result of this 
particular interaction. Indeed, I believe it could be mutually beneficial both to this 
research and to Andreas Reichlin’s practice. This physical attribute of his practice is 
now cemented in his thought processes through his awareness and perception of the 
relationship between his practice and the resulting sculptures. Just as the physical 
attributes of the cylinder where mapped onto an in/out schema, the physical 
attributes of action and rest are now prevalent themes. What Andreas will do with 
this is yet to be seen. He has already elected to actively record the studio ambiance 
and play it at his next exhibition. What will it mean if he takes the idea further into 
the sculptures themselves?  
 
Unlike Schön’s (1983) exemplars of reflection-in-action, where there was often an 
andragogical relationship occurring that necessitated dialogue and linguistic 
interpretations of the situation, I may generalise from experience and my case 
studies that in visual art practice the practitioner is predominately operating alone 
in a private space. There is little interpersonal dialogue or any utterances at all in 
these cases during the time when the practitioner is engaged in the act of making. I 
for one can testify to having worked in my own studio for several hours without 
having uttered a sound. Throughout the time I have spent observing Andreas 
Reichlin working in his studio, he has made no utterances whatever. The reflective 
conversation Schön describes can here only operate metaphorically, of course the 
Figure 34: film still # 12 
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notion of the situation ‘talking back’ to the practitioner, was only ever meant 
metaphorically.  
 
The two kinds of reflection can be thought of as two kinds of “talking back”. 
In the first, the makers talk back to the materials (reshaping them); in the 
second, the materials talk back to the makers, reshaping what the makers 
know about them. The distinction is, in a sense, moot since materials don’t 
“talk” and the “talk” of the makers is most often (but not always) action 
rather than words. Further, the back-talk of the materials is only to the 
extent that the makers “hear” it- i.e., the current state of the makers’ 
knowledge-in-action strongly conditions what they recognise and apprehend 
as the “message” implicit in the current state of the materials. In turn, the 
makers’ talk back to the materials is not “heard” by the materials except to 
the extent that these are re-shaped in some way. (Bamberger & Schön, 1983: 
68) 
 
Johnson (2007: 9) provides a strong case that human meaning traffics as images, 
patterns, qualities and feelings before emerging into language. What happens to 
Schön’s (1983) conversational metaphor when meaning is viewed in this way? What 
other metaphorical structures can we use to describe the processes governing the 
act of creative making? I propose care be taken with the conversational metaphor. 
Schön’s paper on generative metaphor (1970) explores the case of slum housing 
where the underlying metaphor of the slum is as a ‘blight’ or ‘disease’. Schön (1970) 
claims this encourages corresponding medical remedies, including surgery to remove 
the blight. Reliance upon an inappropriate metaphor can have negative 
consequences. Schön (1970) continues by suggesting that if the underlying 
metaphor is the slum is that of a "natural community", then this orients any 
response in terms of enhancing the life of that community. For 
Schön then the way in which a problem is framed depends upon 
the underlying metaphors and conversely the metaphor in use 
sets the direction of problem solving. What alternatives might be 
taken to describe the relationship a practitioner has to the 
materials in the act of making? What if the metaphor dealt with 
qualities or gesture? 
 
Figure 35: film still (sequence) # 13 
 
Gesture cuts through language to a level of pre-linguistic 
meaning, just as Andreas Riechlin’s hand cuts the air to trace the 
form he feels in his mind.  
 
AG: (Stops the film, and refers to a gesture made by AR, in 
which he models the shape of a form he is marking for being 
cut with his hands) What is that? 
 
AR: There? That’s the inside. The soul – did I do that before? 
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AG: You made it one time with your hand like this, (gesturing the motion), 
then you made it now like this (gesturing again). 
 
AR: Ok. There I’m trying to formulate the thoughts that I have. To bring 
them into a form, a connecting platform, connecting the plastic and my 
thoughts. It’s like drawing in space, it is the form so I can feel how it has to 
function. So the form is correct. I think that is the point.  
 
AG: For the practical work, this gesturing with the hand has no direct 
function, as such. The metal work itself doesn’t come further. But for the 
body, to make this (gesturing the form), what you said, ‘drawing in space’, 
it’s a way to take the form. 
 
AR: Exactly, it’s a way to take the form. When I feel it like that in the space I 
can eliminate the mistakes. If I don’t make this, then it is much more work to 
repair the mistake. Here I can just feel it. It’s like a sketch.  
 
AG: If it was possible to cut the metal only with your hand… 
 
AR: That would be cool. I think that would be a dream. (Gray, 2009) 
 
When questioned on this gesture Reichlin is able to realise the function articulately 
but had been unaware that he was doing it. It would indeed be a dream if he cut the 
metal with his hand directly, but in all actuality the reality is far more interesting. 
The processes he has to go through to overcome the resistance of matter and its 
relationship to his will is something the phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard explored 
in ‘Earth and the reveries of will’ (1943).  
 
Of course we learn from material reality. In handling diverse and quite 
distinctive types of matter, we develop our own individual patterns of flexibility 
and resolution. Not only do we become adept at crafting forms, we become 
materially skilful at balancing our strength against the resistance of matter.  
(Bachelard, 1943: 19) 
 
Andreas Reichlin has certainly become adept at 
balancing his strength against the resistance of 
matter. Andreas was in ‘mid flow’, he had attached a 
‘block-and-tackle’ to an affixed appendage, the 
purpose of which was to forcibly twist a section of the 
sculpture. As he was about to apply the necessary force 
when he paused, looked questioningly at the area and 
raised a finger into the air, in a classic gesture of ‘hold 
that thought’. 
 
He leaned on the sculpture for approximately a minute, 
pondering the implications of his actions. He had only 
lightly welded a major section of the sculpture to the 
Figure 36: film still #14 
Figure 37: film still #15 
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main trunk because he would soon have to remove it altogether in order to access 
and complete a ‘hard to reach’ section. The risk however, was that the welding 
would not be strong enough to cope with the pressure. Andreas therefore had to 
assess and quantify the threshold at which the most minimal welding would hold 
the force he intended to exert.  
 
AR: Exactly, That’s why I have to weld this 
now, even though I must take it away 
again later. ‘What happens when I lift this 
piece up’, ‘The other piece breaks apart’ – 
It’s a shame. This is what I was thinking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AG: Yes, ‘how much must you fix it…’ 
 
AR: As little as possible because I must cut 
it again. 
 
AG: That is just with your feeling? You 
must have a lot of experience with metal to 
understand how little you can afford to fix 
it without it breaking. 
 
AR: That is somehow, (points to his heart) feeling  
 
AG: How long have you worked with metal? 
 
AR: When did I begin to work with metal, about 10 years, not so long.  
(Gray, 2009) 
 
The questioning in this regard was rather a led interview technique, however I 
consider Reichlin’s responses genuinely his own. The tacit knowing displayed in 
Reichlin’s sense of this situation is consciously acknowledged as a qualitative feeling 
as opposed to a quantitative measurement. In knowing-in-action, Schön’s (1983) 
description of the tacit knowing implicit in skillful performance when practice is 
going well, might be considered adequate to explain the ‘feeling’ Reichlin uses to 
guide his actions in this instance. Likewise reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983) can 
adequately describe the processes cycled through, when he encountered this 
potential problem, paused and proceeded with caution. However, the question as to 
whether the reflective conversation analogy is an adequate framing of the situation 
requires further research to probe the layers of nonverbal embodied experience and 
Figure 38: film still #16 
Figure 39: film still #17 
Figure 40: film still #18 
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its role in shaping experience. To this end the following chapter will explore theories 
of embodied mind.  
Figure 41: film still (sequence) # 19 
  
AR: (referring to his actions on screen) Now its 
good. Do you see this small adjustment to make it 
curve upwards? Do you see it now, I’m pulling? 
This is so exciting – I’ve never seen such a film! 
This is the first time [I’ve watched myself 
working] 
 
 AG: So you must cut this away? 
 
AR: (gesturing a twisting motion with his hands) 
The upper piece is like this, so the back part must 
twist more. It has to have more power. 
 
AG: How do you define what is the right form 
from the form that feels wrong? 
 
AR: You can see it with these forms (gestures the 
angle of the curve in front of the screen). This is a 
principle of the forms. If you twist one side this 
way the other has to go in the opposite direction. 
When it’s straight it is somehow dead. It is cut. If 
it twists its like it’s like it’s grown. 
 
AG: Organic? 
 
AR: Exactly, Grown, like a plant. It’s totally 
normal. You can feel it now it has to be like this, in 
this form. (Gray, 2009) 
 
Firstly Reichlin’s reaction to watching himself working is overwhelmingly positive. 
In this instance he is observing the success in his actions. In twisting the metal he is 
finding the form he has drawn in space with his hand. It occurred to me that the 
dimensions of the curve on the metal sculpture approximately fit the circumference 
of his extended arm where the centre point is his shoulder. The curves drawn in 
space correlate to his bodily movement just as his notion that ‘straight is dead, and 
something twisted is grown’ correlate to his observations of nature.  
 
The time Reichlin spends in his studio is split into two main sections:  
 
1. The majority of the time is spent sculpting the large-scale structures over 
months, attempting to capture the essence of the form conceived in… 
2. …the maquette, which are spontaneously created in a matter of hours. 
 
There are of course the occasions when he has only an hour or so, a time period, 
which for Reichlin is problematic. 
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AG: Do you find you can work for 2, 3 hours without pause? 
 
AR: 5 or 6 hours, no problem. 
 
AG: I find that when the work is going well then I have no feeling for the 
time. 
 
AR: Yes, you have no feeling for the time. You say ‘the flow’, when you are in 
it. But there are also days when I cannot even work for one hour, then I need 
to go away because it doesn’t work, or I clean the studio. 
 
There are no occasions when he would willingly consider suspending action to 
commence recording or reporting on practice. As Scrivener (2000) states, it is simply 
not necessary for action. From the methodological approach of collecting qualitative 
data however, this case study has shown a number of instances when the recording 
and reporting on Reichlin’s practice has been beneficial. Perhaps most prevalent is 
the moment Reichlin realised that there is a relationship between the diametric 
juxtaposition of the making process and the finished sculpture. Another important 
aspect of his practice, which he had not been previously aware of, was the role that 
drawing in space, using his natural arm movement, plays in helping him feel the 
form he is trying to create. These aspects came to light from the process of being 
filmed by a ‘sympathetic, informed, collaborator’ (Harper, 2013). It must be 
concluded that for Reichlin and consequently for practitioners employing 
naturalistic reflection, where the will to employ a constructed reflective method is 
lacking, significant insights can still be gained by recording and reviewing practice 
together with an informed collaborator. 
 
For Reichlin, the terms knowing-in-action and reflection-in-action, are not employed 
in his practice. However, it is clear that Andreas does possess what Schön (1983) 
describes as knowing-in-action in the sense that he demonstrates tacit knowing 
implicit in skillful performance when practice is going well. Evidence can be seen in 
many instances throughout the documentary, how he attaches the clamps, welds 
the appendages and expertly handles the wide range of potentially hazardous power 
tools in his studio. It is clear also that Andreas reflects-in-action in the way that 
Schön (1983) describes, cycling through the process when problems are encountered 
in practice, such as the moment when he was forced to suspend action and consider 
the threshold of a temporary weld he intended to put under pressure. However, 
there is another layer to the naturalistic reflection Reichlin employs, it is the 
emergent tacit dimension that Scrivener (2000) lists amongst aspects of practice to 
be reported on. It is in the discovering of the form by drawing in space, the feel of 
the ‘organic twist’ that is synonymous with life, and the capacity to recognise the 
right form when it is gradually moved toward. Of key importance to visual art 
practice is the generation of meaning on a pre-linguistic, nonverbal, tacit level, 
which emerges through the embodied experience of practice and only later, into 
conceptual, descriptive language. This additional layer of meaning is distinct from 
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Schön’s (1983) categorization of the moments when practice is going well (knowing-
in-action) and the process of overcoming a problem (reflection-in-action). It is this 
process of generating meaning through practice that enables the outcomes of 
practice to contribute to human experience (Scrivener, 2000: 6), or be an exemplary 
example of human meaning making processes (Johnson, 2007). 
 
Taking into account Schön’s et. al., (1983) recognition that his conversational 
metaphor is not dependant on the exchange of words, it still frames the way we 
review this exchange as a conversation. It suggests two distinct entities expressing 
and responding to each other, which is anthropomorphic in nature. It is a calculated 
simplification of a complex cognitive process that is useful in many everyday 
situations. This simplification has been proved to be beneficial to domains where the 
embodied experience of practice is not of central importance, say, psychology, town 
planning and design, for example. However, I propose that the conversational 
metaphor belies the embodied nature of reflection-in-action in visual art practice. 
Where the phenomenological quality of the tools, the space, the materials etc., are 
central to the meaning generated through the practitioner’s experience of them, the 
metaphorical structure framing visual art practice might benefit from exploring 
accounts of pre-linguistic and non-verbal meaning, as an alternatives to a 
conversational metaphor. 
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5.6  Case Study 4  –  Interview with Laurence Karasek ,  Painter 
 
Refer to file ‘2. Andrew Gray - 0027081 - Interview with Laurence Karasek.mov’, on 
the accompanying external hard-drive. 
 
Having pursued a formal education in painting at the Royal School of Art in London 
during the early 1960’s, Laurence Karasek found the only medium through which to 
deal with the increasingly challenging ideas in the art of the time, to be sculpture. 
By the time Laurence Karasek was a nationally known and respected sculptor in 
New Zealand in the early 1970’s, he met Clement Greenberg. This meeting inspired 
Laurence to relocate to New York where he came into contact with many leading 
artists, including Dennis Oppenheim, whose Metaphorical Minimalism evoked the 
sentiment of ‘reduction’ so characteristic of the Avant Garde in New York at the 
time, was an element he was later to react strongly against.  
 
In New York Laurence continued to refine his adopted medium, exhibiting widely 
and continuing as a lecturer of art by becoming the Chair of the Art Department at 
the University of Montana. In the early 1980’s, after becoming a member of the 
board at the Sculpture Residency Programme in New York, Laurence began to 
seriously investigate the painterly aspects of his art practice.  
 
 
The following case study was conducted in Switzerland in Laurence Karasek’s studio. 
The follow up interview which filmed Laurence watching himself working was 
filmed later in my art studio, also in Switzerland. 
Figure 42: film still #20 
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LK: This is all part of the process, when I think about my painting, I don’t 
usually, since I’m alone in the studio, talk. So this will be an interesting 
articulation of my thinking without actually having to paint. Which is 
another commitment and obligation. So it’s a commentary on a commentary. 
So its a learning thing for me, an informative, instructive thing for me to do. 
I’m happy about that so go ahead. (Gray, 2006) 
 
Documentary is played – duration 20mins 
 
AG: How is it starting on that kind of fresh, virgin paper? 
 
LK: Terrible, its totally difficult. Enormous, problematic. That’s a nice detail. 
(Gray, 2006) 
 
As with the previous case study Laurence viewed the process of being filmed in his 
studio and interviewed positively. Karasek commences work on a new painting. It is 
a series of abstractions based on garden imagery. The particular photograph he is 
working from depicts a close up of flowering bush. The difference between the 
image and the final painting however is clearly evident. 
 
AG: The story about the flowers, I somehow got 
the feeling that the photograph wasn’t 
important at all, it was arbitrary. It was just a 
means, a vehicle, to get started. 
 
Figure 44: LK archive 
Figure 43: film still #21 
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Figure 45: (Karasek, 2006) Blooms 38" x 51", Oil on Paper (last accessed 18.9.14) 
http://cargocollective.com/LaurenceKarasek/Garden-Series 
 
LK: Yes, actually you are correct, it’s just a starting point, to have a subject to 
translate from. Rather than working as an abstract expressionist works, […] I 
am trying to have the same kind of freshness of the moment, but at that 
moment an indication of structure and space also. So flatness is also a 
replication of a special concept. So the lines are – Here I’m fairly, I notice that 
my body language is fairly intense. 
 
AG: there’s a lot of swaying back and forth. 
 
LK: Yes. It’s quite a dance […](Gray, 2006) 
 
One of the immediate characteristics of his engagement with the painting was the 
tenseness of his body and gesture, something that he commented on himself. In a 
way similar to Reichlin, Karasek can be seen drawing in space the form he intends to 
mark upon the surface.  
 
AG: This movement with the hand, are you 
aware of doing that?  
 
LK: Not so much. I’m aware of the fact that its 
extremely intense, I want to make sure I don’t 
Figure 46: film still #22 
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succumb to accidental or casual lines, although they look accidental they’re 
not. They’re very deliberate […](Gray, 2006) 
 
To some degree this act of gesturing passes unconsciously for Karasek, and yet it is 
evidence of an acute sense of embodiment in the act of making. It presents itself as a 
means of feeling the form through bodily movement. Karasek can be seen making 
these gestures throughout the process. I questioned him upon it earlier in the 
interview and he presented a conceptual account of the process. 
 
AG: So here you are trying to visualize the lines before you make them? 
 
LK: No they signify, a structure that I’m perversely creating with different 
colours and lines and so on, which is in turn an abstraction, because I’m not a 
camera, so I’m doing it in fragments, with one stroke after another. So its an 
interpretive process actually. When I try to structure the form of the image of 
the flowers, of the space and the form of the flowers structured on the surface 
of the paper, it’s the way that its connected, every part is connected to the 
other and as I’m doing it there are certain masses of form accumulations of 
form that I feel, like stacking of things, or contrasts of types of forms, or 
connections or groups, actually groupings of forms, so that they form clusters, 
they form associations and they have a compositional structure that I’m trying 
to resolve, but not frontally, its in fragments as one brush stroke or line at a 
time. It’s trying to do the whole thing in one moment. (Gray, 2006) 
 
The idea that the painting process is interpretive echoes something Harland is 
quoted earlier as saying: 
 
I think moving towards something that is unknown is important. Foucault 
calls it ‘working at the edge of an un-thought, slowly building a language in 
which to think it’.’’ (Beth Harland, 2006: 12) 
 
It is this very process of moving towards something that is unknown that I consider 
distinct from either knowing-in-action or reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983). Karasek, 
like Harland, has a clear agenda to his process, what he calls: 
 
LK: […] a self generating rule system, of 
restriction and limitation, versus fullness, and 
the luscious flowing sensual paint and all that. 
If you can imagine a conceptual feast that is 
being eaten with a tiny spoon [laughs], this is 
basically the sensation I have. I have this 
enormous complex structure, which I 
understand, which is dynamic, dynamic in the 
classic sense of having energy and connection, 
but at the same time its also structural in a 
chemical way of this relating to that and that 
relating to this. (Gray, 2006) 
 
However, both painters are also moving through an unknowing-in-action, which is 
experiential rather than problem solving. The responses are not just to the media 
but also to the layers of nonverbal meaning emerging through the connections. 
Figure 47: film still #23 
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AG: This whole process here now, we were discussing this before, you’re 
struggling with this area of the painting… 
 
LK: Well, there’s always a part of the painting, which is problematic, more 
difficult and it’s usually the left hand side for some reason. 
 
AG: Did that mark satisfy that area?  
 
LK: Yes, this mark counter balances this darker 
area here. It relieves the pressure of this, as a 
compensation for that dark area, filled in area, 
I’m trying to draw form, and trying to avoid 
drawing form. […] I mean, it’s a way of contrasts 
and dynamic contrasts where you have different 
things that balance each other out, so it’s a 
dynamic action. So you can accept what it is 
without changing it by doing something else. It’s 
a very important concept actually, accepting what it is with out fussing over it 
so that you can deal with the reality of the moment by taking another action 
which then explains and defines the thing that 
you’re having a problem with which is perhaps 
the work or something that isn’t quite right 
you can actually interpret that phenomenon in 
an external, by going out of the problem, by 
going external, to an external expression of it 
that is different and away from it. That was a 
good shot where you had the close up, I had no 
idea what you were doing with the camera. 
(Gray, 2006) 
 
I consider Karasek’s comments in this section to be synonymous with reflection-in 
and –on-action, and also generative metaphor, which suggests that Karasek has an 
intuitive understanding of the reflective processes Schön (1983) describes albeit 
called by different names. The notion also of ‘accepting what it is with out fussing 
over it so that you can deal with the reality of the moment’, suggests a state of 
mindfulness in the midst of the practice situation. The scene moves to show Karasek 
modelling the movement of the line again without drawing it. This time Karasek 
notices it himself. 
 
Figure 48: film still #24 
Figure 49: film still #25 
Figure 50: film still #26 
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LK: Well, I’m trying to feel my way through the form there I’m trying… 
 
AG: Do you find that that helps you come to terms with that form when you 
play it out in the motion of the body first? 
 
LK: Yes, yes. 
 
AG: So its like sculpted in space before you make the mark? 
 
LK: Yes, it actually is. Pretty much. It’s very much a physical [pause] thinking 
process. (Gray, 2006) 
 
This was a very similar line of inquiry as with Andreas Reichlin, the role of gesture a 
as means of articulating form was evident in the case studies. However, there is a 
sense that is more to gesture than merely a means of mapping or rehearsing 
movement. McNeill (2005: 2) considers that the form of the gesture is driven by its 
meaning as much as by simulation. The pause before Karasek said ‘thinking process’ I 
felt was also significant, it was almost as if he was trying to find an alternative to 
saying ‘thinking’.  
 
AG: One comment I was going to make. The way the image is being built out 
here, [points to screen] its almost organic in some way. A kind of a tree like 
structure, there’s no marks going down here until there’re marks here to 
support it – its almost like its growing out of this. And once this becomes more 
stable, able to carry the weight of the line down there, then you start to move 
into the space. 
 
LK: Yes, there’s a stacking of form here, a stacking that begins here and moves 
up. Its true, its like when they build a bridge they start with the ends they 
build out and build out until the can meet in the middle. Its true its kind of like 
that. I’m impressed how compulsive I seem, driven and compulsive. It’s no 
wonder I get paint in my finger nails, [laughs] its totally, you can’t avoid being 
completely involved in the sensuality of the paint. (Gray, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 51: film still #27 
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Karasek’s response to watching the edited documentary increased in enthusiasm and 
he began giving a running commentary.  
 
LK: So here I’m really loading up the brush I’m 
going quite fast with the urgency of the idea 
that’s compelling and driving me right now, 
what I’m going to do with this colour. It looks 
like I need more fluid, so I’m going to poor some 
in. 
 
Scene changes – Laurence looks bemused. 
 
AG: we’re jumping ahead in time right now. 
 
LK: Oh. (Gray, 2006) 
 
Unfortunately his commentary was cut short by the edit. In this case the chosen 
research method was detrimental to the collection of data. It might have been 
better to review only the raw footage and allow Karasek to comment on the entire 
process.  
 
AG: I’m interested in this relationship between 
the painting and the photograph. There’s this 
continual marrying between… the choreography 
of the painting… you are engaged with the tool 
and the material, the stepping back continually, 
step back, mark, step back, mark, and also in that 
the photograph, mark, step back, there was a kind 
of continuity to the way you were structuring, 
layering… 
 
LK: Yeah, well it has to do with the body language of which the paintbrush, or 
oil stick or pencil, is a part, it’s the end of your arm, so you have a feeling of 
what you want to do that runs through your body. The body then 
automatically relates back your feeling to that point of action which is the end 
of the brush so the ideas, actually this is quite an interesting revelation in a 
way because the ideas that you want to create, that you conceive of, you feel 
when you look at your painting, the image you’re painting from, run all the 
way through the motor activity of your body into the physicality of the 
medium itself and the brush.  So it becomes all one. There’s no separation, the 
mind, the body, the pacing up and down on the floor, the verticality of the 
piece, the wall, the painting, its all part of the same physical existence.  
Is that the end of it?  
 
AG: It passed very quickly, didn’t it? 
 
LK: Yes, why did you cut so much of it out 
actually? Was it repetitive?  
 
Figure 52: film still #28 
Figure 53: film still #29 
Figure 54: film still #30 
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AG: Well I wasn’t sure how long we’d have for the interview, and 20 minutes 
seemed a concise section. 
 
LK: It passed very quickly, from the hour you spent filming me, seemed like 2 
mins. (Gray, 2006) 
 
Here the choice to edit the documentary into a 20 minute section was clearly an 
error. Karasek is just beginning to express a felt revelation, which I consider to be of 
considerable significance. The end of the documentary marked the end of his 
commentary. However, I consider it a success also that Karasek saw able to arrive at, 
and articulate, this revelation through the act of reviewing documentary imagery of 
himself working. I want to pull out this section of text and highlight it for further 
analysis.  
 
LK: […] The body then automatically relates back your feeling to that point of 
action, which is the end of the brush […](Gray, 2006) 
 
Here Karasek is reflecting-on-action about a cognitive process, which it might be 
convenient to call reflection-in-action, or a reflective conversation with a situation 
of materials, but I consider Karasek’s description to be richer. The conversational 
metaphor is a simplification of a complex cognitive process, which is inappropriate in 
this context. Karasek is describing how the body relates back a feeling. 
 
[…] actually this is quite an interesting revelation in a way because the ideas 
that you want to create, that you conceive of, you feel when you look at your 
painting […](Gray, 2006) 
 
In analysing the language Karasek uses in this context I find it noteworthy that he 
does not refer to thinking or reflecting, rather ‘the ideas you want to create… you 
feel’. It suggests a relationship to the act of making in which the ideas are far from 
preordained but are being refined in a very particular way. Karasek’s articulate 
description of practice continues in a way that supports the appropriateness of an 
embodied approach to reflection in visual art processes. 
 
[…] the image you’re painting from, runs all the way through the motor 
activity of your body into the physicality of the medium itself and the brush.  
So it becomes all one. There’s no separation, the mind, the body, the pacing up 
and down on the floor, the verticality of the piece, the wall, the painting, its all 
part of the same physical existence. […](Gray, 2006) 
 
I consider this to be a significant account of visual arts practice and more 
transparent in its clarity than reflective. It suggests a multiplicity of embodied 
connections occurring in the flux of moment-by-moment perceptions. There is no 
need to simplify this beautiful cognitive process by using a crude conversational 
metaphor.  
 
 
 
128 
As Karasek sat back from the screen he began reflecting on his process of making. 
This introduced a dialogue that was distinct from reviewing the documentary.  
 
LK: Because there is no time, its just the idea, you know, the idea that body’s 
forth, like language itself, you have no idea where language comes from, it 
just comes out of you and the ideas follow the words, here the visual ideas 
follow your body, your mind, your thinking, your feeling, all these are put 
together, and become, if you’re lucky, an expressive statement, if you’re very 
lucky it works out. If you’re in tune with what you’re doing. Its like an 
atheletic performance it can be quite beautiful and truthful. Given all the 
factors. The image that comes to mind, is a person riding a horse for example, 
how complex that is, and they jump over a fence or something and they 
control the horse, there’s no difference between the rider of the horse, the 
horse’s mind the rider’s mind, they’re all one. And they’re all in relationship to 
whatever it is they’re doing. It’s like this there’s no difference between my 
mind and my body here. My mind is my body, my body is my mind. The 
painting is me, the idea and the painting become one. (Gray, 2006) 
 
 
Questioning Karasek much later he had never heard of Mark Johnson or his book 
‘The Body in the Mind’ (1987), or indeed any theories of embodied cognition. Yet his 
intuitive response was that of a connected embodiment in which there is no 
difference between his body and his mind.  
 
AG: Do you hold with the idea that, although you’re setting out a certain 
agenda, and you’re engaging in a certain activity, and you have your rule sets 
that limit, but that at the same time its not that the act of painting is a slave 
to the conceptual idea, there’s a relationship there where the actual act of 
painting itself is feeding the conceptual ideas. 
 
LK: Absolutely, because you have to be in the moment. This kind of painting 
which is physical, and phenomenological in a sense, as it has to do with the 
surface and how the paint runs at certain times, or drips or something. It’s all 
part of the mesh of feelings, of ideas, of sensations. I might just as well be 
building a sculpture here for example, its the same physicality, painting is 
extremely physical, I wouldn’t say totally physical, but it certainly has a 
physical reality as much as any other physical reality that existence has. And 
although you’re working on a flat surface, you’re working on a three-
dimensional flat surface if you know what I mean, that exists in space. So the 
Figure 55: film still # 31 
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flat surface of the painting, allows you to have imagination through it, so you 
go through it, as you go through it, you imagine, you’re guiding it, from the 
other side, from the front of the canvass the visual side of the canvass, with 
your body, with your actions. 
 
AG: So you see it more as a three-dimensional space, than a flat surface? 
 
LK: Yes. Totally. Totally as a three-dimensional experience, even through you 
are using a flat surface and you’re using a point or a brush or something to do 
it, and you’re using flat colours and so on. It’s all part of an extension of your 
experience. I notice that the painting becomes an extension of my body 
language, and my body language becomes an extension of the painting. And it 
becomes very intense because I feel very intensely about my work. My body 
becomes all tense and I start to work in a rhythmic way that is a reflection of 
the rhythmic strokes and the pattern of stroking and so on, of application, that 
I’m actually performing, it’s a performance piece. That’s why I find this film so 
interesting, because its actually a performance piece that we’re seeing here not 
just the painting, and out of it comes a framed painting in the end. But 
actually it’s a record of an action, an actual physical action. I had my students 
one time find out what their patterns of behaviour were by dipping their feet 
in paint and walking back and forth in the kitchen, and they developed certain 
patterns of behaviour between the fridge and the sink and so on. For an hour 
long, it was an actual representation of something that had happened 
physically over a period of time. So time is also important in painting, and the 
annihilation of time in the painting is what happens because the artist feels no 
time, because he leaves his normal body outside of the studio. Are we 
watching it again? (Gray, 2006) 
 
After the viewing I requested we continue with some formal questions that 
broached the subject of reflection-in-action. I recall being apprehensive that the 
theme was somehow too technical but I regret colouring my question with a 
negative framing, as my concerns were unjustified. 
 
AG: I’d like to get onto some more formal questions. 
 
LK: Sure, go ahead, ask me any question you like.  
 
AG: I’d like to ask what reflection-in-action actually means for you, although 
its such a dire question somehow. But I’m quite interested in how you 
negotiate that space, whether you are even aware that there is a process of 
refinement going on, what you think about reflecting on your work what do 
you do? 
 
LK: I had my answer already before you used the word dire. No its not dire, its 
difficult. There’s a tremendous sense of responsibility you have with an on 
going piece, for example, you started filming when there was an hour or two 
of earlier work from the previous day. And it was quite good I thought. I liked 
it. It’s quite a responsibility to make it better or continue it. So reflection is a 
sense of perfectionism that you carry, that you have to carry as an artist. You 
reflect upon, is it perfect, and that’s the underlying reflection in making an art 
piece is, you know, perfectionism, perfect statements each time over the 
complexity of structuring the work. The reflection-in-action would be 
something like a commentary, if I was making a commentary, like is this too 
big, is this right here. It’s kind of like as I used to do when I was teaching my 
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students drawing. How big is this, what direction, what angle, I was talking 
out loud, and if I was talking out loud here, I would be thinking like that, I 
would be saying, is this where it ought to be and does this express the feeling I 
have, is this connected, and there’s an intensity I see in things, I observe and I 
see an intensity there, does it reflect an intensity.  
 
AG: Is that kind of questioning coming out in words? 
 
LK: No. Its not coming out as words its just in my head. I’m not saying them 
but I’m thinking, As you think, you know, is this big enough, is this where it 
ought to be, is the angle of it right, how about the colour, was that a good 
brush stroke, did that work, does it work with the other brush strokes, and this 
kind of thing. And it’s a relational thinking is the reflection, which is always 
the case with an artist they’re thinking about the relationships they’re 
building. Is it this, can I do this. Is the colour right is the form right, its 
reflecting on the relationships between the parts. There’s very little that’s 
done, actually done that doesn’t have an existence somehow, materially, 
physically, some effect on time or space, some manifestation, so. 
 
AG: Is that a kind of post-event activity then… 
 
LK: No, no, it goes… 
 
AG: … so that you make a mark, then ask the question whether it works, then 
make another, then ask another question, is it after the event, or whether that 
thought process, or feeling process is occurring as you make the mark? 
 
LK: No it occurs as you’re making them. Does this go there, or there, then you 
step back and see if it does go there or there, and sometimes it doesn’t, 
sometimes, many times they’re corrections. This whole thing was built on, 
recreating and restating and finally, you get to know the image you’re working 
with so well, that it comes together, it becomes familiar, the patterns, the 
forms and so on, the composition of it becomes very familiar to you and you 
get to know it and so it becomes in a way, more resolved as you get to know 
it, although this way of working there never really is a resolution. You don’t 
want a resolution of the ritualistic kind, you want a resolution of the 
expressive and emotional kind. That says this is a truthful statement of how 
you feel about what you’re looking at and observing, does it replicate your 
idea. And of course you don’t know that exactly, because you don’t know what 
the outcome is going to be, although following a line of restraints, restrictions, 
and patterns and rules and regulations that you impose upon yourself, 
eventually a stream, a sequence of work comes out, that’s predictable. (Gray, 
2006) 
 
It is questionable whether Karasek’s case study ought to be considered an example 
of naturalistic or constructed reflection. The obvious answer I think is that the 
distinction itself is problematic as in reality it is not so black and white. Karasek has 
had a career spanning four decades and has lectured in university. Whilst he is under 
no academic obligation to record or report on his practice he is more than capable of 
doing so. His responses to the concept of reflection-in-action appear quite formal at 
first and even follow a conversational metaphor. It is the notion that he considers 
himself to be articulating his decisions and questioning his decisions in his head, 
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much as he might if he were articulating them verbally. For Karasek this might be a 
true reflection of the cognitive processes firing during the act of making. However 
his comments that poetically speak of the sensuality of the paint, indicate the felt, 
phenomenological dimension of his experience. 
 
Both the case studies exploring Naturalistic reflection have focused on the 
underlying experience of practice. From these case studies it can be deduced that 
both knowing-in-action and reflection-in-action are descriptive of certain aspects of 
the visual arts practice situation. However, I conclude from the case studies that the 
tacit dimension and the generation of new meaning through the experience of 
practice cannot easily be articulated verbally. If the potential of focus on the 
underlying experience of practice is going to be fully explored, it would benefit from 
further research into the embodied aspects of practice and from an alternative to a 
conversational metaphorical construct. 
 
3.  Interview with Patrick Sims 
 
This interview recorded in the artist’s studio in Barcelona in 2007 immediately prior 
to the opening of his show the ‘Armature of the Absolute’ at the L’Antic theatre, 1st 
November. Consequently when the interview took place all of the studio practice 
had been completed. As a result the interview took the form of a reflection on the 
making of the show. It is a semi-guided interview involving non-structured 
questions that respond to the interviewee and deal with development of his 
conceptual ideas. As an interview rather than an exemplar of the research employed 
in the previous two case studies, the transcript is presented in the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER 6  –  EMBODIED PRACTICE – THEORIES OF EMBODIED MIND 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR A RICHER ACCOUNT OF REFLECTION  
The previous case studies demonstrated how a focus on the underlying experience of 
practice proposed by Scrivener (2000: 18-19), can be of benefit to understanding 
practice. Through the case studies however, a need has arisen for greater clarity in 
relation to what that underlying experience of practice is. This thesis takes the 
following position; theories of embodied mind, also referred to as embodied 
cognition and a bodily-basis of meaning, can offer that clarity. Bringing the theories 
outlined in this chapter to bear on the issue of reflective practice requires reviewing 
and synthesising existing sets of theories, which is offered as an original 
contribution to knowledge in the context of this thesis.  
 
6.1  The Context and History of Theories of Embodied Mind 
The roots of Schön’s (1983) theories of reflection-in-action, and Johnson’s (1987) 
theories of Embodied Mind have many commonalities. Evidence exists that both 
Schön (1983) and Johnson (1987) have both been greatly influenced by American 
Pragmatism and in particular the work of John Dewey (1933). However, despite 
Schön’s ‘The Reflective Practitioner’ (1983), and Johnson’s ‘The Body in the Mind’ 
(1987), being published merely four years apart, Schön’s (1983) writings predate 
many of the recent findings in cognitive science which have prompted Johnson 
(1987), amongst others, to reassess the role of the body in the development of 
meaning, imagination and reason. As has been discussed through the epistemology 
of reflection in chapter 2, reflection is essential grounded in meaning making, it is a 
primary means through which we make sense of our world. Making sense of 
meaning making in relation to embodied cognition is therefore essential.  
Theories of the embodied mind have emerged out of, and now cover a range of 
knowledge fields including philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence (Varela et. al., 1993: 4). The problem of cognitive science is its disparate 
nature and its relative infancy in terms of the history of science. It is not possible to 
proceed without an account of what cognitive science is.  
 
In its widest sense the term cognitive science is used to indicate that the 
study of mind is in itself a worthy scientific pursuit. At this time cognitive 
science is not yet established as a mature science. It does not have a clearly 
agreed upon sense of direction and a large number of researchers 
constituating a community, as is the case with, say atomic physics or 
molecular biology. Rather it is more of a loose affiliation of disciplines than a 
discipline of its own. (Varela et. al., 1993: 4) 
 
Theories of the embodied mind also referred to as embodied cognition, consider that 
all aspects of human cognition emerge from aspects of the human body. This is a 
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major paradigm shift that I propose has considerable implications for visual art 
practice and how practitioners gain access to practice through reflective methods. 
 
Early reference to embodiment in the mind can be found in the writings of Emanuel 
Kant, who in his early work Universal Natural History and Theory of Heaven (Kant, 
1755) advocated an embodied view of the mind-body problem. A number of writers 
over the last century have put forward theories relating to the embodied mind that 
can be considered to have established frames of reference for contemporary 
theorists, this list includes, but is not limited to, William James (1907) and John 
Dewey (1933), George Santayana (1936), José Ortega y Gasset (1968), Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1962), and Martin Heidegger (2010). 
 
Present accounts of embodiment however, rely much less upon philosophy but 
rather from recent research in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, dynamical 
systems, artificial intelligence, robotics and neurobiology. Gerald Edelman (1987) 
who proposed a form of Neural Darwinism, and António Damásio (1999) a 
neuroscientist/neurobiologist who has put forward work on the underlying biology 
of human emotions and rationality, and others, have explored the connection 
between the body, structures in the brain, and the mind. Major aspects of embodied 
cognition include concepts, categories, and performance in the motor system, the 
perceptual system, and the body's interactions with the environment, which has 
challenged ontological assumptions about the world that is experienced and shaped 
by the body and the brain. 
 
The biologists Gregory Bateson (1979), Humberto Maturana et. al., (1980), Francisco 
Varela et. al. (1993) developed closely related versions of the idea, which they call 
enactivism. The motor theory of speech perception proposed by Alvin Liberman et. 
al., (1991) argues that the identification of words is embodied in perception of the 
bodily movements by which spoken words are made, a sentiment echoed in the 
work of Johnson and Lakoff (1999). 
 
As we will see through a detailed examination of theories of the Embodied Mind, 
and the notion of embodied cognition, essential tenets of the Western Philosophical 
tradition require revision based upon recent findings across a wide range of 
knowledge fields, particularly cognitive science and linguistics. Contrary to Frege’s 
(1892) assertion that human meaning is irreducible beyond concepts and 
prepositions, Johnson maintains that meaning traffics as images, qualities, patterns 
and feelings before emerging into language (Johnson, 2007). Practitioners in the 
visual arts can but surely be allured by notion that the images and qualities with 
which they work, the feelings experienced whilst working and the patterns of action 
as they establish a practice are in themselves rich in meaning long before the 
practitioner can express them in language. Indeed it is well documented, and is also 
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evidenced in the case studies that practitioners find talking about the process of 
making problematic. Do visual art practitioners recognise when this pre-linguistic 
meaning works itself into language and their descriptions of practice? Where does 
this leave Schön’s (1983) conversational model of reflective practice?  
 
The purpose of this chapter therefore is twofold. Firstly, to examine theories of 
Embodied Mind and the challenge to Western thought it poses, and secondly to 
explore the implications of these theories for developing the role of reflection in 
visual art practice.  
6.2  The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought 
“Mental facts cannot be properly studied apart from the physical 
environment of which they take cognizance. The great fault of the older 
rational psychology was to set up the soul as an absolute spiritual being with 
certain faculties of its own by which the several activities of remembering, 
imagining, reasoning and willing, etc. were explained, almost without 
reference to the peculiarities of the world with which these activities deal. 
But the richer insight of modern days perceives that our inner faculties are 
adapted in advance to the features of the world in which we dwell, adapted, I 
mean, so as to secure our safety and prosperity in its midst.” (James 1900: 3) 
“[…] to see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the 
brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the 
problems which haunt philosophy” (Dewey 1925: 198). 
Johnson and Lakoff in ‘Philosophy in the Flesh – The Embodied Mind and its 
Challenge to Western Thought’ (1999), illustrate how the Western philosophical 
tradition has mistakenly asked how the inside (i.e., thoughts, ideas, concepts) can 
represent the outside (i.e., the world), thus establishing the erroneous view that 
mind and body must be two ontologically different entities. In this regard the 
problem of meaning became an explanation of how disembodied “internal” ideas can 
represent “external” physical objects and events. After several centuries of a mind-
body dichotomy, it is now considered that there is no way to bridge the gap 
between the inner and the outer.  
‘When “mind” and “body” are regarded as two fundamentally different kinds, 
no third mediating thing can exist that possesses both the metaphysical 
character of inner, mental things and simultaneously possesses the character 
of the outer, physical things. (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 17) 
Given the advances in contemporary neurocognitive science and linguistics, Johnson 
et. al., (2007) considers that more than two millennia of a priori philosophical 
speculation about aspects of reason are over. Over those two millennia reason has 
been taken as the defining characteristic of humanity. Reason, according to Johnson 
et. al. (2007), includes not only our capacity for logical inference, but our ability to 
conduct inquiry, to solve problems, to evaluate, to criticize, to deliberate about our 
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behaviour and our actions, and to understand ourselves and others, and indeed the 
world at large. Johnson and Lakoff (1999) describe three major findings in cognitive 
science that have radically changed the tenets of Western philosophy, reason and 
consequently ourselves: 
1. The mind is inherently embodied 
2. Thought is mostly unconscious 
3. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical 
When taken together and considered in detail, these three findings from the 
science of the mind are inconsistent with central parts of Western 
philosophy. They require a thorough rethinking of the most popular current 
approaches, namely Anglo-American analytic philosophy and postmodernist 
philosophy. (Johnson, Lakoff, 1999: 3) 
Johnson and Lakoff (1999: 4) assert that reason is not disembodied as it arises out of 
the nature of our brains. Indeed as a result of discoveries in cognitive science they 
claim that it is the same neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow for perception 
and movement that create our conceptual systems and modes of reason.  
Thus to understand reason we must understand the details of our visual 
system, our motor system, and the general mechanisms of neural binding. In 
summary, reason is not, in anyway, a transcendent feature of the universe or 
of disembodied mind. Instead it is shaped crucially by the particularities of 
our human bodies, by the remarkable details of the neural structure of our 
brains, and the specifics of our everyday functioning in the world. (Johnson, 
Lakoff, 1999: 4)  
This claim has potential implications for increasing our understanding of visual art 
practice and for how practitioners make decisions, generate meaning and reflect on 
the processes in their studio work. Where our human reason and meaning are 
shaped by the specifics of our everyday functioning in the world, what can we say is 
specific about the intimate functions of visual art practice? How might theories of 
the embodied mind aid our understanding of the responses a practitioner has to the 
very real qualities of the materials and space he or she works in and with. It speaks 
of how the meaning a practitioner attributes to their work is as much built out of 
the experience of their immediate practice and past experiences as their notions of 
intentionality and conceptual agendas. Where rich meaning is embedded in practice 
gaining access to it is the problematic facing this thesis; how might a practitioner 
reflect upon the embodied experience of practice when thought is largely 
unconscious? 
How might the following revaluations of reason change previously held convictions 
to the major tenets of Western Philosophy?  
• Reason is evolutionary, in that abstract reason builds on and makes 
use of forms of perceptual and motor inference present in ‘lower’ 
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animals. The result is a Darwinism of reason, a rational Darwinism. 
Reason even in its most abstract form, makes use of, rather than 
transcends, our animal nature. 
• Reason is not “universal” in the transcendent sense. It is universal, 
however, in that it is a capacity shared universally by all human 
beings. What allows it to be shared are the commonalities that exist 
in the way our minds are embodied. 
• Reason is not completely conscious, but mostly unconscious. 
• Reason is not purely literal, but largely metaphorical and imaginative. 
• Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged. (Johnson & 
Lakoff 1999: 7) 
These views of reason and indeed what is now known about the mind through 
cognitive science are considered by Johnson and Lakoff (1999) to be radically at 
odds with classical philosophical views of what a person is. The outline they provide 
of how philosophical traditions are altered under this view is extensive, but valuable 
in the context of this study. I offer here a summary of the most important sections. 
• There is no Cartesian dualistic person, with a mind separate from and 
independent of the body, sharing exactly the same disembodied 
transcendent reason with everyone else, and capable of knowing 
everything about his or her mind simply by self-reflection. 
• There is no Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute 
freedom and a transcendent reason that correctly dictates what is or 
isn’t moral. Reason arising from the body, doesn’t transcend the body. 
• The utilitarian person, for whom rationality is an economic 
rationality—the maximization of utility—does not exist. Real humans 
beings are not for the most part, in conscious control of—or even 
consciously aware of—their reasoning. Most of their reason, besides, 
is based on various types of prototypes, framing and metaphors.  
• The phenomenological person, who through phenomenological 
introspection alone can discover everything there is to know about 
the mind and the nature of experience, is a fiction. Although we can 
have a theory of a vast, rapidly and automatically operating cognitive 
unconscious, we have no direct conscious access to its operation and 
therefore most of conscious thought. Phenomenological reflection, 
though valuable in revealing the structure of experience, must be 
supplemented by empirical research in to the cognitive unconscious. 
• There is no poststructuralist person—no completely decentred subject 
for whom all meaning is arbitrary, totally relative, and purely 
historically contingent unconstrained by body and brain. The 
grounding of our conceptual systems in shared embodiment and 
bodily experience creates a largely centred self, but not a monolithic 
self. 
• There exists no Fregean person—as posed by analytic philosophy—for 
whom thought has been extruded from the body. That is, there is no 
real person whose embodiment plays no role in meaning, whose 
meaning is purely objective and defined by the external world, and 
whose language can fit the external world with no significant role 
played by the mind, brain, or body. Because our conceptual systems 
grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our 
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bodies. That does not mean that truth is purely subjective or that 
there is so stable truth. Rather, our common embodiment allows for 
common, stable truths. 
• There is no such thing as a computational person, whose mind is like 
computer software, able to work on any suitable computer or neural 
hardware—whose mind somehow derives meaning from taking 
meaningless symbols as input, manipulating them by rule, and giving 
meaningless symbols as output. Real people have embodied minds 
whose conceptual systems arise from, are shaped by, and are given 
meaning through living human bodies. The neural structures of our 
brains produce conceptual systems and linguistic structures that 
cannot be adequately accounted for by formal systems that only 
manipulate symbols. 
• Finally the is no Chomskyan person, for whom language is pure 
syntax, pure form insulated from and independent of all meaning, 
context, perception, emotion, memory, attention, action, and the 
dynamic nature of communication. Moreover, human language is not 
a totally genetic innovation. Rather, central aspects of language arise 
evolutionarily from sensory, motor, and other neural systems that are 
present in “lower” animals. For scholars passionate about the Western 
philosophical tradition, the above dissection of the dominant 
contributions must be quite disconcerting. Certainly these decisive 
and assertive pronouncements have not gone without criticism. 
The findings they detail are of extreme importance, the arguments in 
support of them are challenging, innovative, and largely convincing, and 
their willingness to explicate their implications is laudable.  But their explicit 
and oft-repeated expectation that the work of cognitive scientists will deeply 
change the practice of philosophy, "require our culture to abandon some of 
its deepest philosophical assumptions," (p. 3) and become "one of our most 
profound resources for self knowledge" (p. 551) is based on a questionable 
understanding of the foundations of philosophy, an apparently limited 
appreciation of the breadth and diversity of Western Thought, and, more 
importantly, on a vision of the role of science in culture that is at best 
somewhat naïve, and at worst a little dangerous (O’Donovan-Anderson, 
2000). (Johnson & Lakoff 1999: 7) 
However, Johnson and Lakoff (1999) have countered these claims by recognising all 
that the Western philosophical tradition has afforded us, whilst claiming that it is 
not possible to ignore the philosophical implications of the new findings to have 
emerged from cognitive science. 
Classical philosophical conceptions of the person have stirred our 
imaginations and taught us a great deal. But once we understand the 
importance of the cognitive unconscious, the embodiment of the mind, and 
metaphorical thought, we can never go back to a priori philosophizing about 
mind and language and or to philosophical ideas of what a person is that are 
inconsistent with what we are learning about the mind. (Johnson & Lakoff 
1999: 7) 
In taking such a radical approach to the range of philosophical doctrines listed 
above, the question remains as to what will fill the gap. Some critics have claimed 
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that Johnson and Lakoff (1999) have not contributed very much more than the 
early American Pragmatists James (1907) and Dewey (1933). I consider that the later 
sections bring in much evidence from cognitive science that simply wasn’t available 
to James and Dewey. In this regard Johnson and Lakoff (1999) have furthered the 
work explored in the next section. 
6.3  The Influence of American Pragmatism and the Unravell ing of the 
Cognitive Unconscious 
Pragmatism’s principle of continuity claims that abstract thought is not 
disembodied; rather, it must arise from our sensorimotor capacities and is 
constrained by the nature of our bodies, brains and environments. From an 
evolutionary perspective this means that we have not developed two separate 
logical and inferential systems, one for our bodily experiences and one for our 
abstract reasoning (as a pure logic). Instead, the logic of our bodily experience 
provides all the logic we need in order to perform every rational inference that 
we do. (Johnson, 2007: 179) 
A specific rejection of mind/body dualism can certainly be traced back to the 
philosopher-psychologists known as the early American Pragmatist philosophers. 
William James and John Dewey, combined the best biology, psychology and 
neuroscience of their day with phenomenology. Their respective work, whilst 
published a century ago, has provided recent philosophers and theorists, such as 
Maturana & Varela (1980), Edelman (1987), Johnson & Lakoff (1999), with 
exemplary non-reductionist and non-representationalist models of embodied mind, 
and have to a large degree been vindicated by evidence emerging from 
contemporary neuro-cognitive science and linguistics (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 21). 
Embodied Realism rejects that mind and body are ontologically distinct kinds. This 
opposes Fodor’s (1987) claim that cognition and language are based on symbolic 
representations inside the mind of an organism, which refer to some physical thing 
in an outside world.  
What I am selling is the Representational Theory of Mind . . . At the heart of 
the theory is the postulation of a language of thought: an infinite set of 
‘mental representations’ which function both as the immediate objects of 
propositional attitudes and as the domains of mental processes. (Fodor 1987: 
16-17) 
Johnson and Rohrer instead, consider the terms “body” and “mind” as convenient 
shorthand ways of identifying aspects of on going organism-environment 
interactions - and so cognition and language must be understood as arising from 
organic processes (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 17). 
Just as the terms “body’ and “mind” have been redefined in this context so the terms 
“cognition” and “embodiment” require analysis. Johnson and Rorher (2007) have 
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selected the following questions, each of which have been taken by theorists as 
emblematic of cognition par excellance. 
When a young child crawls toward the fire in the hearth and a mother 
snatches up the child before the child gets burned, is that cognition? When a 
team of British mathematicians decodes enemy ciphers during wartime, is 
that cognition? When ants carrying food back to their nest lay down 
chemical signals and thereby mark trails to a food source, is that cognition?  
Note the commonalities among these situations. In each case the body (both 
individual and social) is in peril. First, the wellbeing and continued successful 
functioning of the organism is at risk. Action must be undertaken to ensure 
the continued flourishing of the living, physical, individual body of the 
organism. To survive and flourish, the organism must make adjustments in 
its way of acting, both within its current environment and in its relations 
with other creatures. The child must be snatched from the imminent danger 
of the flames, the mathematicians desperately work to prevent their country 
from being overrun by the enemy, and the ants must find food and bring it 
back to the queen in order for the colony to survive. Second, note that in 
each case the cognition is social, composed of multiple organisms co-
operating in response to current or anticipated problems posed by the 
environment. That environment is not merely physical but also includes the 
social “body” — whether the family, the nation or the ant colony — whose 
survival and flourishing is at risk. (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 18) 
Cognition therefore, is considered to be both a result of, and a description of, the 
rich organism/environment interaction in its struggle for continued existence. 
Cognitive sciences are now considered to widely appreciate the importance of 
embodiment in cognition. There remains debate however, as to what “embodiment” 
actually means. Does embodiment describe a ‘body’ as a casually determined 
physical entity? Does embodiment describe the ‘body’ as a set of organic processes? 
Ought the emphasis to be placed rather on the felt experience of sensation and 
movement as explored by Phenomenologists such as Gaston Bachelard (1952) and 
Merleau-Ponty (1962)? Can the physical individual body be understood separately 
from the social networks and families without which it would not have been 
brought into existence and could not survive? Does the ‘body’ in ‘embodiment’ 
rather define a socially and culturally constructed artefact?  
Johnson and Rorher (2007: 19) consider that each of these views contribute 
something toward the development of an adequate theory of embodied cognition, 
and furthermore that the proper understanding of ‘embodiment’ was first 
elaborated upon in the philosophical context of early American Pragmatism. 
As we see it, embodiment theory inherits several key tenets of how these 
Pragmatist philosophers viewed cognition:  
(1) Embodied cognition is the result of the evolutionary processes of 
variation, change and selection.  
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(2) Embodied cognition is situated within a dynamic on going organism 
environment relationship.  
(3) Embodied cognition is problem-centred and it operates relative to the 
needs, interests, and values of organisms.  
(4) Embodied cognition is not concerned with finding some allegedly perfect 
solution to a problem, but one that works well enough relative to the current 
situation.  
(5) Embodied cognition is often social and carried out cooperatively by more 
than one individual organism. (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 19) 
These 5 key tenets of a Pragmatically centred view of embodied cognition is 
in stark contrast to the view put forward by classical cognitive science, which 
maintains that cognition is the application of universal logical rules that 
govern the manipulation of “internal” mental symbols, symbols that are 
supposedly capable of representing states of affairs in the “external” world. 
(Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 19) 
The Representation Theory of Mind, which Fodor (1987) presents, requires internal 
representations in what he calls the ‘language of thought’ to become meaningful by 
being about a state of affairs in the world. As Fodor puts it his Representationalist 
theory requires: 
[…] a theory that articulates, in nonsemantic and nonintentional terms, 
sufficient conditions for one bit of the world to be about (to express, 
represent, or be true of) another bit. (Fodor 1987: 98). 
Evidently this internal/external separation erroneously assumes it could be possible 
that cognition can in anyway be detached from the nature and functioning of bodily 
organisms and the environments they inhabit. A position, which, as written 
previously, is now widely accepted amongst cognitive scientists to be utterly false.  
The historical significance of Representationalism cannot be dismissed as it 
supported the theory of Functionalism. Functionalism was instrumental in helping 
to develop the first electronic calculators and general-purpose computers, which in 
turn gave rise to erroneous models of human cognitive function and the 
development of rationality. Its significance can be traced through the work of Alan 
Turing (1936) on the universal computing machines, as it became the primary 
metaphor for the functions of the human brain. Therefore the modelling of a 
specific intellectual operation, into a successfully labour-saving machine, in turn 
became a metaphor for understanding the intellectual function that inspired it, and 
later, mistakenly regarded as the key to understanding cognition in general. Newell 
and Simon (1976) for example presented the brain as a physical symbol system not 
unlike a Turing-style computing machine, ideas that are present in Simon’s (1969) 
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Technical Rationality, the theory of reflective practice that Schön’s (1983) Reflective 
Practitioner later advanced through a pragmatically centred approach. Johnson 
(2007) therefore considers that for classical cognitive science cognition is defined 
narrowly as a mathematical and logical computation with intrinsically meaningless 
internal symbols that can be supposedly placed in relation to aspects of the external 
world (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 20).  
The Pragmatist challenge to classical cognitive science should come as no 
surprise, since one of the Pragmatists’ chief targets was the tendency within 
the philosophical tradition to assume that what demarcates “rational” 
humans from “lower” animals is the supposedly unique ability of humans to 
engage in symbolic representation between internal thoughts/ language and 
the external world. The remedy offered by the Pragmatists is based on their 
view that cognition is action, rather than mental mirroring of an external 
reality. Moreover, cognition is a particular kind of action - a response 
strategy that applies some measure of forethought in order to solve some 
practical real-world problem. (Johnson et. al., 2007: 20) 
Johnson’s et. al., (2007) contemporary view that pragmatism can be seen as offering 
a remedy to philosophical traditions is a defence of the pragmatist tradition made 
possible, in part, by recent advances in cognitive science. However, this apparent 
revival of pragmatist positions cannot be taken out of context to its earlier decline 
and the objections levelled at pragmatism in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. Nor can the revival of pragmatist positions be taken out of context to the 
work of Richard Rorty, who’s writings through latter half of the twentieth century 
led to a reconsideration of pragmatism as a profound contribution to modern 
philosophy and an answer to the problems of modernism itself (Diggins, 1994: 407). 
Johnson’s et. al., (2007: 20) consideration therefore, that Pragmatism and in 
particular the writings of John Dewey, despite a century of criticism, can still provide 
an appropriate philosophical framework for theories of the embodied mind requires 
a review of some of the objections commonly levelled at the pragmatist tradition. 
An account must also be offered with regard to how an individualist model of 
embodied cognition differs from Dewey’s original focus on community, which has 
implications for how reflective practice in the visual arts might work in individual 
cases but also in the case of collective art practice. 
6.4  Assessing the Appropriateness for the Use of Pragmatist Positions 
in the Development of Theories of the Embodied Mind  
The following section will examine the common objections levelled at the 
pragmatist tradition, its decline, and revival, with a view to addressing the 
appropriateness for its use in the development of contemporary theories of the 
embodied mind. This leads to a suggestion that Dewey’s understanding of situated 
cognition supports the approach toward the development of theories of embodied 
mind. 
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The rise of American Pragmatism is considered by Diggins (1994: 360) to have taken 
place in a post-Darwinian culture where nature replaced scripture, and philosophy 
separated from religion and moved toward scientific naturalism. It was a response to 
the loss of certainly caused by modernism. This loss of certainty was exemplified by 
the secularising of the methods of knowledge, through which pragmatism sought to 
question the authority of institutions whose legitimacy lay in historical origins. 
Taking science as a new authority, pragmatism, and Dewey in particular, turned to 
society to provide a cohesive basis of identity, meaning, and value (Diggins, 1994: 
360). The work of John Dewey has endured and enjoyed something of a revival in 
recent years, however, the early work of Charles Sanders Pierce and William James 
who first established and promoted pragmatism. 
The pragmatist thinker, James explained, “turns his back resolutley and once 
and for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to the professional 
philosopher. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal 
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, 
and pretended absolutues and origins. He turns towards concreteness and 
adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power.” (Diggins, 1994: 
133) 
Citing James and the radical departure from the ‘inveterate habits of the 
professional philosopher’ pragmatism represented, John Diggins (1994: 133) sets the 
stage for the criticism that followed, and the pragamatists’ responses to them. 
Diggins explains how pragmatism was viewed as ‘a philosophy of power and success 
at the expense of truth and morality, a philosophy that eliminated epistemology and 
thus left the modern mind with no access to the real, a philosophy taught and 
practiced by those who seemed to prefer the chaos of endless change to the 
coherence of purposeful order’ (Diggins, 1994: 139). I agrue that it is this very 
emphasis on the endless change integral to the view that cognition is action, which 
has made aspects of pragamtism attractive to contempoary philosophers. 
Much of the early criticism aimed at pragmatist positions was levelled at William 
James. Whilst initially celebrated by Lovejoy (1908) for bringing to philosophy what 
he described as the artist’s freshness and purity of vision, it was ‘The Thirteen 
Pragmatisms’ (Lovejoy, 1908) that provided an enduring dissection of James’s idea 
of truth still examined by contemporary thinkers. Despite initially impressing 
Lovejoy with his bold attempt to generate a new approach to the idea of truth, 
Lovejoy (1908) presented an argument that James had unknowingly put forward 
two different theories of truth with no single criterion of meaning to unite them 
(Diggins, 1994: 133). Bertrand Russell in 1907, critized James for mixing up truth 
with epistemology and G.E. Moore (1922) critized James’s claim that truth can be 
made to happen simply by believing it (Diggins, 1994: 134). Despite the initial 
objections raised in the first and second decades of the twenieth century 
pragmatism claimed to overcome almost any difficultly encounted in a “problematic 
situation”, (Diggins, 1994: 486) and was accepted as the dominent philosophly in 
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America up until the commencment of the Second World War. The decline of 
pragmatism through the Second World War was due to critics who claimed that it 
had rendered America vulnerable to fascism. Later however, it was considered 
pragmatism had enabled America to be impregnable to communism during the Cold 
War. Diggins (1994: 386) considers therefore that the image of pragmatism moves 
from weakness and vacillation to strength and flexibility, indicating something of its 
versatility.   
In answer to some of the most astute critics of the pragmatists, such as the 
aforementioned Russell, and Lovejoy in addition to George Santayana, Diggins 
(1994: 251) questions the failure of such critics to study pragmatic ideas in light of 
the consequences of human behaviour. 
It seems strangely ironic that an intellectual historian or a philosopher would 
accept the theoretical claims of pragmatism without examining its actual 
operations in the daily world of experience. Such behaviour presupposes the 
very formalism that pragmatism sought to overcome—the fallacy of 
accepting at face value what a thinker says rather than what he does, and 
treating the propositions of philosophy as tantamount to their validity. 
(Diggins, 1994: 251) 
James who at the time was regarded as America’s most popular philosopher, was 
publicly defended by John Dewey, despite Dewey’s serious misgivings about James’s 
‘Will to Believe’. Indeed James also publicly defended Dewey and the Oxford trained 
philosopher F. C. S. Schiller whom James complained had “suffered a hailstorm of 
contempt and ridicule” (Diggins, 1994: 139). These shows of public support between 
the promient pragmatists however, covered the concern Dewey felt toward the 
direction James’s was taking pragamatist philosophy.  
Dewey was more interested in establishing a valid criterion for knowing on 
the basis of doing rather than developing a stance for believing on the basis 
of feeling. To Dewey James’s position seemed to rely on an emotional 
inwardness that had little reference to either public awareness or the uses of 
cool, reflective intelligence. (Diggins, 1994: 140) 
Diggins (1994: 137) further isolates the distinctions between James’s pragmatism 
and that of both Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce, considering it too pluralistic, if 
not anarchistic, to give purpose and direction to thought advocating organised 
inquiry and cooperative intelliegence as a means of addressing social problems. 
Indeed whilst James focused on the self, Dewey focused on the self in relation to 
society.  
The best thing about Dewey, one may well feel, is that he did not, like Plato, 
pretend to be a “spectator of all time and enternity,” but used philosophy 
(even that presumably highest and purest form of philosophy—metaphysics 
itself) as an instrument of social change. (Rorty, 1982: 74) 
This theme will be taken up in the conclusion with an account of how Dewey’s focus 
on community has been largely displaced in favour of an individualist model of 
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artistic practice and examines how reflective practice might work in the case of 
collective art practice. Taking this investigation of the appropriatness of the use of 
Deweyian positions as the basis for theories of embodied mind further here, it is 
worth looking at the writing of Rorty (1982) who shows how critisms of Dewey’s 
earlier work became support for his later writing and how Dewey paved a course for 
future inquiry. 
I myself would join Riechenbach in dismissing classical Husserlian 
phenomenology, Bergson, Whitehead, the Dewey of Experience and Nature, 
the James of Radical Empiricism, neo-Thomist epistemological realism and a 
variety of other late nineteeth- and early twentieth-century systems. 
Bergson and Whitehead, and the bad (“metaphysical) parts of Dewey and 
James, seem to me merely weakened versions of idealism—attempts to 
answer “unscientifically” formulated epistemological questions about the 
“relation of subject and object” by “naïve generalizations and analogies” 
which emphasize “feeling” rather than “cognition.” (Rorty, 1982: 214) 
It was this transition from the philosophy of systems, expressive of the science of 
their time and offering pseudo-answers when no better answers were available, 
which Reichenbach (1951: 121-122) considers ends with Kant, toward an empirically 
responsible mode of philosophical inquiry (Johnson, 2007) that is characterised in 
the development of Dewey’s writing. To be clear, pragmatism was grounded in Kant. 
What characterised Dewey however, was that having established a need to abandon 
traditional notions of rationality, objectivity, method, and truth, he emphasized that 
this move “beyond method” gives humanity the opportunity to grow up, to be free 
to make itself, rather then seeking direction from some imagined outside source 
(one of the ahistorical structures mentioned above) (Rorty, 1982: 204).  
The elaborate systems of science are born not of reason but of impulses at 
first sight and flickering; impulses to handle, to move about, to hunt, to 
uncover, to mix things separated and divide things combined, to talk and to 
listen. Method is their effectual organisation into continuous dispositions of 
inquiry, development, and testing […] Reason, the rational attitude, is the 
resulting disposition […] (Dewey, 1930: 196) 
Richard Rorty has contributed greatly to the revival of pragmatism, but it is the 
application of Deweyan positions to twenty first century scientific inquiry that is of 
real interest in this thesis. Contemporary theories of embodied mind draw upon five 
main scientific disciplines, Neuroscience, Linguistics, Philosophy, Cognitive 
Psychology and Artificial Intelligence, and the departure from traditional 
philosophical inquiry exemplified in Dewey’s writing has presented the opportunity 
for theories of embodied mind to examine our actual operations in the daily world 
of experience.  
James and Dewey offered us no guarantees. They simply pointed to the 
situation we stand in, now that both the Age of Faith and the Enlightenment 
seem beyond recovery. They grasped our time in thought. We did not change 
the course of the conversation in the way they suggested we might. Perhaps 
we are still unable to do so; perhaps we never shall be able to. But we can 
nevertheless honour James and Dewey for having offered what very few 
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philosophers have succeeded in giving us: a hint of how our lives might be 
changed. (Rorty, 1982: 175) 
I would argue that now in the twenty first century that the ‘hint’ to which Rorty 
(1982; 175) refers, is being explicated through the works of Mark Johnson and 
George Lakoff (1999), and a number of other philosophers, linguists, and theorists 
including Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1992), and Sean Gallagher (2005). The work 
being done by these writers persuades me of the existence of meaningful experience 
that is prior to all language or even propositional form in order to develop more 
adequate methods of reflection specific to visual art practice. When we do so, 
greater attention is given to our immediate encounter with reality rather than in 
any abstract system, therefore I argue that contemporary writers developing 
theories of the embodied mind are justified in referencing the later writing of John 
Dewey. 
An exploration of how a human being has a meaningful encounter with reality 
requires a section dedicated to the leading theories regarding the 
organism/environment interaction. Out of these theories the suggestion that the 
brain uses the same nerve structures for both conceptualizing and sensory-motor 
activities alike is significant. It reflects the evolutionary economy of using the same 
nerve structures for more than one purpose. If true this would show how the bodies 
we have and what we do with them determine and shape our thoughts. To reframe 
the question posed earlier, does this suggest that what a practitioner ‘does with 
their body’ in visual art practice, shapes and determines their thought in relation to 
practice?  
Many critics of Johnson and Lakoff’s (1999) ‘Philosophy in the Flesh’, remarked at 
the lack of empirical evidence from the domain of cognitive science to support their 
claim. Johnson and Rohrer’s paper ‘We are Live Creatures’ (2007), appears to be an 
attempt to answer those criticisms.  
6.5  Neuroscience and its Contributions to Theories of the Embodied 
Mind 
Having trained in the visual arts, it has taken substantial work to bring myself up to 
date about the neuroscience, neurobiology, and cognitive-linguistics that are 
informing theories of the embodied mind. The agenda for this thesis, as has been 
stated, was to review existing theories and deduce whether a synthesis of them 
would be beneficial, the following section therefore necessitates the use citations 
capable of conveying a condensed overview of the cognitive science of interest to 
this study, taken from the vast array of research that has been undertaken since the 
1980’s.  
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This overview begins with the Chilean biologist and philosopher Maturana and his 
student Francisco Varela, whose work in the 1980’s was at the forefront of their 
field. The two were the first to define and employ the concept of ‘autopoiesis’.  
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a 
network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations 
continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that 
produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in 
space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological 
domain of its realization as such a network. (Maturana, Varela, 1980: 78) 
Aside from making important contributions to the field of evolution, Maturana is 
associated with an epistemology built upon empirical findings of neurobiology. 
If a living system enters into a cognitive interaction, its internal state is 
changed in a manner relevant to its maintenance, and it enters into a new 
interaction without loss of its identity. In an organism without a nervous 
system (or its functional equivalent) its interactions are of a chemical or 
physical nature (a molecule is absorbed and an enzymatic process is initiated; 
a photon is captured and a step in photosynthesis is carried out). For such an 
organism the relations holding between the physical events remain outside 
its domain of interactions. The nervous system enlarges the domain of 
interactions of the organism by making its internal states also modifiable in a 
relevant manner by 'pure relations', not only by physical events; the observer 
sees that the sensors of an animal (say, a cat) are modified by light, and that 
the animal (the cat) is modified by a visible entity (say, a bird). The sensors 
change through physical interactions: the absorption of light quanta; the 
animal is modified through its interactions with the relations that hold 
between the activated sensors that absorbed the light quanta at the sensory 
surface. The nervous system expands the cognitive domain of the living 
system by making possible interactions with 'pure relations'; it does not 
create cognition. (Maturana, Varela, 1980: 78) 
Damasio, a leading cognitive scientist and nuero-anatomist, in his book ‘The Feeling 
of What Happens: Body, Emotion, and the making of Consciousness’ (1999), takes 
this idea further to describe how consciousness came into being. 
The Beginning of Consciousness - Once I could envision how the brain might 
put together the patterns that stand for an object and those that stand for 
the organism, I began considering the mechanisms that the brain may use to 
represent the relationship between the object and the organism. I was 
looking specifically for how the brain might represent the fact that when an 
organism is engaged in the processing of an object, the object causes the 
organism to react and, in so doing, change its state. [...] I propose that we 
become conscious when the organism's representation devices exhibit a 
specific kind of wordless knowledge - the knowledge that the organism's own 
state has been changed by an object - and when such knowledge occurs 
along with the salient representation of an object. The sense of self in the act 
of knowing an object is an infusion of new knowledge, continuously created 
within the brain as long as objects, actually present or recalled, interact with 
the organism and cause it to change.' (Damasio, 2002: 5) 
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Damasio’s insight has been built through 25 years of research and observation of 
patients with various types of brain damage. His experience and findings are of 
course very different from my own. However, as a painter and researcher in the 
visual arts, and long before reading the work of Damasio, I harboured feelings that 
some part of my being is altered by the materials I work with, and that the work 
somehow embodies that change of state.  
As a brief example, I found that painting into clear casting resin whilst the catalyst 
gradually transformed the liquid into a solid, engendered both a transformation in 
my physical ways of working and the meaning I attributed to the work. Initially the 
fluidity of the material allowed for ‘fluid’ movements, dynamic gestures, and 
interwoven lines taken from movement related studies. Later the more resistant 
solid surface required more aggressive techniques. 
Many practitioners I have interviewed or researched do not consider their studio 
practice merely a means to an conceptual end, however the richness of the process 
in relation to the development of conceptual ideas is less well recognised or 
expanded upon. I may not at the time have referred to myself as an organism, but 
the artist/studio, artist/object, and artist/material interactions are essentially the 
same. My curiousity about the relationship between the studio environment, the 
media at my disposal, both chosen and found, the application of it, and the 
outcomes of the studio practice, i.e., my paintings, has been the major drive behind 
conducting this research. Building awareness of the felt experience of practice may 
well be aided by this phenomenological reflection, however, I concur with Johnson 
when he suggests that it needs to be supplemented with empirical research into the 
cognitive unconscious. This is a theme I will take up in the final chapters of this 
thesis. As my thesis has developed the cognitive science supporting the 
organism/environment relationship and the philosophical contexts surrounding the 
scientific discoveries have become central to unravelling my understanding of the 
visual art practices and the notion of reflection-in-action. 
Preceding Damasio’s claim by almost a century, Dewey’s ‘principle of continuity’ 
suggests that there are no ontological gaps between the different levels of an 
organism’s functioning. The organism’s functioning requires the processing of 
objects and environments.  
“there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and 
biological operations and physical operations. ‘Continuity’ [...] means that 
rational operations grow out of organic activities, without being identical 
with that from which they emerge”. (Dewey 1938: 26) 
A key claim, consistent in the work of all the aforementioned theorists, echoes and 
in part vindicates Dewey’s principle of continuity. This claim illustrates the way 
organism environment couplings start with single-cellular organisms and develop 
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gradually through to more complex animals. Importantly across this vast span of 
single- to multi-cellular life the same adaptive processes of interactive co-ordination 
between a specific organism and recurring characteristics of its environment are 
displayed.  
But does that mean that we can trace human cognition all the way back to 
the sensorimotor behaviour of single-cellular organisms? On the face of it, 
this seems preposterous — viewed from an evolutionary biologist’s 
perspective, there are clear differences in the size, complexity and structural 
differentiation of human beings as compared with single-cellular organisms 
like bacteria. Single-cellular organism behaviour is not ordinarily relevant to 
the behaviour of multi-cellular organisms — except insofar as there might be 
structural morphological analogies between the sensorimotor activity of 
single cellular organisms and particular sensorimotoric cells within the 
multicellular body. (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 24) 
The organism/environment interactions of single to multi-cellular organisms may 
initially seem far removed from the study of reflection-in-action. I propose, 
however, that in order to unravel the complex interactions between the artist and 
their visual art practice, the matter of which the reflective method is focused upon 
revealing, a context needs to be established to help understand the complex 
interactions between a human being/organism and the object/environment. The 
incisive point here is that there are clearly distinguishable patterns between the 
simple and the complex. The context therefore, being set by the many theorists 
working on this issue, is one in which simple organism/environment interactions are 
explored in order to explain and understand how complex organisms, like ourselves, 
interact with our environments objects/tools and media. Whilst so complex as to 
possess the capacity to reflect upon these interactions, reflection alone cannot help 
to unravel our experience. In this I concur with Johnson. 
‘Phenomenological reflection, though valuable in revealing the structure of 
experience, must be supplemented by empirical research into the cognitive 
unconsciousness.’ (Johnson, Lakoff, 1999: 5) 
However, similarly cognitive science alone cannot unravel our experience. I concur 
therefore with Varela also that Phenomenological reflection, including the work of 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) and also Bachelard (1958), can offer valuable insight.  
We hold with Merleau-Ponty that Western scientific culture requires that we 
see our bodies both as physical structures and as lived, experiential 
structures-in short, as both "outer" and "inner," biological and 
phenomenological. These two sides of embodiment are obviously not 
opposed. Instead, we continuously circulate back and forth between them. 
Merleau-Ponty recognized that we cannot understand this circulation 
without a detailed investigation of its fundamental axis, namely, the 
embodiment of knowledge, cognition, and experience. For Merleau-Ponty, as 
for us, embodiment has this double sense: it encompasses both the body as a 
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lived, experiential structure and the body as the context or milieu of 
cognitive mechanisms. (Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 1993: 18) 
 
The relationship between cognitive science and phenomenology in the explication of 
embodied cognition will be further explored in the final chapter of this thesis. 
Cognitive science and linguistics however, are not isolated in terms of the academic 
disciplines striving to explicate the role of the body in the development of 
rationality and consciousness, and unravel the implications of embodiment for the 
western philosophical tradition. 
 
The empirical evidence comes from studies in many different disciplines, all 
of which share a common concern, namely, they focus on phenomena where 
human understanding is required for an account of meaning and reason. 
Among the more important phenomena that have been explored, as 
challenging Objectivist assumptions, are the following [...]  
• Categorisation [...] 
• Framing of concepts [...] 
• Metaphor [...] 
• Polysemy [...] 
• Historical semantic change [...] 
• Non-western conceptual systems [...] 
• Growth of knowledge [...] 
The studies in any one of these areas are sufficient to radically question 
Objectivist views of meaning and rationality. Taken together, they are 
overwhelming. They create a crisis in the theory of meaning and rationality 
by showing us that we cannot preserve our deeply rooted Objectivist 
commitments. [...] (Johnson, 1987: 104-107) 
 
Continuing with the findings of cognitive science in this section, Johnson (1987) 
cites evidence from comparative neurobiology of organism-environment coupling 
ranging from the amoeba all the way up to humans, and argues that in humans this 
coupling process becomes the basis of meaning and thought.  
 
Since the earliest episodes of ancient Greek philosophy, humans have been 
distinguished from “brute” animals and all lower organisms by their 
supposedly unique capacity for abstract conceptualization and reasoning. 
According to this view, human reason is what makes it possible for us to 
form abstract mental representations that stand for and point to states of 
affairs that are either external to us or are not currently present in our 
experience (i.e., are past or future). But the Pragmatists’ Continuity Thesis 
denies the inner/outer dichotomy upon which Representationalist theories 
are based. Consequently, the problem for an embodied view of cognition is 
how to explain our marvellous human feats of abstraction, reasoning and 
symbolic interaction, yet without positing an ontological rupture between 
“lower” animals and humans. The key, once again, is the coupling (the 
interactive co-ordination) of an organism (here, a human one) and its 
environment. Recurring adaptive patterns of organism-environment 
interaction are the basis for our ability to survive and flourish. In humans, 
these patterns are no more “internal” representations than they are in other 
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creatures. Let us consider briefly some of the most basic kinds of structural 
couplings that make up a human being’s experience of its world. (Johnson & 
Rohrer, 2007: 32) 
In his 1987 book ‘The Body in the Mind’, Johnson explores the patterns of these on 
going interactions as image schemas that ground meaning in our embodiment and 
yet are not internal representations of an external reality. This leads to an account 
of an emergent rationality that is embodied, social and creative (Johnson & Rohrer, 
2007). In this respect it is important to provide a concrete background for just how 
this is possible.  
6.6  Organism-Environment Coupling  
Maturana and Varela (1998) have been particularly active in this area. Their research 
in the following text traces the path from chemotaxis to the nervous system. This is 
followed by an account of how neural maps evolve into neural plasticity. Whilst 
extensive, I will summarise the main points here. 
Firstly Maturana and Varela’s (1998) argument is that central nervous systems 
evolved in multi-cellular organisms to co-ordinate sensorimotor activity (Maturana 
and Varela 1998: 142-163). This is deduced from examining how locomotion in 
single-cellular organisms is achieved by dynamically coupling the sensory and 
motoric surfaces of the cell membrane.  
The first example given is of an amoeba when it surrounds a protozoan. The cells 
that compose its membranes respond to the chemicals that compose the protozoan, 
this response in turn causes the consistency of the amoeba’s protoplasm to change. 
These changes cause the development of pseudopods with which amoeba, envelops 
the protozoan before feeding upon it.  
Secondly an example is given of how certain kinds of bacteria have a tail-like 
structure called a flagellum. This is rotated like a propeller to give the bacteria 
movement. When a grain of sugar is added to a solution containing this bacterium, 
the sugar molecules cause chemical receptors to change the bacterium’s membrane. 
Consequently the bacterium is seen to change the direction of rotation of its 
flagellar propeller moving it towards the sugar molecules. This process is called 
chemotaxis. In both of these cases the changes in the chemical environment causes 
sensory changes the cellular membrane and initiates movement.  
The key point here is that, without anything like an internal representation, 
single-cellular organisms engage in sensorimotor coordination in response to 
environmental changes. Even at this apparently primitive level, there is a 
finely tuned on going coupling of organism and environment. Multi-cellular 
organisms also accomplish their sensorimotor co ordination by means of 
changes in their cell membranes. However, the cellular specialization 
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afforded by a multi-cellular organism means that not every cell needs to 
perform the same functions. (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 25) 
The third example taken from Maturana and Varela (1998) discusses a more 
complex, yet ancient metazoic organism, called the Hydra. The basic structure of the 
Hydra is described a two-layered tube with tentacles emanating from its mouth. The 
exterior layer is composed of muscle cells that run both around and down the length 
of the tubes. The interior layer of the tubes contains cells that secrete digestive 
fluids. By contracting muscle cells along the body the Hydra can change its shape 
and direction of locomotion. Neurons between the two layers of the cells can extend 
over the length of the entire organism and end in the muscle cells. As a link back to 
the less evolved multi-cellular organisms, the tail-like cellular projections on the 
Hydra, are evolutionarily speaking, the flagella. As the electrochemical state changes 
in smaller cellular projections, called the dendrites, the muscle cells contract.  
Like the Hydra opening its mouth as a reflexive part of bringing food to it 
with its tentacles, we humans think in order to act and we act as part of our 
thinking — cognition is action. But how is it that we humans can learn new 
behaviours, while the Hydra generally cannot? (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 
25). 
The answer to that question requires explanation of the difference between neural 
maps and neural plasticity.  
Although still surprisingly continuous with the Hydra, human cognition is a 
little more similar to what happens in frogs, owls and monkeys in that all of 
these organisms have nervous systems that include neural maps and 
adaptive neural plasticity. (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 26) 
Maturana and Varela, responding to a neurobiological study in which the eye of a 
tadpole was carefully rotated 180 degrees before developing in to an adult frog 
conclude that for the frog: 
[…] there is no such thing as up or down, front and back, in reference to an 
outside world, as it exists for the observer doing the study. (Maturana, 
Varela, 1998: 25—26). 
The poor frog in the experiment was observed to extend its tongue to the opposite 
side of its visual field. Crucially repeated failure to catch the fly fails to change the 
frog’s reaction to seeing the fly. The conclusion given is that the frog: 
[…] acts entirely on the basis of the rewired neural connections between the 
retinal image and the tongue muscles. (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007) 
Johnson and Rohrer consider that one of the most profound findings in neuroscience 
is that nervous systems exploit topological and topographic organization (Johnson & 
Rohrer, 2007). Research in this area points to the fact that organisms construct 
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neural maps. The existence and role neural maps play in the development of neural 
plasticity is foundational in terms of understanding the emergence of embodied 
cognition.  
In neural maps, adjacent neural cells (or small groups of neural cells) fire 
sequentially when a stimulus in adjacent positions within a sensory field 
moves. […] The spatial orientation of this topography is rotated in various 
ways. Thus visual right-to-left has become front-to-back and so on, but the 
topographic mapping between movement in the vertical visual plane and the 
plane of the retinotectal neural map remains consistent. Even though there 
is considerable spatial distortion in the neural map, the key relational 
structures are preserved. In some other cases, such as some auditory maps 
and colour maps, where the correspondences can be less about shape and 
position, the organization is more properly called topologic than 
topographic, but the organizing principle of the neural mapping of sensation 
still holds (Gaze and Sharma, 1970). (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007) 
It is clear interventions as destructive as altering a frog’s vision by 180 degrees, is 
very much outside of the realm of “normal” Darwinian deviation. Gaze and Sharma 
however, conclude that less destructive interventions are more likely to occur in 
nature in line with Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection and mutation. 
In an attempt to simulate the kinds of partially the optic nerve of a goldfish was 
partially lacerated. The two found that the optic nerve regenerated to create 
complete retinal map in what remained of the tectum. This gave rise to the idea that 
the neural maps have a degree of plasticity. The degree to which such neural maps 
might be plastic therefore has been the subject of much recent study (Gaze, Sharma, 
1970). 
Whilst the destructive interventions noted above can disrupt neural maps, the 
adaptive nature of neural plasticity to environmental factors is of interest to this 
study on the grounds that this leads to an account of an emergent rationality that is 
embodied, social and creative (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007). Neural plasticity is 
considered to be particularly profound in more complex creatures whose brains 
possess cross-modal neural maps. The experiment conducted by Knudsen and 
colleagues (Knudsen 1998, 2002) involved making an owl wear glasses that changed 
its perception of the visual field. As with the frog in the previous example, owls have 
evolved a highly accurate method of hunting. Owls hear and locate their prey using 
minute differences in the time it takes for a sound to travel to one ear versus the 
other ear thus establishing the approximate position in the owl’s retinotectal map. 
The owl can then visually confirm the exact location of its prey before it strikes.  
Knudsen and colleagues (Knudsen 1998, 2002) put prismatic glasses on adult 
and juvenile owls, which distorted the owls’ vision by 23 degrees. After 8 
weeks with glasses, adults raised normally never learned to compensate, but 
juveniles were able to learn to hunt accurately “showing that alternative 
learned and normal circuits can coexist in this network” (Knudsen 2002: 325). 
(Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 28) 
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The important difference therefore between the cross-modal maps of more complex 
organisms such as the prism-reared owls, is the ability to receive enough reentrant 
neural connections from other sensory modalities to sustain the multiple branching 
neural arbors (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 28). The frog’s single-modal retinotectal 
maps simply do not have the capacity to receive enough reentrant neural 
connections and therefore do not have the capacity for neural plasticity.  
To continue the exploration of neural plasticity through to increasingly complex 
creatures and eventually to human beings Merzenich and colleagues (Merzenich et 
al. 1987; reviewed in Buonomano and Merzenich 1998) worked on neural plasticity 
in adult squirrel and owl monkeys. What links this research to the previous two 
examples, respectively of the frogs and the owls who grew dual arborizations, the 
monkeys exhibited a plasticity based on their brains’ ability to select which parts of 
their neural arbors to use for various kinds of input (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007). 
Technical as this sounds such research has developed understanding about the 
fundamental nature of being human. Just as the frogs, owls and monkeys have eyes, 
ears and all their other senses, which serve to structure the internal neural maps and 
the parameters of their capacity for neural plasticity, human beings have 
particularly complex sets of visual, auditory and somatosensory neural maps. 
The more obvious of these map perceptual space in fairly direct analogs - 
preserving topologies of pitch, the retinal field, colour, the parts of the body 
and so on ~ but subsequent maps preserve increasingly abstract topological 
structure (or even combinations of structure) such as object shape, edges, 
orientation, direction of motion and even the particular degree of the 
vertical or horizontal. Like the frog, we live in the world of our maps. 
Topologically speaking, our bodies are in our minds, in the sense that our 
sensorimotor maps provide the basis for conceptualization and reasoning. 
(Johnson et. al., 2007: 30) 
We perceive the patterns of our moment-by-moment organism-environment 
interactions in image-like fashion, constantly seeking out various topological 
invariances in those patterns that prove useful to us (Johnson et. al., 2007). This 
finally leads us through to the human context. Our imagination and our reason are 
constituted by patterns of activation within these neural maps. However, Johnson 
et. al., (2007: 30) are particularly adamant that neural maps ought not to become 
misinterpreted as classical Representations.  
Some people might suppose that talk of neural “maps” would necessarily 
engender Representationalist theories of cognition. On this view, the map 
would be construed as an internal representation of some external reality. 
But the account we have been giving does not entail any of the traditional 
metaphysical dualisms that underlie Representationalist views — 
dichotomies such as inner/outer, subject/object, mind/body, self/world. Such 
dichotomies might describe aspects of organism-environment interactions 
from an observer’s perspective, but they do not indicate different ontological 
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entities or structures. According to our interactionist view, maps and other 
structures of organism-environment co-ordination are prime examples of 
non-representational structures of meaning, understanding and thought. 
Maturana and Varela (1998: 125-126) make this important philosophical point 
quite clear. We must not read our scientific or philosophical perspectives 
(i.e., our theoretical stance) on cognition back into the experience itself that 
we are theorizing about. We must not uncritically assume that distinctions 
we make in explaining a certain cognitive experience are thereby part of the 
person’s experience. To do so is to fall prey to what James termed the 
“Psychologist’s Fallacy”. In observing something scientifically, one must 
always consider the standpoint of the scientist in relation to the object of 
study. When we use terms such as “retinal map, pitch maps”, “sensorimotor 
maps”, “colour maps” and so forth to describe the operations of various 
neural arrays in a frog’s nervous system, or in human nervous systems, we 
are doing so from our standpoint as observers and theorists who can see 
mappings between those neural structures and our own experience of the 
“external world”. But for the frog, and for the human in the act of perceiving, 
that map is the basis for its experience of the world. The map constitutes the 
sensorimotor experience of a certain part of the frog’s world. The frog’s 
neural map itself has its origin not in the immediate mappings that we 
observers see in the moment, but in a longitudinal evolutionary and 
developmental process during which those neural connections were “selected 
for” by Darwinian or neo-Darwinian mechanisms. In short, what we (as 
scientists) theoretically recognize and describe as an organism’s “maps” are 
not for that organism internal representations.  
Rather, what we call sensorimotor and somatosensory maps (whether in 
multi-cellular organisms, monkeys, or humans) are for that organism 
precisely the structures of its experienced world! Consequently, we must be 
careful not to be misled by philosophers of mind and language who would 
treat these maps as internal representations of external realities, thereby 
surreptitiously introducing an “inner/outer” split that does not exist in reality 
for the organism. (Johnson et. al., 2007: 31) [Italics added] 
The above citation, whilst lengthy, is the key to Johnson’s et. al (1999) argument 
that theories of embodied mind challenge the philosophical traditions of western 
thought. Our sensorimotor and somatosensory maps structure our experience of our 
world. Yet these are largely invisible structures. Drew Leder in his book ‘The Absent 
Body’ (Leder, 1990) reminds us that we do not hear our ears or see our eyes, and 
questions why are we so frequently oblivious to our own bodies when they play 
such a central role in shaping our experience of the world. This problem is central to 
the human condition, and one, which has certainly affected the absence of the body 
in western philosophy. The condition is such that we are barely aware of our internal 
organs and the physiological processes that keep us alive and are largely unable to 
explain how we perform even the simplest of acts. For the act of reflection-in-action 
this is a pivotal issue. Practitioners can rarely elaborate upon their decision-making 
in the midst of practice for example, or translate into words the felt experience of 
making in a way that unravels their processes. This of course is the issue taken up by 
this thesis, how can the embodiment of practice, and the essentially embodied 
nature of reflection-in-action be made more accessible to practitioners wanting to 
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better understand their own practice? In the following section Johnson et. al.,  
(2007) explore the ontological continuity and human thought and introduce image 
schemas and amodal perception. Ultimately the body need not stay entirely hidden. 
 
The character of our experience is delineated in large part by the nature of 
our bodies and brains, the kinds of environments we inhabit, and the values 
and purposes we have. The patterns of our on going interactions (or 
“enactions” as Varela, Rosch and Thompson (1991) have called them, to stress 
their active, dynamic character) define the contours of our world and make it 
possible for us to make sense of, reason about, and act reliably within this 
world. Thousands of times each day we see, manipulate and move into and 
out of containers, so containment is one of the most fundamental patterns 
of our experience. Because we have two legs and stand up within a 
gravitational field, we experience verticality and up-down orientation. 
Because the qualities (e.g., redness, softness, coolness, agitation, sharpness) 
of our experience vary continuously in intensity, there is a scalar vector in 
our world. For example, lights can grow brighter or dimmer, stoves get 
hotter or cooler, iced tea gets sweeter as we add sugar. We are subject to 
forces that move us, change our bodily states and constrain our actions, and 
all of these forces have characteristic patterns and qualities. We are bound 
inextricably to our world interactively (enactively) by means of these 
recurring patterns that are the very conditions for us to survive, grow and  
the qualities (e.g., redness, softness, coolness, agitation, sharpness) of our 
experience vary continuously in intensity, there is a scalar vector in our 
world. (Johnson et. al., 2007: 136) 
 
The thought of such a state in which our experience is composed entirely of the 
moment-by-moment flux of sensory stimuli without structure and therefore utterly 
chaotic sounds quite alarming, and yet human experience of it has been documented 
in stroke patients. A recent example concerns the neuroanatomist Jill Bolte Taylor 
(2008) who at the age of 37 had a stroke in the left side of her brain, and remains 
the only recorded case of a neuroanatomist to have completely recovered from a 
severe brain haemorrhage. Consequently she was in a unique position to observe 
from the inside as her mind deteriorated over the course of 4 hours until she could 
not walk, talk, read, write, or draw from her memory until she eventually passed 
into unconsciousness. In her book ‘My Stroke of Insight: A Brain Scientist's Personal 
Journey’ (Bolte Taylor, 2008), she shares how she progressively lost over the course 
of those few hours, the functions for categorizing, organizing, describing, judging 
and critically analyzing as the hemorrhage expanded in the left side of her brain and 
physically pressed upon the language centers. She considers her book to be about 
the ‘beauty and resiliency of our human brain because of its innate ability to 
constantly adapt to change and recover function’ (Johnson et. al., 2007), much like 
the frog, owl and monkey described in the previous sections, except in this case, the 
full recovery of her cerebral functions occurred over an 8 year period.  
 
As an aside from the theme of neural plasticity and the regenerative possibilities 
following brain trauma, Bolte Taylor’s (2008) descriptions of her state of being 
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during the moments when only the right side of her brain was functioning normally 
are equally fascinating and worth taking a moment to explore in relation to this 
study.  
 
During the stroke Bolte Taylor reflectively expresses how her consciousness ‘shifted 
into the present moment’ (Bolte Taylor, 2008). 
 
As the hemorrhage in my brain grew larger and larger, I can relate the 
cognitive deficits I was experiencing to the underlying biology. As a 
neuroanatomist, I must say that I learned as much about my brain and how it 
functions during that stroke, as I had in all my years of academia. By the end 
of that morning, my consciousness shifted into a perception that I was at one 
with the universe. (Bolte Taylor, 2008) 
 
Admittedly this is a rather grand if unquantifiable claim. However, the specific 
details in her descriptions in which she describes the felt experience of being solely 
in the right hemisphere are importantly still rooted in metaphorical projection, (a 
concept of Johnson and Lakoff’s to be addressed shortly). The condition caused by 
her brain’s inability to differentiate the tactile and spatial boundaries of her own 
body, for example, gave rise to what she describes as a ‘sense of expansiveness’ 
(Bolte Taylor, 2008). Living entirely in the right side of the brain of course would be 
utterly chaotic and counter productive to the organism’s survival. The predominant 
human condition, whatever it is socially or culturally, is one that requires both 
hemispheres working in tandum.  
 
No matter how lateralized the brain can get, though, the two sides still work 
together. The pop psychology notion of a left brain and a right brain doesn’t 
capture their intimate working relationship. The left hemisphere specializes 
in picking out the sounds that form words and working out the syntax of the 
words, for example, but it does not have a monopoly on language processing. 
The right hemisphere is actually more sensitive to the emotional features of 
language, tuning in to the slow rhythms of speech that carry intonation and 
stress. Neuroscientists know that the hemispheres work together and that 
they do so by communicating through the corpus callosum. But exactly how 
the hemispheres cooperate is not so clear. Perhaps paired regions take turns 
being dominant. That is known to happen in some animals. For instance, 
dolphins use this strategy to sleep and swim at the same time: One 
hemisphere remains active for hours, then fades while the other takes over. 
Bird brains switch as well. In order to sing, a songbird makes the two sides of 
its lungs open and close. The two hemispheres of the bird’s brain take turns 
controlling the song, each dominating for a hundredth of a second. 
 
The intimate cooperation between the two hemispheres makes it all the 
more remarkable that a person can survive with just one a sign that the brain 
is far more malleable than we once thought. After a hemisphere is forced to 
manage on its own, it can rewire itself to handle all the tasks of a full brain. 
In fact, two hemispheres can cause more trouble than one if they cannot talk 
clearly to each other. Neuroscientists have linked some mental disorders, 
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including dyslexia and Alzheimer’s, with a breakdown in left-right 
communication. 
 
The two sides of the brain may be a legacy that we inherited from our 
wormlike ancestors. But their delicate balance of symmetry and 
specialization is now woven into the very essence of human nature. 
(Zimmer, 2009) 
 
As a painter, I can certainly relate to the experience of being fully immersed in a 
visual and sensual domain and yet it is an experience reflectively reviewed by both 
hemispheres of my brain. Indeed in the context of the visual arts recent research 
into brain function in art students, explored the structural differences in relation to 
expertise. These measurable differences had previously been demonstrated in a 
number of domains including visual perception, spatial navigation, complex motor 
skills and musical ability, but had not yet been associated with representational skills 
in visual art.  
 
In the current study a cohort of 44 graduate and post-graduate art students 
and non-art students completed drawing tasks. Scores on these tasks were 
then correlated with the regional grey and white matter volume in the 
cortical and subcortical structures. An increase in grey matter density in the 
left anterior cerebellum and the right medial frontal gyrus was observed in 
relation to observational drawing ability, whereas artistic training (art 
students vs. non-art students) was correlated with increased grey matter 
density in the right precuneus. This suggests that observational drawing 
ability relates to changes in structures pertaining to fine motor control and 
procedural memory, and that artistic training in addition is associated with 
enhancement of structures pertaining to visual imagery. The findings 
corroborate the findings of small-scale fMRI studies and provide insights into 
the properties of the developing artistic brain. (Chamberlain, McManus, 
Brunswick, Rankin, Riley, Kanai, 2014) 
 
The study above, in addition to its primary objective, also disproved the largely held 
misconception that artists work solely in the right side of their brains. Immersion in 
the right hemisphere is a desirable consequence of gaining expertise in the most 
fundamental of visual art practices. It is worth noting, for example that drawing 
ability is a longstanding traditional prerequisite of entry into education in the visual 
arts regardless of whether the practitioners interests are purely conceptual and 
involves out sourcing the making process.  
 
It appears reasonable however, to hypothesize that if the act of learning and gaining 
mastery in drawing physically changes the neural structure of the human brain, the 
structure itself will have some have some specific consequence in the way the 
practitioner conceptualises their world. Throughout history a select group of visual 
arts practitioners have been as equally revered for their unique visions and ideas as 
for their mastery over their chosen media. In Charles Harrison and Paul Wood’s ‘Art 
in Theory 1900 – 1990’ (1992), art is presented as a story of changing ideas best told 
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chronologically. Examples abound through manifesto’s and personal letters where 
the artists’ conceptual ideas are tied uniquely to their practices as visual/conceptual 
artists. The relationship is intertwined and yet I would argue that it is not yet fully 
understood. Theories of embodied mind would have us consider how our experience 
is delineated by the nature of our bodies and brains. The most compelling of the 
theories to have emerged in recent years regarding how embodiment structures our 
mental processes and generates meaningful coherent experience out of the chaotic 
moment by moment flux of sensorial stimuli, explain how the white and grey 
matter, in the two hemispheres, and four lobes, of a typical human brain, deal with 
sensory experience. 
 
6.7  Image Schematic Structures  
 
Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) use the term “image schemas” to refer to the 
stable recurring patterns of sensorimotor experience through which we engage with 
the world. Enabling us to understand, act and further our purposes.  
 
There are numerous sources of evidence for the existence of image schemas, 
ranging from experimental psychology to linguistics to developmental 
psychology. (Johnson & Rohrer, 2007: 33) 
 
Johnson in both his ‘The body in the mind’ (1987) and ‘the meaning of the body’ 
(2007), analyses the evidence for the existence of image schematic structures. 
 
Creativity is possible, in part, because imagination gives us image-schematic 
structures and metaphoric and metonymic patterns by which we can extend 
and elaborate those schemata. [...] And, when it is metaphorically elaborated, 
it can structure many non-physical abstract domains. Metaphorical projection 
is a fundamental means by which we project structure, make new connections, 
and remould our experience.’ (Johnson, 1987: xi - xiv)  
 
The hypothesis that these image schemas are ‘neurally embodied as patterns of 
activation in and between our topological neural maps’ (Johnson et. al., 2007) 
requires that image schemas form part of our non-representational coupling with 
our world. In the same way that the neural maps of the frogs, owls and monkeys 
form image schemas that define their types of sensorimotor experience, image 
schematic structure is the basis for our understanding of all aspects of our 
perception and motor activities.  
 
An example from Lakoff and Nufiez (2000) illustrates this image-schematic 
basis of spatial concepts in humans. What we call our concept IN is defined for 
us by a CONTAINER image schema that consists generically of (1) a boundary 
that demarcates (2) an interior from (3) an exterior. When we say The car is in 
the garage, we understand the garage as a bounded space, we profile 
(Langacker, 1986) the interior of that space, and we regard the car as what 
cognitive linguists call a trajector within that space, with the garage (as 
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container) serving as a landmark in relation to which the trajector is located. 
[…] As with much interdisciplinary research in the neurosciences, the evidence 
for this first emerged from intracranial neuronal recordings on monkeys and 
was later extended to humans via analogous neuroimaging studies. (Johnson 
et. al., 2007)  
 
Within a growing body of research from developmental psychology the proposal has 
been put forward that infants are born with the inherent capacity for experiencing 
image-schematic structures.  
 
Stern (1985) described certain types of experiential structures that infants 
are able to detect, and he argues, first, that these capacities form the basis 
for meaning and the infant’s sense of self; and, second, that these capacities 
continue to play a central role in meaning, understanding and thinking even 
in adults who are capable of propositional thinking. Let us briefly consider 
two of these basic structures: (1) cross-modal perception, and (2) vitality 
affect contours. […] Stern suggests that Infants thus appear to have an 
innate general capacity, which can be called amodal perception, to take 
information received in one sensory modality and somehow translate it into 
another sensory modality. [...] These abstract representations that the infant 
experiences are not sights and sounds and touches and nameable objects, but 
rather shapes, intensities and temporal patterns — the more “global” 
qualities of experience. (Johnson et. al., 2007) 
 
When Johnson (2007) describes human meaning emerging as images, patterns 
qualities and feelings, it is in part a result of the inherent image schematic structures 
and what Stern (1985) calls amodal perception. This inherent structure of perception 
is not something adults grow out of. Rather it is pervasive in our every dealing with 
the world. 
 
When as adults we hear a musical composition building up to a crescendo, this 
causes increasing emotional tension that is released at the musical climax. The 
emotional salience of the vitality affect contours in image schemas shows that 
image schemas are not mere static “representations” (or “snapshots”) of one 
moment in a topographic neural map (or maps). Instead, image schemas 
proceed dynamically in and through time. To summarize, image schemas can 
be characterized more formally as: 
 
(1) recurrent patterns of bodily experience,  
(2) “image”-like in that they preserve the topological structure of the 
perceptual whole, as evidenced by pattern-completion,  
(3) operating dynamically in and across time,  
(4) realized as activation patterns (or “contours”) in and between topologic 
neural maps,  
(5) structures which link sensorimotor experience to conceptualization and 
language, and  
(6) structures which afford ‘normal’ pattern completions that can serve as a 
basis for inference. (Johnson et. al., 2007) 
 
Image schemas constitute a preverbal and pre-reflective emergent level of meaning. 
They are patterns found in the topologic neural maps we share with other animals, 
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though we as humans have particular image schemas that are more or less peculiar 
to our types of bodies. However, even though image schemas typically operate 
without our conscious awareness of how they structure our experience, it is 
sometimes possible to become reflectively aware of the image-schematic structure 
through Conceptual Metaphor Theory. 
 
6.8  Abstract Conceptualization ,  Reasoning ,  CMT (Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory) ,  and Conceptual Blending 
 
Dewey’s ‘Continuity Thesis’ states that in order to explain how abstract thought 
works we must be able to move from: 
 
• body-based meaning of spatial and perceptual experience, characterized by 
image schemas and affect contours 
to: 
 
• abstract conceptualization, reasoning and language use.  
 
Johnson (2007) is optimistic that some of the central mechanisms of abstract 
thought are becoming better understood. Indeed the following statement 
confirming the continued development of this theory has in itself been used to help 
refine the theory.  
 
Consider the sentence ‘We have a long way to go before our theory is finished’. 
Why can we use the phrase a long way to go, which is literally about distance 
in motion through space, to talk about the completion of a mental project 
(i.e., developing a theory)? The answer is that there is a conceptual metaphor 
PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, via which some cultures 
understand progress toward some nonphysical goal as progress in moving 
toward a destination. The metaphor consists of the following conceptual 
mapping: The PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS METAPHOR. 
(Johnson et. al., 2007) 
 
This introduces a particularly important structure Johnson and Lakoff (1980) call 
conceptual metaphor. This has been worked into Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
(CMT). A central aspect of CMT is that “abstract” concepts are defined by systematic 
mappings from bodily-based sensorimotor source domains onto abstract target 
domains.  
 
Johnson (1987) proposes that all abstract conceptualization works via conceptual 
metaphor, conceptual metonymy and a few other principles of imaginative 
extension. However, in relation to this thesis CMT also offers itself as a method of 
reflection-on-action and -practice. The mapping of conceptual metaphors back onto 
the source domain of experience may offer visual arts practitioners a fresh way of 
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reflecting on the experience of making. When I write, ‘I have a long way to go 
before my thesis will be finished’ one of our culture’s most pervasive metaphors for 
understanding the passage of time comes into play. The Conceptual Metaphor 
PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS mentioned above, is understood 
metaphorically as motion along a path to some location. In this metaphor, the 
observer moves along a time line. There are so many examples now that are being 
analysed. 
 
To date there is a rapidly growing body of metaphor analyses of key concepts 
in nearly every conceivable intellectual field and discipline, including the 
physical and biological sciences, economics, morality, politics, ethics, 
philosophy, anthropology, psychology, religion and more. For example, Lakoff 
and Nufiez (2000) have carried out extensive analyses of the fundamental 
metaphorical concepts that underlie mathematics, from simple models of 
addition all the way up to concepts of the Cartesian plane, infinity and 
differential equations. Winter (2001) analyses several key metaphors that 
define central legal concepts and are the basis for legal reasoning. Grady (1997) 
examines “primary metaphors” (such as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS) that 
are combined systematically into more complex metaphors (such as 
PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS). The reason that conceptual 
metaphor is so important is that it is our primary means for abstract 
conceptualization and reasoning. (Johnson and Rohrer, 2007) 
 
As suggested in chapter 2, the development of reflective ability has been continually 
evolving for all of human history, the recency of embodied cognition and the 
implications it has for furthering understanding needs to be understood in context. 
 
Recently several new sources of evidence have become available to explain the 
possible neural bases for the image-schematic mappings that operate in 
conceptual metaphors. The new evidence comes from both the patient based 
neurological literature and neuroimaging studies of normal adults. […] 
Similarly, an fMRI neuroimaging study by Rohrer (2001b, 2005) shows that 
both literal and metaphoric sentences using hand terms (e.g., She grasped the 
apple and He grasped the theory) activate primary and secondary hand 
regions within the primary and secondary sensorimotor maps. After the 
presentation of the linguistic stimuli, Rohrer also mapped the hand somatic 
cortex of each study participant using a tactile hand-stroking task. A 
comparison between the tactile and the sentential conditions shows a high 
degree of overlap in the primary and secondary somatomotor cortex for both 
language tasks, cf. Figure 1. Lllerli Hand Sentences Metaphoric Hand 
Sentences. (Johnson and Rohrer, 2007)  
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Figure 56: (Johnson and Rohrer, 2007) Figure 1. fMRI activation courses in response 
to literal and metaphoric action sentences.  
 
These metaphor mappings are found in patterns motivated by image schematic 
constraints. This is something of a linguistic game but it is extremely important. I 
give a simple example of it here, which I discussed with Mark Johnson in 2007. 
 
The following extracts are taken from an interview I conducted with Professor Mark 
Johnson, at the Experiential Knowledge Conference, University of Hertfordshire, 
England – 29th June 2007. It is included in this chapter on the methodological 
grounds that 1, it is presented as a primary source of qualitative research and 2, 
Johnson’s theories of CMT had not dealt overtly with the consequences of the 
theory within visual art practice, a theme this interview attempts to address. Having 
referred to a series of images depicting stone balance structures Johnson responded 
by saying: 
 
Mark Johnson: By the way there’s a metaphor of standing. Which is, you 
know, going to be operative here. The metaphor is existing is standing, or 
continuing to stand. And so when something is knocked over, it falls, so we 
talk about regime change, you know, it was toppled, it fell. And so the notion 
of standing up right is metaphorically a kind of, continuing in existence. 
Anyway that’s one of the metaphors that would be relevant to our experience 
of those works. 
 
Andrew Gray: That certainly applies. When it got to talking to this old woman 
about the work we could just have easily been talking about existence, our 
conversation about the structures being about finding inner balance in 
ourselves and the relationship of that balance to other forces in life that have 
the potential to knock us off that balance, is just an example of the deeper, 
less obvious, structure of meaning making in which concrete qualities can be 
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projected metaphorically onto abstract domains. You have done extensive 
work on this and I wanted to talk to you to see whether I’m applying your 
ideas correctly. The balanced structure becomes a metaphorical projection of 
the human being. Gravity becomes a projection for inner balance. The 
sideways force, as a physical attribute could be a wind, or you know 
whatever… 
 
MJ – Or you know, it can be a social force, or any metaphorical force.  
 
Figure 57: Mapping physical attributes onto abstract conceptual domains 
AG – These are the physical forces that can be mapped onto… 
 
MJ – …any kind of metaphorical force, right. So social convention, or peer 
pressure or, many different metaphorical manifestations of force. 
 
AG – Very often creative practitioners talk about the conceptual ideas behind 
the work are… or the conceptual ideas in the work are… what I’m suggesting 
would be beneficial for understanding visual art practice is if we were talking 
about what the conceptual ideas projected out of the work are. This leads me 
onto the aspects of this inquiry that are really interesting me. We talk about 
all human experience as having a structure. The structure of the physical 
experience, creates the parameters, the structure, through which we 
understand the experience. Going back to one of the things that I mentioned 
at your presentation yesterday. You described art making as being an 
exemplary example of human meaning making processes. Within visual art 
practice there are particular kinds of experiences that are generated out of 
dealing with matter without direct regard to its everyday functionality. I’m 
very interested in the kind of specific structures that are generated, and how 
creative practitioners internalise and metaphorically project those experiences, 
even unconsciously, into abstract domains. It would suggest that visual arts 
practitioners might owe as much of their creative conceptual ideas not only to 
their social, theoretical, and historical agendas to but to very physical qualities 
and processes in the act of making. Perhaps it is this process that enables visual 
art practice to be the exemplary example of human meaning making you 
describe. 
Balanced stone structure 
 
Human being 
Metaphorical projection 
Gravity 
 
Metaphorical projection 
Inner balance 
Metaphorical projection 
Sideways force: 
Wind 
Applied human force – 
intentional or 
accidental 
Weakening of the 
stone’s composite 
strength 
 
External forces:  
Change 
Interference 
Responsibilities 
Illness/fatigue 
 
 
164 
 
MJ – Exactly. I’m completely on board with what you’re saying. We look at the 
possibility of creativity as to not simply reproduce these templates or 
structures but the modest freedom we have to transform them in creative 
ways. I think that your basic idea is absolutely correct. Dewey says, look, 
what’s so characteristic of art is the focus on the qualitative dimensions in the 
structure of materials and relationships of qualities. And the actual working 
through the possibilities of those. And I think that’s what you are describing 
here and you are showing how that’s a basis for projection in our, sense of 
ourselves, and then into a number of abstract, what we think of as abstract, 
conceptual domains. (Gray, 2007) 
 
The capacity to internalize concrete embodied experience and project it 
metaphorically on to what we think of as abstract domains, presents itself a 
fundamental underlying structure of human meaning making. An underlying 
structure that operates largely unconsciously and it has taken years of data 
collection, empirical testing and analysis to discover. However, if visual arts 
practitioners are to benefit from focusing reflection on the underlying experience of 
practice, as Scrivener (2000: 18 - 19) suggests, then this inherent human capacity 
cannot be neglected.  
 
This is the key point in the thesis at which I consider the reviewing of theories of 
reflective practice and theories of embodied mind, are synthesized. This is presented 
as an original contribution to knowledge in the context of this thesis. The focus of 
reflective methods on the underlying experience of practice can benefit from the 
rich account of embodied cognition, deepening understanding of the qualitative 
dimensions of practice. The development and integration of Embodied Reflective 
Practice would not, I propose be only useful for visual arts practitioners but for a 
greater understanding of visual art practice and appreciation. 
 
[…] the value of an artwork lies in the ways it shows the meaning of 
experience and imaginatively explores how the world is and might be – 
primarily in a qualitative fashion. Therefore, art can be just as much a form of 
inquiry as is mathematics or the empirical sciences. The principal difference is 
that art focuses more intently on the qualitative dimensions of experience that 
we tend to overlook in our other intellectual activities, which, by the way, are 
characterized as the activities they are by their distinctive pervasive unifying 
qualities. The sciences seek to formulate generalizations over groups of 
phenomena and often need to abstract somewhat from the particular unifying 
quality of a situation, in order to focus on selected characteristics of a 
situation that seem salient and explanatorily robust. What distinguishes art 
proper, on Dewey’s view, is the way it presents the qualitative dimensions of 
an experience, instead of only abstract features, such as causal relations.  
The making of artworks is thus an on going exercise – an apprenticeship – in 
how to remake experience to enhance meaning. (Johnson, 2010: 150) 
 
As stated by Johnson et. al. (1999: 7), this deep understanding cannot be arrived at 
purely through phenomenological reflection. I consider that the development and 
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application of an Embodied Reflective Practice would have to occur through 
modifications to andragogy. Certainly the work done by Schön (1983) and Scrivener 
(2000), has developed rigourous reflective methods that have been successfully 
applied in an academic andragogical context. The development of Embodied 
Reflective Practice, is considered supplementary to existing reflective methods with 
specific benefit to visual arts practitioners. The research agenda proposed for this 
degree was to review and synthesize existing theories, this I conclude has been 
achieved. However, as is often the case in research, more questions have been 
opened than answered. Questions remain as to the most beneficial methods by 
which theories of embodied mind can be integrated into existing theories of 
reflective practice. I have offered evidence that the use of image schematic 
structures can offer insight into the role the qualitative dimension of practice can 
play in the language used to describe it. However, this might be of most benefit for 
reflections-on-action. In relation to reflections-in-action developing the inherent 
human capacity to be attendant to the moment and aware of the pervasiveness 
qualities of the materials in shaping aspects of the experience and framing 
conceptual understanding may require further modifications to andragogy. Varela 
et. al. (1993) saw the need for cognitive science to develop a method for examining 
experience and proposed the mindfulness/awareness as a means of training the 
inherent human capacity for being present. 
 
Its purpose [mindfulness awareness practice] is to become mindful, to 
experience what one's mind is doing as it does it, to be present with one's 
mind. What relevance does this have for cognitive science? We believe that if 
cognitive science is to include human experience, it must have some method 
for exploring and knowing what human experience is. (Varela et. al. 1993: 23) 
 
The question as to what relevance mindfulness training could have for cognitive 
science might also be aimed at reflective methods in visual art practice. Schön’s 
(1983) conversational model of reflecting-in-action, hearing what the situation is 
saying, how it talks back to the practitioner, has been shown to be a metaphorical 
means of simplifying a complex cognitive process that is a useful reflective method 
for most practice situations. During the video documentation of my own studio 
practice, for example, I can be heard talking about ‘my dialogue’ with the work. 
However, when reflections-in-action are focused on the qualitative, embodied 
dimension of experience in visual art practice the conversational metaphor is 
inadequate. The notion of experiencing what one’s mind is doing as it does it is 
alluring. If possible it could be extremely beneficial for supplementing the rigourous 
structure of existing reflective methods. The following chapter therefore has been 
included to take the questions developed through this thesis further as a 
recommendation for future research. 
 
Before moving on to examine mindfulness however, I would like to close this 
chapter with reference to an interview I conducted with Professor A C Grayling, 
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which focused on contextualising theories of Embodied Mind in relation to a wider 
humanist debate.  
 
Andrew Gray: I’d like to ask whether you feel they (theories of embodied 
mind) could contribute to a humanistic debate or whether there's a place for a 
humanistic account of visual art practice, and whether it would be useful in 
the humanistic debate. 
 
A C Grayling: Well, so there are three separate things going on in parallel and 
they will have complex relations to one another. One is that in constituting a 
sort of an ethical outlook, the humanistic stance brings the body back into 
focus as the site of our experience and our actual needs and our interests and 
respecting it and tolerating it and making room for it and even celebrating it, 
would be an important part of humanistic ethics. […] In that sense humanism 
is predicated on the idea that we are physical beings in a physical world and 
that it's the constant relationship that we're in with our environment that 
makes us what we are - which is why so much of the way that we think about 
ourselves, certainly emotionally, probably also cognitively, has to do with our 
being spatial and material creatures. (Gray, 2014) 
 
The transcript of this interview can be read in full in the Appendix. 
  
 
 
167 
CHAPTER 7  –  MINDFULNESS – A METHOD FOR EXAMINING 
EXPERIENCE? 
 
7.1   Questioning the Relevance of Mindfulness Training to the Further 
Development of a Model of Embodied Reflective Practice .  
The primary objective of this thesis, as set out in the previous chapters, has been to 
review and synthesize existing theories of reflective practice and theories of the 
embodied mind, in specific relation to developing reflective methods in visual art 
practice. Whilst this objective has been addressed in Chapters 1 to 6, the final 
conclusions presented in Chapter 8, will clarify how this process constitutes an 
original contribution to knowledge. Before moving onto the concluding chapter I 
consider it necessary, on the basis that it may have implications for the direction of 
future research into the development of reflective methods, to address a speculative 
suggestion to have emerged out of theories of embodied mind, concerning the 
potential benefit of mindfulness training in the development of reflective practices. 
If the results of mindfulness/awareness practice are to bring one closer to one's 
ordinary experience rather than further from it, what can be the role of 
reflection? […] This question brings us to the methodological heart of the 
interaction between mindfulness/awareness meditation, phenomenology, and 
cognitive science. What we are suggesting is a change in the nature of 
reflection from an abstract, disembodied activity to an embodied (mindful), 
open-ended reflection. By embodied, we mean reflection in which body and 
mind have been brought together. What this formulation intends to convey is 
that reflection is not just on experience, but reflection is a form of experience 
itself - and that reflective form of experience can be performed with 
mindfulness/ awareness. When reflection is done in that way, it can cut the 
chain of habitual thought patterns and preconceptions such that it can be an 
open-ended reflection, open to possibilities other than those contained in one's 
current representations of the life space. We call this form of reflection 
mindful, open-ended reflection. (Varela, et. al., 1993: 27) 
The Western appropriation of Eastern introspective psychological practices, 
including what has been termed ‘mindfulness’ is a complex and as yet unresolved 
issue, and clearly not the main objective of this thesis. The speculative nature of this 
chapter therefore must be made explicit. However, Varela’s, et. al., (1993: 27), 
proposal to reframe reflection from being considered an abstract, disembodied 
activity, to being viewed as an embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection, in which 
reflection is not ‘on’ experience, but ‘is’ experience, presents itself as a necessary 
avenue for future enquiry in the context of this thesis. Similarly Varela’s, et. al., 
(1993: 27) notion that the role reflection plays in our lives brings us to the 
methodological heart of the interaction between mindfulness/awareness 
meditation, phenomenology, and cognitive science is clearly of contextual interest 
to this thesis. Finally, Varela’s, et. al., (1993: 27) claim that if reflection is ‘done’ in 
that way, it can cut the chain of habitual thought patterns and preconceptions 
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suggests a potentially beneficial method, whose academic rigour has yet been 
thoroughly tested in the domain of Psychology where it has received the greatest 
academic examination.  
Proving mindfulness training to be unbeneficial would have no negative 
consequences I can foresee, proving it to be beneficial however, could have 
significantly positive consequences for modifications to andragogy in visual art 
practice at a number of levels. It is not my purpose in this chapter to present a 
recommendation either way. However, I do consider it necessary to close this thesis 
with a review of some of the developments in mindfulness training across a number 
of disciplines, which could suggest further research opportunities and potential 
developments of an Embodied Reflective Practice.  
This chapter is composed of four sections. The first theorises mindfulness, by 
providing a brief historical overview of the origins of mindfulness in Eastern 
introspective psychological practices and how it has been introduced and adapted by 
Western science, particularly psychology. The second section examines the 
development of a means of measuring mindfulness through psychological research 
in relation to the health benefits of stress reduction. The MAAS scale (Ryan & 
Brown, 2003) claims to provide evidence that subjects trained in mindfulness 
techniques score higher in the test. The third section looks at the development of 
Mindfulness-Based Reflective Practice (Korthagen and Vasalos, 2009), in education 
research, which tries to address superficiality in reflective methods by focusing 
training on cognitive, emotional, and motivational awareness. This method whilst 
framed as Mindfulness-Based Reflective Practice may be criticised for making little 
reference to the tradition of mindfulness as it is understood by either Western 
psychology or Eastern introspective psychological practices. The final section 
introduces primary sources and brings the personal perspectives of mindfulness 
practitioners. Detailed in this section are two interviews conducted specifically for 
this chapter. The first interview, with Dr. Linda Lehrhaupt, Managing Director of the 
European based Institute for Mindfulness-Based Approaches (MBA), explores two 
issues. The first questions whether mindfulness training is worthy of further 
research as a means for developing reflective methods in visual art practice. The 
second issue concerns whether for the visual art practitioner, notions of ‘flow’ 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2009) within the practice situation can be considered a form of 
mindfulness, or rather a state of deep concentration combined with the process of 
discernment. This leads to the second interview with Professor Michael Rodriguez, 
an artist and lecturer in New York who made public his views that being attentive to 
his practice was in its self a kind of mindfulness during a radio broadcast, the 
transcript of which is available at: 
http://ctl.laguardia.edu/journal/v5/pdf/InTransit_Spring11_v5_fernandez.pdf (last 
accessed 29.9.14) 
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7.2  The Western Appropriation of Mindfulness  
Since the 1970’s in the West, empirical studies have been continuously revising a 
conceptual definition of what mindfulness is. However, accepted definitions in 
Western science, largely owe the term mindfulness and the techniques associated 
with it, to Eastern introspective psychological practices. Buddhist psychology in 
particularly, first made reference to the concept circa 500BCE (Black, 2011), 
although many philosophical and psychological traditions have emphasized the 
importance of the quality of consciousness for the maintenance and enhancement 
of well-being (Wilber, 2000).  
The relationship between the scientific psychology of the West and 
indigenous systems of psychology can take many forms, ranging from totally 
independent existence to complete integration. Buddhist psychology, like 
other indigenous psychologies, is prescientific, but it is so only in the narrow 
sense that it developed prior to, and outside the context of, modern Western 
science. It offers clearly testable hypotheses and therefore can be brought 
within the realm of scientific inquiry. (de Silva, 1997: 93) 
The attempt to bring Eastern psychology within the realm of scientific inquiry is a 
complex issue. Padmal de Silva (1997: 94), writing in The Authority of Experience 
(Pickering, 1997), considers that the process of evaluating the notions and practices 
of Buddhist psychology is something that will be consistent with its eminently 
empiricist stance. Consequently the process of hypothesis testing will not be alien to 
Buddhism, which encourages enquiry and discourages dogmatic acceptance of 
theories and claims (de Silva, 1997: 94). de Silva (1997: 94), considering whether 
integration between Western and Eastern psychological practices is either possible 
or desirable, explains how Mikulas (1981: 331-342) advocates neither integration nor 
separation but rather synthesis in the generation of a new form of psychology.  
Mikulas, in discussing the issues of integration between Eastern and Western 
psychologies, has made the point that it is not a matter of whether the 
Eastern or the Western approach is ‘better’. There are, he stresses, strengths 
and weaknesses in both; and the combinations of the two can be very 
powerful. Mikulas has discussed the interrelated domains of (a) biological, 
(b) behavioural, (c) personal and (d) transpersonal, and argues that any 
integrative or conjunctive psychology must include all four levels. It is clear 
that different pre-scientific or indigenous psychologies have different 
degrees of contribution to make to these domains. The same applies to 
modern Western psychology. The psychology of Buddhism can certainly 
contribute significantly to the development of a conjunctive psychology as 
envisaged by Mikulas. (de Silva, 1997: 94) 
The argument that merely bringing Eastern psychology within the realm of Western 
psychology is turned around here to suggest that each has something valuable to 
contribute to the development of psychological practices. Mikulas (1981: 331-342) 
goes on to specify that of the four ingredients of conjunctive psychology Eastern 
psychology can be considered less advanced in only the domain of biology. With 
that in mind the introduction of Eastern psychological practices into Western 
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culture must be viewed not as lacking academic rigour but rather as practices whose 
value is still being assessed and researched. The Eastern psychological practices 
being promoted by Varela, et. al., (1993: 27) begin with the two main kinds of 
meditation practices. 
Two main kinds of meditation are practised in Buddhism: (1) samathi, 
mindfulness, bare and deliberate attention to the details of one’s sensations, 
the resulting calm being an antidote to the evil of craving, and (2) vipassana, 
insight – attending to the arising, dwelling and ceasing of one’s sensations, 
and to their interdependence, an antidote to the evil of ignorance. 
(Valentine, 1997: 249) 
The development of a Western translation of these practices can be traced back to 
1881 when the Pali Text Society, founded by T. W. Rhys Davids, translated into 
English the entire canon of Buddhist text, and the majority of the commentaries and 
expository works. However, is translation is considered to have been beset with 
problems of translation and interpretation (de Silva, 1997: 80). More recently the 
German-born Sri-Lanka-ordained Nyanaponika Thera, formerly Siegmund Feniger, 
who co-founded and was editor-in-chief of the Buddhist Publication Society from 
the 1950’s until 1984, was a key figure in increasing exposure of mindful meditation 
in Europe. Nyanaponika (1972) described mindfulness as “the clear and single-
minded awareness of what actually happens to us and in us at the successive 
moments of perception”, a phrase, which taken out of context of Eastern 
psychological practices appears lacking in rigour. One of the most well-recognized 
Western definitions of mindfulness comes from Dr. Jon Kabat-Zinn, the founder of 
MBSR (Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction) from which the term mindfulness 
science has emerged, which now includes MBCT (Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy). He defined mindfulness as, “paying attention in a particular way: on 
purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Again 
for a text considered to be the landmark definition in regular use in the West, it 
lacks the rigour of a verifiable academic definition. Part of the problem here is the 
ambiguity surrounding how both the contexts of Western and Eastern psychological 
practices are being integrated. It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyze whether 
this particular definition can be verifiable and tested for how accurately it describes 
the human state of being ‘mindful’. The speculative nature of this chapter may 
proceed however, with this in mind, should mindfulness training be considered an 
avenue of inquiry for future research in the development of reflective practices in 
the visual arts, this definition would require detailed scrutiny. 
The root of the term Mindfulness is considered to have emerged from the Pali 
language, whereby Sati when combined with Sampajana, translates to mean 
awareness, circumspection, discernment, and retention (Shapiro, 2009).  
These linguistic renderings have been considered by scholars to suggest that 
mindfulness means to remember to pay attention to what is occurring in 
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one’s immediate experience with care and discernment. (Shapiro & Carlson, 
2009)  
Consequently, given the historical context of the mindfulness tradition in Eastern 
introspective psychological, the introduction of the concept into the realm of 
Western science was gradual, largely due to the negative association that the 
meditation practices used to develop mindfulness were esoteric and attainable only 
by certain people who fostered religious beliefs (Black, 2011).  
Extensive clinical studies particularly in psychology, but also significantly in the 
health sector, together with advances in scientific methods exploring human 
embodiment have dismantled many of these obstacles. Over the last decade 
particularly, researchers from a number of fields and institutions have dedicated 
attention to an empirically based operational definition of mindfulness. These 
definitions include: 
1. An open and receptive attention to and awareness of what is occurring in the 
present moment (Ryan & Brown, 2003)  
2. An awareness that arises through intentionally attending in an open, 
accepting, and discerning way to whatever is arising in the present moment 
(Shapiro & Carlson, 2009)  
3. An attention that is receptive to the whole field of awareness and remains in 
an open state so that it can be directed to currently experienced sensations, 
thoughts, emotions, and memories (Jha, Krompinger, Baime, 2007)  
4. Waking up from a life lived on automatic pilot and based in habitual 
responding (Siegel, 2007).  
5. Clearly a common theme shared among all these definitions is a general 
receptivity and full engagement with the present moment (Black, 2011). 
(Black, 2011) 
In 2003, a series of psychometric development studies provided the first reliable 
measure of dispositional mindfulness called the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
(MAAS) (Ryan, Brown, 2003). Other measures have since been developed (Black, 
2011), however, this chapter will deal specifically with the development and findings 
of Ryan and Brown’s MAAS (2003).  
The work of Ryan and Brown (2003) has helped mindfulness become widely 
accepted across a range of knowledge fields as an inherent quality of human 
consciousness, although certainly the capacity for being ‘mindful’ varies both within 
and between individuals.  
Recognizing that most everyone has the capacity to attend and to be aware, 
we nonetheless assume (a) that individuals differ in their propensity or 
willingness to be aware and to sustain attention to what is occurring in the 
present and (b) that this mindful capacity varies within persons, because it 
can be sharpened or dulled by a variety of factors. (Ryan & Brown, 2003) 
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Indeed, it may be the case that individuals with years of meditation training have 
been shown to score higher on clinical tests (Ryan & Brown, 2003) against the 
MAAS scale developed to measure psychometric properties (Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale). However, the fact that mindfulness can be empirically assessed, 
frames the capacity for attention and awareness focused on the present moment, as 
a human quality that is entirely independent of religious, spiritual, or cultural 
beliefs. Mindfulness can therefore be said to be an important aspect of the embodied 
mind. 
Mindfulness is inherently a state of consciousness. Although awareness and 
attention to present events and experiences are given features of the human 
organism, these qualities can vary considerably, from heightened states of 
clarity and sensitivity to low levels, as in habitual, automatic, mindless, or 
blunted thought or action (Wallace, 1999). 
Whilst John Dewey (1933) has been referenced extensively throughout this thesis it 
was his fellow American Pragmatist William James (1907: 237) who questioned the 
role of mindfulness in the average person, stating, “Compared to what we ought to 
be, we are only half awake”. Mindfulness is considered to capture a quality of the 
conscious embodied mind that is characterized by clarity and vividness of current 
experience and functioning. Mindfulness may be compromised however as when 
individuals behave compulsively or automatically, without awareness of or attention 
to one’s behaviour (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Furthermore a state of mindlessness, or less 
“awake” states in the Jamesian sense, can be defensively motivated, as when an 
individual refuses to acknowledge or attend to a thought, emotion, motive, or 
object of perception or in which the habitual or automatic functioning may be 
chronic for some individuals (Ryan & Brown, 2003). In this respect, mindfulness is 
now considered to play a key role in fostering informed and self-endorsed behavioral 
regulation, long been associated with well-being enhancement, through which 
individuals can disengage themselves from automatic thoughts, habits, and 
unhealthy behavior patterns (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
7.3  The Development of an Empirical Measurement of Mindfulness: 
Ryan and Brown’s (2003) MAAS Construction ,  Factor Analyses ,  and 
Reliabil ity Assessment 
If mindfulness is considered a method for examining experience (Varela, et. al., 1993: 
27), the MAAS scale might be presented as a method for examining mindfulness. A 
brief examination of the MAAS scale is included here for the purpose of reviewing a 
method designed to test levels of mindfulness, which may have implications for 
further research into whether the introduction of mindfulness instruction into 
reflective methods in visual art practice can be recommended.  
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Kirk Warren Brown and Richard M. Ryan, developed an empirical measurement of 
mindfulness, the MAAS scale, in part through a postdoctoral fellowship from the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, whilst working at the 
Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology, University of Rochester. 
They state that their inspiration for the scale items used in the MAAS model came 
from several sources:  
[…] our personal experience and knowledge of mindfulness (and mindless- 
ness), published writings on mindfulness and attention, and existing scales 
assessing conscious states of various kinds. Items were drafted to reflect the 
experience of mindfulness and mindlessness in general terms as well as in 
specific day-to-day circumstances, including variations in awareness of and 
attention to actions, interpersonal communication, thoughts, emotions, and 
physical states. (Ryan & Brown, 2003) 
Beginning with a pool of 184 items, which were split up between direct and indirect 
assessment of mindfulness, where the latter reflected absence of mindlessness, a 
rigorous process of reducing the items that included several exclusion criteria was 
conducted across five stages. Ryan and Brown’s (2003) intention was to capture the 
‘central, subjective experience of mindfulness as present attention and awareness’, 
therefore items containing attitudinal components such as patience, trust and 
acceptance, were excluded. Items referring to motivational intent, what they call 
the “why” of awareness or attention were also excluded, as were items that could be 
consequences of mindful states such as calmness, emotional or physical well being. 
Their intention was to develop a scale for a general adult population. 
Of the 184 items, 55 remained from the first round of testing, which involved a panel 
of experts. The 55 items were further reduced through a round of tests involving 313 
undergraduate students. The final table includes just 15 questions, which were 
distributed across cognitive, emotional, physical, interpersonal, and general 
domains. 
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Figure 58: (Ryan & Brown, 2003: 826) Table 2 Means, Standard Deviations, Factor 
Loadings, and Item-Total Correlations for the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
 
To the non-psychologist the statistical models by which the data was represented 
would require a great deal of explanation that I do not feel is necessary in this 
context. It suffices to say that the ‘Mean’ in the first column is the average of 313 
participant responses, and that MAAS respondents were required to indicate how 
frequently they experienced each statement. They were asked to assign their answer 
a number based on a 6-point Likert (1932) scale where 1 meant (almost always) and 
6 (almost never), where high scores represented more mindfulness.  
There are a number of questions about these questions I feel it necessary to raise. 
From this series of questions how might a mindful person answer? I speculate those 
answers below and make some references to how those answers might relate to 
visual art practice in some situations: 
1. I experience an emotion as it occurs (being attentive to emotional responses 
to the tacit aspects of visual art practice may be considered a far more 
appropriate way of describing the interaction between practitioner and 
artwork than a dialogue as in Schön’s (1983) use of a conversational 
metaphor)  
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2. I almost never break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying 
attention, or thinking of something else, (whilst interviewing Laurence 
Karasek, he commented to seeing himself knock over a bottle of turpentine 
whilst in the midst mixing colour during an intensive panting session, by 
saying “Typical”. There may be aspects of intense concentration in practice 
that do not lend themselves to a state of mindfulness. I will explore this 
further through a stone balancing example toward the end of this chapter) 
3. I am focused on what’s happening in the present (based on the case studies 
and my own experience of visual art practice, I would consider this state 
highly applicable)  
4. I pay attention to what I experience when I walk from place to place (visual 
arts practitioners can be considered highly observant people who focus on 
the qualitative unity of experience when out and about in the world) 
5. I notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort as they occur (the felt 
physical tension a visual arts practitioner feels in a practice situation might 
be considered a primary means by which action is continued or discontinued. 
From an embodied perspective one might speculate as to whether the feeling 
of physical tension might be considered the basis of the much debated ‘sense 
of rightness’, an aspect of practice that is evident in practice but notoriously 
difficult to quantify) 
6. I almost never forget a person’s name as soon as I’ve been told it for the first 
time (I am personally dubious about the ability of this quality to reflect 
mindfulness. It assumes that peoples’ memories are set up in the same way. 
As a visual artist I find that I can remember visual qualities in great detail but 
names tend not to stick in my memory, whereas I have colleagues for whom 
the opposite is true. Does it mean that one is more mindful than the other?)  
7. I am almost never “running on automatic” without much awareness of what 
I’m doing. (There may be moments in visual art practice when repetitive 
action may be considered advantageous, whether this leans toward a mindful 
or mindless state I cannot at present comment on) 
8. I am attentive to the activities I perform. (certainly something I consider 
acutely true of the visual art practice situation) 
9. I am almost never so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch 
with what I am doing right now to get there. (In the practice situation each 
aspect and stage of practice must be attended to) 
10. I am aware of what I’m doing when performing a task or job (to a large 
degree I would say yes absolutely, however, the visual arts practitioner must 
guard against complacency. It is when action-in-practice becomes habitual 
that the same mistakes are made repeatedly, or an aspect of practice is not 
adequately realized that one needs to employ a means of breaking habitual 
patterns and become more aware) 
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11. I give the person I’m listening to my full attention (All of the responses to 
these questions are speculative, however a response to this would require 
too broad a generalization to be useful) 
12. I am fully aware of both the act of driving and the journey  
13. I am almost never preoccupied with the future or the past (I understand the 
need not to neglect the present, however, I question whether anyone can be 
‘almost never’ preoccupied with past and future. The example given in the 
previous chapter concerning Dr. Jill Bolte-Taylor who’s stroke in the left side 
of her brain rendered her in a state of absolute present in which the 
functions of the brain to recall or predict where completely absent from her 
experience, with potentially terminal consequences, i.e., she couldn’t seek 
medical assistance until those brief moments when she returned from what 
she affectionly referred to as ‘La-La-Land’. Henri Bergson (2007) also 
characterized experience as the ‘thickness of a moment’ when past, present, 
and future are simultaneously in unison. In many respects this may be more 
reflective of awareness than mindfulness. 
14. I am always paying attention whist I’m doing things (for the visual arts 
practitioner this state may well be considered a prerequisite for successful 
action) 
15. I am aware when I’m eating (Here is a response to a question that poses 
issues for the visual arts practitioner. All of the response that run along the 
lines of being present and in the moment whilst doing things seem to marry 
up against the visual arts when considered in relation to the practice 
situation. However, to whether this state is continued through to other daily 
actions is entirely another matter. I have witnessed myself drifting off whilst 
eating alone, to entertain a whole range of thoughts, or what Gaston 
Bachelard would call reveries, only to return from the images in my head and 
find the plate empty. In contrast however, I can also be extremely attendant 
whilst eating) 
What do these statements tell us about being mindful? How could these statements 
relate to a practitioner’s mindfulness in visual art practice? Can the visual arts 
practitioner be considered mindful whilst engaged in visual arts practice? There 
have been no clinical trials to test this as yet. The MAAS scale has provided data 
indicating that subjects with mindfulness training score higher on the MAAS scale 
detail above. Would mindfulness training be beneficial in relation to reflective 
practices in the visual arts? It is an interesting question, which as yet has not 
received adequate attention. However, research concerning the introduction of 
mindfulness techniques into reflective methods in education has been carried out. 
The following section looks at Mindfulness-Based Reflective Practice (Korthagen, 
Vasalos, 2009) as an example for how mindfulness training may benefit reflective 
practice. 
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7.4   Mindfulness-Based Reflective Practice -  An Adaptive Model of 
Reflection from Education 
Korthagen and Vasalos from CETAR, VU University, Amsterdam & Institute for 
Multi-level learning (IML), set out in a conference paper in 2009, the issues 
reflective methods experienced in education as follows: 
 
Reflection as it is currently being used in professional settings and in 
educational programs for professional development, does not always lead to 
optimal learning or the intended professional development. Sometimes 
reflection seems to be used by practitioners as merely a technical tool 
generating quick, but often ineffective, solutions to problems that have been 
only superficially defined. If we look closely at how many practitioners 
reflect, we see that if there is any time for reflection at all, work pressure 
often leads to a focus on finding a 'quick fix' - a rapid solution for a practical 
problem - rather than shedding light on the underlying issues determining 
the situation at hand. While this may be an effective short-term measure in a 
hectic situation, there is a danger that one's professional development may 
eventually stagnate. As Schön (1987) argues, practitioners may 
unconsciously develop standard solutions fitting in with their personal 
perception of situations, so that the accompanying strategies become frozen. 
The practitioner will then no longer be in the habit of examining these 
strategies or the analyses once made of the problems they face. This means 
that more structured reflection is important in promoting deep learning and 
sound professional behavior. It also supports the development of a growth 
competence (Korthagen et al., 2001, p. 47): the ability to continue to develop 
professionally on the basis of internally directed learning. 
Dewey (1933) already emphasized the need for such careful and structured 
reflection as a basis for deep learning. In this paper, we will deepen this idea, 
and link it to the person of the professional. At the same time, we will bridge 
the gap between a kind of detached thinking about our actions and the 
actions themselves, bringing the concept of reflection closer to notions such 
as presence, awareness and mindfulness. (Korthagen, Vasalos, 2009: 2) 
 
Calderhead and Gates (1993: 2) claim that the essence of reflection enables 
professionals “to analyze, discuss, evaluate and change their own practice”, whilst 
this denotes reflection as a post event activity it does establish that in the work of 
practitioners, reflection is always linked to practice. For the purpose of this model of 
mindful, reflective practice, the relation between reflection and practice is presented 
simplistically as cyclic.  
 
 
REFLECTION PRACTICE 
 
 
Figure 59: (Korthagen, Vasalos, 2009: 2) Cyclic relationship of reflection and 
practice 
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As presented throughout this thesis, the relationship between practice and 
reflection is far from simplistic. It is rather a highly complex cognitive process, 
interdependent on a vast array of factors and situations. However, in order to make 
this model work in a professional educational setting Kolb and Fry (1975), 
established four phases of reflective practice which have been the basis for a number 
of models of reflective practice: (1) experience, (2) reflective observation, (3) 
abstract conceptualization, and (4) active experimentation. 
 
Korthagen and Vasalos (2009: 3) however, claim that Kolb and Fry’s (1975) model, is 
better for describing the analytic processes needed for an understanding of practice 
than for enhancing personal effectiveness.  
 
This is firstly caused by the fact that the model overemphasizes the role of 
abstract concepts, at the cost of concrete and more individual notions and 
images determining the practitioner’s behavior when dealing with practice 
(cf. Clandinin, 1985, and Connelly & Clandinin, 1984), which are often 
strongly rooted in his or her personal history (Carter & Doyle, 1996; 
Kelchtermans, 1993). As a consequence, a person may develop abstract 
concepts that help to understand practice without being able to develop a 
more fruitful relation with it. An example is the student teacher who 
understands concepts such as ‘care’ and ‘trust’ and their significance for the 
relationship with students in the classroom, but who fails to develop such 
relationships, because of an image of the classroom as ‘a dangerous place to 
be’ (something not unusual in novice teachers). (Korthagen, Vasalos, 2009: 
3) 
 
Korthagen and Vasalos (2009: 3) take issue with Kolb and Fry’s model on the 
grounds that it over emphasizes cognitive analysis, a criticism echoed by Day (1999: 
69) who concluded that the model 
 
[…] fails to take account of the need for developmental links between 
cognitive, emotional, social and personal development in the journey 
towards expertise in teaching. (Day, 1999: 69).  
 
The emotional, social and personal contexts are important aspect of developing 
methods of reflective practice that Schön recognizes when describing the limitations 
to ‘The Reflective Practioner’ (1983). The central influence of a practitioner’s 
personal needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and their emotions on everyday behaviour has 
been explicated in the domain of cognitive science. 
 
In response to this central criticism Korthagen (1982, 1985) published an adaptation 
of the model of Kolb and Fry titled the ALACT model of reflection (1. Action, 2. 
Looking back on the action, 3. Awareness of essential aspects, 4. Creating alternative 
methods of action, and 5. Trial, which itself is a new action and thus the starting 
point of a new cycle).  
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It is important to note that I do not find the ALACT model useful in visual art 
practice, it is clearly set up specifically for student teachers and the mentors helping 
them to learn to reflect in classroom situations, however it is worth working 
through the development in this model in order to assess how it has been refined 
and adapted to encompass aspects of embodied experience as it may provide insight 
into how a more effective model of reflective practice in visual art could be 
developed.  
 
Since its introduction the ALACT model has been used in teacher education for many 
years and in many teacher education programs throughout the world (Brandenburg, 
2008, Hoel & Gudmundsdottir, 1999, and Jones, 2008). More specifically, having 
been developed in the Netherlands, it is at present the main reflection model in 
most programs of teacher education in that country and has been used in Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, Norway, and the United 
States, either as an additional or as the key framework for promoting reflection in 
teachers, nurses, and other professional groups (Korthagen and Vasalos, 2009). 
 
Figure 60: (Korthagen, 1982) ALACT model of reflection  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Korthagen and Vasalos, (2009) provide a case study of a student teacher working 
through this model with a mentor. The case illustrates that the  process of reflection 
is less aimed at abstract conceptualization, and more on developing relational 
awareness. To develop such awareness, the student teacher has to become aware 
not only of their thoughts, but also of their emotions and needs, and how they 
influence behavior. In what might be considered an act of reflection-in-action on 
behalf of the mentor, Korthagen (2001) has elaborated phase 2 of the reflection 
process by means of the technique of ‘the nine fields’. 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
Trial Action 
Awareness of essential aspects 
 
Action 
Creating alternative methods      
of action 
Looking back on the action 
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Figure 61: (Korthagen, 2001) Table of Questions to Supplement the ALACT Model  
 
Korthagen (2001) emphasizes that in the supervision of student teachers, it is not 
enough for supervisors to merely help them go through the ALACT model, which he 
calls ‘helping to reflect’, but rather that it is more important to help them to ‘learn 
how to reflect’. It is considered that if teachers acquire this insight and the skills to 
go through the phases of the ALACT model on their own, they develop a growth 
competence: the ability to direct their own professional development. This can also 
help them to play an active role in future change processes in their work 
environment and thus promote their innovative capacity (Wubbels & Korthagen, 
1990).  
 
Addressing weaknesses in the model, Korthagen claims, perhaps subjectively, that 
failures in the model often related to the way in which the model was being used 
rather than with the model itself, furthermore he adds that any weakness is not so 
much inherent to the specific approach to reflection, but to the way the whole 
concept of reflection is commonly being conceptualized world-wide (Korthagen, 
Vasalos, 2009). This is rather a grand claim but significantly, one that is supported 
by theories of embodied mind (Johnson, Lakoff, 2007). Korthagen recommends that 
through close scrutiny of the weaknesses of ALACT essential issues in the way the 
concept of reflection is being used, also within other approaches, can be addressed. 
 
The first of the weakness to be addressed is pivotal for it suggests that while 
reflecting through the five phases of ALACT, practitioners were found to still focus 
on finding quick solutions rather than the underlying phenomena in the practical 
situation under reflection.  
 
In such cases, phase 1 of the model is an experience that was dissatisfying, for 
example a discipline problem in a teacher’s classroom, phase 2 (looking back) is 
nothing more than the conclusion that it was a bad experience, phase 3 
(awareness of essential aspects) is that the kids should have been more quiet, 
phase 4 (creating alternative methods of action) that stricter teacher behavior 
is needed. If in phase 5 (trial) such a ‘reflection’ appears not to work out well, 
student teachers often start to criticize the ALACT model for not being very 
0 What is the context? 
1 What did you want? 
2 What did you feel? 
3 What did you think? 
4 What did you do? 
5 What did the other(s) want? 
6 What did the other(s) feel? 
7 What did the other(s) think? 
8 What did the other(s) do? 
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helpful. As we have already noted, such reactions to models for reflection are 
not confined to the ALACT model. Already many years ago, Hoy and Woolfolk 
(1989) concluded that students often consider reflection as impractical and 
unhelpful in solving their problems, while being unaware of the fact that this 
first of all has to do with the quality of their reflection (Korthagen, Vasalos, 
2009) 
 
The observation made by Hoy and Woolfolk in 1989 of students considering 
reflection as impractical and unhelpful is similar in some respects to my own 
experience of visual art practitioners operating outside of an academic framework. 
Like Korthagen, Schön (1983) questions the lack of intellectual effort applied by 
practitioners who rather blame the inadequacies of the reflective method.  
 
There is nothing in reflection, then, which leads necessarily to paralysis of 
action. The fear of paralysis may spring from worst-case analysis which 
ignores the opportunities for reflection within the action-present, from 
neglect of our ability to construct virtual worlds in which the pace of action 
can be slowed, from ignorance of double vision, from inability to imagine 
descriptions useful for action, or from an inappropriate dichotomy of 
thinking and doing. […] In actual practice, practitioners do, without 
paralysis, reflect-in-action. The fear of a paralysis induced by reflection, like 
the belief in the indescribability of artistry, comes not from the experience of 
practice but from the lingering model of practical rationality, which is much 
in need of reflection. (Schön, 1983: 281) 
 
Korthagen and Vasalos’ first steps towards further improvement of their concept of 
reflection therefore, was the insight that the ALACT model was helpful as a process 
model, but that it does not support the practitioner in knowing what to reflect on, 
and that this can easily make the reflection somewhat superficial. The concern 
amongst educators was that a type of reflection, which focused only on previous 
and future behavior, could be counterproductive if it dealt with negative recurring 
problems. Levy & Mary (1986) consider that strong professional development 
processes ought to include the possibility of changes in the underlying sources of 
behavior, rather than constantly reviewing recurring behavior. This is what Schön 
(1987) argues, when suggesting practitioners may unconsciously develop standard 
solutions fitting in with their personal perception of situations, so that the 
accompanying strategies become frozen.  
 
When a practitioner makes sense of a situation he perceives to be unique, he 
sees it as something already present in his repertoire. To see this site as that 
one is not to subsume the first under a familiar category or rule. It is, rather, 
to see the unfamiliar, unique situation as both similar to and different from 
the familiar one, without at first being able to say similar or different with 
respect to what. The familiar situation functions as a precedent, or a 
metaphor, or... an exemplar for the unfamiliar one. (Schön 1983: 138) 
 
Korthagen and Vasalos (2009) consider that in order for transformational changes 
to take place, deeper layers need to be touched upon and consequently 
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supplemented the ALACT model with a model describing possible contents of 
reflection at six different levels called ‘The onion model’, which is a variant of the 
Bateson model (Dilts, 1990, and Korthagen, 2004). 
 
Figure 62: (Korthagen and Vasalos, 2005) The Onion Model  
 
The Onion Model (Korthagen, & Vasalos, 2008) is presented as an attempt to 
illustrate how mindfulness can be incorporated into, and structure, reflective 
methods in education. By stimulating a connection between what Korthagen and 
Vasalos, (2008) call a student teacher’s ‘inner core’ and their interaction with the 
outer world, subjects started to become more enthusiastic and motivated for the 
profession.  
 
We decided to start empirical studies into this phenomenon, and found that 
the process resulting from a stronger connection between the various onion 
levels could be framed in terms of the concept of flow. Flow has been 
described by Csikszentmihalyi (1990) as a state of being completely in the 
here-and-now, optimally connecting the demands of the situation with one’s 
inner capacities. In other words, the onion model appeared not only an 
instrument for deepening the reflection process, but also for creating more 
flow in student teachers, and hence more enthusiasm for ‘doing reflection’, 
and for enhancing more effective teaching. (Korthagen and Vasalos, 2009) 
 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000: 7) developed positive psychology as a 
reaction to what they perceived as a tendency by psychologists to focus on 
pathology, weakness, and negative situations that required treatments.  
 
[…] treatment is not just fixing what is broken; it is nurturing what is best. 
(Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000: 7).  
 
Their intention was to highlight the importance of people’s personal strengths. 
These include creativity, courage, perseverance, kindness, and fairness (Seligman, 
2002; Snyder & Lopez, 2007) and have come to be referred to as ‘essential aspects’ 
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(Almaas, 1986: 148). The research conducted in positive psychology over the last 
decade has focused on naming and categorizing what these essential aspects are. 
Almaas (1986) employs the term essential here to mean that they cannot be 
analyzed into more basic constituents. A claim that I propose can be challenged by 
theories of embodied mind and cognitive science. For the purpose of positive 
psychology however, the idea that people can use their personal qualities so that 
their actions are both effective and personally fulfilling became a compelling 
notion for Korthagen and Vasalos (2009) in the development of the ALACT model 
of reflective practice. Through considering the findings of Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi (2000) Korthagen and Vasalos (2009) considered that a further 
weakness in the way the ALACT model was often being used, was the tendency to 
focus on problematic aspects. 
 
This made us very aware of a second Phase 1 of the model, which means the 
experience to reflect on, often became synonymous to ‘a problematic 
situation’. This is again a tendency that is not so much inherent only to our 
own approach, but which seems to surface in almost all approaches to 
reflection. People often have the habit of lingering longer with things that 
went wrong than with successes. A side-effect is that somehow this fosters 
a feeling of inadequacy in them. (Korthagen and Vasalos, 2009) 
 
Fredrickson and Losada (2005) demonstrated that a focus on weakness and 
deficiencies leads to a narrowing of available action tendencies and that the person 
is inclined to think within the boundaries of the problematic framework, which is 
just what positive psychology hopes to avoid. Consequently Korthagen and Vasalos 
(2009) conclude that their notion of Core Reflection helps to link levels of their 
‘onion’ model together to help student teachers get in touch with their personal 
strengths.  
 
A next step in the further development of our approach emerged through 
the insight that, to many practitioners but also to their educators, reflection 
is often synonymous with thinking, or - at best - structured thinking. 
Although the specification of phase 2 of the ALACT model presented in 
Figure 3, is helpful in bringing awareness of feelings and needs into the 
reflection process, it often leads to thinking about feelings, instead of what 
Damasio (1999: 279-295) calls feeling the feelings. (Korthagen and Vasalos, 
2009) 
 
It is interesting to see the model of Mindfulness-Based Reflective Practice 
incorporating recent research in neurobiology, which has yielded strong evidence 
for the close relations between cognition and emotion in humans in general (e.g. 
Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007). 
 
In short, our analysis led to the insight that a focus on strengths alone is not 
sufficient, but that what is needed is cognitive, emotional and motivational 
awareness of both one’s strengths, and of one’s inner obstacles to the 
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actualization of one’s strengths. Of course, we realize that external 
obstacles (for example an unmotivated class) are also highly relevant and 
can trigger these internal obstacles (for example in the form of inhibiting 
beliefs or inhibiting self-concepts), but we believe that for self-directed 
professional growth to take place, the inner obstacles to the realization of 
one’s full potential in particular deserve careful attention within the 
reflective process. (Korthagen and Vasalos, 2009: 538) 
 
The role of mindfulness in reflective practice in education focuses on developing 
training methods that help bring a students teacher’s cognitive, emotional, and 
motivational awareness into a reflective arena. However there is no mention of the 
three primary mindfulness training techniques that have emerged out of the MBSR 
and MBCT. These three training techniques are as follows: 
 
1. Breathing meditation  
2. Body scan 
3. Mindful Yoga 
 
With the lack of focus on mindfulness training techniques it might be argued 
Mindfulness-Based Reflective Practice is misleading. However, further research into 
the success of this research in education might become useful for future research 
into whether mindfulness techniques can be incorporated into reflective methods in 
visual art practice. 
7.5   Personal and Professional Perspectives on the Practice ,  Teaching 
and Application of Mindfulness in Relation to Reflective Methods In 
Visual Art Practice 
Whilst significant in their own fields, both the MAAS scale from the domain of 
Psychology and the educational model of MBRP, require indirect inferences to be 
made as to whether mindfulness training could be beneficial for developing the 
effectiveness of reflective methods in visual art practice. However, following 
through with Varela’s et. al., (1993: 27) recommendation that the interaction 
between mindfulness/awareness meditation, phenomenology, and cognitive science 
can change the nature of reflection from an abstract, disembodied activity to an 
embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection, begs the question as to whether 
mindfulness training can be recommended for visual art practice. To this end the 
following interview was conducted in order to collect primary qualitative data 
through which an expert in the field could be directly questioned. Dr. Linda 
Lehrhaupt is the Managing Director of the IMA (Institute for Mindfulness-Based 
Approaches) one of the few international companies running MBSR and teacher 
training courses across Europe.  
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The primary focus of the interview was to collate the professional opinions of a 
trained and experienced mindfulness practitioner to contrast the academic texts 
referenced in the previous two sections, whilst retaining scope for the interviewee 
responses to be open ended. The following extracts are taken from the complete 
interview, lasting approximately an hour, which can be read in full in the appendix.  
 
AG: […] One of cognitive scientists whose work has recently become central 
to this research, is a guy called Varela. He has very much advocated that 
there's the methodological-- 
 
LL: What's his name? 
 
AG: Francisco Varela. 
 
LL: He's one of the founders of the Mind and Life Institute. You're talking 
about the scientist from Paris, Francisco Varela? 
 
AG: Yes, indeed. 
 
LL: But he was also very important in the founding of the Mind and Life 
Institute, together with the other people, that launched the whole scientific 
exploration of mindfulness that's been going on now for the last 20, 25 years 
in a very strong way. But he died of something. So you're using Francisco 
Varela's theories? (Gray, 2014) 
 
The common ground of Francisco Varela’s involvement in the Life and Mind 
Institute, and the theories of embodied cognition, which has been very active in 
bringing cognitive science and Eastern mindfulness practices together, was 
noteworthy in the context of this thesis. The focus of the questioning however, 
turned toward the potential relation of mindfulness training to visual art practice. 
 
AG: So do you think that it is possible to be mindful and be practicing 
creatively? 
 
LL: Absolutely. I'm not an artist in that sense, but I would say... What I also 
notice a lot is that mindfulness for artists... Let me see, that it helps them to 
expand their range of what they take in, what stimulates them that they can 
use in their art rather than being so restricted by what they have done before 
or whatever. (Gray, 2014) 
 
The reference here is that mindfulness training is beneficial in helping practitioners 
to be attentive to what they take in, to what stimulates them. There is no mention 
as to whether this can operate in the midst of practice or rather during reflections-
on-action and –practice. 
 
AG: There seems to be a lot of emphasis on the notion that you can break 
habitual action once you become aware that it is habitual. That sounds to me 
like something that will be very useful for practitioners in terms of methods of 
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reflection in action. We are talking about trying to improve one’s practice or 
trying to become more aware of what it is that we doing. 
 
LL: It's definitely interrupting. It's a mindfulness-- the moment we become 
mindfully aware of something, you have gone from what we call auto-pilot to 
being in direct contact sense wise, or mental wise. That often doesn't last very 
long, but we can continually reawaken it and be present with it. So if you're 
really paying attention to how your holding a brush or whatever you're doing 
or you're playing music and you're really allowing that to be very present for 
you, I can imagine that would allow a whole new flow out, as it were, rather 
than the traditional or habitual thing that you'd be doing. We've trained at 
least five music teachers to be MBSR teachers. Of course, they were more 
interested in MBSR from the perspective of helping artists who are wounded. 
Either they have suffered injury from excessive playing or whatever - playing 
instruments or whatever, or suffering from the stress of constant 
performance, and things like that. But I can see how it might allow more 
creativity because people become-- by being in the moment, you also become 
more responsive to the moment. You're responsive to whatever is there. 
 
AG: In terms of training for this, there was a comment made by the artist in 
New York who stated that being attentive to his practice was in itself a kind of 
mindfulness. I think that's okay to say but I wonder whether you have any 
thoughts on whether art practice can be considered training for becoming 
what is conventionally known as mindful. There was an example given that 
I'm sure you've come across. It is the story of "Zen in the Art of Archery", 
where the student fires the arrow perfectly by just coping the master's 
technical ability, this greatly offended the master archer because he hadn't 
arrived at how to fire the arrow himself through a personal process. The artist 
that I was talking to described how his experience of practice has cultivated a 
state of mindfulness that has been nurtured over a period of 20 years of 
practice, but he is also a teacher. When working with first year students 
taking studio drawing as an elective often for the first time, he works to get 
them to focus solely on the task for the two-hour duration of the class, to put 
their phones aside and just focus. If one can be mindful during art practice and 
indeed, if art practice can be considered a form of mindfulness, the question 
remains as to whether some of his young students get into that state? Is 
mindfulness a state that only years of practice can develop or would it be 
beneficial for students starting university to take a course in mindfulness. 
 
LL: I think it would be fantastic. Mindfulness-based awareness programs are 
being integrated into medical schools, into nursing schools, into teacher 
training programs to train school teachers. It's being used in the police. It's 
being used in the military. It's actually, across the board now. There are 
programs of mindfulness training in many professions because it's seen to be 
very helpful not only for stress but also for making people more attuned to 
what's going on. For example, in some professions they've noticed there's 
better teamwork that results, there's less injuries that result. People become 
more skillful with how they work with their bodies in a difficult situation. For 
example, they trained firemen and policemen and emergency room workers in 
mindfulness, and found improvement in these things I just mentioned. It tends 
to loosen ones-- one becomes aware of oneself, not as an isolated 
phenomenon, but in relationship to others and to things. 
 
AG: Could you expand upon some of the specific techniques, I've been talking 
about it quite abstractly. Say that we move on to try to introduce a course and 
how one trains people who have never considered themself to be mindful, to 
become so. 
 
LL: We all have experiences in our life when we have been spontaneously 
mindful without necessarily being aware of it, usually in situations that call us 
 
 
187 
to be very present, for example, a birth or a death, or that kind of situation 
where we're moment-to-moment. Just really going with what's happening. 
But let's say when a cook, when a master chef or even someone's who's really 
paying attention to how they're cutting the vegetables and how they-- and 
they feel the knife as if it's part of their body and there's no separation 
between them and what they're doing. That doesn't mean that they lose the 
aware-- they don't lose themselves as so much that they lose their sense of 
their personality or their thoughts. But there is a very, very strong sensual 
sense of what's going on. So, the first-- 
 
AG: That sounds like it has a lot of parallels with visual art practice, the knife 
could be my paint brush. 
 
LL: I'm sure it does. What's happening is that-- look, there's not too many 
things that are new under the sun. The different disciplines are basically 
talking about the same thing. But, they're just using different terminology, 
and everybody's trying to create their new theory. Everybody's trying to 
create their whatever that gets discussed for awhile. Yes. Are there 
descriptions of mindfulness in other terms that never use the word 
mindfulness, but nevertheless are talking about mindfulness? Of course. The 
way that we train-- the preliminary training and one of the central trainings 
to training mindfulness is what we call Mindfulness of Breathing. We direct 
students to become aware, first of all, of the physical sensations of breathing. 
Breath flowing into the body, flowing out of the body, and we ask them to 
find a point on their body where they feel, where they sense the breath most 
directly. That could be in the belly area, that could be in the chest area or it 
could be under the nostrils, under the nose. We ask them not to think about 
breathing, as much as they can actually feel the physical sensations. What of 
course happens is people can perhaps be really in touch with the breath for 
maybe two seconds. Then what they notice is that their mind beings to drift. 
They're no longer actually in contact with the sensations but they're planning 
or they're remembering or the mind is busy, or they're thinking various 
thoughts. Visual artists - people in the arts - tend to think in terms of pictures 
much more. But from the prospective of mindfulness, pictures are mental 
activities, that tend to also take us way from the direct physical sensation of 
what is going on in the moment, which is in this case breathing. So we teach 
people, we gave them the instruction that when you notice that you are no 
longer present with the breath, you are no longer sensing your physical 
sensations, then first of all notice that you have drifted away, and then with 
the conscious intention turn your attention, bring your awareness back to the 
physical sensations of breathing and sense next in breath and next out breath. 
And people practice with that. That the mind drifts off, it may drift off a 
hundred times in two minutes, or five minutes. That's not unusual. What 
we're doing, we talk about mindfulness as being a muscle. Just like when you 
into a fitness studio, you can't expect with the very first pumping iron, that 
you're going to be strong and fit, you have to slowly train the muscle of 
mindfulness. To begin with, it might just be for a second or two that you can 
really be present. But as time goes on, you can develop longer periods of being 
mindful. Now, there's a difference between mindfulness and concentration. 
That's important. Concentration, for example-- I'll illustrate the difference. 
Let's say, you're concentrating on your breath. You're really concentrating on 
your breath and then, you become aware of a thought, or you hear a sound, 
or you smell something in the air, you would have the sense that your 
concentration has been disturbed, and there would be a sense that one has to 
push out everything, and nothing should be there except simply the breath. In 
mindfulness practice, there is no such thing as a disturbance. Rather, it's more 
about things being in the foreground and in the background. For example, in 
the foreground of our awareness is mindfulness of breathing, and maybe 80 
or 90% of our awareness is with the mindfulness of breathing, and then there 
may be is an awareness of a sound or this and that or whatever. We can let 
that be in the background and still maintain our focus on what's on the 
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foreground. But what's in the background is not disturbing, it's not 
experienced as disturbing. (Gray, 2014) 
 
There is the issue that aspects of visual art practice resist a state of mindfulness. 
Specific aspects of the practice situation require extreme states of concentration. 
However, there are moments when the work can benefit from being viewed non-
judgmentally. 
 
Whilst discussing recently with a mindfulness instructor, I 
asked him to speculate as to what other ways there might 
be of training this inherent human capacity. He had no 
suggestions other than those offered through his courses. 
Pursuing this question further I shared with him the story 
of when I was stone balancing in the lake and found myself 
surrounded by swans to whom I was initially oblivious, until 
being startled by a hiss. The question was whether the deep 
focus that I clearly exhibited whilst balancing the stones 
could be considered a state of mindfulness, in the sense that 
it displayed an acute sense of being in the moment. He 
agreed with Linda Lehrhaupt that it was not mindfulness 
but rather a deep state of concentration. In mindfulness training, he explained, one 
can focus one’s attention on an activity, and be utterly attendant to it whilst still 
being absolutely aware of what is going on around 
you to the point that if there was a sudden noise 
one wouldn’t be shocked by it. This seemed initially 
to contradict the example Linda had shared with me 
during our interview, in which trained monks and 
novice meditation students where exposed to a 
series of loud sounds whilst an EEG recorded their 
brain activity. The monks’ responses remained 
consistent to each noise throughout the 
experiment, where as the students became 
habitualized to the sound after a period of time.  
 
I now understand this experiment in slightly different light. One might say that it 
served to illustrate that the cognitive mechanisms, through which certain non-life-
threatening, non essential sensory stimuli become habitualized, that is, screened out 
from immediate sensory perception, are as inherent a quality as mindfulness is 
considered to be. Habitualization is an evolutionary survival trait, and many studies 
have explored it. This might suggest however, that mindfulness training can help to 
supress one inherent quality (habitualization) and enhance another (mindfulness).  
 
Figure 63: film still #31 
Figure 64: film still # 32 
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He shared an example of when he plays the Conga drums, attaining a mindful state, 
whilst being aware of the players around him, enabled him to be more creative in 
the midst of performance. He was adamant that mindfulness training could help 
support visual arts practitioners but did not consider that visual arts practice could 
in itself be considered a state of mindfulness. The suggestion then seems to be that 
mindfulness is an inherent human capacity but that only training can activate it. 
One can be trained to be mindful and access that state in the midst of performance 
in a way that supports practice, but the practice itself cannot train a state of 
mindfulness.  
 
Professor Michael Rodriguez, currently Chair of the Humanities Department 
LaGuardia Community College, New York, was a participant in a radio show titled 
Mindfulness in the Arts - A Conversation. The following extract is from an interview 
conducted with him in relation to his contributions during the radio show, the 
transcript of which can be found here: 
(http://ctl.laguardia.edu/journal/v5/pdf/InTransit_Spring11_v5_fernandez.pdf - last 
accessed 29.9.14) 
 
Andrew Gray: In the radio show about mindfulness in art the context was 
coming out of educational theory and you were being asked to discuss that as 
a department of tutors. Prior to this radio show had you ever considered 
mindfulness in the context of you work at all? 
 
Michael Rodrigeuz: Certainly the center for learning here was interested in 
mindfulness and learning but for my purposes during the radio show I was 
really talking primarily about mindfulness in the arts in my studio 
practice.  For me mindfulness is really a by product of studio practice, or the 
goal of studio practice but I haven't really done a lot of research or work into 
mindfulness in terms of education or how it would benefit students. (Gray, 
2014) 
 
The full interview transcription can be referenced in the appendix. From both the 
radio broadcast and the interview there was a clear suggestion that aspects of visual 
art practice could be considered mindful states. However there remain many 
questions that only further research can answer. My proposal that a series of 
longitudinal studies exploring whether mindfulness training could help support 
practitioners in the visual arts, could have implications for andragogical modification 
at many levels. If successful the introduction of mindfulness training in visual arts 
education could enhance the natural capacity for reflection-in and –on –action and –
practice. Likewise, given the recent trend toward the implementation of 
mindfulness training across many professions, research in the visual arts will need to 
carefully examine whether it is indeed appropriate and beneficial for visual art 
practice in part or whole, or risk making the same error of adopting a model of 
reflective practice designed for other practices.  
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CHAPTER 8  –  DEVELOPING AN EMBODIED REFLECTIVE PRACTICE – 
REFLECTIONS ON RESEARCH AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1  Reflections on the Initial  Development of this Thesis  
 
The commencement of this research developed out of investigations into my own 
visual arts practice whilst enrolled on the MA (by Project) (2000 - 2002). Schön’s 
‘The Reflective Practitioner’ (1983), was introduced via Christopher Smith’s research 
seminars in 2000. Despite my initial concerns that Schön’s writings explored the 
process of reflection-in-action in design but did not extend to examples in visual art 
practice, I began adopting methods of reflecting-in- and –on –action and –practice 
throughout my Masters education. My initial use of this reflective method was 
beneficial for the purpose of enhancing my ability to report on and critically analyse 
my practice, however I continued to question the adequacy of the reflective 
methods I employed. This concern was supported by Scrivener’s (2000: 5) assertion 
that whilst the distinctions between creative-production and problem-solving 
projects in design and technology are by no means black-and-white, they can 
nether-the-less be viewed as fundamentally different.  
 
Upon completion of the Masters degree the benefits of continuing to develop 
reflective methods in my studio practice was reinforced by Scrivener’s (2000: 18-19) 
argument that Schön’s (1983) theory of design as reflective practice, provided 
concepts, which also helped to characterize creative production. Scrivener (2000: 
19) made the distinction between creative production doctoral projects and 
everyday visual art and design making, which he also considered distinguishable 
from Bachelor and Master education. This distinction emphasized the additional 
requirements imposed on the student conducting doctoral research, which Scrivener 
(2000) maintained took the activity of reflection beyond the ordinary practice 
situation. Whilst not engaged in a creative production research project my personal 
and professional interest to continue the critical investigation of practice initiated 
through the MA (by Project), prompted me to adopt the sense of rigor associated 
with a doctoral research project. It was as Scrivener (2000: 11) points out a 
discipline, rather than a necessity.   
 
8.2  Investigating Reflective Methods Through Practice – Reflections 
and Analysis of Studio Experiences Post-MA (By Project) – The 
Development of a Hypothesis and Application to PhD 
 
I was drawn to Schön’s (1983) assertion that reflection is not only central to the 
practitioner’s ability to complete projects successfully, but also to their overall 
professional development, both of which I wanted to advance in the context of my 
own practice. Scrivener (2000: 12) however, noted that such reflection is largely 
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unremarkable to and unmarked by the practitioner and that furthermore, the 
importance of such events and how they have changed the practitioner may not be 
consciously registered. This was an obvious concern that I hoped to overcome. 
Scrivener (2000: 12) argued that practitioners could benefit if reflection was 
recorded and then reported on more systematically. This required reporting on the 
following operations, all of which were then to be reflected on, both with regard to 
their contribution to practice and their implications for future action and practice 
(Scrivener, 2000: 13): 
 
• each surprise during working and its associated frame  
• refuted theory of action 
• surfaced tacit knowledge  
• revised theory of action  
• revised frame and subsequent action  
 
Scrivener's (2000: 19) proposal that the description of creative production should be 
focused on these ‘moments of reflection-in-action and –practice’, led to further 
questions as to the nature of each of those ‘moments’ in relation to visual art 
practice. My initial attempts to move this process and reportage beyond where it 
had been during my Masters education, resulted in documenting my studio practice 
with video cameras and reviewing the material before the commencement of the 
next studio session. Furthermore, I began filming myself watching and commenting 
on myself working, this documentary method was first proposed to me by 
Christopher Smith during the MA (by Project) in 2001. As outlined in chapter 4, I 
began making use of this process in 2004, and it has since been developed as a 
research method in this thesis in relation to the case studies dealing with other 
practitioners’ practices. Notably this research method has recently been developed 
and published in Paul Harper’s doctoral thesis ‘Talking and Doing: Communicating 
Crafting’ (2013: 183). 
  
Figure 65: film still #33 6. Refer to Andrew Gray - Studio 
Documentary 1 - development of research method 
 
I consider this cyclic reflective process of applying this 
documentary technique to my own practice before 
commencing this research degree played an important 
role in the development of the research method I have applied to the case studies on 
NRM. This process also brought to my attention the problem of reporting on my 
embodied experience of making and the relationship of these methods to 
phenomenological reflection.  
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Whilst Schön (1983) describes the role of tacit knowledge in competent practice as 
‘knowing-in-action and -practice’, the notion of reporting on ‘surfaced tacit 
knowledge’ (Scrivener, 2000: 13), was evidently problematic. Through this felt 
perturbation I was left with the impression that this essential aspect of visual art 
practice was not being adequately inspected.  
 
8.3  Reflections on Becoming a Researcher -  Analysis of Research and 
the Development of a Conclusion 
 
Upon commencing this research degree, I felt it necessary to not only return to 
Schön’s ‘The Reflective Practitioner’ (1983) but to delve deeper into how the concept 
of reflection developed in order to better contextualize Schön’s writings. The first 
chapters therefore dealt with establishing an epistemology of reflection and Schön’s 
development of the ‘The Reflective Practitioner’ (1983) and sequels. I assessed that 
for reflections-on-action and –practice, Schön’s (1983) model had been proven to be 
beneficial for framing and reframing practice situations, reflecting on habits of 
practice, past experience, conceptual agendas, and the background theories shaping 
practice. I also considered that Schön’s (1983) notion of ‘design as a reflective 
conversation with the situation’, and ‘learning as a reflective conversation with 
materials (Schön et. al., 1983), in which the situation is ‘talking-back’ to the 
practitioner in a nonverbal metaphorical sense, could be relevant for the visual arts 
practitioner, at certain points of the creative process. However, I questioned how 
this metaphor functioned. I returned to Scrivener’s (2000: 2-7) distinctions between 
creative-production and problem-solving research projects, and his conclusion that 
there are fundamental differences between them. I considered it necessary 
therefore, to investigate examples of research projects in both visual art practice and 
design, in which reflective methods are rigorously applied.  
 
Like Scrivener (2000: 10) my felt sense of visual art practice was at odds with 
Schön’s scientific language of theory of action, logic, experimentation, hypothesis 
and experimental rigor, that seemed appropriate for design research, and like 
Scrivener (2000: 10) I did not have adequate alternatives to put in their place. I 
agreed with Scrivener's (2000: 18) assertion that the ‘processes and characteristics’ 
of this language had the potential to capture much of what I was observing in both 
the actions of my own visual art practice, and that of others. However, I concluded 
that this constituted a compromise that was unsatisfactory in relation to explicating 
the role of tacit, embodied, knowing-in-action, the possible resolution of which 
required further investigation through academic research. In order to investigate 
this I have examined what was distinct, firstly between the reflective practices in 
visual art practice and design, and secondly between what I termed, CRM and NRM. 
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Constructed Reflective Methods (CRM) – Case Studies 1 & 2 
 
The term Constructed Reflection has been developed to describe methods of 
reflection designed to be academically rigorous. Two cases studies where chosen 
from a number of candidates. Initially I searched through completed PhD thesis in 
both art and design, however upon the recommendation of my main supervisor, I 
looked also at post-doctoral research and independent research projects that were 
academic in nature.  
 
For the example of CRM in design, Owain Pedgley’s doctoral thesis was chosen. 
 
For the example of CRM in visual art practice the decision was taken to look at Beth 
Harland’s involvement with the VIRP (Visual Intelligences Research Project). Whilst 
not a doctoral research project the VIRP epitomises the academic rigour that could 
be applied to reflective methods in visual art practice, whilst presenting the 
opportunity to explore what is distinct between visual art practice and design. 
   
This thesis concludes that Owain Pedgey’s use of the diary as a reflective tool and his 
use of Schön’s (1983) theories of reflection-in-action, serves to illustrate the benefits 
of Schön’s (1983) problem solving model of reflective practice in the field of design. 
Pedgley, (2007) describes how end-of-the-day diary entries (framed as reflections-
on-action and –practice), helped to ‘raise the level of alertness to own design activity 
(reflections-in-action and –practice), easing the grasping of some design issues and 
aiding decision-making’ (Pedgley, 2007). In the case of the Beth Harland however, 
the attempts to systematize the process of documentation and reflection introduces 
a grey area between clear critical aims and the notion of ‘moving towards an 
unknown’ which is experiential in nature and does not conform to Schön’s (1983) 
problem solving model of reflective practice. Scrivener’s (2000: 18-19) 
recommendation that reflection in creative production ought to focus on the 
underlying experience of practice seems more appropriate. However the process of 
recording and documenting the underlying experience of practice in Harland’s 
process of making Zone 15 (Harland, 2006) sets up a new problematic between 
revealing the clear critical aims through an innovative interactive series of textual 
and visual references, and obscuring the experiential process of ‘moving towards an 
unknown’ through the slickness of the flash presentation. Harland (2004) reflects 
on her process of making as a strategic and mechanical approach whilst maintaining 
her interest in the meaning engendered by the materials and its behaviour. In 
relation to working from visual reference material, described as fragmented digital 
reproductions that are hard to follow, Harland (2004) considers the process as a 
kind of mapping in which she looses her place and then finds it again, a process she 
considers very appropriate because of the experience. This process is lost in the 
Adobe Flash presentation of Zone, 15, albeit that novel representations are produced 
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as a result of the digital manipulation of the documentary images. The distinctions 
between the research through visual art practice typified in Harland’s involvement 
in the VIRP and problem-solving research, is illustrated in something Harland (2004) 
calls ‘moments of spill that occur in the process’. The relationship between the new 
meanings engendered through the materiality of the painting process and the 
strategic and mechanical approaches that guide the painting alludes to the 
relationship between thinking and making Fortnum (2007) states the VIRP was set 
up to explore. However, I do not consider that this relationship was fully explicated 
in this example. I wondered whether new meanings emerging from the materials 
ever disrupted or modified the strategies and mechanical application of them. In 
terms of how Harland (2004) thinks about reflection, she describes it as a process of 
‘moving into the work and back out of it’ that goes on constantly, in addition to 
connecting her interest in theoretical and historical research. The Adobe Flash 
presentation documenting her work helps the viewer to connect to the influences 
which inspired, and are largely included in, the composition. However in relation to 
what happens when she ‘moves into the work’, and hence her reflections-in-action, 
it exhibits inherent issues in the form of presentation. Whilst the cross fading of still 
images taken at various stages of the making process creates novel intermediary 
stages that the painting was never physically in, as much as it reveals aspects of the 
sequence of compositional development it obscures much of the actual process of 
making.  
 
Nevertheless these CRM case studies illustrate the distinctions between the 
reflective methods successfully employed in problem solving design research 
projects and those required to successfully explicate the underlying experience of 
practice in visual art practice. The aspect I deduced was particularly distinct 
however, concerns the personal meanings that emerge out of practice and the 
practitioners’ ways of dealing with them. In design personal meaning is placed in the 
context of solving the problem of the design and producing an object that will 
perform a function. In visual art practice however, new meaning is dealt with very 
differently, and is framed in the context of a complex interpersonal relationship with 
the process of making and resulting artwork, which may contribute to human 
experience.  
 
As I had discovered through my own visual arts practice, prior to commencing this 
research degree, there was a considerable distinction between the academic 
requirement to specify a research methodology and construct, apply, and reflect 
upon rigorous reflective methods, and the naturalistic, subconscious, and at times 
phenomenological reflections, applied in practice situations outside of academia. I 
felt however, that whilst I had developed experience of SRM, CRM, and NRM I 
consequently felt it necessary to explore these distinctions further. 
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Naturalistic Reflective Methods (NRM) – Case Studies 3 & 4 
 
Developing and employing a qualitative research method, in the form of the video 
documentaries, has been a quintessential aspect of becoming a researcher. The 
experience I gained in filming and editing techniques whilst an undergraduate at 
Newport Film School was certainly valuable but I conclude now that the process of 
recording my own studio practice prior to commencing this research degree was 
essential training for making it work with other practitioners.  
 
The decision to employ the video documentaries as the primary research method for 
the collection of qualitative data in other practitioners’ studios was taken, based on 
a methodological analysis and the recommendation of my leading supervisor. This 
required making use of my personal experiences of recording and reviewing video 
footage from my own studio practice. The analysis of the case studies has followed 
Scrivener’s (2000: 18-19) recommendation that the underlying experience of 
practice should be a central focus of reflection. 
 
With regard to the first case study presented with Andreas Reichlin, I was able to 
refine the research method significantly by learning from previous experiences. The 
logistical requirements of conducting the interview phases in a second language 
took considerable effort to overcome. However, in many respects I consider it 
beneficial that I was conducting the interview in Reichlin’s mother tongue (German) 
as it taught me to limit my questions and encourage the interviewee via gestures 
and encouraging expressions. The case study was successfully split into three 
separate phases. 
 
1. A passive phase in which Reichlin’s studio practice is documented over a 
period of some hours 
2. An interview phase in which he speaks conceptually about his work and 
both interviewer and interviewee engage in productive dialogue and 
response 
3. A formal reviewing phase in which the interviewee reviews an extended 
edit of the raw footage, which made use of multiply angles in order to 
best capture the action. The interviewee is allowed to respond to the 
imagery, and pertinent questions are asked at appropriate moments 
 
After the first studio recording it was clear that the method was beneficial and 
yielded rich qualitative data. Through analysis of this case study Schön’s 
conversational metaphor is called into to question, and the generation of other 
structures can be seen as governing the act of creative making. In this thesis I have 
proposed care be taken with the conversational metaphor by referring to Schön’s 
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paper on generative metaphor (1970) where he explores how a reliance upon an 
inappropriate metaphor can have negative consequences. Through this case study I 
have concluded that the conversational metaphor is an inappropriate metaphor that 
could have negative consequences. I conclude that the complex relationship 
between the qualitative engagement with materials and the development of 
conceptual ideas in Reichlin’s practice are better explored through an attentiveness 
to the ways in which nonverbal qualities, images, and feelings are mapped onto 
abstract conceptual domains.  
 
With Karasek I can reflect upon my role as an ‘informed and sympathetic 
collaborator’ (Harper, 2013: 180), and arrive at the conclusion that I was too eager 
to pose questions during certain moments of the interview. Looking through the 
transcript there are clear disparities between my actions and an oral history 
approach. Whilst it was not my intention to operate an oral history method I 
consider in retrospect that a balance between a passive approach and a forceful 
journalistic approach might have been beneficial. It is the fine balance between 
knowing when to pose a question and when to remain silent and rely upon the 
subject’s responses. For example there are moments in the transcript when a 
question generated a rich response from the participant. However by contrast there 
were two occasions when my questioning cut Karasek off from a comment he was 
about to make. In retrospect I would have preferred to know what he was going to 
say in that moment. The edit could have had a longer review process and also the 
aesthetic quality of the camera angles and frame composition occasionally drew 
Karasek’s attention from what he was doing on screen. However, I consider that 
over a significant majority of the interview process I performed adequately as an 
interviewer in many respects. The imagery was well filmed and edited, the filming 
process was conducted so as not to influence or distract Karasek’s studio process. 
The interview location put Karasek at ease and the questions were pertinent with 
regard to elucidating themes central to this thesis whilst open enough to allow the 
subject to respond in his own way and words. Through this interview process 
valuable aspects of embodied practice and Karasek’s relationship to reflective 
practice were revealed. A section of text highlighted in the analysis needs to be 
revisited in order to consider its implications for the conclusion.   
 
Laurence Karasek […] The body then automatically relates back your feeling 
to that point of action, which is the end of the brush […] (Gray, 2006) 
 
Here Karasek is reflecting about a cognitive process. It might be convenient to frame 
this comment as knowing-in-action, or a reflective conversation with a situation or 
materials, but I consider Karasek’s description of how the body relates back a feeling 
to be richer. The conversational metaphor is a simplification of a complex cognitive 
non-verbal process, the question here is as to why it needs to be framed as a 
metaphorical conversation at all. Schön, et. al., (1983) maintain that it is not verbal. 
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It may provide a convenient structure to aid the understanding of reflective 
processes in some circumstances, but I propose it would be counterproductive and 
inappropriate in this context.  
 
LK […] the image you’re painting from, runs all the way through the motor 
activity of your body into the physicality of the medium itself and the brush.  
So it becomes all one. There’s no separation, the mind, the body, the pacing up 
and down on the floor, the verticality of the piece, the wall, the painting, its all 
part of the same physical existence. […] (Gray, 2006) 
 
I consider this to be a significant account of visual arts practice. It suggests a 
multiplicity of embodied connections occurring in the flux of moment-by-moment 
perceptions. In Karasek’s description of practice the mind, the body, the physicality 
of the media, spatial and temporal phenomena, all these aspects of practice become 
one existence during the visual arts practice situation. As a visual arts practitioner I 
can relate to that situation, as a researcher I can relate it to the other practitioners I 
have interacted with and relate it to the background theories of the embodied mind. 
There is simply no need to reduce this complex cognitive process by using a 
conversational metaphor. Rather I conclude that richer accounts of practice can be 
obtained by developing understanding of the embodied aspects of practice. 
 
Parallel to my studio practice, and prior to conducting the studio documentaries, I 
was engaged in researching theories of the embodied mind to which I had been 
introduced whilst on the MA (by Project). Mark Johnson’s ‘The Body in the Mind’ 
(1987), suggested possible avenues of inquiry into the way in which embodied 
experience and tacit knowing surfaces in conscious thought. My initial interest 
surrounded his work on image schematic structures and the linguistic evidence for 
metaphorical projection. These theories explored the ways in which embodied 
experience can be mapped through the language used to describe it. It introduced 
the idea that human experience itself structured the way in which experience is 
understood. Assessing the implications these theories had for a deeper 
understanding of the ways in which visual arts practitioners know- and reflect-in-
action became integral to my investigation and was consequently integrated into 
the working title of this thesis. 
 
8.4  Developing a Theoretical Understanding of the Wide Range of 
Research Contributing to Theories of the Embodied Mind 
 
Coming from an art and design discipline the time dedicated to background reading 
across the broad range of knowledge fields embracing theories of embodied mind 
was necessarily extensive. It included linguistics, cognitive psychology, philosophy, 
artificial intelligence, and neuroscience. The selection bias, which omitted artificial 
intelligence, was based upon the hypothesis that theories of the embodied mind 
could help advance understanding of the tacit, embodied aspects of visual art 
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practice that surface through action. Indeed I deduced that the term ‘embodied 
mind’ not only encompassed empirical evidence across the knowledge fields listed 
above, but also Schön’s (1983) notion of ‘knowing-in-action’ and Polyani’s (1958) 
notion of ‘tacit knowing’, under one umbrella term.  
According to Johnson et. al., (2007: 1) The philosophical tradition mistakenly asks 
how the inside (i.e. thoughts, ideas, concepts) can represent the outside (i.e., the 
world). This trap is a consequence of the view that mind and body must be two 
ontologically different entities and that on this view the problem of meaning is to 
explain how disembodied “internal” ideas can represent “external” physical objects 
and events (Johnson, et. al., 2007). Theories of the embodied mind have worked to 
dismantle other theories of cognition such as cognitivism, computationalism, and 
particularly Cartesian dualism. Johnson et. al., (1999) describe three major findings 
in cognitive science that have radically changed the tenets of Western philosophy, 
reason, and consequently ourselves: 
1. The mind is inherently embodied 
2. Thought is mostly unconscious 
3. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical 
When taken together and considered in detail, these three findings from the 
science of the mind are inconsistent with central parts of Western 
philosophy. They require a thorough rethinking of the most popular current 
approaches, namely Anglo-American analytic philosophy and postmodernist 
philosophy. (Johnson, et. al.,1999) 
Theories concerning human meaning making have recently been subject to a 
philosophical shift away from Gottlob Frege’s "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" in 1892, 
(Johnson, 2007) which claimed that human meaning was grounded in language, as 
it could not be reduced beyond concepts and prepositions. Johnson’s (2007) 
assertion that human meaning traffics firstly as images, qualities, patterns and 
feelings before emerging into language was significantly influential in the 
development of my thinking.  
 
As a researcher the potential I saw in the theories of Embodied Mind turned to focus 
on the implications of this assertion. I considered these four properties of pre-
linguistic meaning in relation to visual art practice in more detail, both in terms of 
my own practice and the practices of others, and found them to be fundamentally 
central. I considered whether visual arts practitioners, engaged in the midst of 
action with visual and mental images, qualities of tools, materials and relations, 
patterns of action and the felt experience of making, could be considered to be 
developing meaning on a pre-linguistic level? Considering further that the 
experience of making could structure the way in which that pre-linguistic meaning 
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would emerge into verbal conscious thought and language, I began to look at Mark 
Johnson’s (1987) theories of ‘image schemata’ and ‘metaphorical projection’ in more 
detail. These descriptions of cognitive functions where presented as a means of 
tracking the development of pre-linguistic meaning through non-verbal actions 
through metaphorical projections into language. In 2007 Mark Johnson visited 
London Metropolitan University to give a lecture, in the last two slides he presented 
the following 5 points: 
 
• Meaning emerges from the structures, qualities, and felt direction of our 
embodied experience. 
• Meaning is tied directly to sensory-motor processes, which have both 
structure and emotional valence. 
• Abstract concepts are metaphorical extensions of sensory-motor meanings.  
• Art employs all of the structures and processes of human meaning-making, 
and it does this often without abstract conceptual and propositional content. 
• Art is the exemplary, consummatory presentation (enactment) of the 
possibilities of human meaning. 
 
I considered the implications contained in these five points to be of great 
significance, not only for re-evaluating Schön’s notion of knowing-in-action (1983) 
and consequently for reporting on ‘surfaced tacit knowledge’ (Scrivener, 2000: 13) 
but also for suggesting a method through which embodied experience of practice 
could be more thoroughly explored. Consequently I began experimenting with ways 
of mapping embodied experience into language using Johnson and Lakoff’s (1999) 
methods.  
 
8.5  Developing a Method for Applying Theories of Metaphorical 
Projection 
 
The continued development of a means of mapping pre-linguistic meaning came 
from an unlikely source.   
 
Figure 66: (Gray, 2005) Example of 
stone balance structures 
 
I began to balance stones twelve years 
ago in Switzerland as a supplement to 
my studio practice (refer to video file 6 
on the external hard drive accompanying 
this thesis). It was something I could do 
without tools or bought materials. It was 
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an activity I was compelled to do when I chanced upon a pile of stones outside of the 
studio and I had some spare time. Whilst working on the structures in Figure 68, by 
the lake in Zurich, an elderly woman came to question me as to what I was doing. 
My explanation was framed around the physical qualities of the structure and we 
discussed the qualities of fragility and strength the structures can simultaneously 
embody. Left alone they would stand until the stone eroded and therefore might be 
thought to embody great permanence, but given that even the slightest sideways 
force, such as a gust of wind, can topple the structure they can likewise be 
considered exceeding transient objects. In the context of our discussion however, 
she expressed that the balanced stones were a symbol for the struggle against 
external forces in her life and her drive to attain inner balance. The interview with 
Mark Johnson (Gray, 2007), in which this encounter was referenced in detail, can be 
read in the appendix.  
 
The key analysis of this experience in relation to this research project, is that the 
conceptual ideas where in stark contrast to a material account I had been writing 
just some hours earlier.  
 
This case inadvertently provided a very simple example of how conceptual ideas can 
emerge from the structures, qualities, and felt direction of our embodied experience 
(Johnson, 2007). The following schematics illustrate how the stone balance activity 
can be deconstructed to reveal metaphorical mapping. 
 
Physical attributes  Conceptual Ideas 
 
Figure 67: Schematic mapping material practice onto conceptual ideas 
 
 
Figure 68: Analysis of stone balance structure. Schematic #1 of 3 
 
Both the physical attributes of gravity and the composite strength 
of the stones, can be mapped metaphorically onto conceptual 
domains relating to permanence. 
 
Figure 69: Analysis of stone balance structure. Schematic #2 of 3 
 
Physical attributes of force pushing against the 
structure from the side cause the structure to collapse. 
The physical attribute of fragility can be mapped onto 
conceptual domains relating to temporal transience. 
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Figure 70: Analysis of stone balance structure. Schematic #3 of 3 
 
The physical, temporal and spatial qualities of the 
materials and the structure are projected from its 
physical attributes, such as strength and fragility, 
into a conceptually blended space (Turner, 1996). In 
the blended space, the structures can embody both 
concepts simultaneously.  
 
When the old woman and I spoke of strength and fragility, of permanence and 
transience, we were sharing our capacity to connect our experience of the object 
with a wider vocabulary of concepts. When we spoke of the structures as being ‘a 
symbol of the struggle against the external forces in our lives and our drive to attain 
inner balance’, we were performing far more complex projections and blends. Our 
communal understanding says something significant about an important feature of 
Dewey’s pragmatism. Whilst Dewey’s stress that cognition is action has been taken 
up by contemporary theorists such as Johnson et. al., (2007) to elucidate the 
individual experience of being, Dewey’s use of philosophical inquiry to promote 
understanding of the individual within a community has received less attention. 
However, I consider that the processes of individual meaning making, the 
internalisation of physical embodied experience and the role it plays in shaping our 
ideas, is the very process that enables communities of people to share in the 
development of abstract concepts. We share the same physiological and perceptual 
hardware and social cultural contexts. I have personally experienced this in action 
working on community creative projects where the capacity to find a common 
understanding of themes in relation to the media was evident. In the same way that 
Dewey’s pragmatism can be seen a foundational in the development of an embodied 
reflective practice in an individual context, so I contend his work on the community 
can be foundational in the development of reflective practices within community art 
projects. This however, is an area for future research and development. 
 
My research into how conceptual ideas emerge as metaphorical projections in 
language from both the material process (the act of making, and the material 
qualities of the media) and the visual qualities of the resulting structure needed 
verification before I attempted to apply them to more complex practices. In 2007 
Mark Johnson was invited to be the keynote at the Experiential Knowledge 
Conference organized by Chris Smith and Linden Reilly of London Metropolitan 
University, and Dr. Kristina Niedderer and Rob Godman of the University of 
Hertfordshire. This was a significant attempt at bringing theories of embodied mind 
into a discursive arena with visual art practice and design. This married with my 
research agendas, in the sense that I felt it necessary to gain primary sources from 
the theorists whose work, written around the fields of linguistics and philosophy, I 
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was attempting to use in relation to visual art practice. As stated in Chapter 6 Mark 
Johnson kindly agreed to be interviewed during the conference. 
 
AG: […] I’m very interested in the kind of specific structures that are 
generated, and how visual arts practitioners internalise and metaphorically 
project those experiences, even unconsciously, into abstract domains. It 
would suggest that visual arts practitioners might owe as much of their 
creative conceptual ideas not only to their social, theoretical, and historical 
agendas to but to physical qualities and processes in the act of making. One 
of the artists I interviewed described it as, the mind, the body, the pacing up 
and down on the floor, the verticality of the piece, the wall, the painting, 
being all part of the same physical existence. Perhaps it is this process that 
enables visual art practice to be the exemplary example of human meaning 
making you describe. 
 
MJ: Exactly. I’m completely on board with what you’re saying. We look at 
the possibility of creativity as to not simply reproduce these templates or 
structures but the modest freedom we have to transform them in creative 
ways. I think that your basic idea is absolutely correct. Dewey says, look, 
what’s so characteristic of art is the focus on the qualitative dimensions in 
the structure of materials and relationships of qualities. And the actual 
working through the possibilities of those. And I think that’s what you are 
describing here and you are showing how that’s a basis for projection in our 
sense of ourselves, and then into a number of abstract, what we think of as 
abstract, conceptual domains. 
 
[…] 
 
AG – It’s the physicality of the materials, your relationship to the tools…and 
the environment in which you’re working that the conceptual ideas can also 
grow out of… 
 
MJ – Precisely, I think that’s right, you’re saying it just right it seems to me. 
All of those things you’ve mentioned are, your constraints shaping the 
possibilities of meaning, of carrying a situation, of developing a situation in a 
certain way, and what you’re doing is enacting that. I mean, what you’ve 
described are ways of knowing. And its not like there’s more that has to be 
said it seems to me. We just have to get over the idea that there’s this 
municipal concept, knowing, knowledge, that it is, you know a concept 
handed down to us in its traditional form with a whole bunch of problematic 
assumptions. So that’s where we have to go at this. You talked about this 
process, an active process, and it is an intelligent engagement with these 
materials and their qualities and their relations. It’s an inquiry of sorts 
seeking to see what’s possible and when its creative its transformative in 
seeing what’s possible for us. And I think the key is just to, get people to see 
that that is a way of knowing, and not then to say how does it get translated 
into conceptual knowledge because that gives it second-class citizenship. I 
mean it doesn’t have to become knowledge. We can ask what goes on there 
feeds into our, you know, abstraction. That’s my work, what I’m focused on. 
If we’re trying to validate it, translate it into a certain conceptual, 
propositional framework, I think that’s not the way to go. I suggest that the 
way to go is to validate it at the level of ‘this already is’ a knowing. But in 
order to do that we have to challenge the traditionally received views about 
knowledge, and the kind of transcendent ‘god’s eye view’ of universal 
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concepts. I mean, what Dewey said… science evolves certain abstractive 
modes where symbolic processes are brought into play, that in a sense, 
remove us from the more immediate engagement with the qualitative 
enactment of art. And seeking generalizations over the phenomena, that’s 
what science does. Sometimes the generalizations are in the form of 
universal laws, but not exclusively. That’s another story. That’s a form of 
knowing, but there is a cost to that, the cost is that it pulls away from the 
qualitative engagement with the materials, which is so critical to art’s way of 
being in the world it seems to me. (Gray, 2007) 
 
The conclusion from this dialogue suggests that the cost of attempting to translate 
embodied experience through the scientific language of reflection-in-action has the 
potential to distance the visual arts practitioner from the qualitative engagement 
with the materials. This supports the view that Schön’s et. al., (1983) conversational 
metaphor, simplifies accounts of qualitative engagement with materials, which is as 
Johnson (Gray, 2007) suggests critical to visual art practice. This was evidenced in 
the case study with Laurence Karasek, for whom the revelation that the mind, body, 
and physicality of the media become one in the midst of practice was an important 
concept. In Johnson’s (Gray, 2007) view, this engagement ought to be considered a 
form of knowing that feeds into our capacity to abstract from concrete embodied 
experience.  
 
Varela et al. (1999: 27) proposes that reflection is not on experience but is 
experience and that such a reflective form of experience can be performed with 
mindfulness/ awareness. This claim has led to the speculation that mindfulness 
training may be beneficial within the visual arts practice situation, as it has been 
proven to be in a range of other professions. This thesis has made it explicit 
however, that extensive further research would be required in order to validate 
whether the introduction of mindfulness training into visual arts education, or any 
modifications to andragogy its introduction might engender, could indeed be 
beneficial. 
 
8.6  Main Conclusions: The Synthesis Between Theories of Reflective 
Practice and Theories of Embodied Mind – A Contribution to 
Knowledge 
 
In this thesis I have argued for the potential to advance aspects of Schön’s theory of 
reflection-in-action (1983), in relation to visual art practice, by incorporating recent 
theories of embodied mind. I consider this to have been achieved and furthermore 
conclude that the findings, which recommend modifications to the way in which 
reflective methods in visual art practice are approached, have the potential to be 
beneficial for visual art practitioners and to visual art practice. The process of 
bringing these peer reviewed theories of high methodological value, together in an 
original context, is offered as an original contribution to knowledge. 
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This thesis concludes that Schön’s (1983) model of reflective practice has been 
shown to be beneficial in a wide range of practice situations, across a range of 
disciplines. The conversational metaphor (Schön, 1983) presented under the 
headings ‘design as a reflective conversation with a situation’ (Schön, 1983: 76-104) 
and ‘learning as a reflective conversation with materials’ (Schön et. al., 1983: 68-73), 
can likewise be a useful simplification of a complex cognitive process in a wide range 
of practice situations where the embodied aspects of practice are not of central 
importance. However, based on the qualitative data collected through the case 
studies, the conclusion is drawn that by taking into account embodied aspects of 
practice, such as the qualitative engagement with the materials and the generation 
of non-verbal, pre-linguistic meaning, which are of critical importance, a reliance on 
the need to reduce the reflective experience of the process of making to a 
conversational metaphor is removed, and richer embodied accounts of the 
relationship between the practice situation and the conceptual ideas can be 
generated. Johnson’s (2007) assertion that visual art practitioners’ qualitative 
engagements be considered a form of knowing supports Karasek’s description of 
practice (Gray, 2006) in which, the mind, the body, and the physicality of the 
material and environment become one experience in the practice situation.  
 
So, the key point here is not that art is a form of knowing how, which is to be 
distinguished from sciences acts of knowing that. Both art and science are 
about the transformation of experience to enrich meaning, open up new 
connections, and help us harmonize our experiences. Art may focus more 
intently on the qualitative unity of the experience (the work), while science 
focuses more on causal relations and connections, but both of them are 
transformative modes of inquiry. (Johnson, 2010) 
 
I have proposed that the process of focusing attention on the underlying experience 
of visual arts practice, as Scrivener (2000: 18-19) recommends, is aided when 
connections between the physical act of creative making, and the conceptual ideas 
that grow out of that process are examined and mapped in direct relation to each 
other. 
 
I propose this richer account of reflection, which attempts to penetrate non-verbal 
levels of meaning, which are considered pre-linguistic (Johnson, 2007), be referred 
to as Embodied Reflective Practice when used in relation to the visual arts. This 
specifically requires analysis of the connections between the nonverbal tacit 
meaning, emergent through practice, and verbally articulated meaning describing 
the development of practitioners’ conceptual ideas. I propose that this analytical 
method shall be based on the process of metaphorical mapping developed by 
Johnson (1987), examples of which have been detailed in this thesis. The further 
development of this analytical method explored through Figures 67-70, and 
endorsed by Johnson (Gray, 2007), is put forward as a future research opportunity.  
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I have made explicit in this thesis that the potential to advance aspects of Schön’s 
(1983) reflective methods in relation to visual art practice, is presented as 
supplementary to the main work in ‘The Reflective Practitioner’. This thesis 
therefore supports both Scrivener’s (2000: 18) recommendation that Schön’s (1983) 
theory of reflective practice can bring structure and rigour to art and design 
research projects, and that focusing reflection on the underlying experience of 
practice can be beneficial, when processes do not lend themselves to a problem 
solving model of reflective practice.  
 
In conclusion this thesis has put forward a case that a focus on the underlying 
experience of practice can be enriched by the development of an Embodied 
Reflective Practice, which encourages visual arts practitioners to be attendant to the 
embodied nature of reflection-in-action. 
 
 
  
 
 
206 
Bibliography 
 
 
Almaas, A. H. (1986) Essence: The diamond approach to inner realization. York 
Beach: Samuel Weiser. 
 
Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1974) Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional 
Effectiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1978) Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action 
Perspective. Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley. 
 
Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1996) Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method and 
Practice. Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley. 
 
Arnheim, R. (1962) Picasso's Guernica; the genesis of a painting. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
 
Bachelard, G. (1969) The Poetics of Space. Translated by Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
 
Bachelard, G. (2002) Earth and reveries of will: an essay on the imagination of 
matter. Dallas: Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture. 
 
Bal, M. (2003) Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture, Journal of Visual 
Culture, pp. 5-31. 
 
Ball, L., Evans, J. and Dennis, I. (1994) Cognitive processes in engineering design: a 
longitudinal study, Ergonomics, 37(11), pp. 1753-1786. 
 
Bamberger, J. and Schön, D.A. (1978) The Figural-Formal Transaction. Working 
Paper 1. Cambridge: MIT Division for Study and Research in Education. 
 
Bamberger, J. and Schön, D.A. (1983) Learning as Reflective Conversation with 
Materials: Notes from Work in Progress, Art Education, pp. 68-73. 
 
Bamberger, J. and Schön, D.A. (1991) Learning as Reflective Conversation with 
Materials, in Steier F. (ed.) Research and Reflexivity. London: Sage. 
 
Bergson, H. (2007) An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Thomas, Ernest 
Hulme. Mullarkey, J. and Kolkman, M. (eds.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Biggs, M.A.R. (2000) Editorial: the foundations of practice-based research. Working 
Papers in Art and Design 1. Available at: 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol1/vol1intro.html 
(Accessed: 6 September 2014). 
 
Black, D.S. (2011) A brief definition of mindfulness. Mindfulness Research Guide. 
Available at: http://www.mindfulexperience.org (Accessed 20 August 2014). 
 
Brett, S. (ed.) (1987) The Faber book of diaries. London: Faber & Faber. 
 
Breuil, H. (1979) Four hundred centuries of cave art. New York: Hacker Art Books. 
 
Brown, B., Gough, P. and Roddis, J. (2004) Types of Research in the Creative Arts 
and Design. Bristol: University of Brighton.  
 
Buonomano D.V. and Merzenich M.M. (1998) Cortical plasticity: from synapses to 
maps, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 21, pp. 149-186. 
 
Burnard, P. and Hennessy, S. (2006) Reflective practices in arts education. 
Dordrecht: Springer.   
 
 
207 
 
Chamberlain, R., McManus, C., Brunswick N., Rankin Q., Riley, H., Kanai, R. (2014) 
Drawing on the right side of the brain: A voxel-based morphometry analysis of 
observational drawing, NeuroImage, 96, pp. 167-73. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.03.062. 
 
Cherry, D. (2004) Art History Visual Culture, Art History, 27, pp.479-493. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2009) Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and 
Invention. New York: HarperCollinsPublishers. 
 
Damasio, A.R. (1999) The feeling of what happens: Body, emotion and the making 
of consciousness. London: Vintage. 
 
de Silva, P. (1997) Buddhism and Modern Western Psychology Issues of Integration 
in Pickering, J. (ed.) (1997) The authority of experience: essays on Buddhism and 
psychology. London: Curzon Press. 
 
Dewey, J. (1916) Democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of 
education. New York: Macmillan. 
 
Dewey, J. (1933) How We Think, 2nd edition. Lexington MA: Heath. 
 
Dewey, J. (1934) Art as experience. New York: Minton, Balch & Company. 
 
Diggins, J. P. (1994) The promise of pragmatism: modernism and the crisis of 
knowledge and authority. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Donald, M. (1991) Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of 
culture and cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Donald, M. (1993) Precis of Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the 
evolution of culture and cognition, Behavioral & Brain Sciences 16(4) pp. 737-791. 
 
Donald, M. (1998) Hominid enculturation and cognitive evolution, in Renfrew C. 
and Scarre C. (eds.) Cognition and material culture: The archaeology of symbolic 
storage. Cambridge, England: McDonald Institute of Archaeological Research. pp. 7–
17. 
 
Donald, M. (2001) A mind so rare: The evolution of human consciousness. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
Duncan, A. (1993) The space between theory and practice, Architecture Art and 
Design, 3(1), pp 66-77. 
 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (2001). Chicago, Britannica.com. 
http://www.britannica.com/. 
 
Edelman, G.M. (1987) Neural Darwinism: the theory of neuronal group selection. 
New York: Basic Books. 
 
Erlandson, P. (2005) The Body Disciplined: Rewriting Teaching Competence and the 
Doctrine of Reflection, Journal of Philosophy of Education 39(4), pp. 661-670. 
 
Eraut, M. (1994) Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence. London: 
Falmer. 
 
Feldstein, M. (2004) Kissing Cousins: Journalism and Oral History. Oral History 
Review, 31 (1).  
 
Fenstermacher, G.D. (1988) The place of science and epistemology in Schön´s 
Conception of Reflective Practice, in Clift, R. T., Houston, W. R. and Pugach, M.C. 
 
 
208 
(eds.) Encouraging Reflective Practice in Education. New York: Teachers College 
Press. 
 
Field, Sean (2007) Oral History Methodology. SEPHIS Workshops in Vietnam and 
Philippines. Centre for Popular Memory, Historical Studies Department. Cape Town: 
University of Cape Town, pp.1-23.  
 
Filep, B. (2009) Zur diskursiven Konstruktion des ungarisch-rumänischen 
Miteinander, Nebeneinander und Gegeneinander in Siebenbürgen, Geographisches 
Institut, Universität Bern. 
 
Fodor, J.A. (1987) Psychosemantics the problem of meaning in the philosophy of 
mind. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
 
Fortnum, R. (2006) What is visual intelligence and how do artists use it? Catalogue 
essay for exhibition Inspiration to Order. Stanislaus: University Art Gallery, 
California State University, pp. 6-13. 
 
Fortnum, R. and Smith, C. (2007) The Problem of Documenting, Fine Art Practices 
and Processes, Journal of Visual Arts Practice 6(3) pp. 167–174. doi: 
10.1386/jvap.6.3.167/2. 
 
Frey, L. R. (1991) Investigating communication: an introduction to research 
methods. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
 
Frayling, C. (1993) Research in art and design, Papers series 1(1), London: Royal 
College of Art. 
 
Fredrickson, B., & Losada, M. (2005). Positive affect and the complex dynamics of 
human flourishing. American Psychologist, 60, 678-686. 
 
Frege, G. (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Leipzig, [s.n.]. 
 
Gallagher, S. (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Gaze R.M. and Sharma S.C. (1970) Axial differences in the reinnervation of the 
goldfish optic tectum by regenerating optic nerve fibres, Experimental Brain 
Research, 10, pp. 171-181. 
 
Glenberg, A. M., Havas, D., Becker, R., and Rinck, M. (2005) The grounding of 
cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking, in 
Zwaan R. and Pecher D. (eds.) Grounding Language in Bodily States: The Case for 
Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Glenberg, A.M. Witt, J.K., and Metcalfe, J. (2013) From the Revolution to 
Embodiment: 25 Years of Cognitive Psychology. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 8, pp. 573-585. 
 
Gould, S. J. (1999) Leonardo's mountain of clams and the Diet of Worms: essays on 
natural history. New York: Three Rivers Press. 
 
Gray, A. (2006). Interview with Laurence Karasek. 
 
Gray, A. (2007). Interview with Professor Mark Johnson. 
 
Gray, A. (2007). Interview with Patrick Sims. 
 
Gray, A. (2009). Interview with Andreas Riechlin. 
 
Gray, A. (2014). Interview with Dr. Linda Lehrhaupt. 
 
Gray, A. (2014). Interview with Professor Michael Rodriguez. 
 
 
 
209 
Gray, A. (2014). Interview with Professor A C Grayling. 
 
Habermas, J. (1971) Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Hainer, R.M. (1968) Rationalism, pragmatism and existentialism, in Glatt E. and 
Shelly M.W. (eds.) The Research Society, New York: Gordon and Breach. 
 
Hales, C. (1987) Analysis of the engineering design process in an industrial context, 
PhD thesis. University of Cambridge. 
 
Hallam, E. and Ingold, T. (eds.) (2007) Creativity and cultural improvisation. Oxford: 
Berg. 
 
Harrison, C. and Wood, P. (1993) Art in theory, 1900-1990: an anthology of changing 
ideas. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
 
Hatton, N. and Smith, D. (1995) Reflection in teacher education towards 
definition and implementation, Teaching and Teacher Education, 11(1), 
pp. 33-49. 
 
Heidegger, M. (2010) Phenomenology of intuition and expression: theory of 
philosophical concept formation. London: Continuum. 
 
Hovelynck, J. (1998) Learning from Accident Analysis: The Dynamics Leading Up to 
a Rafting Accident, Journal of Experiential Education, 21, pp. 86-95. 
 
Husserl, E., and Gibson, W.R.B. (1931) Ideas: general introduction to pure 
phenomenology. London: G. Allen & Unwin. 
 
Hutchins, R.M. (1970) The Learning Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Immordino-Yang, M.H., & Damasio, A. (2007) We feel, therefore we learn: The 
relevance of affective and social neuroscience to education. Mind, Brain and 
Education, 1(1), 3-10. 
 
Jagodzinski, P., Reid, F., Culverhouse, P., Parsons, R. and Philips, I. (2000) A study of 
electronics engineering design teams, Design Studies, 21(4), pp. 375-402. 
 
James, W. (1907) Pragmatics, reprint 1975, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Jarvis, M. (2007) Articulating the tacit dimension in artmaking, Journal of Visual 
Arts Practice, 6(3), pp. 201-213. doi: 10.1386/jvap.6.3.201/1. 
 
Johnson, M. (1987) The Body in the Mind – The Bodily Basis of Meaning, 
Imagination, and Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Johnson, M. (2007) The meaning of the body: aesthetics of human understanding. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Johnson, M. and Rohrer, T. (2007) We are live creatures: Embodiment, American 
Pragmatism and the cognitive organism (ed.) Ziemke, T., Zlatev, J., & frank, R. M. 
(2007) Body, language and mind. Vol. 1. Embodiment. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 
pp. 17-54  
 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994) Wherever you go, there you are: Mindfulness meditation in 
everyday life. New York: Hyperion Books. 
 
Katz, A. (1997), Interview with Alex Katz, in Sylvester D. (ed.) Interviews with 
American Artists, London: Pimlico, pp. 235–250. 
 
Kemp, M. (2003) The Art Book, 10(2), pp. 37-38, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd. 
 
 
210 
 
Killian, J. and Todnem, G. (1991) Reflective judgment concepts of justification and 
their relationship to age and education. Journal of Applied Developmental 
Psychology, 2(2), pp. 89–116. 
 
Kolb, D. A. (1984) Experiential learning: experience as the source of learning and 
development. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Korthagen, F. (2001) Helping individual student teachers become reflective: The 
supervisory process. In: Korthagen, F.A.J., Kessels, J., Koster, B., Lagerwerf, B. & 
Wubbels, T., Linking practice and theory: The pedagogy of realistic teacher 
education (pp. 108-130). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Korthagen, F.A.J. and Vasalos, A. (2009) From reflection to presence and 
mindfulness: 30 years of developments concerning the concept of reflection in 
teacher education, EARLI Conference, Amsterdam, August 2009.  
 
Lovejoy, A. O. (1963) The thirteen pragmatisms, and other essays. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press. 
 
Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980) Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Lakoff, G. (1990) Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal 
about the Mind. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lakoff, G. and Núñez, R.E. (2000) Where mathematics comes from: how the 
embodied mind brings mathematics into being. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Langacker, R.W. (1986) The nature of grammatical valence. Duisburg: Linguistic 
Agency University of Duisburg. 
 
Leder, D. (1990) The absent body. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lewin, K. (1947) Frontiers of Group Dynamics: Concept, method and reality in social 
science, social equilibria, and social change, Human Relations, 1, pp. 5-41. 
 
Liberman, A.M., Mattingly, I.G. and Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1991) Modularity and the 
motor theory of speech perception: proceedings of a conference to honor Alvin M. 
Liberman. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Lomax, H. and Casey, N. (1998) Recording Social Life: Reflexivity and Video 
Methodology, Social Research Online, 3(2). Available at: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/3/2/1.html (Accessed: 10 September 2014). 
 
Mackinder, M. and Marvin, H. (1982) Design decision making in architectural 
practice: the roles of information, experience and other influences during the design 
process. Research Paper 19, Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies, University 
of York. 
 
Macleod, K. (1999) The relationship of making to writing, Point, 7, Spring/Summer, 
pp. 4-7. 
 
Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1980) Autopoiesis and cognition: the realization of 
the living. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co. 
 
Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1998) The tree of knowledge: the biological roots of 
human understanding. Boston: Shambhala. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
 
 
211 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973) Consciousness and the acquisition of language. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
 
Mikulas, W. L. (1981). Buddhism and behavior modification. Psychological Record, 
31, pp. 331–342. 
 
Molander, B. (2008) Have I kept inquiry moving? On the Epistemology of 
Reflection. Phenomenology & Practice, 2(1), pp. 4-23. 
 
Moon, J. (1999) Reflection in Learning and Professional Development. London: 
Kogan Page.  
 
Moore, G. E. (1922) Philosophical studies. London: Routledge & K. Paul. 
 
Nevins, A., and Hill, F.E. (1963) Reminiscences of Allan Nevins. Columbia: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Newell, A. and Simon, H.A. (1976) Computer science as empirical inquiry - symbols 
and search. Chicago: Information Cassettes. 
 
Newman, S. (1999) Philosophy and Teacher Education: A Reinterpretation of Donald 
A.  Schön’s Epistemology of Reflective Practice, London: Avebury. 
 
Norlander-Case, K., Reagan, T. and Case, C. (1999) The Professional Teacher: The 
Preparation and Nurturance of the Reflective Practitioner. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. 
 
O'Donovan-Anderson, M. (2000). Philosophy in the Flesh. The Review of 
Metaphysics. 53, 941-943. 
 
Ortega Y Gasset, J. (1968) The dehumanization of art; and other essays on art, 
culture, and literature. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Pakman, M. (2000) Thematic Foreword: Reflective Practices: The Legacy Of Donald 
Schön, Cybernetics & Human Knowing, 7(2-3), pp. 5-8. Available at: 
http://www.imprint.co.uk/C&HK/vol7/Pakman_foreword.PDF (Accessed: 20.9.14). 
 
Pedgley, O. (2007) Capturing and analysing own design activity, Design Studies, 
28(5), pp. 463-483. 
 
Pedgley O. (2009) Influence of stakeholders on industrial design materials and 
manufacturing selection, International Journal of Design, 3(1), pp. 1-15. 
 
Pedgley O., Norman E. and Armstrong R. (2009) Materials-inspired innovation for 
acoustic guitar design, METU Journal of The Faculty of Architecture, 26(1), pp. 157-
175. 
 
Pedgley O. and Wormald P. (2007) Integration of design projects within a PhD, 
Design Issues, 23(3), pp. 70-85. 
 
Pendergrast, M. (2003) Mirror mirror: a history of the human love affair with 
reflection. New York, Basic Books. 
 
Piaget, J. (1954) The Child's Construction of Reality, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Piaget, J. (1970) Science of education and the psychology of the child. New York: 
Orion Press. 
 
Pickering, J. (1997) The authority of experience: essays on Buddhism and 
psychology. London: Curzon Press. 
 
Polyani, M. (1967) The tacit dimension. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. 
 
 
 
212 
Portelli, A. (1991) The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories, Form and Meaning 
in Oral History. New York: State University of New York Press. 
 
Renov, M. (1993) Theorizing Documentary. London: Routledge. 
 
Rossman, G.B. & Rallis, S.F. (2003). Learning in the field: An Introduction to 
Qualitative Research. 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Russell, B. (1967) Philosophical essays. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Rorty, R. (1982) Consequences of pragmatism: essays, 1972 – 1980. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Ryan, R.M. and Brown, K.W. (2003) The Benefits of Being Present: Mindfulness and 
Its Role in Psychological Well-Being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
84(4), pp. 822–848. 
 
Santayana, G. (1936) The works of George Santayana. New York: C. Scribner's Sons. 
 
Shapiro, S.L. (2009) The integration of mindfulness and psychology, Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 65(6), p. 555. 
 
Shapiro, S.L. and Carlson, L.E. (2009) The art and science of mindfulness: Integrating 
mindfulness into psychology and the helping professions. Washington, DC: APA. 
 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1992) Giving the body its due. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1963) Displacement of Concepts. New York: Humanities Press. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1967) Technology and Change: The New Heraclitus. New York: 
Delacorte Press.  
 
Schön, D.A. (1971) Beyond the Stable State. New York: Random House. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1973) Organizational Learning, in Morgan G. (ed.) Beyond Method. 
Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1978) Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem Setting in Social 
Policy, in Ortony A. (ed.) Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Schön D.A. (1983) The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. 
New York: Basic Books. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1985) The design studio: an exploration of its traditions and potentials, 
London: RIBA Publications for RIBA Building Industry Trust. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1987) Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for 
Teaching and Learning in the Professions. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1988) Coaching Reflective Teaching, in Grimmett P. and Erickson, G. 
(eds.) Reflection in Teacher Education. New York: Teachers College Press. pp. 19-29. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1990) Causality and Causal Inference in the Study of Organizations. 
University of Southern California Colloquium on the Epistemology of Social 
Sciences. 
 
Schön, D.A. (ed.) (1991) The Reflective Turn: Case Studies In and On Educational 
Practice. New York: Teachers College Press. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1992) Designing as Reflective Conversation with the Materials of a 
Design Situation. Knowledge-Based Systems, 5(1), pp. 3-14. 
 
 
213 
 
Schön, D.A., Drake, W.D., and Miller, R.I. (1984) Social Experimentation as 
Reflection in Action: Community-Level Nutrition Intervention Revisited. 
Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 6(1), pp. 5-36. 
 
Schön, D.A. and Rein, M. (1994) Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of 
Intractable Controversies. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Schön, D.A. and Wiggins, G. (1992) Kinds of Seeing and Their Functions in Designing, 
Design Studies, 13(2), pp. 135-156. 
 
Scrivener, S. (2000) Reflection in and on action and practice in creative production, 
doctoral projects in art and design, Working Papers in Art and Design 1. Available at: 
https://www.herts.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/12281/WPIAAD_vol1_scrivener.pdf 
(Accessed 5 September 2014). 
 
Scrivener, S. (2002) The art object does not embody a form of knowledge. Working 
Papers in Art and Design 2. Available at 
https://www.herts.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/12311/WPIAAD_vol2_scrivener.pdf 
(Accessed 5 September 2014). 
 
Scrivener, S. (2002) Characterising creative-production doctoral projects in art and 
design, International Journal of Design Sciences and Technology, 10(2), pp. 25-44. 
 
Shahn, B. and Soby, J.T. (1957) Ben Shahn: his graphic art. New York: G. Braziller. 
 
Seligman, M.E.P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000) Positive psychology: An 
introduction. American Psychologist, 55(1), 5-14. 
 
Simon, H. A. (1996) The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.  
 
Simon, H.A. (1965) Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making Processes 
in Administrative Organization, 2nd ed. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Simpson, J.A. and Weiner, E.S.C. (1989) The Oxford English dictionary. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Smith, M.K. (1994) Local Education, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Smith, M.K. (2011) Donald Schön: learning, reflection and change, the encyclopedia 
of informal education. Available at: www.infed.org/thinkers/et-Schön.ht (Accessed 6 
September 2014). 
 
Srivastva, S. and Barrett, F.J. (1988) Foundations for Executive Integrity:  
Dialogue, Diversity, Development, in Srivastva, S. (ed.) Executive Integrity: The 
Search for High Human Values in Organizational Life. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
pp. 290–320. 
 
Stern, D.N. (1985) The interpersonal world of the infant: a view from psychoanalysis 
and developmental psychology. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Turing, A.M. (1936) On computable numbers: with an application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, 
42, pp. 230-265. 
 
Unamuno, M.D. and Kerrigan, A. (1967) Selected works of Miguel de Unamuno. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Usher, R., Bryant, I. and Johnston, R. (1997) Adult Education and the Postmodern 
Challenge, London: Routledge. 
 
 
 
214 
Valentine, E. (1997) The validation of knowledge: Public and Private, in Pickering, J. 
(ed.) (1997) The authority of experience: essays on Buddhism and psychology. 
London: Curzon Press. 
 
van Manen, M. (1990) Researching lived experience: human science for an action 
sensitive pedagogy. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. 
 
van Manen, M. (1995) On the Epistemology of Reflective Practice. Teachers and 
Teaching: Theory and Practice, 1(1), pp. 33-50. 
 
Varela, F.J., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1991) The embodied mind: cognitive 
science and human experience. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
 
Whiteley, N. (2007) Seeing what, how and why: the ART news series, 1953–58, 
Journal of Visual Arts Practice, 6(3), pp. 215–228. doi: 10.1386/jvap.6.3.215/1. 
 
Zeichner, K. and Liston, D. (1996) Reflective Teaching: An Introduction. Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Zimmer, H.D. (2009) Handbook of binding and memory: perspectives from 
cognitive neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 
 
Zull, J.E. (2002) The Art of Changing the Brain. Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing. 
 
Zull, J.E. (2011) From brain to mind using neuroscience to guide change in education. 
Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  
 
The following section presents the full transcripts of the interviews referenced in the 
thesis.  
 
1. Case Study 3: Andreas Reichlin - Studio documentary filmed August 2008 – Follow 
up interview filmed August 2009 
 
Stage 1 Interview  
 
Andrew Gray: Do you find you can work for 2, 3 hours without pause? 
 
Andreas Reichlin : 5 or 6 hours, no problem. 
 
AG: I find that when the work is going well then I have no feeling for the time. 
 
AR: Yes, you have no feeling for the time. You say ‘the flow’, when you are in it.  
But there are also days when I cannot even work for one hour, then I need to go 
away because it doesn’t work, or I clean the studio. But the creativity is here. 
 
AG: I find that when I’m in this ‘flow’, even through the studio is in chaos I can find 
whatever I need, it’s like a dance. 
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AR: Exactly, But it happens often with me that when I’m working my head is already 
involved with the next work. How do I do it with the next work. That is quite 
interesting. When I have a new idea I put what I’m doing aside and I make a small 
model from the new work, very spontaneously. I have to realize the ideas 
immediately.  
 
AG: Do you always make a model or do you sometimes go straight to the large 
sculpture? 
 
AR: Sometimes I make a model but not always. I have ordered new plates (points to 
the back of the studio) with this I have not made a small model I just start. 
  
Interview 2: post-practice interview 
 
[later standing beside a sculpture in the garden] 
 
AR: The inner part of the heart (demonstrates sweeping gesture curving his hands 
from his chest out in front of him) is made like this – (Spoken in English)  this is the 
inside – this is the inside (referring to concave areas of the sculpture that are facing 
outwards) 
The inside comes outside –  
(spoken in German) that is the idea and the philosophy – I know it only in Russian, 
that is the ‘душа’ (dousha)’, that is the name (of the sculpture) ‘dousha’ and 
that’s why there’s also the contact. (touches the sculpture) 
 
(moments later - beside another sculpture) This one is actually the same as the 
other, without this opening. This here is together (on the other sculpture – gestures 
across the garden)  
 
AG: Was this piece a whole circle? 
 
AR: With this sculpture not. It was a flat plate, which was pressed into the form. 
 
AG: Do you make this yourself or did a firm make it for you? 
 
AR: A company makes it. I will show you, over there you can see those plates, but 
they are flat. Those works, they are solid pieces (moving over to smaller scale works) 
 
AR: In the solid metal you see that the character of the steel is different than those 
over there, it’s a different character. 
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AG: Here it is polished, but here not? 
 
AR: There I never make anything, only here, here, and here, and here neither. Can 
you see it. This is perfect, perfectly polished. And only put together like this and here 
welded. Very simple, but highly complex. 
 
AG: This piece was originally a whole cylinder, and this angle, and here was cut and 
the middle piece flipped vertically. 
 
AR: These two pieces are the top and this piece is the bottom (referring to the 
middle section). 
 
AG: And the pieces always fit back together, that is the geometry of the cylinder and 
it is always 360 degrees. 
 
AR: Except this one I’m working on now, that is more. This is 360 (gestures the 
initial shape) and another piece more comes in. This is for me… I mean this work 
symbolizes love.  
 
AG: That totals more than a whole circle? 
 
AR Yes, something more comes into it. When you are in love there is always 
someone else involved, a second person comes in from outside and that’s why it is 
more than a circle. 
 
 
Interview 3: Later beside a solid metal sculpture 
 
AG: Once you have made the model and then you move to the larger piece, you 
encounter this problem, this machine, this new process, this quality in the polishing, 
does a new concept emerge through the process, through the material, the time you 
have, the space you have, your experience of the work? The metal is hot, sharp, 
heavy, you expend so mush energy, do all these processes change the idea from the 
original model? 
 
AR: You mean whether the form changes? I think not, no, I think…. I have a very 
clear vision how I’d like to do it. Then comes only the craftwork to realize it. And the 
problem is that when you have a small model you can make it very spontaneously, 
very quickly, it is complete, it is correct, it is right.  
 
AG: It’s not so much work? 
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AR: Exactly, and if you are working one month or two months on the same 
sculpture then it means that you have to bring during the whole time the same 
quality as you brought in, in 5 or 6 hours (making the small model). And this is very 
difficult, that the large sculptures have the same power, spontaneity, and clarity. 
You see I’m working already a long time on this, I work, and work, and that it has 
this lightness this calmness, that it is self evident (Selbstverständlichkeit) You don’t 
need to ask what for and why, its logical, it is just normal, it is just here. 
 
AG: It is a huge contrast, this piece here is very quiet, its very stable, and the 
experience of the piece is a calm experience, but the practice to make it is the total 
opposite.  
 
AR: Exactly! 
 
AG: It is loud and heavy… 
 
AR: …and hot 
 
AG: ..and hot, and I have seen when you work that you make small pauses as if it’s a 
reward, of as if the stillness in your pause is the quality you wish the sculpture 
eventually to have. 
 
AR: I find that really beautiful what you have just said. I have never been aware of 
that.  The work is loud, extremely, with the machines and other things, and the 
sculpture is quiet. You don’t feel the work anymore. It is quiet, still. This is a totally 
new aspect.  
 
AG: With this, that is only a physical quality… 
 
AR: Exactly. 
 
AG: …but what can we make with this physical, with this metaphor – It is what we 
make with this metaphor, I mean for you the circle metaphor, this is the inner part, 
this is the outer part, it is, but when we say that is a symbol or a metaphor for life 
then we come to another… 
 
AR: another level. 
 
AG: For me it is a very interesting question – what comes first – ok this is the 
quality, and for me, I can work with this quality and bring it to a metaphor for life, 
or do I have an idea, a concept of life and I must find something that displays that 
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quality? Does the material and the process lead to the idea, or does the idea find the 
material and the process? 
 
AR: I think it is both. It is really both. 
 
AG: I think that could be a good place to finish, because the camera is telling me the 
battery is finished. 
 
AR: (laughs) Bye. 
 
AG: Thank you very much. 
 
Stage 3 Interview 
 
August 2009 
 
 
AR:  I know now, but at the time I had completely forgotten, just forgotten, that 
you where there, I was so into the work. 
 
AG: Here I find it is like chess. You want to make this here, but you must think ‘what 
will happen when that piece comes up’ 
 
AR: That is the eye in the sculpture, the camera was filming my head, I’m thinking 
then I moved, and there was the eye. (laughs)… You know the problem here is these 
pieces are not yet welded, not yet complete, I have to lift the bottom piece up, 
(demonstrates it breaking)  
 
AG: Ah, you must take that away later? 
 
AR: Exactly, That’s why I have to weld this now, even though I must take it away 
again later. ‘What happens when I lift this piece up’, ‘The other piece breaks apart’ – 
It’s a shame. This is what I was thinking 
 
AG: Yes, ‘how much must you fix it…’ 
 
AR: As little as possible because I must cut it again. 
 
AG: That is just with your feeling? You must have a lot of experience with metal to 
understand how little you can afford to fix it without it breaking. 
 
AR: That is somehow, (points to his heart) feeling  
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AG How long have you worked with metal? 
 
AR: When did I begin to work with metal, about 10 years, not so long. 
 
AR: You know it would be great to, for example, for an exhibition, if you see the 
work, just this sculpture, you just see only that… but when you close your eyes, you 
know you hear just the audio. That fascinates me now! 
 
AG: You’d play just the soundtrack from the process, no images. 
 
AR: You told me something which I have never forgotten, you told me, I work in 
such noise, emissions, with such a lot of noise, always (points to ears), When the 
work is finished the sculpture is silent. That’s what you told me. I’ll never forget this. 
That was amazing. It was when we spoke here a year ago. I could imagine to place a 
sculpture in a room where you hear only the sound of its making, its development. 
Do you understand? The sound of the process, Just the sound, not visual. The sound 
of the chains, the power tools… For once no music, just this sound. With really good 
speakers, good quality recording. That is really cool. I will do that at the next 
exhibition! 
 
AG: (turns the light down on the computer screen – both AG & AR  
listen to the audio) 
 
AR: It’s really exciting (listening to the audio with no images) It’s the essence. 
 
AG: (light brought back up). 
 
AR: (looking at the image again) Here it’s beautiful…   
 
AG: Have you ever produced drawings? 
 
AR: Yes, a little bit, Life drawing - I was in Paris for 6 months to do that. Only life-
drawing. I draw just a little bit. In fact it’s a shame. You have to live my forms, for 
me they are very difficult to draw. I prefer to translate ‘that’ directly into the form.   
 
AG: For me a sculpture ought always to be seen whilst in motion, you can’t see it 
only from one angle. 
 
AR: It is always three-dimensional. (looking back to the screen) Now it comes good 
(looking away from the screen). It is so interesting to see this from the outside.  
(looking back to the screen) That’s not good there.  
 
 
220 
 
AG: Why? 
 
AR: I have the feeling that that piece must go up more. But it could be ok. I don’t see 
it exactly here yet. Here this piece should be like this (demonstrates on screen). It’s 
difficult to see from here, (after studying the screen intently) For me it was the 
most complicated work that I have ever done. It’s so complex. You said it right 
before, it’s like a chess game. You have really to think very far ahead to be able to 
construct them.  
 
AG: It is interesting also… This piece (pointing to the inner most curve) is really 
deep inside. With your concept, that which is on the inside of the sculpture 
represents what is inside us. It is the most vulnerable part of ourselves, and so the 
most intimate part of the sculpture. 
 
AR: Exactly, its so fragile –  
 
AG: Mankind has so many possibilities when we can take a symbol from cold, hard, 
metal, which can get really hot, its heavy, its sharp, and yet it can represent the 
most vulnerable part of you. 
 
AR: The soul.  
 
AG: I find it to be a very different language. 
 
AR: (referring to his actions on screen) Now its good. Do you see this small 
adjustment to make it curve upwards? Do you see it now, I’m pulling? This is so 
exciting – I’ve never seen such a film! This is the first time [I’ve watched myself 
working] 
 
AG: So you must cut this away? 
 
AR: (gesturing a twisting motion with his hands) The upper piece is like this, so the 
back part must twist more. It has to have more power. 
 
AG: How do you define what is the right form from the form that feels wrong? 
 
AR: You can see it with these forms (gestures the angle of the curve in front of the 
screen). This a principle of the forms. If you twist one side this way the other has to 
go in the opposite direction. When it’s straight it is somehow dead. It is cut. If it 
twists its like it’s like it’s grown. 
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AG: Organic? 
 
AR: Exactly, Grown, like a plant. It’s totally normal. You can feel it now it has to be 
like this, in this form.  
 
AG: When you have a solid metal cylinder and you cut the diagonal, cut it then 
rotate it, you immediately have the form. It’s not so much work. But with this 
process you must find the forms. 
 
AR: Exactly, you have to construct it.  
 
AG: How is that, if you have, say, ten times longer to produce the piece, but is it a 
better experience for you? I mean this curve is not natural, you must find it. 
 
AR: Yes, I understand.  
 
AG: Does it present you with more possibilities? 
 
AR: I think it is another chance, with this work some things are harder and some 
things are easier. With the solid metal, this part is easier but this is far more 
complex. With this work I always learn things for the work with solid metal.  
 
AG: With the solid work you have only one chance with this work you have more 
chances to play with it. 
 
AR: Exactly. 
 
AG: (Stops the film, and refers to a gesture made by AR, in which he models the 
shape of a form he is marking for being cut with his hands) What is that? 
 
AR: There? That’s the inside. The soul – did I do that before? 
 
AG: You made it one time with your hand like this, (gesturing the motion), then you 
made it now like this (gesturing again). 
 
AR: Ok. There I’m trying to formulate the thoughts that I have. To bring them into a 
form, a connecting platform, connecting the plastic and my thoughts. It’s like 
drawing in space, it is the form so I can feel how it has to function. So the form is 
correct. I think that is the point.  
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AG: For the practical work, this gesturing with the hand has no direct function, as 
such. The metal work itself doesn’t come further. But for the body, to make this 
(gesturing the form), what you said, ‘drawing in space’, it’s a way to take the form. 
 
AR: Exactly, it’s a way to take the form. When I feel it like that in the space I can 
eliminate the mistakes. If I don’t make this, then it is much more work to repair the 
mistake. Here I can just feel it. It’s like a sketch.  
 
AG: If it was possible to cut the metal only with your hand… 
 
AR: That would be cool. I think that would be a dream. 
 
(Guests arrive and the interview in brought to a close.) 
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2. Case Study 4: Laurence Karasek transcription 
 
Laurence begins watching himself work. 
 
LK: This is all part of the process, when I think about my painting, I don’t usually, 
since I’m alone in the studio, talk. So this will be an interesting articulation of my 
thinking without actually having to paint. Which is another commitment and 
obligation. So it’s a commentary on a commentary. So is a rather learning thing for 
me, an informative, instructive thing for me to do. I’m happy about that so go 
ahead. 
 
Documentary is played – duration 20mins 
 
AG: This I find interesting. 
 
LK (speaking on video about a painting of the lake in Zug): The painting the blue 
one I just did, I got the feeling from the painting that I wanted to dive in and swim 
and stuff. It must have reflected something in its appearance. So are you filming? 
 
LK: I look entirely eccentric [laughs] 
 
------- 1 min ---------- 
 
AG: How is it starting on that kind of fresh, virgin paper? 
 
LK: Terrible, its totally difficult. Enormous, problematic. That’s a nice detail.  
 
AG: So here you are trying to visualize the lines before you make them? 
 
LK: No they signify, a structure that I’m perversely creating with different colours 
and lines and so on, which is in turn an abstraction, because I’m not a camera, so I’m 
doing it in fragments, with one stroke after another. So its an interpretive process 
actually. When I try to structure the form of the image of the flowers, of the space 
and the form of the flowers structured on the surface of the paper, it’s the way that 
its connected, every part is connected to the other and as I’m doing it there are 
certain masses of form accumilations of form that I feel, like stacking of things, or 
constrasts of types of forms, or connections or groups, actually groupings of forms, 
so that they form clusters, they form associations and they have a compositional 
structure that I’m trying to resolve, but not frontally, its in fragments as one brush 
stroke or line at a time. Its trying to do the whole thing in one moment. 
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AG: The story about the flowers, I somehow kind of got the feeling that the 
photograph wasn’t important at all, it was arbitrary, it was just a means, a viechle, 
to get started. 
LK: Yes, actually you are correct, its just a starting point, to have a subject to 
translate from. Rather than working as an abstract expressionist works, which is you 
know, subconscious level, with action, with action of paint and gravity, arm action, 
action painting it was called. Lots of swinging of arms, lots of running up and down 
the length of the canvass, lots of physicality. I trying to have the same kind of 
freshness of the moment. But at that moment an indication of structure and space 
also . so flatness is also a replication of a special concept. So the lines are – Here I’m 
fairly, I notice that my body language is fairly intense. 
 
AG: there’s a lot of swaying back and forth. 
 
LK: Yes. It’s quite a dance. And now I feel a need for paint, so I’m mixing paint. 
 
AG: You feel a need for paint? 
 
LK: Yeah, a need for liquid or paint or something, I have that desire. 
 
AG: Its an interesting way of describing this, that it is a need, a must. It suggests 
that there’s some kind of a sense of rightness, and that painting is now the right 
thing to do. 
 
LK: Yes, it’s a self generating rule system, of restriction and limitation, versus 
fullness, and the lushous flowing sensual paint and all that. If you can imagine a 
conceptual feast that is being eaten with a tiny spoon [laughs], this is basically the 
sensation I have. I have this enormous complex structure which I understand, which 
is dynamic, dynamic in the classic sense of having energy and connection, but at the 
same time its also structural in a chemical way of this relating to that and that 
relating to this. This is a good shot I like this silhouette. 
 
AG: It was interesting because you could see the expression on your face, you 
couldn’t see the way the image was being built. One comment I was going to make, 
The way the image is being built out here, [points to screen] its almost organic in 
some way. A kind of a tree like structure, there’s no marks going down here until 
there’re marks here to support it – its almost like its going out of this. And once this 
becomes more stable able to carry the weight of the line down there then you start 
to move into the space. 
 
LK: Yes, there’s a stacking of form here, a stacking that begins here and moves up. 
Its true, its like when they build a bridge they start with the ends they build out and 
 
 
225 
build out until the can meet in the middle. Its true its kind of like that. I’m impressed 
how compulsive I seem, driven and compulsive. It’s no wonder I get paint in my 
finger nails, [laughs] its totally, you can’t avoid being completely involved in the 
sensuality of the paint. 
 
AG: Could you say something of that compulsion, that need to… be doing this, just 
to be doing this. 
 
LK: Well, its obvious isn’t it, it’s a desire for perfection, a desire to be perfect, A 
desire to have a representation of life in one work, as much as its possible to 
incorporate your understanding and knowledge of life. My conversation is now a bit 
taken up with the visual effect of this film. As I’m drawing here, I see, I remember 
how it was. There’s an urgency here that I find quite alarming. 
 
AG: The dry brush here, doing that because you wanted the effect of it, or because 
you needed to make the mark and somehow to pause and reload the brush would 
be… 
 
LK: No, no, I like the effect of the dry brush very much. [Watching himself mixing 
paint on the table and knocking something over] Typical. 
 
AG: Typical? Why is that typical? 
 
LK: To knock something over. So, you can draw very quickly with a dry brush, like a 
pencil almost. 
 
AG: I’m interested in this here, you’re looking for something here, and (clicks 
fingers) you’re going off to get what you need, do you find that within your studio 
space you have a very intimate relationship to the location of all of your materials 
and tools. 
 
LK: Yes I’m organized, I have my storage of my paint over there and on the table I 
have what I need for the immediate purpose. So here I’m really loading up the brush 
I’m going quite fast with the urgency of the idea that’s compelling and driving me 
right now, what I’m going to do with this colour. It looks like I need more fluid, so 
I’m going to poor some in. 
 
Scene changes – Laurence looks bemused. 
 
AG: we’re jumping ahead in time right now. 
 
LK: Oh.  
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AG: Essentially the whole painting builds up over an hour. You can see you’ve 
already made a lot more marks. This movement with the hand, are you aware of 
doing that?  
 
LK: Not so much. I’m aware of the fact that its extremely intense, I want to make 
sure I don’t succumb to accidental or casual lines, although they look accidental 
they’re not. They’re very deliberate, I want to… [cut off by interviewers question] 
 
AG: This whole process here now, we were discussing this before, you’re struggling 
with this area of the painting… 
 
LK: Well, there’s always a part of the painting which is problematic, more difficult 
and its usually the left hand side for some reason. 
 
AG: Did that mark satisfy that problem?  
 
LK: Yes, this mark counter balances this darker area here. It releaves the pressure of 
this, as a compensation for that dark area, filled in area, I’m trying to draw form, and 
trying to avoid drawing form. 
 
AG: There’s almost this kind of… [click fingers – scene shows LK modeling the 
movement of the line without drawing it] 
 
LK: Well, I’m trying to feel my way through the form there I’m trying… 
 
AG: Do you find that that helps you come to terms with that form when you play it 
out in the motion of the body first? 
 
LK: Yes, yes. 
 
AG: So its like sculpted in space before you make the mark? 
 
LK: Yes, it actually is. Pretty much. Its very much a physical [pause] thinking 
process. 
 
AG: I’m interested in these metaphors, where you’re relieving the pressure of a 
space, relieving the pressure over here by counter balancing – in the same way that 
if you needed to relieve the pressure of having too much wind in your bowles, you 
need to belch of something, where you bring your body back into balance. 
(inarticulate question that sent LK off on a tangent – would have liked to articulate 
that it is the way we project embodied experience into abstract domians) 
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LK: Yeah (sounding unconvinced) I mean, it’s a way of contrasts and dynamic 
contrasts where you have different things that balance each other out, so it’s a 
dynamic action. So you can accept what it is without changing it by doing 
something else. It’s a very important concept actually, accepting what it is without 
fussing over it so that you can deal with the reality of the moment  by taking 
another action which then explains and defines the thing that you’re having a 
problem with which is perhaps the work or something that isn’t quite right (is LK 
taking about generative metaphor here?) you can actually interpret that 
phenomenon in an external, by going out of the problem, by going external, to an 
external expression of it that is different and way from it. 
That was a good shot where you had the close up, I had no idea what you were 
doing with the camera. 
[LK points at the screen – but question is asked) 
 
AG: I’m interested in this relationship between the painting and the photograph. 
There’s this continual marrying between… the choreography of the painting… you 
are engaged with the tool and the material, the stepping back continually, step back, 
mark, step back, mark, and also in that the photograph, mark, step back, there was a 
kind of continuity to the way you were structuring, layering… 
 
LK: Yeah, well it has to do with the body language of which the paintbrush, or oil 
stick or pencil, is a part, it’s the end of your arm, so you have a feeling of what you 
want to do that runs through your body. The body then automatically relates back 
your feeling to that point of action which is the end of the brush so the ideas, 
actually this quite an interesting revelation in a way because the ideas that you 
want to create, that you conceive of , you feel when you look at your painting, the 
image you’re painting from, run all the way through the motor activity of your body 
into the physicality of the medium itself and the brush.  So it becomes all one. 
There’s no separation, the mind , the body, the pacing up and down on the floor, the 
verticality of the piece, the wall, the painting, its all part of the same physical  
existence.  
Is that the end of it? 
 
AG: It passed very quickly, didn’t it? 
 
LK: Yes, why did you cut so much of it out actually? Was it repetitive? 
 
AG: Well I wasn’t sure how long we’d have for the interview, and 20 minutes 
seemed a concise section.. 
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LK: It passed very quickly, from the hour you spent filming me, seemed like 2 
minutes. 
AG: Indeed. 
 
LK: Because they is no time, its just the idea, you know, the idea that body’s forth, 
like language itself, you have no idea where language comes from,  it just comes out 
of you and the ideas follow the words, here the visual ideas follow your body, your 
mind, your thinking, your feeling, all these are put together, and become, if you’re 
lucky, an expressive statement, if you’re very lucky it works out. If you’re in tune 
with what you’re doing. Its like an athletic performance it can be quite beautiful and 
truthful. Given all the factors. The image that comes to mind, is a person riding a 
horse for example, how complex that is, and they jump over a fence or something 
and they control the horse, there’s no difference between the rider of the horse, the 
horse’s mind the rider’s mind, they’re all one. And they’re all in relationship to 
whatever it is they’re doing. It’s like this there’s no difference between my mind and 
my body here. My mind is my body, my body is my mind. The painting is me, the 
idea and the painting become one. 
 
AG: Do you hold with the idea that, you’re setting out a certain agenda, and you’re 
engaging in a certain activity, and you have your rule sets that limit, but that its not 
that the act of painting is a slave to the conceptual idea, there’s a relationship there 
where the actually act of painting itself is feeding the conceptual ideas. 
 
LK: Absolutely, because you have to be in the moment. This kind of painting which 
is physical, and phenomenological in a sense, as it has to do with the surface and 
how the paint runs at certain times, or drips or something. Its all part of the mesh of 
feelings, of ideas, of sensations. I might just as well be building a sculpture here for 
example, its the same physicality, painting is extremely physical, I wouldn’t say 
totally physical, but it certainly has a physical reality as much as any other physical 
reality that existence has. And although you’re working on a flat surface , you’re 
working on a three dimensional flat surface if you know what I mean, that exists in 
space. So the flat surface of the painting, allows you to have imagination through it, 
so you go through it, as you go through it, you imagination, you’re guiding it, from 
the other side, from the fornt of the canvass the visual side of the canvass, with your 
body, with your actions. 
 
AG: So you see it more as a three dimensional space, than a flat surface? 
 
LK: Yes. Totally. Totally as a three-dimensional experience, even through you are 
using a flat surface and you’re using a point or a brush or something to do it, and 
you’re using flat colours and so on. It’s all part of an extension of your experience. I 
notice that the painting becomes an extension of my body language, and my body 
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language becomes an extension of the painting. And it becomes very intense 
because I feel very intensely about my work. My body becomes all tense and I start 
to work in a rhythmic way that is a reflection of the rhythmic strokes and the 
pattern of stroking and so on, of application, that I’m actually performing, it’s a 
performance piece. That’s why I find this film so interesting, because its actually a 
performance piece that we’re seeing here not just the painting, and out of it comes a 
framed painting in the end. But actually it’s a record of an action, an actual physical 
action. I had my students one time find out what their patterns of behavior were by 
dipping their feet in paint and walking back and forth in the kitchen, and they 
developed certain patterns of behaviour between the fridge and the sink and so on. 
For an hour long, it was an actual representation of something that had happened 
physically over a period of time. So time is also important in painting, and the 
annihilation of time in the painting is what happens because the artist feels no time, 
because he leaves his normal body outside of the studio. Are we watching it again? 
 
AG: I’d like to get onto some more formal questions. 
 
LK: Sure, go ahead, ask me any question you like.  
 
AG: I’d like to ask what reflection-in action actually means for you, although its such 
a dire question somehow. But I’m quite interested in how you negotiate that space, 
whether you are even aware that there is a process of refinement going on, what 
you think about reflecting on your work what do you do? 
 
LK: I had my answer already before you used the word dire. No its not dire, its 
difficult. There’s a tremendous sense of responsibility you have with an on going 
piece, for example, you started filming when there was an hour or two of earlier 
work from the previous day. And it was quite good I thought, I liked it. It’s quite a 
responsibility to make it better or continue it. So reflection is a sense of 
perfectionism that you carry, that you have to carry as an artist. You reflect upon. Is 
it perfect, and that’s the under riding reflection in making an art piece is, you know, 
perfectionism, perfect statements each time over the complexity of structuring the 
work. The reflection-in-action would be something like a commentary, if I was 
making a commentary, like is this too big, is this right here. It’s kind of like as I used 
to do when I was teaching my students drawing,. How big is this, what direction, 
what angle, I was talking out loud, and if I was talking out loud here, I would be 
thinking like that, I would be saying, is this where it ought to be and does this 
express the feeling I have, is this connected, and there’s an intensity I see in things, I 
observe and I see an intensity there, does it reflect an intensity.  
 
AG: Is that kind of questioning coming out in words? 
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LK: No. Its not coming out as words its just in my head. I’m not saying them but I’m 
thinking, As you think, you know, is this big enough, is this where it ought to be, is 
the angle of it right, how about the colour, was that a good brush stroke, did that 
work, does it work with the other brush strokes, and this kind of thing. And it’s a 
relational thinking is the reflection, which is always the case with an artist they’re 
thinking about the relationships they’re building. It’s relational thinking, that’s what 
reflection is. Is it this, is it this, can I do this, can I do this. Is the colour right is the 
form right, its reflecting on the relationships between the parts. There’s very little 
that’s done, actually done that doesn’t have an existence somehow, materially, 
physically, some effect on time or space, some manifestation, so. 
 
AG: Is that a kind of post-event activity then… 
 
LK: No, no, it goes… 
 
AG: … so that you make a mark, then ask the question whether it works, then make 
another, then asks another question, is it after the event, or whether that thought 
process, or feeling process is occurring as you make the mark? 
 
LK: No it occurs as you’re making them. Does this go there, or there, then you step 
back and see if it does go there or there, and sometimes it doesn’t, sometimes, many 
times they’re corrections. This whole thing was built on, recreating and restating 
and finally, you get to know the image you’re working with so well, that it comes 
together, it becomes familiar, the patterns, the forms and so on, the composition of 
it become very familiar to you and you get to know it and so it becomes in a way, 
more resolved as you get to know it, although this way of working there never 
really is a resolution. You don’t want a resolution of the ritualistic kind; you want a 
resolution of the expressive and emotional kind. That says this is a truthful 
statement of how you feel about what you’re looking at and observing, does it 
replicate your idea. And of course you don’t know that exactly, because you don’t 
know what the outcome is going to be, although following a line of restraints, 
restrictions, and patterns and rules and regulations that you impose upon yourself, 
eventually a stream, a sequence of work comes out, that’s predictable. 
 
AG: That familiarity that you have with the work, if you’re looking at it as a three 
dimensional space, not a two dimensional space, but where the layering is quite 
physically three-dimensional, as you are almost swimming amongst the lines and 
putting things behind. When you are engaged with one particular area, even though 
you are continually stepping back, there’s a certain kind of vibrancy to the lines, as if 
they are a living part of the action. Where as once the lines have been made and you 
step back perhaps some hours after the activity, does that vibrancy fade from the 
lines, do they become flat? I don’t know if that explains what I want to say. 
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LK: No, they become objectified Andrew, they become objectified, I mean I could 
maintain this kind of intensity I’d go crazy, I’m just working on this thing. So then in 
reflection, later you look at it, if it works, you feel like it works, or it doesn’t work. 
You know oftentimes I find I’ll pick up the paint brush and I’m into it again, and I 
didn’t mean to do all of it, I just wanted to do a little bit here, and sometimes 
paintings get completely repainted, like the red one of the lake series, was 
completely repainted, all over, everything pretty much. But that’s the reflection you 
get when you’re not working, of looking at other peoples paintings, of looking at 
your own paintings objectively, does it work. 
 
AG: [standing up and taking a book] For example, if we look at the work of Brice 
Marsden, are you familiar with his work. 
 
LK: A little bit yes. 
 
AG: Or perhaps looking at this image, by Gerhard Richter, I can never engage in this 
painting in the same way that he did when he was working, I view this as a two 
dimensional image. Whereas for him, in the same way that yours is a living space. 
 
LK: Yes. That’s right you can never go back. Once enough time has gone by you can’t 
go back, or get into it, besides you’ve changed. The interesting thing about, Gerhard 
Richter is that he’s simultaneously working in a photographic style, and this 
scrapped surface style, and he can work with glass, and people say, well, what’s 
wrong with the guy, but when he’s with glass, he’s not with paint so when he’s 
working photographically he’s working photographically, so. If people want 
consistency of style they want to know how it was done so they can depend on it. So 
I think that if you wanted to sell this drawing you could use this videotape to show 
how it was done, they would understand it and want to buy it,  
 
AG: Do you feel a need for that, a potential for that? 
 
LK: I do, yeah I do. I think the more knowledge you bring to your vision, the more 
understanding you have the better. I think its essential to have knowledge and 
understanding if you look at something.  
Interview ends. 
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3. Case study 5 - Interview with Patrick Simms performance artist and puppeteer 
 
Conducted at the artist’s studio in Barcelona [The following interview is illustrated 
with video still images from the interview, which is not presented amongst the 
primary case studies in the thesis.] 
 
 
 
AG: I think the most immediate thing, is that out of all the puppets here the 
majority of them have skeletal heads. The significance of the use of skeletal heads… 
having the flesh stripped away from them? 
 
PS: Well there is the obvious metaphor of the puppet being neither alive nor dead. 
For starters in this story they live in the land of the dead. But in terms of searching 
for material or form for the idea, I tried to use images and combinations that allude 
to this sort of middle zone between living and dead. So we have a lot of taxidermy, 
and sort spanning the whole expanse of things that where alive and are dead now, 
and things that where dead and will soon be alive. 
 
AG: So do you think it could be said that the skeletal forms are coming out of that 
physical attribute of the puppet as an object that is inanimate, but is given life 
through gesture and movement?  
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PS: With this show anyways, there’s much less scenery and props, its much more 
empty. And when I create a character I try to make them carry their scenery with 
them, like in their costume or their form or their attribute or the props that they 
carry with them. They carry with them all of their scenery so that its not necessary 
to… it’s a way of combining many different stories and spheres, and you rely upon 
each character to bring their whole universe with them. As they are coming into it 
it’s much more economical to have all these little worlds combining and mixing in 
one space.  
 
AG: Does it start as an economical, practical necessity, within the performance, that 
they bring certain attributes of their environment with them, rather than having to 
change the set and if so what kind of ideas spiral out of that in terms of the 
characters? 
 
PS: I think that in the conceptual story, there are many narratives woven into one. 
Well for one thing, the characters are complete unto themselves, so that even if you 
just allude to one character as being representative of this sphere or this sphere, 
hopefully you can create an immediacy of that sphere in the physical embodiment of 
the puppet but also in terms of mixing ideas as well. It’s a combination of this 
immediate completeness of the character and its ability to mix with other 
characters, other spheres of thought.  
So in terms of the skeletal forms, there is an immediacy to it, but it also cuts right 
down to the bone of the story. Also I tried to avoid any kind of rhetoric, anything 
extra unless that’s the subject. Unless the subject is rhetoric, unless the subject is 
decadence unless the subject is extravagance, I try to keep it as… Although every 
character is a kind of monster, is a kind of hybrid of other worlds also, so each 
character represents a mixture of worlds also, so they combine. A lot of the 
characters have animal characteristics. Many of them started from animal skulls as a 
head; there is a rat, 
an owl… 
 
AG: We where 
talking before about 
that kind of cyclic 
relationship between 
the character, the 
concept of the 
character and the 
puppet that embodies 
that concept, and the 
making of it and how 
that changes the 
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concept of the character, and how the concept of the character informs the making 
of the character and so on. Do you have any specific examples of where the concept 
of the character was very strong but the making of the puppet changed the concept 
of the character? 
 
PS: This is a crocodile dominatrix, and she 
represents, from the third act of the last show, 
which is a lamentations regret of this woman 
Eleanor Butcher Bishop, she regrets not having 
wept at her son’s funeral, so she evokes this 
crocodile goddess whose responsible for 
bringing tears to her eyes. So with the 
metaphor of the crocodile tears, she sort of 
became the totem animal of this act. Through 
this very false ceremony some other truth is 
revealed. She does it through these mechanisms of evoking this crocodile goddess 
who’s waving onions around and trying to make her cry for this photo shoot. 
Eleanor regrets not crying at her son’s funeral so she’s exhumed him and got all the 
paparazzi to come in and take a picture of her, and must have a tear in her eye for 
this reburial. So she evokes this crocodile goddess who’s the totem of crocodile tears, 
of false sentiment. In terms of the costume, the dominatrix aspect was false role-
playing, this willing game of suffering… 
 
AG: Do you sketch out any of the character concepts before you start making them? 
 
PS: Mostly kind of maps, 
connections of drawings and 
word play, she very much 
started with the idea of 
crocodile tears. 
 
AG: Do word play and 
metaphor come up quite a 
lot in the design of the 
characters? 
 
PS: The first act of the last 
show starts with a rustic 
bunch of hill-billies. This guy 
is made from an owl’s skull. 
He’s kind of the wise old 
moonshining freemason owl 
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who’s just fallen off the back of the turnip truck. In American slang that’s like being 
born yesterday. This wagon comes in full of turnips and he falls of the back of it, so 
we play a lot with very literal references, almost to the cliché extent. Like the title of 
this show is the Armature of the Absolute, that’s taken from an Alfred Jarry quote 
who said that ‘cliché is the armature of the absolute’. So this show brings together 
all the clichés about what we know about Alfred Jarry’s life. So to take those clichés 
and present them literally, for example from Deluze’s concept of folds and rhizomes 
he refers to the ultimate 
nomadic spirit as being old 
man river, from an old Paul 
Robeson song ‘you don’t plant 
taters, you don’t plant cotton, 
and those who do are soon 
forgotten, but old man river 
just keeps rolling along. This 
puppet is supposed to look like 
Paul Roberson, but he’s also a 
boxing sweet potato. He’s this 
embodiment of this Deluze’s 
concept of old man river - 
folds and rhizomes, and he’s a boxing sweet potato that sings a song about how he 
can never partake in the fruits of his own labour. 
 
AG: So if we say to some degree that metaphors and inferences are drawn from 
references that are literally translated into the puppets, which become a sort of 
starting point. At what point do the inferences from those puppets take it further 
into other conceptual domains? 
 
PS: It’s really when they come into contact 
with each other, when one sphere of thought 
comes together with another. Sometimes its 
done kind of arbitrarily, so we could take him 
and all his attributes and what he was born 
from and say what would happen for example 
if he came together with him from this sphere 
of thought and how they might overlap and 
touch. 
 
AG: So not only do the puppets carry their 
environments with them, but also the universe 
of concepts that surround them come into 
contact as well. So you have these concepts 
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interacting and the kind of conceptual blending between them, to the extent that 
there’s a kind of union between them. 
 
PS: This is a recurring theme in the last shows, where there have been two or three 
scenes of cottice per show, either between and animal and a person, an object and a 
person or a machine. Some kind of cottice that spawns a new thought that is often 
monstrous. The birth of the archaeopteryx, for example, from Ubu’s ass. Vockinson’s 
mechanical duck shit is poured into the sewers and Ubu’s henchmen dredge it out. 
Ubu licks the bowl they’ve filled clean then gets indigestion, keeling over he has this 
very difficult birth and shits out the archaeopteryx. But it doesn’t stop there because 
the archaeopteryx then mates with the mechanical duck to produce yet another 
type of offspring in the form of an egg, and Ubu tries to absorb this new sphere of 
thought, we see him eating it but it immediately passing through him as he’s 
imperturbable to any kind of thought as Jarry explains. 
 
AG: So if we look at some sort of strategy, some way of working, you’re developing 
your creative decision making whilst you’re producing the show, do you find that 
when the puppets come together and there is a particular interaction and each of 
the puppets embody their own set of values and crystallised ideas, that through the 
union of those ideas you are able to get a sense of the interaction that is produced, 
and that the product of the interaction then impacts upon your decision-making as 
to how the scene develops? 
 
PS: Yes very much so. A lot of that has to do with rearranging and trying out all 
kinds of different combinations. There’s some concept in the beginning that needs to 
be, some goal that needs to be achieved at the end. The elements are in place, we 
know where to begin, we know where to end and we know the elements in between 
but it is their arrangement that is often a process of experimentation and 
recombination. So two characters come together and form a very clear concept that 
can relate virtually with the next concept that comes along chronologically. The 
following scene always must begin with where the last scene crystallised, between 
the combinations of these two already crystalline spheres. 
 
AG: One question that I have: there are always going to be a myriad of conceptual 
ideas both literal and metaphorical that come out of the interaction of puppets, the 
development of scenes and the over all concept of the show. That will involve a 
huge selection process of which ideas to take forward and which ideas to drop. It’s a 
difficult question, but to what degree are the selection processes made on a 
conceptual basis or a practical basis, through what the puppet can do and what is 
possible within a given scene? 
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PS: Sometimes it’s the case that the conceptual choice is preferred over the practical 
choice. Sometimes that may result in something not flowing together on the stage 
in terms of practicality and technical possibilities. Sometimes its absolutely 
essentially that that element is there whether it disrupts the flow or not and that’s 
when it becomes very clear (cutting gesture with the hand) that there’s a break in 
the thought. There are breaks in the flow as well and it just becomes a very obvious 
time that when there’s a seizure between any of these spheres, that it won’t happen, 
that’s when its time to completely transform the flow and rhythm of the following 
scene. It’s very clearly a break. Literally interpreted its when two characters are 
forced into a ring together, and maybe they in the outside world have nothing to do 
with one another, but when they’re put inside this ring they have to battle it out 
just to see what happens, often times it causes the flow of the show to completely 
transform (hands peddle backwards) and go in another direction. Often when there 
is a failure in a machine, or a time when two characters, two spheres don’t marry so 
easily it often erupts in violence. Or total chaos. 
 
AG: Do you see any aspects of your decision making in other spheres out side of 
puppetry either with the writing or in your life in general which somehow draw 
upon the creative decision making processes that you engage in as a play write, 
director, puppeteer. So there are certain engagements of drawing literal inferences 
metaphorically into abstract domains, the interactions of the concepts embodied in 
the puppets, within the puppet world that give rise to certain thought processes. 
That when you’re going forward into a next show that your thought processes are 
derivative … does that make sense as a question? I’m not sure I articulated it very 
well. 
 
PS: Well. I’ve never had any sort of artistic training, and I don’t really make 
distinctions between disciplines, writing, photography, painting, sculpture, for me I 
found out a while ago that the puppet theatre allowed me to incorporate all of my 
interests, writing, drawing, sculpting, performing, music, so its all fair game really 
and in terms of the ideas, the media that we choose to use, follows from the idea 
more or less. A lot of the next projects are written, well not written in a finalised 
form but conceptually the subjects have been chosen and it depends on what media 
to use. Whether its to research antique photography for doing a scene of Larisa – an 
1889 funeral we need to have a feel for the kind of photographic techniques they 
would use, so we’d research photographic techniques, its all done with magnesium 
flashes, photo lighting techniques… 
 
AG: And this would bring in a whole flood of other images and references? 
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PS: Exactly. We know it’s a photo scene but it breaks open new possibilities and 
combinations. The more complete the research is… but drawing the line 
somewhere. I always look for the exception in the media, some quirky element. 
 
AG: I’m very interested in this relationship between the ideas and the practice and it 
seems to me that there’s some kind of relationship between your ability to operate 
amongst a number of disciplines creatively that you don’t give a distinction 
between, but you’re operating with different tools, different media and different 
approaches and the relationship between that practice and your ability to bring 
ideas, conceptual ideas together from lots of different domains with out necessarily 
drawing distinctions, and allowing things to come through. They are metaphorically 
very similar (PS – Yes) where as one is dealing with the realm of thoughts, ideas and 
language, and the other is dealing with material interactions. How to actually map 
one onto another or see the relationship is very difficult and I’m not so sure how to 
do that, but I’d be very much interested on any thoughts to have on that to take it 
forward, not necessarily now but in the future, 
 
PS: There are quite a few examples in the other show of the materials chosen, where 
the material has influenced… because it yes in the end it is a combination of all of 
these disciplines of art. And in the end it does come down to a temporal staging of a 
theatre play. There is a set of rules. I’ll have to show you from the other show the 
physical materials from each of the puppets that are partly chosen because of the 
ideas because I had a very good idea of the characters of this show because I’d done 
a lot of research on Alfred Jarry (through the PhD) so the characters were chosen 
before any of the puppets were made. So it’s a very different way of working, so it 
was all about the concept, it was all in the head, I didn’t start with any new material, 
except for the baboon skull. And also I wanted to do this show with a lot of metal 
mesh and latex and its all very expense and we don’t have any money, but luckily as 
we arrived here in Barcelona in this squatted factory, well its rented now but it was 
squatted. This factory used to produce latex and we found barrels of it to use for 
free. Lots of metal of course. I wanted to use copper but we could afford that. 
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4. Interview Professor Mark Johnson 
 
Conducted at the Experiential Knowledge Conference, University of 
Hertfordshire, England – 29th June 2007 
 
Note 1. [This discussion takes the form of a tutorial, with Mark Johnson offering 
thoughts on my work rather than on his own work. The opening section of this 
text is therefore explanatory, as I outline the topic of discussion. As the context 
for my research project may already be known to some readers, the explanatory 
section is indicated as coming to a close with the following symbol (*), and may 
be skipped over to where Mark Johnson begins to respond to the context of the 
discussion.] 
 
Transcription: 
 
Andrew Gray: Firstly, I’d like to thank you for taking the time to join me here. The 
point of departure for my research project, is looking at notions of reflection-in-
action, based on the theories of D. A. Schön. And looking at his theories of 
reflection-in-action as being not particularly appropriate to creative practice.  
 
Mark Johnson: I have to confess that I know Schön’s earlier work but I haven’t 
read the reflective practitioner. His earlier work was on generative metaphor, and 
was very good, but I haven’t followed his recent work.  
 
AG: I’m beginning to look at the implications of a bodily basis of meaning for 
better understanding art practice given the huge amount of physical activity 
that’s involved in creative practice. 
For me a refined model of reflection-in-action will accommodate embodied 
experience. Now it is an issue for me how that is going to be documented, how 
we can be attendant to… 
 
MJ: to that… 
 
AG: …one of the things you mentioned that Dewey said, was the notion of being 
attendant in the moment, to what is now becoming known as embodied 
experience, and to be aware of that experience. I’ve been conducting interviews 
with art practitioners to try to find evidence of that happening. One of the things 
I’d find when interviewing a practitioner is that I’d immediately get a conceptual 
account of the work. 
 
MJ: Oh, yes 
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AG: Then if I dug a little deeper I’d get a material account. There seems to be a 
gap, in many cases between what they are actually doing and what they think 
they are doing. I feel that having a means of reflection-in-action that looked at 
embodied practice would be beneficial. I tried to find some simple examples of a 
distinction between a material account and a conceptual account and this is one 
of things I wanted to show you… 
 
[The following images are brought up onto the screen] 
 
 
MJ: By the way last summer I was up in Long Island, someone had done this, like 
twenty of them, just out along the shore, and there’s a road that runs out there, it 
was amazing, you know we stopped and took photos. I mean that’s truly 
remarkable. Wow. This is stuff you’ve done? 
 
AG: Yes, I’ve been balancing stones for the last seven years.  
 
MJ: How is that even possible [laughs] that’s incredible to me. Ok, go ahead I’m 
sorry. 
 
AG: Thank you. As an activity balancing stones is more of a hobby than an artistic 
endeavour, I saw it once and decided to have a go myself. It was something that I 
could do outside of the studio that didn’t require the use of tools, it didn’t require 
the use of materials. It’s just wherever there happened to be some stones and I 
had some time on my hands. So I didn’t go into it with any background 
conceptual agendas. 
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MJ: Right. 
 
AG: It wasn’t central to my art practice. I was carving glass and painting in the 
studio. However, these images were taken in Zurich some months ago, and an old 
lady came up to me and started talking to me about them. It turned out that she 
was an ex-mountaineer and so she had a certain relationship with stone and 
wanted to know how it was possible. I had to stop myself because I immediately 
started talking about it in a conceptual way. The work as being a synthesis of 
fragility and strength of permanence and transience and this started being 
projected onto other things. She left with the idea that the structures were some 
kind of symbol for how we try to attain inner balance in our lives but there 
always forces trying to throw us off, she gave examples in her life where she had 
been balanced but then an event would throw that balance off. 
 
MJ: Hmm, the fragility, the contingency. Yeah. 
 
AG: Now this struck me as significant because about half an hour before she 
arrived on the scene I was writing a material account. And the material account 
was looking at things like, the choice of location, which is always on the highest 
point, the potential for triangulation. Looking for imperfections in the stone, 
holes balance on points, points in holes. The choice of stone, is dependant on the 
surface, is dependant on its potential to balance, its composite strength etc. Then 
the qualities like shape and colour… 
 
MJ: the texture… 
 
AG: … came in last. Only after the other agendas had been satisfied. 
 
MJ: I see 
 
AG: As a practitioner it was these agendas that I was dealing with. So the material 
account was looking at the practical activity of making, what I was engaged in 
what I was doing. Because this was not central to my art practice, it was 
absolutely clear to me that the material practice came before the conceptual 
ideas. And so it became a very simple example of how the conceptual ideas can be 
metaphorical projections of the act of making. So I began to question how the 
physical qualities of stone, the vertical force of gravity and the side ways forces 
like wind could come to be mapped onto conceptual ideas like strength and 
fragility. 
 
[The following diagrams were displayed and referred to] 
 
 
 
242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AG: Strength is a physical attribute and refers to the composition of a material 
which is hundreds of millions of years old and will not erode for a long time to 
come, gravity as the force acting upon the stones is taken as being something of a 
permanent feature of this world and indeed the universe, so even without a 
background theory of geology or gravity it is not hard to assume that the stones 
would stand until unaltered with. We can therefore infer the abstract concept of 
permanence from the concrete qualities of the structure. Fragility is a physical 
attribute of the structure. It takes only the slightest side ways force for the stones 
to become extremely fragile. We can therefore infer the abstract concept of 
transience from the concrete physical qualities of the structure. But they can’t be 
both at the same time. It’s strong until it’s made fragile. 
 
MJ: Right 
 
AG: But then, [Referring to Fig. 3], within a kind of a blended space, I refer to the 
Fragility/Transience 
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Physical attributes 
Strength/Permanence 
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Physical attributes 
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work of Mark Turner and his idea of conceptual blending, the physical attributes 
of strength and fragility become the concepts of permanence and transience, and 
whilst in the structure they can only be one thing or the other, they can be both 
simultaneously in our minds. 
 
MJ: By the way there’s a metaphor of standing. Which is, you know, going to be 
operative here. The metaphor is existing is standing, or continuing to stand. And 
so when something is knocked over, it falls, so we talk about regime change, you 
know, it was toppled, it fell. And so the notion of standing up right is 
metaphorically a kind of, continuing in existence. Anyway that’s one of the 
metaphors that would be relevant to our experience of those works. 
 
AG: That certainly applies. When it got on to talking to this old woman about the 
work we could just have easily been talking about existence, our conversation 
about the structures being about finding inner balance in ourselves and the 
relationship of that balance to other forces in life that have the potential to knock 
us off that balance, is just an example of the deeper, less obvious, structure of 
meaning making in which concrete qualities can be projected metaphorically onto 
abstract domains. You have done extensive work on this and I wanted to talk to 
you to see whether I’m applying your ideas correctly. The balanced structure 
becomes a metaphorical projection of the human being. Gravity becomes a 
projection for inner balance. The sideways force, as a physical attribute could be a 
wind, or you know whatever… 
 
MJ: Or you know, it can be a social force, or any metaphorical force.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AG: These are the physical forces that can be mapped onto… 
 
MJ: …any kind of metaphorical force, right. So social convention, or peer pressure 
or, many different metaphorical manifestations of force. 
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AG: Very often creative practitioners talk about the conceptual ideas behind the 
work are… or the conceptual ideas in the work are… what I’m suggesting would 
be beneficial for understanding visual art practice is if we were talking about what 
the conceptual ideas projected out of the work are. This leads me onto the aspects 
of this inquiry that are really interesting me. We talk about all human experience 
as having a structure. The structure of the physical experience, creates the 
parameters, the structure, through which we understand the experience. Going 
back to one of the things that I mentioned at your presentation yesterday. You 
described art making as being an exemplary example of human meaning making 
processes. Within visual art practice there are particular kinds of experiences that 
are generated out of dealing with matter without direct regard to its everyday 
functionality. I’m very interested in the kind of specific structures that are 
generated, and how creative practitioners internalise and metaphorically project 
those experiences, even unconsciously, into abstract domains. It would suggest 
that visual arts practitioners might owe as much of their creative conceptual ideas 
not only to their social, theoretical, and historical agendas to but to very physical 
qualities and processes in the act of making. Perhaps it is this process that enables 
visual art practice to be the exemplary example of human meaning making you 
describe. 
 
MJ: Exactly. I’m completely on board with what you’re saying. We look at the 
possibility of creativity as to not simply reproduce these templates or structures 
but the modest freedom we have to transform them in creative ways. I think that 
your basic idea is absolutely correct. Dewey says, look, what’s so characteristic of 
art is the focus on the qualitative dimensions in the structure of materials and 
relationships of qualities. And the actual working through the possibilities of 
those. And I think that’s what you are describing here and you are showing how 
that’s a basis for projection in our, sense of ourselves, and then into a number of 
abstract, what we think of as abstract, conceptual domains, but its all, thinking. 
 
AG: To find evidence of this is problematic within art practice. One of the things 
I’m trying to develop is ways that you can evidence how the material process of 
making is influencing the conceptual ideas. Within your work you’ve looked 
extensively at human embodied experience and how that’s structured language, 
and how physical experience can be projected into abstract domains. I wondered 
whether you’d given any thought to what kind of structures might be generated 
out of visual art practice and how they can be metaphorically projected into a 
practitioner’s conceptual ideas, knowing or understanding of practice.   
 
MJ: Well. Boy. First off I want to say. Creativity is not the suspension of 
constraint. I mean creativity is not an act radical freedom. Because there’s no such 
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thing as radical freedom. OK. So first off it is true that some things get 
transformed and that novelty emerges. And I consider that to be the problem to 
give an account of how that novelty is possible. So we may be on the same page 
about this. But you don’t throw out the rule, it’s with the technique… 
 
AG: It’s the physicality of the materials, your relationship to the tools… 
 
MJ: Right 
 
AG: and the environment in which you’re working that the conceptual ideas can 
also grow out of… 
 
MJ: Precisely, I think that’s right, you’re saying it just right it seems to me. All of 
those things you’ve mentioned are, your constraints shaping the possibilities of 
meaning, of carrying a situation, of developing a situation in a certain way, and 
what you’re doing is enacting that. I mean, what you’ve described are ways of 
knowing. And its not like there’s more that has to be said it seems to me. We just 
have to get over the idea that there’s this municipal concept, knowing, 
knowledge, that it is, you know a concept handed down to us in its traditional 
form with a whole bunch of problematic assumptions. So that’s where we have to 
go at this. You talked about this process, an active process, and it is an intelligent 
engagement with these materials and their qualities and their relations. It’s an 
inquiry of sorts seeking to see what’s possible and when its creative its 
transformative in seeing what’s possible for us. And I think the key is just to, get 
people to see that that is a way of knowing, and not then to say how does it get 
translated into conceptual knowledge because that gives it second-class 
citizenship. I mean it doesn’t have to become knowledge. We can ask what goes 
on there feeds into our, you know, abstraction. That’s my work, what I’m focused 
on. If we’re trying to validate it, translate it into a certain conceptual, 
propositional framework, I think that’s not the way to go. I suggest that the way 
to go is to validate it at the level of ‘this already is’ a knowing. But in order to do 
that we have to challenge the traditionally received views about knowledge, and 
the kind of transcendent ‘god’s eye view’ of universal concepts. I mean, what 
Dewey said… science evolves certain abstractive modes where symbolic, you 
know, processes are brought into play, that in a sense, remove us from the more 
immediate engagement with the qualitative enactment of art. And seeking 
generalisations over the phenomena, that’s what science does. Sometimes the 
generalisations are in the form of universal laws, but not exclusively. That’s 
another story. That’s a form of knowing, but there is a cost to that, the cost is 
that it pulls away from the qualitative engagement with the materials, which is so 
critical to art’s way of being in the world it seems to me. I mean I don’t want to 
translate, or say this is useful for, I want to say that it’s a mode of knowing itself 
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and there are various uses we have for these various modes of knowing, and they 
do not do the same thing, they are not inter-translatable. So I was trying to 
answer the question. Ok, how does this translate into, or whatever the words are, 
into conceptual knowledge. 
 
AG: One of the things I’d like to propose is that our embodied experience of 
making, structures our understanding of it. 
 
MJ: I agree. 
 
AG: But when we talk about what Dewey said, that we are seeking to be aware of 
these things, to be attendant in the moment… 
 
MJ: That’s true, that’s true. 
 
AG: … it seems easier said than done. If a creative practitioner was to say, I’m 
really interested in a method of reflection that’d help me understand more about 
my practice, but how do I go about doing that. There is the question of, yeah 
how? I’d like to be able to answer that. Personally I feel my practice is far more 
enjoyable now that I am becoming aware, to a certain degree, of how my 
conceptual ideas are growing out of my material practice, but how do you define 
a method for other to do that? 
 
MJ: Well, we have various ways, and I mean there are various levels of 
explanation, and that’s another thing we have to get our heads around, is that 
there are different conceptions of explanation, for different purposes, and they all 
do the same thing and they’re not reducible one to the other. And so, one of the 
ways we claim to understand is by generalising over phenomena. And so, when 
we do that we use symbols, typically linguistic symbols that are supposed to 
activate concepts for us, and so we try to get some sort of conceptual analysis of 
what’s going on there, and its not a substitute for the activity. It’s a second level 
reflective, interrogation of what was going on in the process, and you know, 
we’re notoriously bad at doing that but we can try. And I think that’s one of the 
things that cognitive scientists do, and so there’s going to be a neural explanation, 
that’s only one level, they’ll be phenomenological explanations, there are 
cognitive linguistic explanations, and so, I think, the point is not to think that the 
reflection on that process is itself the knowledge. It’s one way of understanding 
what’s going on there, but it does not substitute for the doing of it. We know that 
dam well, you know. And so there’s the doing of it and the engagement with 
materials and then there’s reflection on how aspects of these experiences can be 
appropriated as the basis, or lets say how they highlight some of the experiential 
basis for, like the fragility business and how that can be projected metaphorically. 
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And I mean, I think that’s marvellous, I really like that. On one level I don’t see a 
problem and on another I see the problem. We can talk about this using different 
modes of explanation, and each of them is enlightening in its own way relative to 
what you think an explanation has to do. Well, some people say that the purpose 
of explanation is to predict. Well that’s one purpose but that’s not the only value 
we have, one thing is that we want to understand something, well what does it 
mean to understand, and then you have to go into that. And so there are different 
ways to approach the experience of making. I mean your understanding of where 
this whole approach is coming from and how it works, I think you ought to feel 
quite confident about that, and there’s lots of good work emerging. 
 
AG: I think the development of practice-based and practice-led research over the 
last 15 years has encouraged creative practitioners to take responsibility for the 
theorization of creative practice, and I think that’s encouraging. There a definitely 
benefits, insights that creative practitioners can share. Certainly your work has 
been central for the last five years, also Gaston Bachelard and I’m looking at Mark 
Turner and his work on conceptual blending… 
 
MJ: And you might think about Raymond Gibbs, Psychologist, he’s got this new 
book out on Embodied cognition and it’s very interesting. He’s a person I’m 
enthusiastic about because he comes at it from the point of view of the 
psychologist. 
 
AG: Excellent. I’d like to thank you very much for your time and insight. 
 
MJ: I’m sorry we didn’t have more time. 
 
AG: It’s been a privilege.  
 
MJ: So, if this develops keep in touch. Tell me what’s coming out of this. But what 
you’ve done here, the way you’ve laid it out, you know, what you showed me, 
was very clear, and you know it shows how there can be metaphorical mapping 
between each domain. I think that’s exactly what you need to do, you have to be 
specific about it and you have to show for example, how some experience of 
physical fragility can get articulated in terms of psychological fragility, or 
existential fragility, or emotional fragility, or things like that. And I also admire 
you for being able to balance those stones. There was one there that looked 
impossible, I mean it couldn’t possibly be. I mean there had to be a little nick in 
that one stone. Absolutely amazing, I love it. 
 
AG: Thank you very much Mark. 
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5. Interview with Dr Linda Lehrhaupt 
 
Linda Lehrhaupt, Ph.D. is the Founder and Director of the Institute for 
Mindfulness-Based Approaches. She began teaching Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction (MBSR) in 1993 and has been training MBSR & MBCT teachers since 
2002. She is certified from the Center for Mindfulness (CFM). She is the Co-
Author of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction: An MBSR Course Book (2014). 
 
Linda Lehrhaupt: I did read [your email] very briefly about all this and that and one 
thing or another-- just fire away and we'll see what happens. 
 
Andrew Gray: Again all the theoretical stuff that surrounds it is all very dry. I was very 
excited to speak with you because it would give a little bit of color, a bit of personality 
to this theme. 
 
LL: I am an academic too. I have a PhD behind my name so I know what it is. I 
understand the necessity but I will answer your questions as best as I can and then we'll 
see what happens. 
 
AG: In terms of the questions I wanted to keep it fairly open and I'm more than happy 
for it to be a more open conversation really just to get your experiences of mindfulness-
based approaches and your experiences of teaching them. There are a few formal 
questions that we can use to kick us off and see where we go from there.  
 
LL: Can I just ask you, what are you doing at PhD in? What subject was it? 
 
AG: It's visual arts actually. It hasn't taken the form of visual arts in terms of a practice-
based submission, but it's practice-led research in a sense that I am a visual artist and 
there's been a drive in recent years to have practitioners theorizing practice as opposed 
to leaving it up to theorists. 
 
LL: You need to talk to my husband. He attended the Düsseldorf Art Academy. He 
graduated in the late 1970s with an equivalent of an MFA in Fine Arts. He was studying 
at the time with these very famous people like-- you may know them in German - 
Katharina Fritsch and Thomas Schütte. They were all together as students. We even 
have student pieces from these people that today are very famous.  
 
AG: Did he continue as a practitioner? 
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LL: He did in the sense that he decided to study landscape architecture. So, after he left 
the academy he was working for a bit as an artist. Then he felt that he wanted to bring 
his art into landscape architecture. In 1985 he began studying landscape architecture 
and for over 25 years, he's worked as a landscape architect bringing also art into the 
garden. Here at La Matilde when you come you will see that there's a lot of land art 
and he's continuing to develop that. He does paint, he paints a lot on his iPad now. He 
really discovered the iPad. He's done some landscape things and stuff but he became 
really involved in landscape architecture. Again that's for him applied art. We just 
learned art. I think it's best you talk to him about it and he is a bit intellectual so 
[chuckles] he is very different from me. That might satisfy your intellectual. But he 
doesn't practice mindfulness so I can't connect you with him about that. 
 
AG: I look forward to speaking with him very much. In terms of the PhD and the 
background of what am doing there. There were a series of theories that came out 
about how practitioners, whether they are teachers or psychologists or town planners 
or whatever, reflect in action. These theories were— 
 
LL: Can I ask you a question? What do you mean by practitioners? 
 
AG: People who practice. 
 
LL: Practice what? 
 
AG: For example, you would be a practitioner in terms of that you are a teacher of 
mindfulness-based approaches. 
 
LL: So you're using the word "practitioner" to describe people who actually do 
something, rather than theorize about it or write about it. 
 
AG: Indeed. This was a theory about how practitioners reflect in action. It was very well 
received in education. It was very well received in psychology and other disciplines. It 
began to be used in visual art practice. It became institutionalized in education, and 
there was a drive to have students take courses in being reflective practitioners to 
create a generation of practitioners who will be reflective. There was some concern 
about it being used in visual arts. It seemed to be applicable to design practice. But in 
creative production, in art practice, there were a number of things which I felt didn't fit. 
Schön talked about practitioners having a ‘reflective conversation with the situation’. 
That they reframe situations and by doing that they are able to improve their practices. 
In creative practice, that kind or reflective conversation doesn't really happen, or it 
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happens in non verbal level. I have been attempting to improve his practice by doing a 
narrative review by bringing another set of theories to bear upon his theory in an 
attempt to expand it. These theories concern the embodied mind, which have been 
coming out of cognitive science over the last 20 years or so. One of cognitive scientist 
whose work has recently become central to my thesis, is a guy called Varela. He has 
very much advocated that there's the methodological— 
 
LL: What's his name? 
 
AG: Francisco Varela. 
 
LL: He's one of the founders of the Mind and Life Institute. You're talking about the 
scientist from Paris, Francisco Varela? 
 
AG: Yes, indeed and worked together with Humberto Maturana. 
 
LL: But he was also very important in the founding of the Mind and Life Institute, 
together with the other people, that launched the whole scientific exploration of 
mindfulness that's been going on now for the last 20, 25 years in a very strong way. But 
he died of something. So you're using Francisco Varela's theories? 
 
AG: Yes, and he considered that the methodological heart of looking at how reflection 
could be used to analyze experience was to bring together cognitive science, 
mindfulness meditation, and phenomenological reflection. So with the 
phenomenological reflection and the cognitive science side of things, what Varela 
called neurophenomenology, I have a lot of academic material that I can draw upon, 
but the mindfulness-based approaches, these are things which are now new to me, but 
something that I would like to bring into the thesis. So really, I'm just trying to not only 
deal with the academic side of mindfulness, because there is quite a lot of literature out 
there, but to have a conversation with somebody who has been integral in introducing 
it, developing it, teaching it, experiencing it yourself, and to share with you some of 
your thoughts about how you think it can be applied, how it's being applied.  
We could start with the three primary components in the eight-week course that 
Kabat-Zinn developed that were being used. Those three were the theoretical materials 
on relaxation, and body-mind connections. The experiential practice of that, and then 
the group processes and the problem-solving relating to impediments of effective 
practice. What are those theoretical materials relating to relaxation and the mind body 
connections to you as a teacher? 
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LL: The first important thing is that MBSR has nothing to do with relaxation. 
Mindfulness has nothing to do with trying to induce a state of relaxation, because that 
is actually often the mind state or state of awareness that will be present in a relaxation 
is not the same as a mindful state. MBSR is a skills training in training people to practice 
and cultivate mindful attention. If people come expecting to relax, they're actually 
looking for a different kind of state, which is nice, but it has nothing to do with 
cultivating the kind of the skills and things that they'll need to be able to engage in 
mindful reflection about their life, and also to be able to cultivate a stance of non-
judgmental awareness about the things in their life. So, I would be careful about using 
the word "relaxation." We never use the word. We never say that mindful-based 
programs are relaxation programs. They are not. They are awareness training programs. 
Now, someone as a result of doing an exercise may experience relaxation, but that is 
not our pedagogic intention. Furthermore, we also have to work a lot with-- because 
what practitioners-- what students mean by "relaxation" is what often could be 
described as they just want to zone out. They don't really want to be in contact with 
their physical sensations, with their emotions, with what we call the four foundations 
of mindfulness. You should look into reading a little bit about the four foundations of 
mindfulness, which is mindfulness of the body, of the breast, of emotions and thoughts 
and of mind states. 
 
AG: The word relaxation was perhaps a bit misleading. In the psychological papers I was 
reading they did state very clearly that there was an eight-week program that was 
conducted in the clinical area with cancer patients. It was based on the MBSR. Perhaps 
they had included a few things the MBSR don't. But in terms of mind-body 
connections, that's something very much that you would be looking to cultivate and 
the people taking the course. 
 
LL: Of course, but even the terminology mind-body connection is a misnomer, if you 
really want to get into it. This is a terminology that was developed out of this Cartesian 
idea about mind and body, as if they're separate. From the perspective of mindfulness, 
mind and body are not separate. 
 
AG: That's supported by all the theories of embodied mind of which Varela is very much 
a part. 
 
LL: Yes, of course. Remember, mindfulness-based stress reduction is a stress reduction 
program. So, one of the theoretical aspects of it is how could the practice of 
mindfulness help people to reduce stress? It has to do with both the Lazarus and his 
theories of stress. I always explain it very simply to my students.  It's not the situation 
or the event or the person that causes us to experience stress. It is our perception of the 
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event. If we can shift how we perceive a situation or people or whatever, then we can 
also shift our relationship to it and it will not cause stress in the way it might normally 
do. But in order to be able to shift ones perspective, one has to first be aware of what 
one is experiencing and what one is thinking. One has to be in touch-- there are 
naturally automatic reactions that we may experience in a particular situation. But for 
example, if we can see – let’s say someone says something to us and our heart is beating 
faster, we might break out in chills. There may be all sorts of physical reactions that are 
showing us we may experience tightness of chest or something gets caught into our 
throat, and we begin to recognize these as, "Oh, okay, I'm experiencing stress." 
Normally, the stress reaction is so automatic that there's no way of intervening. But if 
we begin to attune in to ourselves, in the mind-body connection, if we attune more to 
our states of emotions or the thoughts that are going in on our mind, we can begin to 
for example, on a thought level, we can question something. We can say, "Well, is this 
person really meaning to insult me? Maybe I'm taking this too personal. Maybe this has 
nothing to do with me." This is a way of then, through mindfulness, through being 
aware that one can, so to speak, have a certain objective distance. Is what I'm saying 
helpful to you, or do you already know this? 
 
AG: Absolutely. I think the stress reduction side of mindfulness-based approaches is 
very interesting. It provides very visceral examples of what mindfulness is. Perhaps the 
focus, in some ways, should be on the mindfulness-based approaches, generally. As you 
are no doubt aware, the field is really taking off at the moment. It's not just 
mindfulness-based stress reduction. You also have mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy. You have now in education mindful-based reflective practice. There's a whole 
host of other things that are beginning with mindfulness-based. In terms of your 
institution, it's mindfulness-based approaches. I wonder whether you could expand on 
mindfulness generally without it being specifically applicable to stress reduction or 
anything else for that matter, but people's lives in general. Then we can discuss how it 
might be applied to other fields and how you feel about that also. 
 
LL: The definition of mindfulness that I work with is basically the one Jon Kabat-Zinn 
and basically everybody else bases their definition on. Mindfulness is a kind of 
awareness that happens when we pay attention on purpose in the present moment, 
non-judgmentally. 
 
AG: Indeed, I've read that. 
 
LL: I memorized this, so this is not mine. It's important to stick with the sources. That is 
quality. It is a state of awareness that results as we pay attention, on purpose, in the 
present moment, non-judgmentally and we've also added the phrase with kindness.  
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AG: I am very interested in discussing what that state actually is. I was interviewing a 
creative practitioner just a few moments ago in New York who had been involved in a 
radio program whose theme was the relationship of mindfulness to visual art practice. I 
was interested in some of his thoughts in relation to that. He describes a space that he 
creates for himself in his art studio that attracts him to go back and continue practicing 
creatively. That state of mind has parallels with being present in the moment. Whether 
I could say it is non-judgmental or not, I don't know, because when I'm working on a 
painting there are judgments being formed about a particular qualities and processes. 
 
LL: There's a difference between-- what you're describing is what I would call 
discernment. In other words, do I use this color paint, or that color paint, or whatever? 
This is, I hate to say it, in Buddhist teaching order in the Abidharma psychology, we are 
teaching-- that is the process of discernment, which allows one to make choices, which 
allows one to work somewhat analytically. But it is not the same as what we mean by 
judgments, which are much more about applying one's likes and dislikes in a way which 
is exclusionary rather than creating a field where one can, let's say, can make choices. 
It's a different kind of mental process. 
 
AG: So do you think that it is possible to be mindful and be practicing creatively? 
 
LL: Absolutely. I'm not an artist in that sense, but I would say... What I also notice a lot 
is that mindfulness for artists... Let me see, that it helps them to expand their range of 
what they take in, what stimulates them that they can use in their art rather than 
being so restricted by what they have done before or whatever. 
 
AG: There seems to be a lot of emphasis on the notion that you can break habitual 
action once you become aware that it is habitual. That sounds to me like something 
that will be very useful for practitioners in terms of methods of reflection in action. We 
are talking about trying to improve one’s practice or trying to become more aware of 
what it is that we doing. 
 
LL: It's definitely interrupting. It's a mindfulness-- the moment we become mindfully 
aware of something, you have gone from what we call auto-pilot to being in direct 
contact sense wise, or mental wise. That often doesn't last very long, but we can 
continually reawaken it and be present with it. So if you're really paying attention to 
how your holding a brush or whatever you're doing or you're playing music and you're 
really allowing that to be very present for you, I can imagine that would allow a whole 
new flow out, as it were, rather than the traditional or habitual thing that you'd be 
doing. We've trained at least five music teachers to be MBSR teachers. Of course, they 
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were more interested in MBSR from the perspective of helping artists who are 
wounded. Either they have suffered injury from excessive playing or whatever - playing 
instruments or whatever, or suffering from the stress of constant performance, and 
things like that. But I can see how it might allow more creativity because people 
become-- by being in the moment, you also become more responsive to the moment. 
You're responsive to whatever is there. 
 
AG: In terms of training for this, there was a comment made by the artist in New York 
who stated that being attentive to his practice was in itself a kind of mindfulness. I 
think that's okay to say but I wonder whether you have any thoughts on whether art 
practice can be considered training for becoming what is conventionally known as 
mindful. There was an example given that I'm sure you've come across. It is the story of 
"Zen in the Art of Archery", where the student fires the arrow perfectly by just coping 
the master's technical ability, this greatly offended the master archer because he hadn't 
arrived at how to fire the arrow himself through a personal process. The artist that I 
was talking to described how his experience of practice has cultivated a state of 
mindfulness that has been nurtured over a period of 20 years of practice, but he is also 
a teacher. When working with first year students taking studio drawing as an elective 
often for the first time, he works to get them to focus solely on the task for the two-
hour duration of the class, to put their phones aside and just focus. If one can be 
mindful during art practice and indeed, if art practice can be considered a form of 
mindfulness, the question remains as to whether some of his young students to get 
into that state? Is mindfulness a state that only years of practice can develop or would 
it be beneficial for students starting university to take a course in mindfulness. 
 
LL: I think it would be fantastic. Mindfulness-based awareness programs are being 
integrated into medical schools, into nursing schools, into teacher training programs to 
train school teachers. It's being used in the police. It's being used in the military. It's 
actually, across the board now. There are programs of mindfulness training in many 
professions because it's seen to be very helpful not only for stress but also for making 
people more attuned to what's going on. For example, in some professions they've 
noticed there's better teamwork that results, there's less injuries that result. People 
become more skillful with how they work with their bodies in a difficult situation. For 
example, they trained firemen and policemen and emergency room workers in 
mindfulness, and found improvement in these things I just mentioned. It tends to 
loosen ones-- one becomes aware of oneself, not as an isolated phenomenon, but in 
relationship to others and to things. 
 
AG: Could you expand upon some of the specific techniques, I've been talking about it 
quite abstractly. Say that we move on to try to introduce a course and how one trains 
people who have never considered themself to be mindful, to become so. 
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LL: We all have experiences in our life when we have been spontaneously mindful 
without necessarily being aware of it, usually in situations that call us to be very 
present, for example, a birth or a death, or that kind of situation where we're moment-
to-moment. Just really going with what's happening. But let's say when a cook, when a 
master chef or even someone's who's really paying attention to how they're cutting the 
vegetables and how they-- and they feel the knife as if it's part of their body and there's 
no separation between them and what they're doing. That doesn't mean that they lose 
the aware-- they don't lose themselves as so much that they lose their sense of their 
personality or their thoughts. But there is a very, very strong sensual sense of what's 
going on. So, the first— 
 
AG: That sounds like it has a lot of parallels with creative practice, the knife could be 
my paint brush. 
 
LL: I'm sure it does. What's happening is that-- look, there's not too many things that 
are new under the sun. The different disciplines are basically talking about the same 
thing. 
 
AG: Yes. I agree. 
 
LL: But, they're just using different terminology, and everybody's trying to create their 
new theory. Everybody's trying to create their whatever that gets discussed for a while. 
Yes. Are there descriptions of mindfulness in other terms that never use the word 
mindfulness, but nevertheless are talking about mindfulness? Of course. The way that 
we train-- the preliminary training and one of the central trainings to training 
mindfulness is what we call Mindfulness of Breathing. We direct students to become 
aware, first of all, of the physical sensations of breathing. Breath flowing into the body, 
flowing out of the body, and we ask them to find a point on their body where they feel, 
where they sense the breath most directly. That could be in the belly area, that could be 
in the chest area or it could be under the nostrils, under the nose. We ask them not to 
think about breathing, as much as they can actually feel the physical sensations. What 
of course happens is people can perhaps be really in touch with the breath for maybe 
two seconds. Then what they notice is that their mind beings to drift. They're no longer 
actually in contact with the sensations but they're planning or they're remembering or 
the mind is busy, or they're thinking various thoughts. Visual artists - people in the arts 
- tend to think in terms of pictures much more. But from the prospective of 
mindfulness, pictures are mental activities, that tend to also take us way from the 
direct physical sensation of what is going on in the moment, which is in this case 
breathing. So we teach people, we gave them the instruction that when you notice that 
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you are no longer present with the breath, you are no longer sensing your physical 
sensations, then first of all notice that you have drifted away, and then with the 
conscious intention turn your attention, bring your awareness back to the physical 
sensations of breathing and sense next in breath and next out breath. And people 
practice with that. That the mind drifts off, it may drift off a hundred times in two 
minutes, or five minutes. That's not unusual. What we're doing, we talk about 
mindfulness as being a muscle. Just like when you go into a fitness studio, you can't 
expect with the very first pumping iron, that you're going to be strong and fit, you 
have to slowly train the muscle of mindfulness. To begin with, it might just be for a 
second or two that you can really be present. But as time goes on, you can develop 
longer periods of being mindful. Now, there's a difference between mindfulness and 
concentration. That's important. Concentration, for example-- I'll illustrate the 
difference. Let's say, you're concentrating on your breath. You're really concentrating 
on your breath and then, you become aware of a thought, or you hear a sound, or you 
smell something in the air, you would have the sense that your concentration has been 
disturbed, and there would be a sense that one has to push out everything, and nothing 
should be there except simply the breath. In mindfulness practice, there is no such thing 
as a disturbance. Rather, it's more about things being in the foreground and in the 
background. For example, in the foreground of our awareness is mindfulness of 
breathing, and maybe 80 or 90% of our awareness is with the mindfulness of 
breathing, and then there may be is an awareness of a sound or this and that or 
whatever. We can let that be in the background and still maintain our focus on what's 
on the foreground. But what's in the background is not disturbing, it's not experienced 
as disturbing. 
 
AG: That then would become a more advanced level of the capacity to be mindful. 
Albeit that mindfulness is considered an inherent human capacity. But you can take 
that heightened or improved capacity to mindful out into your daily activity. 
 
LL: Absolutely, it's a tool. It's not esoteric bullshit. Mindfulness is a mental tool that we 
can use in any aspect of our life. The problem is, I have to tell you this also, that most of 
the people that are writing about mindfulness have never practiced. A lot of people 
who are writing have not practiced. I got news for you, I know some people who have 
written books on mindfulness who personally do not practice. You can create a whole 
world in your mind. What you're doing now is looking for all these mental connections 
and you're doing a practice which is based on comparing various things of what you 
heard, and trying to make bridges between them. And that's fine, but it is completely 
mental. 
 
AG: I'm very conscious of that. 
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LL: I'm not being critical, I'm just saying what it is. If you would practice yourself 
mindfulness, even if you practice mindfulness of breathing for a little bit, you would 
even, in that short session begin to see what is going on.  
 
AG: I looked to the website that you recommended to me, Inside LA, and did the few of 
the guided meditations to get a feel of it before we had our conversation. 
 
LL: That's cool. That's very good. 
 
AG: Again I think I certainly need to be very aware of the fact that I'm writing about 
this without having a lot of experience of formal mindfulness training. I am however 
interested in the idea that visual art practice can in itself be a form of mindfulness. In 
this sense I could consider myself to be quite experienced. I refer to your example of the 
chef with a knife, which could be in my case a painter with a brush. I would like to 
share with you one particular experience that I’m not sure qualifies as mindfulness. I'm 
curious as to your thoughts on what kind of states this is as it may help to clarify what 
is distinct about mindfulness in creative practice.  
 
LL: It's okay. Just do it. 
 
AG: A couple of years ago, I was doing a documentary about a sculptor on a lake in 
Switzerland. I was preparing to film him in a studio that day but he had been delayed 
and I had to wait around for a few hours. Now, one of the things that I've done as an 
addition to painting in my studio is to balance stones. It's something that I can do 
outside where I don't need any tools or materials. It's just a pile of stones that I find and 
will balance them upon very fine points and it's something that I found very beautiful 
to do. So on this day I had a few hours to spare and it was a beautiful, hot summer day 
and I went down to the lake and started to balance stones in the water. I had the 
cameras with me because I was ready to film the sculptor, so I set the camera running 
and filmed myself getting into the lake and balancing the stones instead. Now, it's a 
very interesting activity - balancing stones in water - because all of the visual clues are 
completely thrown. The water is moving around you, you cannot get a sense of 
verticality. You have to balance the stones purely by sensory means. It is just from the 
felt sensation of where the stone is falling and the state of-- it's not really 
concentrating on the breath, but you are incredibly focused-- you are in the moment in 
terms of dealing with the fine motor control and nuances of where the stone is moving. 
Unknown to me there was a group of swans that came around in front of me and they 
were observing what I was doing. I was completely oblivious to them until one of them 
made a hiss and I jumped back and dropped the stone. All of this of course was captured 
on camera, which was quite amusing in a sense to review it, but it was the first time 
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that I had seen myself practicing in which I was so completely absorbed on the activity 
that I was unaware that the swans were around me. The state is as it is. It's a state that 
I enjoy to be in and it's a natural consequence of balancing stones if you like. But it's 
curious for me just to what that state is and I don't want to mislabel it. I don't want to 
call it mindfulness when it isn't. 
 
LL: I'm not sure it is mindfulness because-- let me give you an example. I think it's the 
state of absorption of being very absorbed. I would say it was probably an extremely 
concentrated state, a state of concentration because one of the differences between 
mindfulness and concentration-- let's say we're meditating and we are sitting and 
practicing mindfulness and there is a certain sound like a car that fires. When you jump 
and are startled and whatever, you are not in a mindful state. You're in a very 
concentrated state, but it's not the same as mindful, although in the language that’s 
being used now in the general public, they are saying one is very mindful. It is not the 
same, because if you were being very mindful you wouldn't be disturbed. You wouldn't 
jump up in alarm because you're not a 100% focused on something. Most of your 
attention is with it, but it is also not excluding. Concentration tends to be exclusionary. 
It focuses on one thing and excludes everything else. That’s not really the case in 
mindfulness, because mindfulness, this is a quality I think that's important at least from 
my perspective because the other important thing about mindfulness is that if we are 
shutting out things, then we can't be aware of them. We can't be aware of them in a 
sense that they may support us or help us in negotiating our daily life. So, I don't know 
if you want to explore the difference between what is concentration and what is 
mindfulness. You can look at that in your own terms and see if that fits. I would say 
that when you describe that you suddenly-- through the hiss of the swan, you suddenly 
became aware of them, that you were in an extremely concentrated state, or in a state 
of absorption, but not necessarily mindful. Not from the background that I'm operating 
- my theoretical perspective. I think that the word mindful is being used now in such a 
wide way and I think that sometimes people may be talking about concentration and 
not mindfulness. 
 
AG: That's a very interesting point. Thank you for sharing that insight. 
 
LL: There's also something interesting. I always think of this experiment, and this might 
also be interesting to you in terms of your work. I'll give you the little test. Some time 
ago they are measuring all these people with electrodes to see what happens in the 
brain. What lights up when they feel sad and what lights up when they feel happy and 
things like that. They decided to test two groups of people. One was a group of 
extremely experienced monks who've practiced Zen meditation for many years. The 
other was a group of students who received a one-week introduction or something to 
meditation training. What they did was to measure the brain waves of both these 
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groups in response to sudden noises of things. So, both of the groups would be sitting 
and then they would introduce sounds at various periods. So, at the end of the 
experiment, one group showed on their EEGs or whatever they were a continual-- 
every time there was a sound there would be a huge spike going up. The other group, 
to begin with, they would have the same high increase, but as time went on these 
spikes would become less. 
 
AG: The question is which group was— 
 
LL: Which group was which? Don't think about it, just answer spontaneously. 
 
AG: I would say the monks continued having the same reaction to the sounds, because 
they were mindful of what was happening in each moment. 
 
LL: You are informed, but you know the answer most people give is the opposite way 
round. You are right. The monks don’t become habitualized to the sound. They are 
mindful of each successive experience as if for the first time. That is where the training 
comes in. 
 
AG: I think it would be extremely beneficial in developing the reflective methods used 
in creative practice, to train the practitioner’s inherent capacity for mindfulness. To the 
degree that mindfulness training might enable practitioners to be more responsive to 
the immediate moment-by-moment perceptions of practice, more attentive to 
habitualistic aspects of their practice, more aware of how the physical qualities of 
making help shape the way they think about and describe their work. I find it very 
interesting the distinctions you made between being deeply concentrated and being 
mindful. I think periods of deep concentration are certainly necessary for certain 
aspects of the process of creative making but perhaps visual arts practitioners are too 
concentrated at times and miss the opportunity to be mindful and aware of phenomena 
that could enrich their understanding of practice. 
This has been an illuminating discussion Linda, I’d like to thank you for your thoughts. 
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6. Interview with Professor Michael Rodriguez 
 
Interview with Prof Michael Rodriguez currently Chair of the Humanities 
Department addressing mindfulness in visual art practice.  
 
AG: In the radio show about mindfulness in art the context was coming out of 
educational theory and you were being asked to discuss that as a department of 
tutors. Prior to this radio show had you ever considered mindfulness in the context 
of you work at all? 
 
MR: Certainly the center for learning here was interested in mindfulness and 
learning but for my purposes during the radio show I was really talking primarily 
about mindfulness in the arts in my studio practice.  For me mindfulness is really a 
by product of studio practice, or the goal of studio practice but I haven't really done 
a lot of research or work into mindfulness in terms of education or how it would 
benefit students. 
 
AG: In terms of your own studio practice before the radio show, had you ever 
considered the notion of mindfulness before? 
 
MR: Absolutely. I don't know if I always would have used that term. I actually 
would think of it in terms of consciousness and awareness. For me the meaning of 
the work really has to happen in the studio, the meaning has to happen in the act of 
doing. The studio practice and what I get out of that focus, and that kind of paying 
attention really is a reward for me. The work functions on two levels in terms of 
meaning. It's related to process art and "geometric abstraction" and the history of 
abstraction, but it's also tied into this notion of the process being pictured. 
There's  a process that's pictured, and there's a process that's related to process art. 
There's that interest in abstraction but then also pictorial quality. My work is really 
this aggregate of simple marks - very simple marks, very simple gestures that are 
almost mechanical in nature, that accumulate over time and results in this form. 
This process results in this form, which is somewhat analogous to natural processes, 
but I'm not an illustrator. 
 
AG: I happened to see one image that was displayed along with one of your 
profiles. It had a very light background and was quite linear in the sense that it 
went horizontally across the image. There was a repetition in the patterning, as you 
said, that was the mechanical process in there. But there was also a spike, almost 
like an adrenaline spike or a sound-wave spike or something. I happen to be a fan of 
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dribbly paint myself, which caught my attention. From the image it was quite 
difficult to see what media you were working in, whether you are dealing in 
ceramics or were doing it digitally or you're painting onto the paper. 
 
MR: No, it's all a matt acrylic on canvas. I flock rayon fibers. So, I use a really 
smooth canvas and I use this smooth map paint and some of the gestures or 
negative spaces are actually like velvet. They are like soy. The flocking technique, 
which is used for screen-printing. Imagine a velvet wallpaper or raised print on a t-
shirt. All of these very light absorbing surfaces trying to create seductive surface 
that really needs to be seen in person. So I really want to root the viewer in the 
moment and drill them in physically by the experience, because sometimes it's not 
obvious what the surface is, but it definitely has the visual quality because of the 
rayon fibers to get the slide velvet, which doesn't quite look like acrylic paint. So, 
that seductive surface to draw you in so that hopefully, it causes the viewers to 
slow down and actually pay attention and look for a moment. I'm interested in a 
long, engaging read as opposed to a quick read. 
 
AG: The qualities of the surface are something, which engages me in very often far 
more than the composition of the image or even the subject matter of the painting, 
the actual surface qualities. There are a number of things that we can say about 
that. There's one question that I had, though, on this. I'm happy for this to take the 
form of a dialogue between two people who are both practitioners and both think 
about mindfulness in terms of their work. Perhaps between us we can come to a 
deeper understanding, I don't know. In the research that I've been doing about 
mindfulness, it talks about being present - attendant - at the moment, being aware 
of what is going on both in you and around you in a successive progression of 
moment-by-moment perceptions. Sometimes, they talk about a mindlessness, 
which is when you engage in habitual action. To what degree is the mechanical 
process of working on a surface, mindful or habitual? 
 
MR: When I do drawings on paper as well as when I'm working on a canvas, I very 
much like the idea of concentrating on something that is really, really metric, doing 
some simple cross-hatching. I create these spheres using a very short pen that starts 
off with a certain geometry. I imagine Bucky balls, Buckminster Fuller. But I very 
much like this idea on concentrating on something that is almost inconsequential, 
whether I'm concentrating on applying color in a negative space, very exact. So, it's 
always this balance between being very mechanical and specific without being 
overly mechanical. I'm not interested in perfection, by any standard. I'm much more 
interested in the perturbations that happen, the quirks that happen, again 
analogous to a natural process, whether it's cell division or something that happens 
in nature on occasion. You get these things that-- we could call them deformities or 
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whatever. But I do very much like this face of concentrating on what I'm doing, not 
clouded by an outside goal as, say, if you're painting a portrait or something 
representational, you're very aware of, is it accurate? I like working on an 
abstraction because... Also I'm not always successful. Some days I'm more focused 
than others. Some days I'm more mindful than others. I go into the studio and I 
can't always just flip a light switch on and suddenly become completely engaged. 
Also making intuitive decisions, some days I'm probably better than others but 
that's the goal. 
 
AG: It's an interesting thing that within a lot of fields where mindfulness is being 
considered a useful practice particularly in the clinical area and in psychology and 
things like this, you have an end goal for people that they eventually are able to 
break habitual action, become more aware of what they are doing as they are doing 
it, and eventually become more creative. It's interesting. Where does that place a 
creative practitioner then? Are we actually just through the practice of many, many 
years of experimentation and experiential experience and practice further along 
that continuum somehow? I get from what you are saying that even though the 
process can be mechanical, it's not that habitual action. It's not a mechanical 
thought process. You are very much conscious of every moment, the moment-by-
moment perception by placing, and the qualities of the things they are placing. In 
that respect it can be very much considered a mindful action. I think of an example 
from my own practice and something that I've done, not that it's integral to my 
studio practice but just something that I can do when I'm outside, when I have no 
tools or material and there just happens to be a pile of stones around then I'll stop 
to balance them. I'm sure you've seen these kinds of structures around. A couple of 
years ago, I was doing a series of interviews with a sculptor by a lake in Switzerland. 
Whilst I was waiting for him to be prepared, I went into the lake and started 
balancing stones in the lake. I was filming myself doing this because I had the 
camera ready to film him. When I looked-- there was a moment that stayed with 
me. I balanced one stone underneath the surface of the lake and was trying to 
balance the stone on top of it. The visual cues are all thrown because the water is 
moving around and so you could only go on the sense perception of the feeling. 
Whilst I was doing this, it was a whole bunch of swans that came around. I was 
completely oblivious to them until one of them let out the [inaudible]. I freaked 
out, dropped the stone, and went back. It was like a little movie that you could put 
on Who's Been Framed or something. It's like a little shock moment. What it did 
relate to me was the-- I was seeing myself from the outside for the first time 
completely engaged in the moment, so focused on the feeling of the stone and the 
balance that I was completely oblivious to everything that was around me. On one 
hand in the interview you mentioned that the process is its own kind of 
mindfulness. I do believe that that experience is in some way analogous to some 
meditative state. But at the same time it smacks of being oblivious to the things 
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that are around you. It's a strange liminal space between being mindful and being 
completely unmindful that I'm trying to think about. 
 
MR: That's a hard space to get to. It's not so easily accessible because you do-- I'm 
doing something very specific so I have to clearly pay attention, but when what I'm 
paying attention to can be very specific and simple. So it's not meditative in the 
sense of-- I have limited experience with meditation but it is something that you 
have to constantly-- you find yourself drifting away, go back pay attention. When I 
teach drawing or painting, one of my goals is to get the students-- if I can get my 
students to concentrate and draw in a two-hour block, it's a major accomplishment 
to get them to slow down, put their football away, and I tell them. I say, "You may 
never draw again in your life. You may never spend two hours, three hours drawing 
again." I like to urge them that if they can develop this skill, it may help them in 
their other studies, whether it's getting through a text, getting through a paper or 
assignment. So, I like to think that when I'm teaching beginning drawing, I'm 
introducing them to the ability to create mindfulness, to really stay focused. They 
do a really good job, lot of them really get into it. I put on some ambiance, music, 
maybe some early Brian Eno or something, ambient techno-pop music just to get 
them out of their normal frame of reference and get them really focused for a 
couple of hours. I think that's a major accomplishment. 
AG: It is. I've never done any formal meditation. I find the notion of sitting on my 
knees for any more than 30 seconds problematic. At the same time, I can quite 
happily work for ten hours in the studio. Whilst my wife has done yoga and Zen 
and the rest of it, we've often spoken about it and she agrees that I don't really 
need to do that because I already engage in that space. There might be some people 
that would contest that notion quite vehemently. I have spoken with many creative 
practitioners for whom just an hour in the studio, they might as well do nothing 
and just clean up. They need that elongated engagement in order to do what they 
do. You're right in the sense that, how many people do have these prolonged 
periods of time where they are completely focused on an activity? I think that the 
full consequences of how that can be beneficial hasn't really been realized yet. 
 
MR: I've learned to be disciplined with my time, because there are moments where I 
only have two or three hours in the studio and I need to be productive. Certainly, 
having a full day in the studio is really critical. Because of the demands of my family 
and the academic career, I find myself working say, from 10:00 to 3:00 during the 
day or something like that. But I'm going on sabbatical in September. I'm really 
looking forward to having uninterrupted time - nothing to do. I've had periods of 
my life where I haven't had a job or I've been able to be in my studio, be it in sales 
or whatever. Something I always tell my students in terms of-- I always tell them 
that - you probably know the quote - inspiration is for amateurs. It's really about 
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this ability to be disciplined and to be focused. I think I'm getting better at-- if I only 
have two hours to get in there and get to work and focus, because the real 
tendency is to sharpen all your pencils, sweep the studio, put your paints in order 
and read a little bit of the newspaper. But I think it's also viable too, just to look and 
you get away from the work for a while, come back and just look. 
 
AG: There is another state where you-- sometimes I'm trying to go forward with 
the next stage of the process and just sitting down and allowing the surface 
qualities of the painting to swim in front of my eyes and find that my eyes are 
going from one thing to another, not really having an inner verbal dialog, but 
allowing these things to ferment and crystallize. That's also a very focused state 
when you are just looking at the work like that. I wonder if I can move to another 
theme, which is related but also something that I'd be quite interested to hear your 
thoughts on. It's something that you alluded to earlier in the sense that there is a 
sense that the students, if they can attain this level of concentration and be able to 
put things aside and work for two hours, that, that might be beneficial to them and 
in other classes and things. It goes a step further to talk about how meaning comes 
out of the work. In the theories of embodied mind, there is one particular theorist 
who I'm not sure whether you're familiar with his work, Mark Johnson and George 
Lakoff, who've been operating across the linguistic philosophy crossover. Over the 
last 30 years of infant studies researchers have been looking at how infants have 
meaning before they have language. I presume you're a father and you've seen that 
evident in your offspring that they clearly have meaning before they have 
language. Gottlob Frege who is the godfather of analytical philosophy suggested 
that human meaning is irreducible beyond concepts and prepositions. That really 
stood for a long time until it's been questioned by these theories of embodied mind 
that are challenging western thought and saying that actually human meaning 
traffics its images and qualities, patterns, feelings before it emerges into language. 
As human beings, we abstract from the concrete and there's a whole series of ideas 
about how we do that in terms of metaphorical projection and conceptual blending 
and ideas like these. For me the purpose of becoming mindful in practice is to 
become attentive to the way in which the meaning is growing out of the work. It 
seems to me that with a lot of the practitioners that I've spoken to and interviewed 
that they have a preconception that they know that they're starting from a 
conceptual position. They have an idea of what they want to do. Something 
happens in practice, which they are not really attentive to because they're so 
engaged in practice, and then their ideas at the end of it can sometimes be 
different, but exactly where those ideas came from isn't always clear. To give one 
specific example, a sculptor called Andreas Reichlin that I was interviewing, was 
constructing sculptures out of cylinders. He would take, for example, this big metal 
cylinder and slice it down in two places and invert one section so that the inside 
part of the cylinder was now facing outside. It formed quite a beautiful, elegant 
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curve. When talking to him about his conceptual ideas he describes it as revealing 
the inner soul outside to the world. It's not a huge intellectual leap to see how the 
concrete qualities of the object have been mapped metaphorically onto the 
conceptual ideas of something as abstract as a human soul, whatever that maybe to 
him. There are other notions of where he had not just taken a whole circle but 
constructed more than the circle and this was two people together in a relationship 
that is more than 360 degrees. There was this mapping of concrete elements onto 
abstract domains. It's like a chicken and egg conversation to say we know which 
one came first. For me, in the interviews and the documentary was evidence that 
the ideas were growing out of the work and becoming conceptually embedded and 
solid. I'm aware that you're being very patient and listening to me trying to get to 
my question here. For me, it's a recurring theme that is very important in my 
research that creative practitioners become attendant to the embodied nature of 
practice and to know that their embodied experience of practice is impacting on 
their understanding of the practice. I wondered whether as somebody who had 
considered mindfulness in practice whether it's ever had that function for you or 
whether you consider the qualities of your-- you talked about the velvety quality of 
the work and how that's sensual. It suggests to me an understanding of the 
embodied understanding of that quality, whether you had anything that you could 
comment on that. 
 
MR: Your point is well put in there. I don't go to work with this fixed notion of 
meaning necessarily that-- I think a lot of my ideas about the meaning of the work 
come after the execution of the work and reading into it. Reading into the patterns 
and the color all those things. There's an element of my work that I consider related 
to semiotics or how one reads a painting. But I'm also very much interested in this 
Shamanic notion of the artist too in bringing elements of almost memory from a 
visionary experience and alluding to that as a valuable space. I think it has value in 
that. I think it relates to my influence, this notion that Shamanic visionary space 
being brought into the process without being-- again, I'm not interested in 
illustration or I'm not interested in creating "Shamanic" art, because I think 
ultimately my work ends up being a little hemmed in by  formal considerations of 
painting. But as I work more and more this way I do find that I am now a little more 
aware of what I'm doing in terms of meaning than in the past. I, partly through 
process, stumbled into things that alluded to certain processes, whether it's like 
alluding to a simplistic notion of algorithms or process or alluding to a visionary 
space or all these things. I am always trying to disrupt my own-- I always try to 
throw myself curve balls or to disrupt my own preconceived-- I don't want to know 
what I'm doing precisely. I don't want to know what I'm doing and why I am doing 
it. I don't want to just crank them out. I know we make certain paintings, I know 
we do certain things. I don't have one foot in the unknown and one foot in the 
known and it's not really important for me to do. 
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AG: That's the sentiment that I've heard echoed a number of times with-- 
something that I feel has got great validity for a practitioner's and experience. 
 
MR: I know how to do certain kinds of paintings and I could coast and make those 
paintings but that's not what draws me to it. I'm drawn to a little bit of struggle, a 
little bit of-- I feel like I've been trying to make the same painting my whole life. I 
just can't get it right. I guess I don't want to get it right. I don't know what that 
would be anyway. 
 
AG: If you were to analyze that a little further and say that there is pattern 
repetition when you-- and I'm only going off one painting that I've seen. It has this 
linear formation across the canvas and you have the sense that it started before the 
canvas and it's continuing beyond the surface of the cameras very much probably 
onto the next one and the next one. You could say that the painting you've been 
doing your whole life is just one big one that's cutting the [?] I don't know about. 
To try to analyze your thought process, would you say that it's too simplistic to say 
that, through the process of doing patterns, you became interested in ideas of 
pattern recognition such as memory is a kind of pattern recognition. When you 
talked about that there is like a sense of memory in the work which can be regarded 
as the recall of neurochemical patterns, is it a conceptual interest in memory and 
pattern that makes you want to create these patterns or is it that through the 
process of engaging and creating patterns that these ideas  grow out of it? 
 
MR: It's definitely interest in recognizing pattern or seeing pattern perhaps 
certainly a nature or just through observation, seeing things that may appear rather 
chaotic or complex but seeing pattern in those. But I do think that for the purposes 
of painting, I feel very limited by what I physically can do with these concepts by 
the act of painting, which I feel rather rudimentary. I'm not interested in creating 
computer generated images rooted in chaos theory or that stuff. If I was to start 
getting into that too much, there's machines that could do it far more better than I 
can or-- I'm still rooted in the desire to bring something to fruition out of my own 
intuition and practice. So there's still the rudimentary quality about painting, 
whether it's letting things drip, letting things be very human, not overly 
mechanical. Again, I think it allays a certain-- I hope I'm not getting too off track, 
but is there certain value system where I insist on creating this space for myself to 
do artwork, that's like my own way of resisting consumerism or corporate culture, 
whatever you want to call it. 
 
AG: Then they do- 
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MR: -creating a space that I insist upon having it. 
 
AG: They talk very much about-- sorry I just lost the thread there, but the space 
that you create for yourself. They talk about mindfulness as an inherently human 
quality. It isn't inherently human capacity to be mindful, to be creative. I can only 
say that, yes Michael I agree with you entirely, that for me, why have I being doing 
this since I was 15 years old? Why do I continuously go back to the studio? Because 
I want that space and I want to create that space for myself. Very often the 
products are secondary to the process in that respect. There's one final thing if you 
still have time to speak for a few more moments. 
 
MR: Yes, I do. 
 
AG: The idea of it being beneficial to students to experience this space that we 
create for ourselves, whether it's just in the very simplistic level of having a two 
hour drawing class, or whether it's going on and having the experience of hours and 
hours of studio time. There would be an interesting model to have a bunch of 
students being-- it would almost be a psychological case study, I guess, that one 
group of students had an eight-week course in mindfulness and the other half of 
the students didn't, just what kind of effect that they would have on their 
engagement with creative practice. There was a psychological study done that 
created the mass, which was the mindfulness attention awareness scale or 
something like this. They've got a bunch of Zen meditation practitioners together 
and compared them with the people they'd taken and found that they scored much 
higher on this test. I wonder if you got a whole bunch of creative practitioners 
together whether they would score similarly. 
 
AG: If I can formulate that into a question would be, whether you would consider it 
to be beneficial to the students to become more  mindful about practice, or 
whether that's somehow  paradoxical that your colleague in the interview talked 
about Zen and the art of archery and how the master was derisory of the students' 
ability to replicate his process, because he hadn't been through the process to get 
there, and whether it's a case of the  mindful state that we think we get into 
because we've been practicing for 20 years of more that is not immediately 
attainable somebody that hasn't. Is it that we should, within universities, start 
teaching mindfulness courses to benefit that or is it just something that we have to 
say, "Keep practicing and in 15 years time maybe you'll attain that state." I don’t 
know. 
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MR: I think it's important to-- my students are often right out of high school, many 
of them are not art majors. They're just taking the class as an elective. You need to 
just introduce that idea to them. I don't think they even considered it. They come 
into the classroom very goal-oriented. They took the class because they thought it 
would be easy. "I'll take a beginning drawing class. It should be easy. Maybe you'll 
get an easy A or something." Then suddenly they're confronted with this notion 
that they have to be very disciplined, do a lot of work. Suddenly I'm asking them to, 
"Stop. Don't think about your grade. Don't think about finishing. Just try to be in 
the moment, focused and concentrated and trust yourself." If they trust 
themselves, things will work out. If they trust their own idiosyncratic natures, 
that's what going to make the work interesting and they get better. It happens in 
front of their eyes. They come in thinking they can't draw and you show them what 
they're good at and why their drawings have value. 
AG: The College is introducing a course called, The First Year Experience, and we are 
going to try to introduce study habits and mindfulness. I was touching on it a little 
bit to the students because I think that it's something that is really important. 
We're always making the case in the humanities that the value that we bring to the 
classroom is just that-- again, it doesn't always work to have students who are not 
at the right temperament for it or they just don't get it. On occasion, you really tap 
into the students who really get it and really benefit from it. But for me, I just want 
to introduce the idea to them because I don’t think they've ever entertained it, 
many of them. It's good because it's like that. You've got to practice to preach 
[chuckles]. 
 
AG: There's a level of understanding, I think, that is only attainable through-- 
there's not a level of understanding of practice that is attainable through practice. I 
think in a lot of ways that was the drive for developing practice-led and practice-
based research degrees so that we could have practitioners theorize on practice as 
supposed to just theorists, and try to bring some genuine richness into it. 
 
MR: What is your studio? What work do you do? 
AG: I'm a painter. I have gone through a number of processes over the last 20 years, 
of course, like anybody. Right now, I'm working quite figuratively dealing with a lot 
of journalistic photography but finding the process of making the work. I do these 
quite large-scale canvasses and sometimes, I've taken up to 300 hours to complete 
over the course of a year or something this. The qualities of the surface become 
very... I like to deal a lot with erosion and I like to deal with-- the paint isn't always 
under the control of my hand. There is a lot of putting on and eroding off, but 
having the structure of a figurative image is almost like a template for it not to get 
too lost, if you like. I like the discipline of guiding it towards an image. For the last 
year, I've been pretty much concentrating on my thesis. I might find it as October 
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when I submit it, if I ever get there, it'll be a moment to reflect on process. I'll 
would be reducing to an 80% contract as of August, which is going to give me 
three-day weekends. Once the thesis is finished, then I'm really looking forward to 
getting back into studio and reanalyzing where I'm going with the painting. 
MR: Maybe we could exchange some images of some work. 
 
AG: Absolutely. I'd be delighted. I'll email you through some stuff. 
 
MR: So you're working on your dissertation or are you almost finished? 
 
AG: I'm getting on for about 90,000 words right now and I just feel like I'm starting 
to be honest [chuckles]. My supervisor is coming down to France in three weeks 
and I really should have it done by then but there's a... It'll be ready for October, 
one way or another. 
 
MR: I hope you share with me. I hope to read it. 
 
AG: Absolutely. When I have moments of lucidity in this process I do feel like I'm 
creating a model of reflective practice within creative practice, which goes beyond 
what we have at the moment is something that could be beneficial. Again I 
mentioned some of it in the email that I sent to you, but Schön's conversational 
model of reflective practice. Whilst still very useful in things like psychology and 
education and town planning really didn't fit with creative practice because of that 
tattered engagement and this idea that, if human meaning does indeed traffic these 
images and qualities and pans and feelings, then it's almost  like a pre-linguistic, 
unknown verbal  reflection that practitioners have. Being attentive to what you're 
doing in the moment and being attentive to how the experience of practice feeds 
through into your conceptual ideas I think is-- there's a potential to advance his 
theory that could be potentially beneficial to creative practitioners. So certainly, I 
don't want to just sit. I would like to do something with it. 
 
MR: You've inspired me to do a little more reading on the topic. I haven't engaged 
in theory in a while because I felt like I did a lot of reading in graduate school and 
after graduate school and now I didn't want to get clattered up with theory. But 
what I find what you're working on now so close to the bone, that I think I'm going 
to do some more reading on it. The two theorists you mentioned, I think-- because I 
think it's definitely an area that is-- it's something that oddly enough is not being 
explored a whole lot, at least in the [contemporary?] art world. You know what I 
mean? You would think it would be but it's actually not. 
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AG: Perhaps becoming more and more prevalent as work is becoming more and 
more conceptual and anti-technical and there's this whole  new artist-artisan 
relationship where you have practitioners who just don't make their work anymore. 
They outsource it to whoever they need to create their conceptual ideas. To a 
certain degree, I think that they--  what is rich in human meaning about creative 
practice has all workers become  conceptual and anti-technical before it was ever 
really understood why the technical process was important. Certainly, that human 
state that we create for ourselves in the studio is something that I think is very rich 
humanistically and needs explicating. 
 
MR: I very much model my studio practice somewhat after Adam Reinhart. I'm a 
huge Adam Reinhart fan, not that that's the right word, but it's  proto-
conceptualism. His ability to  distill things down to this  essence, his attention to 
surface, handmade quality of his work. The elusiveness of his surfaces. I find him to 
be an interesting model. Also his political engagement, but through a whole other 
medium, his cartoon [inaudible]. 
 
AG: Now that you mention it, I'm going to go out and like you said just-- I'm 
looking forward to the time and space to  enrich my practice, perhaps as much as 
you are looking forward to the time and space to re-engage into theory [chuckles]. 
It's a balance. 
 
MR: If you ever get to New York City, please let me know. 
 
AG: Absolutely. Michael, thank you very much for you time. It's been great chatting 
to you and I will most certainly send you the thesis when it's finished. May I ask 
whether I have your permission to transcribe this interview just to put into the 
appendix and also to-- that there might be a couple of things that I will take out in 
relation to that art school. The art and mindfulness radio show that you did into 
something that I would like to reference in the thesis. 
 
MR: I'd love to have a copy of the transcription of this. 
 
AG: Then, I'll certainly send it through to you. Probably within the next week, I'll 
have it transcribed online and then edited and send it over to you as soon as... 
 
MR: Okay. Nice chatting with you. 
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AG: Best of luck with your paintings and enjoy the sabbatical when it comes. 
Certainly, if I get over to New York, I'll be sending you an email. Likewise, if you 
come over to Switzerland or France. Take care. Thanks very much. Bye. 
 
MR: Bye. 
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7. Interview with Professor A C Grayling  
 
May 26th 2014 
 
ACG: There is a connection between humanist, and more humanistic outlooks on the 
one hand, and questions about embodiment. The impact of being embodied on one's 
emotional and cognitive lives. It's a slightly indirect connection in the following 
way: one first has to notice the background revolt as it were, against what had been 
a very, very longstanding view in philosophy about the disembodied mind. The 
conception of the disembodied mind has a lot of different consequences, one is that 
embodiment - that is, emplacement of the mind in the body - is something that 
confuses and inhibits and beclouds the mind. Aristotle, for example, was a little bit 
against the ecstasies of sex because it impugned one’s rationality. In the Judeo-
Christian tradition, especially the Christian tradition, they are sinful proclivities. By 
the way, this is an idea adopted, actually, from Plato. In the Phaedrus, the dialogue 
where he likens the human being to a charioteer driving a two-horsed chariot. And 
one of the horses, the black horse, is the one that wants to drag you back down to 
Earth - down to the material, down to the appetites and desires that are intrinsically 
bodily desires. This gets in the way of the purity, the clarity, the possibility of 
knowledge of the mind and the fact that, again a theme in Plato, that love shouldn't 
be a physical thing but it should be a love of the abstract, of the forms and the ideal 
world being. This view about the mind as something which is separate from and 
which is unhappily exiled into the body, which has its proper home, its proper 
destiny in a disembodied state gives rise also to the idea of the mind as a spectator 
or as a pilot in a ship - as something which isn't and shouldn't really be over-
influenced by the fact that it has this exile in clay. It's a wonderful line in one of 
Dryden's poems, he talks about the soul of the really avid, enthusiastic, burning 
genius-like mind, over-fretting that element of clay; burning it out and using it up. 
Little by little, different aspects of the influence of embodiment on our cognitive 
capacities had come through rather surprising routes. For example, it was discovered 
that you'd learn a second or third language much more effectively if you enact the 
things that you're saying. If you sit at your desk and just learn verbs, they tend not 
to stick. If you stand up and you employ verbs of action and you perform the actions 
while you're doing it, then you have a much stronger retention of these linguistic 
forms. Very, very simple experiments that have been done on memory, retention 
and understanding. If you get somebody to hold a pencil between their teeth - you 
may have come across this - they're much better learners than if you have a pencil 
under your nose. All those sorts of things have fed into the fact that it's not just our 
emotional lives but our cognitive lives that are influenced by embodiment. This has 
been taken up, of course by the philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. 
People like Dewey and Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and others have been big 
influences on this debate. The Dewey one, which is the one that I know best, has had 
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a big impact on the theory of knowledge, for example, because in trying to shift 
understanding about what we know, how we think, how are our concepts of the 
world deformed from the participant perspective of the disembodied mind, 
temporarily occupying a body - to, what you'd call the participant perspective, that 
is, handling, moving about, touching objects, being affected physically by them and 
this informing - that idea's a really interesting one of giving shape and structure to 
the way that we think about things - and has, of course, been an influential idea. The 
connection with humanism is this: humanism is a ethical outlook and the word 
'outlook' is really key because humanism is not a doctrine, it's not a teaching, it's not 
a list of do’s and don'ts but it's an attitude and it's an attitude which is neutral with 
respect to quite a lot of differences of opinion among humanists on matters of 
politics, even indeed on matters of morality, which is a narrower thing than ethics of 
course but which will exclude a whole range of ways of thinking about human 
experience and human destiny and human values. What it excludes is anything 
which says that what gives a human life its significance and its purpose is something 
extraneous to human reality - a supernatural agency, a god, making a command 
from on high on us. One very characteristic thing about divine command moralities 
in particular, is that they tend to ask of people that they live in a way that cuts 
across the grain of their embodiment. Natural appetites and desires, needs and 
interests of human beings as embodied creatures, like for example, their appetites 
for food, for warmth, for comfort, for sex and so on, are denied in the extremist 
views of some religious moralities. The body has to be punished and subdued and its 
appetites excluded so that the spirit/mind can be freed from them. If you took the 
opposite view, which is that what your mind is, is shaped coloured and formed by 
what the body is and how it relates to what's around it then you can see this is an 
entirely unrealistic way of thinking about it. 
 
AG: I agree, indeed this opposite view has changed the way in which I've looked at 
my own art-making and the art-making of others. In order to set a context for this 
question in relation to my thesis I’d say that just from being immersed in the history 
of art you see how medieval history is filled with examples of how art was entirely 
in the service of religion, and even after the Renaissance art has managed to retain 
this connection, this link to divinity and to a sense of transcendental otherness. 
Many of the practitioners I speak to still use spirituality or divinity in their work. I 
contrast I have found that the theories of embodiment, which have been developing 
for the last 20 years, through the likes of Johnson and Lakoff have offered 
alternative views. Johnson talks about the arts as being an exemplary example of 
human meaning-making; that contrary to Frege's assertion that human meaning 
was irreducible beyond concepts and prepositions, human meaning traffics rather as 
images and patterns and qualities and feelings, pre-linguistically, and then emerges 
into language. Through 20 years of infant studies, we see that infants have meaning 
before they have language. I think for that for visual art practice, this is very 
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interesting because that's what practitioners trade in - it's the images and the 
qualities and how they emerge into language that have potential in terms of 
furthering understanding about art practice. It becomes problematic for 
practitioners to speak about their work because to translate it into language is very 
difficult. Where I have seen examples of it emerging into the conceptual ideas of the 
practitioner, that's where it becomes really interesting for me. Very often the 
practitioner assumes that their ideas are credited to their individual creativity but 
have no real idea their idea's are coming from, how they’re developing. I take an 
example of a sculptor who's been working just down the lake here, in a place called 
Immensee. He was taking cylinders and slicing them and then inverting a part of it 
so that part of the inside of the cylinder was facing outward and it creates a rather 
nice curvy shape. And for him, these were embodiments of-- when he talks about it 
conceptually it's, 'This is the soul', it's revealing the inside, outside. But it's not a 
great intellectual leap to see that the physical characteristics of the object have 
somehow been mapped metaphorically onto his conceptual idea. Mark Johnson talks 
a lot about this kind of metaphorical projection. When we take a stance that our 
experiences with the world and our experiences with matter do inform and shape 
and colour, as you say, our conceptual ideas then this seems to become a much more 
responsible reflection, a more humanistic approach to our practice and actually, all 
of the things that are going on in all of the art studios all over the world are these 
very wonderful human endeavors and interactions with matter and how those 
ideas-- for me, I would like to see the visual art practitioners not only concentrating 
on the ideas that they put into the work but the ideas that they get out of it. That 
would become a celebration of this human endeavor of visual art practice. You 
mentioned about how mind-body dualism has kind of alienated the body from 
discussions of the mind. Drew Leder talks about focal disappearance, in the way that 
we don't see our eyes and we don't hear our ears hearing and the body is very good 
at hiding from us. For me, one of the things that Johnson talks about is the 
phenomenological reflection in the phenomenologcial sense, is not enough 
anymore; that we need to infuse that reflection with findings of cognitive science 
and to understand how neural maps lead to neural plasticity and then on to image-
schematic structures. It's those theories, the very recent theories of embodiment—
I’d like to ask whether you feel they could contribute to a humanistic debate or 
whether there's a place for a humanistic account of visual art practice, and whether 
it would be useful in the humanistic debate. 
 
ACG: Well, so there are three separate things going on in parallel and they will have 
complex relations to one another. One is that in constituting a sort of an ethical 
outlook, the humanistic stance brings the body back into focus as the site of our 
experience and our actual needs and our interests and respecting it and tolerating it 
and making room for it and even celebrating it, would be an important part of 
humanistic ethics. Well where cognitive neuroscience comes into the picture and 
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relates to that is that when you think about what it is that art in large part does - 
even if it's not figurative art - but in large part what it does is it constitutes the 
capture of the expression of what is being inputted by our experience. So what we 
see over here, we feel, and we compute that in some way, and respond to it. It 
means something and so we express it. We start to paint or tell a story where we're 
translating experience into art, and the artwork is a capturing of that output. The 
output of course is what has come through the experience of feeding that, putting it 
along the context of having heard a sound and wanting to make something of it or 
having seen a shape or a color or a scene and wanting to comment on it and art is 
commentary. The art is the capture of the commentary, the output but what 
cognitive neuroscience has done for us in very recent years is to point out that the 
way we process the impingements of the environment on our bodies is by modelling 
what we take the causal origins of those inputs to be. We have irritations of our 
sensory surfaces in the extremely complex networks of the brain, we construct a 
virtual reality model of what lies beyond it. We know that the model is not at all like 
what's out there but it's very effective and applicable because it helps us to survive. 
Given all the saber-tooth tigers that once existed, the fact that we're here today 
shows us that our models are very successful. We know - we see the world as 
coloured, as textured, as having tastes and smelling of vanilla or peppermint or 
whatever it smells of, and all these things are attributes imputed to the world by the 
way that we are processing that data. Primary, secondary quality distinction in what 
respect in nature is in itself anything like the way the model presents itself to us to 
be but the model works. The experience that we have of the world is output, not 
input. It's output based on a very very complex but highly selectively managed 
amount of data that our central nervous systems on a nonconscious levels are 
working with to try and construct a picture that can help us to navigate our 
circumstances. In that way cognitive neuroscience is predated on the idea that we 
are physical mechanisms so that the mind itself. It's terribly important to see that in 
connection with that is this idea that the mind is not just in the head. That the mind 
is out there. Our social minds for example are networks of relationships with other 
minds. One way that this is sometimes expressed - and it's a good way of expressing 
it - is to talk about our understanding of semantics and the meanings of terms in our 
natural languages. If I were a super neuroscientist able to look inside your skull and 
say 'Ooh there you're thinking about your mum, and there you're thinking about the 
latest piece of work that you've been doing'. To be able to individuate these two 
thoughts in your brain, where they are just patterns of excitation of neurons or 
axions, to be able to do that I would only be in a position to do it if I were able to 
relate them to the targets outside your skull. Individuating particular thoughts 
inside the skull requires essential reference and it's a really important philosophical 
weight is attached to the idea of the word 'essential'. Essential reference to 
something external to the mind which helps you to individuate to what some 
thought in your mind is about, gives rise to this theory which is known as broad 
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contact - that the nature of ideas - the nature of experiences, can only be 
understood by relating them to the social and physical environment in which they 
occur. They're not something that could be completely specified or described just in 
terms of what’s happening inside the brain but they really need to relate to things 
outside that and the things that they relate to, are of course, both physical and non-
physical because social reality is a non-physical thing. It doesn't exist in space, but it 
does exist in time so it is sort of semi-abstract and it is of course our major reality 
since most of what's important to us is the social sphere. 
If you think about the fact that embodiment is a material phenomenon, that matter 
is essentially spatial, that therefore most of the metaphors that we use - I mean you 
look at the work of Lakoff and Johnson and others have done on metaphor - up, 
down, in, out - I'm feeling up today, I'm feeling down today - that they're all spatial 
and material metaphors that describe especially our emotional states. This is a deep 
clue to the idea that we are in a broad content relationship with the world around 
us. 
 
AG: The issue of reflection, of becoming attendant to embodiment - Dewey 
attempted to discuss that way in advance of the technology that could image the 
brain and the working the reflective methods that are necessary to become aware of 
the way in which your embodied experience of the world is relating to how you 
understand the outer world is problematic but things like the metaphorical 
projection and the way in which ideas could be mapped metaphorically and then 
somehow traced back gives us a lifeline, if you like. I was balancing stones by the 
lake in Zurich and this primary art practice which is something which is nice to do 
when you have some time on your hands,. Actually I have images. 
 
ACG: Nice, that's really lovely. 
 
AG: When I was doing this, I started a little treatise of what made a good stone pad. 
You need a solid base and you need triangulation, holes balance on points. 
 
ACG: Is that purely a matter of balance or is there anything, nothing fixing? It's 
purely balance, that's brilliant, that's beautiful. How stable are they? 
 
AG: Well the thing is. Unless they are interacted with then you have gravity pulling 
the composite strength of the stone and they're incredibly stable and you can get on 
to very very fine points of balance but any sideways force, whether its wind, or, 
hopefully not a small a child, or something like this, can then upset that. When I was 
doing it I was approaching it from the point of view as a practitioner and thinking 
about what makes a good structure, thinking about it as an aesthetic thing, like 
having a heterogenous background and balancing next to a lake, so you can see 
what it's about and a lady came along and suddenly stopped and started thinking 
 
 
277 
and she was like 'It's such a metaphor for the human condition that you know we 
we're incredibly strong but any kind of sideways force can just knock us off balance. 
She carried away this profound sense of herself which was in such stark contrast 
how as a practitioner I was envisaging it, and that I put together a schematic model 
of how this had been linked so that this notion of strength related to permanence 
and fragility related to transience. Within the stone of course it can either be one or 
the other but in the mind, we can conceptually blend that so that it can be both 
simultaneously and then how to balance style and structure as metaphorically 
projected onto the human being. You know the idea that if it's not interfered with 
then it will, somehow the balance, the balancing sideways force can be external 
changes. It became a useful way of looking at how the conceptual ideas were 
growing out of the work. 
 
ACG: That's absolutely fascinating. Yes. You should have a look at these images, 
they're really a lovely piece of work, that's great. 
 
MA: Is it your own work? 
 
AG: Well just actually something that I was killing a bit of time down by the lake in 
Zurich. Just putting a few stones on top of each other, but it's very like painting in 
the sense that you have this fine motor control and just feeling where it's falling. 
You should try it just to see. 
 
ACG: Yes I will, I will. Well what this makes me think of is the reading in, you know 
the interpretations that people place on things, especially, especially non or quasi 
figurative things, I mean those look like very abstract representations of the human 
body and the way that the head has to be so finely balanced on the rest of the body 
presence and how you can be not sideways emotionally in time. I mean of the things 
that that woman saw. I mean it's an extremely lucid articulation of the point that 
your exploring about embodiment. Other kinds of artworks, like abstract dance for 
example, or narrative fiction, open themselves up to a multiplicity of 
interpretations. People talk about texts existing in a relationship between the words 
on the page and the reader and it's a commonplace bit of theory about that and that 
can be true even of figurative work. Somebody who walked into an art gallery and 
saw a portrait of Juno's breast milk causing the Milky Way in the sky and feeding 
Hercules at the same time but not knowing the legend might think of it in a 
completely different way and construct a different story around it. There's nothing 
in the theory of the embodied mind, which says there is only ever one right or 
natural interpretation of the experience that we capture when we are living in this 
broad content where you're in a physical environment. 
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AG: I think you’re right about that. The Reflection-in action thing is  an attempt to 
start to bring some professional honesty into the domain of visual art practice and 
one example when I was working on a painting of Rostropovitch. It was a very iconic 
image, and it was just after his death.  
The process involved was crushing charcoal into a paste and mixing with oil and 
applying it and all of this and I got to the studio on a Sunday and I had the whole 
day ahead of me and it was going to be a lovely, lovely day in the studio - a good 
10/12 hour session - and I ran out of charcoal, which was terrible. The art shop was 
closed. What can I do? After sitting there mulling it over for a while I was like 'Okay 
I could go down to the garage and get a ten kilo bag of barbecue charcoal'. Off I 
went and did that, brought it back to the studio, beat it with a hammer and got my 
paste and continued practicing. The by-product of that was these very sharp and 
very hard pieces of charcoal which couldn't be reduced down into the dust. As I was 
working I was sitting down and reading about his life and I didn't know a great deal 
about him, the idea of oppression and the way in which the Communist regime had 
provoked him to write the letters to the Kremlin because they had imprisoned his 
poet friend and then him having to defect in order to become Pre-eminent chellist 
and all the rest of it. It's a very physical thing if you have a very low ceiling room it 
has an oppressive feeling, or if there is something heavy over your head that you 
feel is oppressive. And there is a black line which underscored that ‘Charlie's retired’ 
sign on the end of Berlin Wall and I looked down at the by product of these 
barbecue charcoal and attributed significance to them. Why do smooth things have 
a gentle feel and why do sharp pieces of glass have an aggressive feel? Glass can 
either be gentle or aggressive in a human sense but it is possible to map that state 
metaphorically on to it. I bonded it with resin and applied it to the surface and it 
seemed to fit. Now, in the exhibition, somebody that came up was like 'I really like 
that textual, lumpy charcoal thing over the top, it's really oppressive' and at that 
point it would have been very easy to turn around and say 'Well do you know what 
that's all to do with the communist oppression'. The fact that actually I just ran out 
of charcoal and I had to improvise seemed to me a much more human and fair and 
honest and beautiful thing to say and to reflect upon, to be attentive to. Those little 
kinds of examples-- again when I started on this thesis it was it was just an attempt 
to bring some professional honesty into it, but actually I feel that it - without 
intending to be grandiose about - it is a very humanistic thing and I think it does fit 
into the humanistic debate. 
 
ACG: Well I agree with you because I think if humanism says anything at all it says 
that facts about human nature are the determining consideration when we think 
about what a well-lived, good, flourishing life might be or what human possibilities 
might be or why the middle principle about allowing a wide variety of human 
experiments to exist without social pressure and convention trying to limit them 
because we lose an opportunity if that happens to really find out what a good 
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human experience can be. In that sense humanism is predicated on the idea that we 
are physical beings in a physical world and that it's the constant relationship that 
we're in with our environment that makes us what we are - which is why so much of 
the way that we think about ourselves, certainly emotionally, probably also 
cognitively, has to do with our being spatial and material creatures. The point that 
you just made there about how the texture of the looming, oppressive mind on top 
of the picture - you say, just be honest about it, Well that's just what I had to hand 
and so I used it. My inclination and I'm no, what's the word, post-facto rhetorical 
justification of the deep significance of things but I think that again the humanist 
perspective is one that invites us to recognise the truth in those aspects of say, 
Freudian theory, which say that nothing is really accidental. There's always 
something at some level of our recognition of what something says, or means or 
how it can be used which we can discover ourselves even post-facto. There's an 
example - it's a very standard example - in thinking about the nature of perceptual 
experience, that the impressions that one gets in immediate perceptual experience, 
give rise of course to fainter memories - this is the human thing about impressions 
and ideas - but it might be that when you think back over them afterwards, as a 
detective does about a crime scene, suddenly something unnoticed or marginal 
might become salient and have real significance. The poker that was used to commit 
the murder, was it on the left hand side or the right hand side of the fireplace 
because it tells you whether the murderer was left-handed or right-handed. That's 
something that you might not just when you're in the room, but then when you 
think about it suddenly it becomes salient. You can think of meanings as being 
layered and layered and reflection and interpretation - you know we are 
interpretative beings. That's a really important. Exactly, exactly. Post-facto you 
might say, Why did I do that? You could have said, Oh damn I'm going to have to 
leave this to another day because there are lumps in the charcoal but you didn't you 
see. 
 
AG: I think it was a realisation moment that it's not all that you put into it - this 
dialogue. I was enriched by the meaning that was infused in the-- if that sentence 
does sounds terrible and very pretentious - the meaning that comes out of the work, 
there is rich human meaning infused in experience. Being attentive to that is 
problematic, that we know because the right side of our brain is constantly in this 
flux of sensory experience and the left side is trying to make sense of it, categorise it 
and put it into past and projections about the future and all the rest of it. When 
we're talking about humanism and trying to live good human lives and then that 
seems to me to be a way of enriching. I'm losing my thread. 
 
ACG: No but you're right. You're very much on the right track, because it seems to 
me the most legitimate thing to recognise that in making something we at the same 
time make new meanings of things. Go back to the commonplace about readers and 
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texts, you know there are as many different versions of Pride and Prejudice as there 
are people who read it. Of course there is the authorial intention, of course there is 
the text itself that imposes limits on just - Pride and Prejudice is not about the First 
World War, for example, it's about every man whose got a bit of money is looking 
for a wife and the Bennett sisters but there are all these little layers, nuances, 
footnotes of significance that people bring out of their own experience to the thing. 
Why couldn't it be the case that Jane Austin herself might, on re-reading the text, 
have discovered things that she said, meant, and thought and felt while writing it 
that weren't salient at the time or at the forefront of her mind? This is surely going 
to happen in any creative process because you can't control the number of meanings 
that you've created or produced when you are creating this one because it's like a 
note played on the cello - it's going to resonate, there's going to be overtones and 
undertones and other people are going to hear them or capture them or see them in 
something - and so to create one meaning is to create a chord of meanings and 
that's perfectly legitimate. 
 
ACG: We know when people start waving their hands and come out with long words 
standing in front of a work of art interpreting it, it does sound pretentious but you 
know, let pretension flourish in my view because something might be captured in 
there which is of real human significance. That would be another connection with 
the humanist project which is to live richly and fully a human life in our human 
world, remembering by the way that one of the sort of tenets of humanism is that 
the space of a conscious adult existence is in overall terms a brief one. It's the old 
sobering point, isn't it? Human life is less than 1000 months, 300 of them you're 
asleep, another 300 you're in the supermarket so you know you've really got to grab 
onto the brief moment of living in Walter Pater's sense with every pulse filled up 
with significance. One does that by recognising that to be human in this little gap 
between dawn and dusk is to grasp everything that's there. Joyful and courageous as 
well, because one thing that we're talking about here in connection with the 
humanist outlook is the stoic view of following nature. First follow nature - that was 
their great teaching. Living naturally, live in accordance with nature, live parallel to 
or in harmony with nature. They meant it in the medical sense but they also meant 
it in the sense that to deny your human nature or to deny your needs and desires for 
affection and community is to live a distorted kind of life. That's a very important 
tenet of humanism. It's interesting stuff you're doing, great work that you're doing, 
I love it, I think it's wonderful. So when you've finished writing this I hope you'll 
send me a copy.  
 
AG: Thank you very much for your time. 
 
ACG: Well, it's a pleasure, most interesting to see what you're up to. 
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